Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm - Book Report/Review Example

One of America's most eminent and influential philosophers, Roderick Chisholm has the ability to inform contemporary issues with analyses which are culled from historical sources. He was a Platonist in the mold of another eminent philosopher, Bertrand Russell. Chisholm is known for his assertion that all justified beliefs are "directly evident". He is a well-known analytic philosopher. Chisholm's was a most persistent philosopher, he showed his strong commitment to getting all of his arguments right, no matter hard or how long it takes, and no matter the number of times one needs to start all over again. The broad range of Chisholm's work, whether it is a discussion on counterfactuals or sense perception and whether it invokes Thomas Reid, all displays an insightful intersection of traditional and contemporary argumentation. Chisholm always proceeded with his work as if he thought that all of the philosophical problems he confronted were among the most worthwhile and engaging problems a person could confront. These questions can cover a wide range of queries: Who am I What am I What are the probability or assurances that I will be able to continue to exist in some way after I die How do I know What can I know How can I know it What would make my life better for me over time What specific aspects would make this world a better place Chisholm's doctoral dissertation which he did in 1942 discussed extensively the fundamental propositions of empirical knowledge. He had wanted to formulate some general principles that may explain the specific circumstances under which an empirical proposition is epistemically justified. A scholar, Chisholm gives the respect for reliable sources in the history of philosophy. He also tends to highlight the subtlety and rigidity of ancient philosophical problems. His remarkable skill and intuitive perspective in explaining the genuine characteristics of a philosophical question can be gleaned from his peculiar reasons of argument and through the main question's historical origins. (Chisholm, 1960). Chisholm's particle view of a person is inherently a materialistic one. He expounded that a person is a living human body, an ens successivum, that is made up of different things at various times. For instance, the components of one's body at this time is very different from what constituted it yesterday. This simply means that all of the cells and the bits of matter constituting the same person are not the same from one moment to the next. (Chisholm, 1960). The prevailing philosophical opinion on personal identity had equated one's person or self with one's physical body, and personal identity is equated with sameness or continuity of change in one's body. Chisholm claims a different argument since for him personal identity maintains a certain degree of elusiveness. Chisholm's conclusion rests on intuition rather than a simple argument. He stated that the physical body appears to retain its sameness with one's self not because it thinks the same, behaves the same, or expects the same -- but because, as the subject experiencing pain or pleasure, in this respect alone does it look convincingly the same. (Chisholm, 1960). This is Chisholm's basic formula for self-evident truths: What justifies me in thinking I basic that a is F is simply the fact that a is F. Another related example would be: What justifies me in thinking I know that I am imagining a pale blue sky is simply the fact that I am imagining a pale blue sky. The act of my imagining a blue sky is a state of affairs that is 'self-presenting' for me. He explained that our own thoughts, apparent memories, apparent perceptions, desires and emotions are self-presenting by themselves. However, it is important to take into serious consideration that not all self-presenting propositions are directly evident. Similarly, one should also seriously consider that not all directly evident propositions are also self-presenting. In his landmark work, the Directly Evident, Chisholm thoroughly tackled his foundational views on knowledge. He covers the views on self-presenting properties and the unity of consciousness. Furthermore, he had discussed extensively that the self-presenting properties are such that if one has them one will believe that one has it. The self-presenting properties include attitudes, opinions and feelings. (Chisholm and Hahn, 1997). In a way, Chisholm shares the same view with Brentano that when one sees something and is aware of it. Then if at the same time, one is aware of hearing something, then one is also aware that oneself is both hearing something and seeing something. Hence, he concluded in this manner: "The person's self-presenting properties makes one perfectly certain that they are all had by one and the same thing which is oneself. (Chisholm, 1997). Chisholm also states that this is the closest one can possibly reach to apprehending himself directly. Basically this degree of awareness that there is something having the properties in question presents the foundation, at any time, for all the other things that we may be said to know at that time (Chisholm, 1997, p. 89). Then he further expound by stating as such: "How do I know that "I" is not ten thinkers thinking in unison' The answer I would say, is this: we know it in the same way as we know that there is at least one thinker" (Chisholm, p. 90). Based on his discussion, it is Chisholm's perspective that oneself and its corresponding intact identity through time or at any given time are implied to be "given" directly to one's awareness. Furthermore, his interpretation on knowledge admits of Verstehen. Verstehen is crucial for the foundation of knowledge, spanning topics from knowledge that is "directly evident" to "transcendent" knowledge of other minds, etc. (Chisholm and Hahn, p. 86). Moreover, Chisholm had already affirmed that verstehen is still essential for founding knowledge-claims in addition to the corresponding principles of evidence, rules of deductive and inductive logic, and principles of perceptual evidence. On hindsight, this discussion leads us to self-justifying statements. These statements pertain to one's own psychological states, illustrated for instance by the statement "I believe that Socrates is mortal." If asked to justify my saying this, all one can do according to Chisholm is to reiterate it. The final justification statement is that I do believe that Socrates is mortal. This statement leads us to an ancient doctrine that if some statements are evident, then some statements must also be self-evident. In addition, Chisholm's main position is that if some statements are justified or not then some must be self-justifying or excluded from the justificatory process. He deliberately refrains from "psychologism," and its related confusion of philosophical and psychological issues. Most of his trademark analysis is inherently introspectively based. However, he does not seek out and clarify psychological details of philosophically relevant experiences. Moreover, according to Chisholm, the perennial sameness of physical objects like human bodies is of a "loose" description in as much as these objects, over ample time, may change in every respect but will be called the same so long as the changes are gradually continuous. The discontinuous pertains to changes which mark one thing's termination, and a new thing's beginning. The project of defining personal identity can be described as composed of continuous bodily changes or as psychological continuity composed of intact memory and cognition. He supposed that assuming one will be totally transformed tomorrow, physically and psychologically, then one is offered the choice of doing A, which will reward your transformation with bliss, or of doing B, which will penalize your transformation with a degree of torture. Given the bodily and psychological disruptions that are involved in making one transform into a different person, one can care about these offered choices. If one chooses A from B, for instance, then, Chisholm states that, "It will be you who undergoes that pain, even though you, Jones, will not know that it is the same Jones who is actually undergoing it and even if you will never remember it. Chisholm argues that he cannot supply that person with an argument for it. (Chisholm, 1960). The main conclusion is that although it may leave one apprehensive about exactly what is being emphasized due to the inherent elusiveness of the I and the you, Chisholm's main conclusion, seems finally to rest on intuition or introspection rather than argument. He has not reduced the degree of elusiveness nor provided introspective grounds for his conclusion. He has reduced his self's elusiveness to some degree. In a sense, the transformed self in his imagined situation does appear to retain its sameness with your present self not because it thinks the same, moves the same, experiences the same, or expects the same but because, as the main subject experiencing pain or happiness, in this experience alone does it look the same. For deeper observations about self-awareness and personal identity, one needs to check out Chisholm's concepts of self-presenting properties and the unity of consciousness. The self-presenting properties are such that if you have them then you will believe that you have them, and these include a whole gamut of positive attitudes and ambivalent feelings. Chisholm shares with Brentano the argument that when one sees something and is simultaneously aware of hearing something, then one is also aware that oneself is both hearing something and seeing something. Thus this: "The person's self-presenting properties, then, are such that he can be certain that they are all had by one and the same thing, that is himself. He states that this is the closest that a person apprehends himself directly. However, this single awareness that there is something having the properties in question is what gives us a basis, at any time, for all the other things that we may be said to know at that time" (p. 89). And this statement: "How do I know that "I" is not ten thinkers thinking in unison' The answer I would say, is this: we know it in the same way as we know that there is at least one thinker" (Chisholm). Chisholm also excludes oneself from being an impression, being its subject instead. His words suggest that there is no "how," no experiential criteria, no inferential process based on observational data. He states that there is no case of "knowledge without observation." (Chisholm and Hahn, 1997). For example, when one starts feeling depressed, one finds more than depression. One discovers that the depression characterizes oneself. Finding oneself depressed which is different from feeling depressed, without considering it or being at all self-conscious about it, fits introspecting. In that same experience, Chisholm introspectively discovers himself within. Therefore, it becomes a self-awareness experience. He presents the introspective result only, excluding the introspective process leading to it. Through this process, he explained, one discovers his intentions. (Chisholm and Hahn, 1997). One can also propose that on Chisholm's view, it seems that oneself and its intact identity over time and at any given time are "given" directly to one's awareness. This statement will not be acceptible to him but because of its own nearness to argument, it generates a further level of analysis that Chisholm conveys in his later writings. One can discover how much the notion of the "given" in self-awareness relies for its interpretation in Chisholm's view on a concept. He has discussed more on intuition in another work which is The Foundations of Knowing. This work was published by the University of Minnesota in 1982. None of the modern day philosophers can rival Chisholm's insight on self or selfawareness and his eventual depiction of it. He has shown extensive knowledge about its functions and important role in acquiring knowledge, and of being aware of a unified consciousness and of enjoying an enduring personal identity. Indeed, Chisholm's contribution is a major one for the field of philosophy. His legacy of logical argumentation and erudite brand of thinking endures in our generation. References: Chisholm, Roderick. 1960. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Chisholm, Roderick and Lewis Hahn. 1997. The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court. Read More