Viable Morality and the Legal Component - Coursework Example

Running head: Sur Viable Morality and the Legal Component The concept of “dependence of law onmorality” and/or “dependence of morality on law” is one that has perhaps posed the greatest fundamental philosophical problems in philosophy. This is an area that has created a contentious dilemma with two schools of thought: one that argues that there is no apparent need for laws in society, that all that is necessary is moral uprightness in the society, while the other believes that it is the laws that make people act morally (Hart & Honore, 1985, p. 116). Tony Honore is among the most recognized philosophers who have challenged this proposition on a number of philosophical grounds based on his sound knowledge in legal matters. In his objective approach, Honore challenged the above notion by postulating his thesis that “in any complex society, a viable morality must have a legal component” (Hart & Honore, 1985, p.112). By this proposition, Honore argues that morality is merely but a guide that require such ‘determination’ as can only be provided by law to make it complete. This implies that in order for our moral obligations to have meaningful content, determination, which can only be objectively supplied by law, must be present. The aim of this paper therefore is to have an insight into the various areas in which human morality issues have raised mixed reactions (including abortion, taxation, traffic regulations as well as the possible alternatives as enumerated by Honore) so that we can have a clear understanding of the relationship between morality and law. Introduction: It has been suggested by many that there can never be a concise means by which we can be able to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong without having precedent laws to govern the right direction or course of our actions. These laws, along with accompanying conventions, act as the basic interventions to fill in the missing links and details of our behaviors as we relate with other aspects of social life and nature. However, it is imperatively important to note at this point that the determining laws are also human constructions just as morality is, and they also sometimes pose contradicting issues. For example, we may ask ourselves the reason why one law would hold acceptable in one society, and in another society, the same law interprets violation of moral obligations. Why, for instance, is the homosexual law acceptable in some countries (including religious institutions) and in others they interpret the conflict with the laws of nature (Hart & Honore, 1985, p.122). Discussion: To have a precise understanding of the interdependence of law and morality, it is succinctly important to establish whether there is a necessary connection between morality and law. It is common knowledge for everyone who has studied law that laws are made, either at individual level or collectively. Some laws are made with specific aims as intended by their makers. However, not all such laws will have aims because not all laws are made intentionally. This basically means that it is that it is not necessity that relates morals and laws and this is why there are many reasons as to why legal positivists are able to give concrete distinctions between morality and law. Honore argues that positivism will always remain in discord (or rather inconsistent) with positive law if it can only be interpreted to mean it can only be law when it conforms to the criterion that is regarded socially accepted (Hart & Honore, 1985, p. 128). The reason for this is that every law purports to be in order morally. Due to this, there always are possibilities that certain law interpretations that are not indefensible morally can be argued against and similarly there always are certain pressures within specific legal systems that can render such laws morally defensible. In such instances, Honore holds that critical morality comes in necessarily as persuasive sources of law. In agreement with other legal positivist like Hart, Honore is of the opinion that what a law is, and what it ought to be, are two completely separate entities. This implies that there isn’t any connection that should be taken as a link between morality and regality (Hart & Honore, 1985, p. 110). A society can legitimize a law which is at the same time immoral, while still worse some systems of law can be instituted by evil regimes. Furthermore, he believes that it is analysis of such legal concepts as rights, legal systems and rules that constitute justifiable endeavors in the morality-law distinction and/or interrelatedness. However, Honore is in opposition of prior propositions that laws should be considered commands by sovereign or authority centered entities and which should be submissively obeyed by the subjects out of common habit. In the case of simpler societies, such as native communities, morality is seen as a collective endeavor that upholds the norms of the society without any legal component. It is determination to uphold cohesiveness in the society by convention that makes morality functional in the society. However, there isn’t any known society that has never had a form of authority in one way or the other. For example, even within the remotest native society settings, some form of norms were used as the rules and there were forms of sanctions used to abhor ‘wrong actions’ as well as incentives to praise ‘right actions’. Concerning complex societies, Honore is categorically doubtful whether it can ever be possible for morality to dispense law and at the same time maintain cohesive coexistence. Taking the case of international organizations like the European Union for example, one would wonder how everybody at an individual or at an international context would internalize the notion of morality without there being the governing rules that must be accompanied by sanctions to reinforce conformity. At this juncture, we get back to our dilemma whether laws must only be interpreted as made for voluntary adherence or whether they are supposed to be interpreted as coercive or commanding authorities. Applying Honore’s arguments to current issues, international law’s relevance seems to have morphologically developed from a level that would be self debilitating with individual futility to more effective stages in the sense that it proves the indubitable necessity of non relatedness to morality. The laid down international legal rules and procedures proves that law must be incorporated in any societal setting at simple or complex situation (Hart & Honore, 1985, p. 134). A legal system is therefore not composed of individual laws’ compilation but the union of both primary and secondary rules as well. Traffic rules for example state clearly that it is upon the abstract reason of every individual to take responsibility of others as he/she simultaneously reflects on the necessity of the collective responsibility and objective. Primary rules as those that dictates a player’s obligation as concerns what role they play not only for their benefit but as a mutual exchange of understanding. On the other hand, secondary laws dedicate themselves in enumerating the specific aspects that are contained in the primary laws. In his concerted efforts to exemplify this theory, Honore challenge us to imagine a situation where we would be in non-legal society with no laws whatsoever, and as such not only imagine the complications that would be present, but also how normalcy would be integrated. The argument here is that there is no way we can pathologically arrive at the best cure to the many unwavering social problems unless we appreciate the inevitable intervention of the legal systems in simple and complex societies (Hart & Honore, 1985, p. 133). This fundamentally inform us that even with the many differentiating and distinguishing factors between law and morality, and as they direct our search of consistency in contentious issues like abortion, taxation and traffic regulation, all other underlying alternatives as postulated by Honore are insufficient to replace law. Conclusion: The nature of abstract reasoning and convention, though not satisfactorily conclusive in itself, as is philosophically expected of any uncertainty within a contentious phenomenon, provides rational and logical identity as a base for all other laws, and as they exhibit consistency in both community and international level interpretation, and as they relate within and/or without them. Agreeing with Honore, it is the internal morphology that exhibits the external symptomatic manifestations. This is why I agree with Honore that individual obligation to others is discretely determinable individually with or without the generalized obligation determination. It is therefore the inner factors of rules that separate habits from rules in the sense that such habits may portray repeated patterns of behavior and conduct even though we may not regard them as conduct standards. Work cited: Hart, H.L.A., and Honore, Tony. Causation in the Law, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985, p. 113-34 Read More