Mediation Efforts in the Arab-Israeli Conflict - Research Paper Example

? This paper examines two fundamental approaches to decision making: the rational theory and the prospective theory and how they relate to decision making in making demands during international mediation in inter-state conflicts. In the rational theory, the players identify the best results for the highest number of people before taking decision. The prospect theory on the other hand involves a situation where parties in negotiations seek the best results for themselves by consolidating their strengths and taking risk where they have weaknesses. This aims at maximizing self-interest goals of each party. The paper uses the two concepts to analyze three mediation efforts in the Arab - Israeli conflict: the Camp David Accords I, Oslo Accords and the Camp David Accords II. In the findings of the research indicate that in all the agreements reviewed, both sides held on to their strengths and privileges to make demands. In areas that either party had weaknesses, they were ready to make risky demands, sometimes at the expense of breaking down the negotiation process. It was therefore conclusive that in mediation in international conflicts, parties use the prospect theory to take decisions on the demands to make. On the other hand, the rational theory is still important. Hence, mediators can only succeed if they guide the parties to the rational choices. Introduction Dealing with interstate conflicts has become a high priority, not only between disputants themselves, but on the global arena as well. The approach and the way by which conflicts are decided to be managed is a crucial issue. “Mediation is one of the oldest forms of conflict resolution and has been used extensively worldwide by individuals, states and organizations to bring about peaceful resolution to interstate and intrastate conflicts” (Siniver and Thomas, 2011 p2). Typically, mediation involves a third party helping two parties in a conflict to come up with solutions to their disagreements. Mediation aims at promoting a less adversarial method of dealing with conflicts in international relations. Terris and Maoz identify that third party negotiations have been used in 35% of post-World War II militarized disputes (Terris& Maoz 2005 p563). This underscores the importance of mediation as a tool for diplomats to solve conflicts and tensions between nations and states. I see high importance in understanding the perspective role of international mediation as a future conflict resolution tool. Since the demands of each side of the conflict must be heard in mediation, the method with which parties come up with decisions on the demands they put forward is important in determining the success of the process. Thus, each party might need to come up with decisions on the condition to present in the mediation. A simple decision making model involves diagnosis of the problem, search for options and choice, revision through a critical assessment, evaluation of options, choice of a given option and the implementation of choice or demands (Maoz, 2012 p5). The simple decision making model form the basis of the traditional or orthodox negotiation framework known as the Theory of Rationality. The Theory of Rationality is based on an attempt to attain a win-win outcome or the best solution for both parties with the long term interest of the parties. This is steeped in the Expected Utility (EU) Theory, which seeks the best good for the largest numbers of people (Milburn& Isaacs, 1995 p335). However, other theories like the Game Theory which is steeped in probabilities and choices come be used to arrive at the rational theory (Coombs& Avrunin, 1998). The Prospect Theory on the other hand, involves an individual negotiating to get the maximum net gains for himself (Bazerman et al, 1985). In other words, each group in the negotiation table will present demands that serves his or her needs best. And as such, we seek the best interests for ourselves. Thus, one must be expected to negotiate for his or her best interest. This makes the Prospect Theory the default position of all negotiators in third party mediation drive. On the other hand when peace is at stake, an individual must be prepared to make concessions for the greater good. In this vein, the Theory of Rationality must be in place. The research question for this paper is which of the two theories of decision making [rational or prospect theory] best describes the decision making model used during mediation? The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the world's most protracted conflicts since 1948 (Siniver& Thomas, 2011 p3). Due to its centrality to global affairs over the past decades, stemming far back to the heights of the Cold War, several third party mediation attempts have been made to address the issues of the conflict. This paper will examine whether the prospect theory or the theory of rationality is most influential in decision making on what demands to make in mediation. The study will focus on three major mediation drives in the Arab-Israeli conflict: 1. The Camp David Accords of the late 1970s and 2. The Oslo Accords of 1993. 3. Camp David Accords 2000 Literature Review This section will discuss the fundamental concepts that define the variables discussed in this paper. First of all, there will be a discussion of the concept of mediation. This will be followed by the analysis of the main elements of the two theories at hand: the prospect theory and the rational theory. The final section of the literature review will focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the stakes in making decisions. Mediation in International Conflicts Article 2(3) of the UN Charter states that “All member states shall settle their international disputes in such manner that international peace and justice are not endangered”. To this end, the UN Charter recognize: 1) Direct Negotiations, 2) Mediation and Conciliation and 3) Third Party Intervention and Arbitration (Bercovitch, 2005 p164). Mediation has several definitions. Mitchell defines it as “intermediary activity... undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior” (Mitchell, 1981 p287). Mediation therefore involves a third party with neutral interest who attempts to bring two sides to come together to achieve some kind of consensus in a conflict. Another definition put forward by Moore states that mediation is goes beyond just negotiations. He defines mediation as “an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process. Mediation involves the intervention of an acceptable impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement” (Moore, 1986 p6). Moore's definition implies that the end that mediation seeks to achieve is a voluntary consensus by the parties to attain peace under the auspices of a neutral authority. In this process, each of the parties comes up with demands which must be met in order to create the mutually acceptable settlement for the parties. In view of that, the focus of this paper is to identify the way each of the parties arrive at their decisions on the demands to put up in mediation. Rational Theory Rational Theory in decision making is steeped in the utilitarian philosophy which asserts that the rational man seeks to do what gives the highest level of results for the highest numbers of people (Vito, 2010 p67). This is steeped in ethics and morality. Hence, a rational person weighs the costs and consequences of a set of option and chooses one with the lowest costs for the highest numbers of people and the highest results for the highest numbers of people. On political and diplomatic arena, Mintz & deRouen (2010 p57) identify that the rational theory is stepped in the Expected Utility Theory. In this theory, a person has to rank alternative choices and their consequences. From this, rational person will select the best options based on the value proposition. This means that the rational theory is meant to provide the best outcome for people. It has the view of critiquing different options to attaining a goal and selecting the best option that suits the stakeholders in the universal population (Mintz & deRouen, 2010 p57). Thus, in negotiations, the rational approach would be for each party to go through a series of choices relating to the outcome of the group they represent as well as the opposing group. Based on this, they are to come up with conclusions on demands to put forward. These demands would represent their best returns and also have some cognizance to the other parties' needs and expectation. Limitations of the Rational Theory There is an inherent limitation in the rational theory. In the first place, the individual care about absolute results in every rational decision (Frank, 1997). Thus, the reference point is about how to get the best from the resource available. However, the rational theory does not take into account, the risks that individuals are willing to take (Frank, 1997 p341). Secondly, what is 'rational' is subjective (Gowda and Fox, 2010 p64). What one party might expect to be enough for the other might not necessarily be so to the party in question. In reality, states or groups might not be in conflict if they agreed on anything. As such, the rational theory has an inherent limitation. This is in spite of the fact that the rational theory is seen as the classic and default position in international relations and public policy (McDermott, 2004 p2). With the inherent limitations of the rational theory, parties in negotiation are charged to take reasonable steps to maximize their gains in negotiation. Risk is often an actual part of negotiation. Thus, negotiators have to balance the dynamics of strategic interaction between factors (McDermott, 2004 p2). Prospect Theory The prospect theory argues, “individuals are risk averse when evaluating potential gains and risk seeking when evaluating potential losses” (Spoelstra & Pienaar, 2011 p84). In other words, negotiators avoid risks when seeking a certain outcome, which is in their favor. On the other hand, individuals are willing to take risks when they are faced with losses. McDermott states that the prospect theory predicts that people are cautious when they are in a good position and more likely to take risks when they are in a bad position (McDermott, 2004 p4). The ultimate end is to enable a given party to negotiate or the maximum possible benefits (Bazerman et al, 1985). The prospect theory factors in the risks and individual needs of maximizing their individual gains in transactions (Frank, 1997 p332). The prospect theory therefore examines what a person would do in situations where he has various risk levels in pointers in negotiations. In application, it is apparent that most people in life will be willing to hold on to what they have and not take too much risk with what they have. However, when there is a risk that is in sight, people are ready to gamble to get the best gains. A common example might be the case of a rich person considering an investment. A rich person might settle for a lower return on investment and lower risk than a poor per person who might opt for a high risk venture like a lottery with a slim chance of success but a high return (Frank, 1997). The prospect theory involves editing and evaluating (Kahnenman & Tversky, 1979). In editing, an individual weighs his risks and probabilities (Frank, 1997). Through this, he comes up with a plan for the future. Most people are willing to take lower risks with high value rights they have and take higher risks where it is apparent that they would not gain much from a given venture. Through this, the individual hopes to attain the highest net results in the long run. The rational theory of decision making implies that people negotiate for the best results with respect for the other party with the ultimate end being the greater good of the wider society. The prospect theory on the other hand, is based on the premise that an individual will negotiate for the best result for his group. This means he would negotiate to keep his gains and try to cut down on losses by taking risks to overturn some of the losses. In the analysis of the two theories, it appears that in negotiations where the parties seek the ultimate and absolute ends, there is likely to be a mutual consensus. However, where a party decides to maximize its gains and take extreme risks in making demands in situations where they know they have a lot to lose is likely to cause negotiations to break down. The general overview on the nature of the Arab - Israeli Conflict The ongoing conflict between Israel and Arabs is both simple to understand, yet deeply complex. The Israeli-Arab conflict can be described as an existential conflict between "two people" - two identity groups - each of which claims the same territory for its national homeland and political state. Although the history of the conflict is much more complex than that simple explanation, since the religious and historical differences play a very important parts to this conflict, the reasons for the continual fighting are easy to understand. From 1967 crucial points in peace negotiations, was the return of occupied territories and to bring home refugees. After 1967 the focus of the Arab resistance shifted to liberating the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a first step to the liberation of entire Palestine. The Arab Palestinians started to manifest themselves as people and to demand an independent state. The main debates are also about: East Jerusalem (became a core issue for both sides in the conflict), the division of Jerusalem with its holy places is the second obstacle for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is no solution so far for Israeli settlement and Palestinian refuges. The Dynamics of Mediation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict The peace process in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as I already mentioned above, has taken shape over the years, despite the ongoing violence and an "all or nothing" attitude about a lasting peace. Through the years so many attempts have been made not only from Israel and Arab part but, as well as, across the international community concerning about the outgoing conflict and the non-stop violence. There were many failed attempts to bring a lasting settlement that would bring an end to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. The Arab-Israeli conflict comes with two main thing that are fundamental to negotiations are land concessions and security (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010). These two factors have marked the main negotiation criteria for attempts to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians/Arab states. The United States have led three major mediation attempts in getting the parties to come up with mutual consensus on the conflict. These involve the Camp David Accords of 1978, Oslo Accords of 1993 and Camp David II of 2000. These mediations drive seek to provide a win-win situation for the Arab-Israeli deadlock. However what stimulates parties to make a decision to except a mediator? Although there can be a numerous explanations for this question. First, I would say that sides will be willing to accept mediation when they consider that mediation will bring about settlement that will benefit more than they stand to gain by continuing the conflict. Additionally, by participating in the talks, each of the parties seem to indicate that they both recognize the needs of each other and willing to come up with compromises for the mutual agreement. As such, it can be said that the parties' decision to enter the US-led mediation is motivated by the rational choice. However, looking at other factors like international pressure and other issues, there could be some justification in asserting that the two parties only take part in the negotiation because the international community wants them to. Thus, with the hope of not upsetting the international community, the two parties decide to join the mediation process. In this case, it is more of the reputation of either party that is important. This position can be further justified by the fact that the conflict and bloodshed has not ended after all the mediation efforts. Thus, it can be said that the decision to mediate comes through international pressure and to avoid repercussions, the parties reluctantly decide to negotiate to keep a good image. Cross-Case Comparisons In all negotiation attempts, the two sides, Israelis and Arabs have made different propositions on how the two fundamental issues must be handled. However, the different actors have made different proposals and their mediators have accepted them in different ways and forms. Thus from the position of each party and the proposition they made, inferences can be drawn on whether the parties were using a prospect oriented approach or rational based approach. Camp David Accord 1978 The Camp David Accords of 1978 was an American attempt to deal with the stalemate between Israel and Egypt. Although details of the discussions were to be held in close confidence, recent reports and other secondary sources provide information about the activities that transpired and how the agreements were made. Central Matters in the Mediation According to Brzezinski (1985 p255), Egypt's interest was to get Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai and as such, their success would depend on what they were willing to offer to Israel in return for any action. Israel on the other hand, had the interest of seeking a procedural arrangement that would ensure lasting peace with its neighbors. Israel stated at the beginning that they would resist pressures for any substantive concessions based on no other reciprocal gestures from the Egyptians (Brzezinski, 1985 p255). The United States' position as a mediator was steeped in the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 stated amongst other things the “inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war”. The Resolutions sought to get Israel to withdraw from territories they acquired in the 1967 Egyptian-led Six Day War and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. In the Camp David agreements of 1978, the two parties had their interest in seeking peace and the fair distribution of resources. A rational approach, under the expected utility theory principle would have been one where all the parties would have engaged in the mediation process with a view of gaining the best and most rational outcome. The theory of rationality indicates that both parties seek the greatest good for all stakeholders and not one individual group. In this wise, the two parties in the mediation representing the Israeli and Arab positions should have sought a consensus in the matter. This would have led to two possible solutions that could have been considered 'rational'. Solution I The whole issue at hand was rooted in a complex blend of history dating back to the exile of Jews from Israel over 2000 years ago and other incidents that date beyond that time. However, for the purposes of this discussion, it appears that Camp David was based on the activities of the 1967 attempted Egyptian-led military takeover of Israel. In this case, the rational decision of both parties should have aimed at providing some degree of mutual agreement for both parties. This would have amounted to three things. First of all, Egypt should have accepted their fault for attempting to capture Israel through military means. Clearly, that was what Resolution 242 sought to condemn. Egypt's decision to invade Israel in June 1967 was not based on any direct threat or provokation from Israel. This means that Egypt was at fault, they had to accept responsibility for that. Secondly, Egypt should have undertaken to sign a peace pact in which they promised that they would commit not use militarized solutions to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict in the future. Thirdly, Israel should have returned the captured territories back to the Arab peoples who had been given those lands under earlier UN partitioning arrangements. These three actions would have restored the two parties into their pre-1967 position. This would have marked a rational solution which would have led to some degree of peace. Solution II From the complications of the Arab-Israeli conflict which dates back to the 30 years before the 1967 Egyptian-led invasion, it was difficult for the three pointers mentioned in Solution I above to be accepted by the Arab contingent. Hence, there was the need for the involvement of a neutral and trustworthy third party in the implementation of the peace processs. In this second route, the mediators should have sought such a trustworthy party to carry out the process. This way, lands could have been transferred from the Israelis to the relevant Arab groups in a manner that would not have threatened Israel's security. Also, the third party should have remained stationed in the region to ensure that there was no aggression from any of the two sides in the conflict. Israeli Negotiation Posture in Camp David Israel held on strongly to its gains in the 1967 war to press home its demands for a guarantee for security and peace from Egypt. Israel was willing to hold on to its gains and get the Arabs to change their position on waging war on Israel. In the situation where it is apparent that their release of land to a neutral force might expose them to criticisms on one hand and security issues on the other, they were ready to take the risk and hold on to the lands. This exhibits that Israel's negotiation posture in Camp David was based on the prospect theory rather than the rational theory. Israel's decision to hold on to their gains was to enable them to get some assurances for security. They were not willing to let go of their gains so easily. Hence, they made demands for them to hold some key security points in the Arab territories they captured. This means that they were playing according to the prospect theory, rather than the rational theory. This is because if their decision was based on the rational theory, they would have demanded or a trustworthy third party to take over the exchange process. However, they sought to remain in most of the West Bank for 'security reasons'. Clearly, they were not interested in giving up what they had. On the other hand, they sought to get Sadat to sign a peace treaty. This was steeped in what they sought to gain, rather than what they were willing to give. Egypt's Negotiations in the Mediation Egypt's approach was to push its position on the UNSC Resolution 242 which would have incriminated Egypt in the first place. The resolution condemned the acquisition of land through military means. This is because without that resolution, they were likely to lose their territories to Israel permanently. The explanation for this is that Egypt sought to use force to take Israeli lands and thus, with a common sense approach, it could be inferred that Israel had the right to keep the lands since Egypt started the aggression in the first place. However, the Resolution made the Israeli acquisitions in the war illegal. Hence, Egypt's decisions on making demands in the mediation process was steeped in Resolution 242. They were not ready to let go of it. The initial Comprehensive Plan to peace presented by Sadat made stringent demands on Israel to return Arab lands (Brzezinski, 1985 p255). It is apparent that they were bargaining on the backlog that they could cause more havoc and unrest in the region on the basis of their military and economic strength. It is therefore clear that the Egyptians lobbied on the basis of their prospects and maximum gains with little regards to Israel's own gains. These indicate that their choices of decision were based on the prospects they were to get and not the need to respect the terms of rationality. Oslo Accords & Camp David II The Oslo (1993) and Camp David II (2000) Accords were initiated by President Bill Clinton with the view of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully and also support the implementation of the Two State Solution that was meant to create a Palestinian State (Hassner, 2009). In this processes, there were backlogs of issues that could be traced to the return of Palestinian refugees to their former homelands, rejection of the 1947 Partitioning Plan, return to the 1967 borders and withdrawal of Israeli troops from lands considered to be part of the future Palestinian State. At the time of the Oslo Accords, the Intifadas or Palestinian uprisings had led to a spate of suicide bombings by Palestinians, targeting Israelis. Based on the rational theory, the ideal thing was to define what Palestinian lands were and what Israeli lands were. This should have been consensual and accepted by both parties. It was not clear whether the Palestinian State was to be based on the 1947 Partitioning Plan or post-1967 borders. So the issue would have ended if both parties had accepted a universal partitioning of the two states. Certainty in the negotiation would have led to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories that would have been universally known as 'Occupied Territories' and this would have been replaced by trustworthy security forces who would have cooperated to end the suicide bombings. Israel's Negotiation Position in the Mediation Israel was ready to take risks by asking for them to keep some strategic locations in territories that were meant to go to the Palestinians under most of the partitioning plans. This is because these locations were either of high religious value to Judaism or of military importance to Israel. In other cases, these included built Jewish settlements, which had inhabitants who were attached to the land since 1967. Although Israel knew that these demands could break down negotiations, they went ahead to demand them as conditions to surrendering lands to the Palestinians. This means that Israel was ready to take risks and thus did not use a rational position but a prospective approach in arriving at the decision. On the other hand, Israel was ready to hold on to some extra lands and some territories which they could have easily given up in negotiations. This is clear that they wanted the best for themselves and did not feel compelled to force the Palestinians if they were not ready to play the cards 'right'. Palestinian Negotiation Position in the Mediation The Palestinians, under the guidance of Yasser Arafat refused to make concessions in situation like the Temple Mount and Jerusalem (Karsh, 2003). This is because the Palestinians considered Jerusalem to be the third holiest site in Islam. And since they held on strongly to it in physical terms, they had power to refuse to put it on the negotiation table. However, they went ahead to make demands in areas they were not in control like some territories that were in the hands of Israel. The Palestinians were also not willing to cooperate in the disbanding and sanctioning of violent Palestinian terrorist groups or cut ties with governments identified as terrorists states (Karsh, 2003). They sought to maintain their position on the subject and rather perceive them as freedom fighters. In areas taking land back, they were ready to take risks at the expense of the mediation arrangements. Although most of the West Bank was to be handed back immediately, following a partial withdrawal by Israel over a period of time, the Palestinian put in an all-or-nothing demand (Eran, 2002). This shows that the Palestinians were negotiating for their goals alone with little regards for Israel's right to exist. Conclusion It is observed that the decision of both the Israelis and Arabs to take part in the three US-led mediation efforts were based partially on the hope that peace could be attained through negotiation led by a third party. However, judging by the demands of both parties and the results of the negotiation, it is apparent that the parties got involved in those mediations because of international pressure. Also, evidence exists to suggest that both parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict negotiate by holding on to what they have strongly and taking high risk in areas that they stand to lose. This is the case even where it was apparent that some risks would break down the negotiations completely. This line of demands is consistent with the prospective theory of decision making. This is because the parties decide on the demands to make, based on what they would get alone but not what would be best for all players under the theory of rationality. The research discovers that from these two/tree cases can be concluded that the prospect theory is more applied in mediation efforts relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I would recommended to conduct a qualitative analysis of the Arab-Israeli mediation attempts to determine which decision making structures are used by both parties in a more accurate manner. References Bazerman, M. H, Magliozzi, T and Neale, M. A. 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