Voluntary Active Euthanasia - Research Paper Example

?Voluntary Active Euthanasia – Arguments for Legalization As the of euthanasia looms over the law, the debate has become more heated in termsof whether voluntary active euthanasia should be legalized. Problems surrounding the delicate issues touched upon by the debate have raised great concern of the potential for abuse of such legislation. Yet are such concerns exaggerated, and are arguments against VAE based on misconceptions of the issue of the sanctity of life? Legalization may be seen by some as inevitable, though whether it occurs in reality will “depend on a variety of factors” (Jones, 2009, p. 2). Which elements would proposed legislation need to possess in order to safely permit and suitably regulate VAE? It is clear to observe that the reluctance to legalize VAE is based primarily on fears of abuse (Keown, 2002, p. 74) combined with fears that terminally ill patients would “feel under pressure to agree to an assisted death” (Smartt, 2009, p. 100). However, such apprehensions can be eased and overcome by properly drafted and implemented legislation which would precisely prevent abuse and strike an appropriate balance between the right to life and the right to die. The public perception of VAE is clear: studies suggest that a huge majority of the public stands in favor of legalizing VAE, and those who were against it expressed the very aforementioned fears of abuse (Chapple et al, 2006). The legalization of euthanasia would have a difficult task ahead of it, but such legalization would not be impossible, and would also be beneficial to society as a whole. The law generally protects the autonomy of individuals in several areas of life, yet the ability to choose between autonomy and life when the two conflict is an issue that the law has been rather reluctant to delve into (Callahan and Keown, 1995, p. 208). Some question the point of the assessment of whether some have a more ‘worthy’ life than others, thus rendering them with a greater right to life: the issues rather turns on the fact that “doctors have never been under a duty to preserve life at all costs” (Keown, 2002, p. 58). There is an obvious stigma which is closely linked to allowing others to enact VAE, however. It is arguable that there can safely exist a social duty to end the pain of a person who expressly declares a wish to end their life, and that this duty can override the fears and apprehensions of society as a whole (Hooker, 2002, p. 26). Very little evidence exists to provide foundations for the argument that legalization of VAE would gradually be interpreted as a positive duty to end the life of suffering individuals in all cases; its very restriction to ‘voluntariness’ would overcome such fears. Some argue that the value of human life cannot be overridden by any conflicting theory, thus rendering VAE morally incorrect because the sanctity of life should never be actively legislated against (Keown, 1997, pp. 482-484). Such arguments approach the issue of VAE on simplistic notions of good versus bad, and this is not a realistic approach; it is suggested that ethics should be approached as a science allowing notions of good and bad to be balanced against one another in specific situations. This would enable the argument surrounding VAE to escape irrelevant and frustratingly complex analyses of morality and enable legal drafters to approach the issue on an objective level. The most potent arguments against VAE are based on the assumption that such a law would be applied equally to all individuals, resulting in the requirement that terminally ill individuals have their life prematurely taken. This is described by Laing as a situation in which “disability may be ruthlessly eliminated and some perceived form of perfection imposed’ (1997, p. 4). This argument is however unrealistic. It would be extremely easy to draft the law in a manner that would expressly forbid the extension of VAE to involuntary euthanasia. Careful drafting could safely ensure that it would not be mandatory for every terminally ill individual to request to die – it would limit the law to precisely exclude any instances of passive or involuntary euthanasia. The legislation could also be worded so that no interpretative practice could lead to the ‘reading in’ of such expansion of the law beyond VAE. This would be extremely easy to implement. Indeed, some worries as to the issue of abuse do hold ground and require further analysis in order to advance the argument in favor of assisting VAE. There is evidently a great potential for legislation to be abused, rendering its application and very existence disastrous (Jones, 2009). However, such an argument ignores the fact that abuse occurs even without the existence of legislation, and this leads to the counter-argument that legislation could indeed clarify the problematic area and restrict instances of abuse greatly. Some worry that requests to die may not be adequately assessed in order to determine their validity or sincerity (Keown, 2002, p. 74). This again could be overcome through provisions which would clearly and expressly list the criteria that requests and VAE acts must fulfill and correspond to in order to escape conviction. Essentially, legislation would need to be specific and avoid catch-all applications of its provisions, ensuring that each situation is assessed on its individual merits. Essentially, it is easy to see how the legalization of VAE would not be any more difficult to achieve safely than any other legislation centering around a difficult or delicate topic. It is simply difficult to pu strength into arguments that claim that a person who suffers extreme pain and harbors no desire to live should be kept alive simply because the sanctity of life should prevail. On a more theoretical approach, the value of life can be said to be equated with the sanctity of life. This, in conjunction with importance placed on the extreme value of self autonomy provides a strong argument for the legalization of VAE. Dworkin claims that VAE can (and should) be approached in a manner that respects the autonomy of individuals, as well as their best interests. He claims that the debate is not centralized around the sanctity of life being overcome by some other value, it is rather about “how life’s sanctity should be understood and respected” (1995, p. 217). Moreover, an approach like that of Bentham’s can also provide theoretical support for the legalization of VAE. Bentham claims that a right act must bring the greatest happiness to the largest amount of people, and because we seek to achieve pleasure and avoid pain, we can thus understand how wishing to die when in pain is not ‘wrong’ or ‘immoral’ (1789, ch. 1). Under this argument, legalizing VAE would bring pleasure to those suffering great pain. Whether the theory could be applied to weigh this pleasure against the pain caused to others, or society as a whole is doubtful. If it can be argued that legalizing euthanasia would bring the greatest amount of happiness to society as a whole, then the case for legalization is greatly enhanced. If we take the approach of Mill, the argument in favor of legalization can be further strengthened. According to Mill, the issue can be interpreted as one of rights and harm: finding that individuals in society have a right to act as they please, provided it does not cause harm to other members of society also finds in favor of legalizing VAE (Mill, 1861, p. 142). On this line, general ethical rules that exist in society can be broken in certain situations (Mill, 1861, p. 28). The sanctity of life rule can thus not be said to be absolute, and which other situation than VAE is the most appropriate basis for derogating from such a rule? It can be concluded that the argument in favor of legalizing VAE is strong, and placed upon sturdy foundations of both a legal and ethical nature. On a theoretical, ethical stance, it is desirable that individuals possess the requisite autonomy in order to request that their lives be ended when (a) their pain and suffering is unbearable, and (b) their quality of life is no longer considered to justify their continued living. This leads to the argument that the sanctity of life can be derogated from in terms of enacting VAE, because it would have “generally good consequences” for society as a whole (Hooker, 2002, p. 26). The law should respect an important sphere of autonomy which should be possessed by individuals, and which should be interpreted to allow them to request to die when terminally ill or in severe pain. The law could deal with such legalization provided great care is taken to limit its application to voluntary euthanasia, and to prevent fears of abuse which are so often cited. Beyond such criticisms, which can be solved by appropriately drafted legislation, the argument for legalizing VAE is strong, and backed by the importance of individual private freedom and the non-absolutist view of the sanctity of life principle. References Bentham, J. (1789/2009). Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Callahan, D., & Keown, J. (1995). Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapple, A., Ziebland, S., McPherson, A., & Herxheimer, A., (2006). ‘What People Close to Death Say About Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Qualitative Study’. Journal of Medical Ethics 32(12), 706-710. Dworkin, R. (1995). Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New York: Vintage. Hooker, B. (2002). ‘Rule-Utilitarianism and Euthanasia’, in Lafollette, H. (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Jones, D.A. (2009) ‘Sleepwalking into Euthanasia’ The Tablet, 8 August 2009a. Available at: http://www.thetablet.co.uk/pdf/3264 . Keown, J. (1997). ‘Restoring the Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law After Bland’ Law Quareterly Review 3(10), 481-503. Keown, J. (2002). Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Laing, J.A. (1997). ‘Innocence and Consequentialism: Inconsistency, Equivocation and Contradiction in the Philosophy of Peter Singer’, in Laing, J.A., Oderberg, D.S. (eds.), Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Mill, J.S. (1861/2001). Utilitarianism, 2nd edn. Sher, G. (ed.), Cambridge, Hackett. Smartt, U. (2009). ‘Euthanasia and the Law’.173 Criminal Law &Justice Weekly 7(173), 99-121. Read More