Arms, Mines, and Use of Explosive Force - Research Paper Example

Running head: Arms, Mines, and Use of Explosive Force Arms, Mines and Use of Explosive Force Insert Insert Insert Name 4 March 2012 Arms, Mines and Use of Explosive Force Question1   In my view, Rutherford advances a more compelling explanation for the successful global campaign and negotiations, leading to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty. One reason why his explanation seems more compelling is that, he brought out the whole structure of how NGOs worked leading to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty. Unlike Rutherford, Hubert did not show the whole working structure of the campaign that had landmines banned. The working structure shown by Rutherford of how NGOs advanced their cause included two sections into which the agenda setting components could be divided. The first takes a keen view of level-one agenda setting called “cognitive agenda setting,” and the second takes another keen view of level-two agenda setting, called “norm agenda setting”. The first section investigates how NGOs placed the landmine issue on the agenda of the government and the public. The second investigates the influence of the particular elements of the landmine issue on the agendas of the public and the government (Rutherford 78). Another reason why Rutherford’s explanation is more compelling is that he shows the three important components of agenda setting that were addressed by NGOs in both sections, as they advanced their cause leading to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty. These are framing, schema, and priming. Framing means the selection of elements within a particular issue. These elements are used in the promotion of a particular problem definition, evaluation in moral terms, and treatment recommendation for the item viewed. The core of the second level of setting agendas is the transference of the salience of attributes. Schema on the other hand is a concept linked closely to framing, but takes a deeper view on how people organize their thinking. Priming is the process of activation of schemas. It assumes that features of a stimulus or frequency activates cognitive structures that were previously learned and has an influence on ambiguous stimulus interpretations. These three important components of agenda setting were then addressed in both sections. In addressing framing in section one, the landmines were listed as a new issue and in the process, get people to think about landmines as a humanitarian issue. In section two, the horrible effects and disproportionate consequences of landmines were exposed. In addressing schema in section one, outrageous landmine statistics were listed, and in section two, leadership games to control the landmine issue were revealed. In addition, in addressing priming in section one, landmine victim stories were told, most of them sad. In section two, incoherent arguments among anti-ban states were brought up. This is more convincing (Rutherford 78). Hubert on the other hand chooses to focus more on the proceedings of conferences that were held prior to the signing of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban treaty. This, in my view, is not very convincing, as it does little to show how the NGOs and other organizations influenced the debates and proceedings at those conferences. For example, at The Conference on Disarmament, he explains of how supporters of the CD approach were opposed by the supporters of the Ottawa Process. He does not go further to explain how the CD process was reached at and who exactly came up with the process (Hubert 19). The third reason why Rutherford advanced a more compelling argument is that, apart from coming up with a structure of how NGOs advanced their cause leading to the Anti-Personnel Landmine Treaty, he went ahead to explain the structure comprehensively. Hubert had no comprehensive structure in the first place and therefore, his explanations were not very catchy. Rutherford explained his structure well by stating the three agenda-setting components in the two levels. In stating the agenda-setting component framing, he says that landmines, as a new issue, attracted tremendous attention internationally. He argues that even critics of the movement to have landmines banned credited NGOs with their good effort of bringing the landmine issue to the international level. He says that the initial NGO’s interest in the issue of landmines started in the 1970s due to the fact that landmines damaging effects were of an indiscriminate nature, having no distinction between militants and civilians. He went ahead to explain why NGOs set the agenda for landmines. These were the possibilities of weapons being used by terrorists, and also the nonstarter actor use, technology, and the end of cold war. The transformation of the landmine ban from a political to a humanitarian issue began in 1991. It is the first time in the United States that landmine use was publicly addressed as a humanitarian concern and not an issue of security (Rutherford 80). In stating the agenda-setting component Schema, Rutherford says that NGOs promoted statistics as indicators in a schema to get states to at least recognize the landmine problem. These statistics were effective in drawing in the media, policy makers, and the public because the problem could not be ignored anymore. Finally, in stating the agenda-setting component Priming, Rutherford showed how NGOs used landmine victim stories to get people to think about landmines. This proved to be a very effective way of getting the public’s attention concerning the landmines (Rutherford 90). These few reasons led conclusion that, Rutherford gave a more compelling explanation for the successful global campaign and negotiations leading to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty.  Question2                      In negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty, many complexities have come up and made the whole process difficult. One big complexity in negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty is the economic consideration. Economic considerations involving arms control treaties may be narrowed down to the cost of verifying compliance. Apparently, the cost of creating a verification regime to verify diversion was seen as unacceptable by some states. The cost of achieving the desired outcome is viewed to be higher than the future benefits. Economic consideration is also a complexity in that, many nations that deal in arms would not like to see Arms Trade treaties coming in their way of making money. Some of these nations have invested heavily in new technologies of arms, and they would like to see returns not necessarily in wars involving them, but through the trade of those arms. Thus, the negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty that operates effectively becomes difficult (Avenhaus 608). Another big complexity in negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty is military security considerations. It came to the knowledge of many Arms Treaty negotiators that many nations had many restrictions when it came to their arsenal being scrutinized for compliance. Many came up with reasons that vital information concerning their weapons could be leaked out to their enemies, therefore interfering with their military security. In addition, an insightful view of the evolution of these treaties reveals that forces powerful such as the more influential nations, guide negotiations and determine what comes out of them. They site military security as one of the reasons why they never ban some weapons (Avenhaus 608). One other big complexity in negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty is the question of compliance. The CWC and CTBT require “international verification of compliance” and “verification of compliance” when, on the other hand, NPT refers to “verification of the fulfillment of its obligations,” which is an equivalent to verification in terms of compliance (Avenhaus 608). This is an almost impossible task, as the regimes for verification cannot come up with an outcome as that because these arms treaties do not give a specification of the attributes of compliance but only those associated with non-compliance (Avenhaus 608) The value of negotiating an Arms Trade Treaty utilizing the normal multilateral channels of disarmament diplomacy is that negotiating parties have set guidelines to guide them through the negotiation process. These Guidelines were adopted by the Disarmament commission in 1996. The Guidelines included the following principles: which was respect for the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, including the right to national defense, the sovereign equality of all its members, non-interference of the internal affairs of state, and respect for human rights, the need for transparency in arms transfers, prohibition, and eradication of illicit arms trafficking. These guidelines guided the negotiation process making the whole process easier (Steams 19)  Negotiating the arms trade treaty through two-track diplomacy is more useful in that, it has a higher chance of succeeding. This is because in most cases of two-track diplomacy, the public gets involved. When the public gets involved and in the process bringing additional media attention, celebrities get involved in most cases and in the process putting pressure on the governments to implement the treaty. The usefulness of two-track diplomacy was shown when the campaign to ban landmines was launched. The Campaign’s success was buoyed by efforts of celebrities to get involved. Princess Diana visited landmine survivors, and in the process bringing immense media attention to the issue which finally piled pressure on government to sign the treaty. The visit of a celebrity of Diana’s caliber meant that the media attention on the issue was so enormous that the government had no chance of hiding the situation anymore. They had to bow to public pressure and implement the treaty (Tsaliki et al. 221) Negotiating the arms trade treaty through two-track diplomacy is also more useful because in taking this approach, rogue nations that would otherwise not have agreed to any sort of negotiations whatsoever are charmed into getting into one. For example, in 1977, when the Russians had refused to get into any negotiations with the US concerning ballistic missiles, the two-track strategy adopted by NATO in late 1979 charmed the hearts of the Russians who finally agreed to get to the negotiating table. This led to the signing of the INF in December 1987. Consequently, the INF banned all US and Russian land-based ballistic missiles (Wheeler 33). Works Cited Hubert Don. “The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy.” Occasional Papers. 2000. Rudolf, Avenhaus. Verifying Treaty Compliance: Limiting Weapons of Mass destruction and Monitoring Kyoto Protocol Provisions. Berlin: Springer Berlin Publishers. Rutherford Ken. The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines. World Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2000. Steams, Monteagle. Talking to Strangers: Improving American Diplomacy at Home and Abroad. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1996. Tsaliki, et al. Transnational Celebrity Activism in Global Politics: Changing the World? The University of Chicago Press. Wheeler, Michael. International Security Negotiations: Lessons Learnt from Negotiating with The Russians on Nuclear Arms. London: Glen Segell Publishers, 2006. Read More