The Legality of Sweeping Airport Security Measures - Assignment Example

? The Human Rights vs. the Legality of Sweeping Airport Security Measures Details: al Affiliation: Date of Submission The Human Rights vs. the Legality of Sweeping Airport Security Measures Introduction Airport security has been one of the many crucial international entry points that have gone through significant changes over the past decade with tightened measures to ensure the safety of passengers aboard flights are safeguarded. The aftermath of the 9/11 informed a revolutionized security system with airport security managements devising ways of manning their territorial control. The complexity of developing a comprehensive airport security plan is no doubt a daunting task in itself. However, this must be done with due regard to the fundamental human rights. Therefore, an Act enacted to provide a regulatory framework must entail forward thinking approaches that incorporate holistic mechanics to safeguard infringement of individual entitlements enshrined in the bill of rights and championed by the international law. Case 1 Understandably, the fictitious Airport Security Act 2009 apparently gives the UK minister of security a free hand in devising and imposing bans on persons deemed to be security threats within the vicinity of the UK airports. As a matter of first principle, the legality of the Security Act 2009 should be operationalized within the guiding framework of the public laws as well as approved international laws. Due to a Ministerial policy of an always imposition of restrictive orders on persons considered threats to the Airport safety, Roger found himself dismissed unfit to serve as a security personnel in the Airports on grounds of assault allegations on Alexa, his former girlfriend. According to the law, discretionary powers must be exercised within reasonable limits. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits inhuman treatment or punishment. Further, article 3(2) of the same Acts put limitations on imposed restriction orders by requiring precise and clear definition in situations where curtailment of rights are involved. The minister’s directive is no doubt a preservative measure to safeguard “Human security,” which requires absence of violent conflicts.1 However, minister discretion baring Roger from access to all airports amounts to unreasonable use of powers. In Secretary of State for Education v Tameside M.B.C. case involving the use of discretionary powers, the Secretary of State power to reject applications authorizing the running of grammar school system was under review. Accordingly, the court found the Secretary of State for Education discretion to reject the system unreasonable stating that the grammar school system had a proven track record and was therefore a reasonable system of education.2 The basis of the directive in Roger case cannot be ascertained with finality as there is no evidence of criminal record to warrant a label of security threat to all airports. Thus, Roger has legal standing to seek redress in a court of law provided his testimony satisfy the "victim test" stipulated under Article 34 of the Human Rights Act of 1998. According to Section 4 of the Security Act 2009, the Minister of Security has power to issue a restriction order in circumstances he thinks fit. This process regardless of whether the such decisions are ‘right’ or ‘correct’ decision, falls far short of the procedural legal basis in reaching a conclusive decision as set forth under the law. The Act is in contravention of the constitutional right of access to the courts at common law,3 which also involves the right to be heard and unimpeded access to a legal expert to offer legal advice and assistance.4 Case 2 One of the fundamental principles of the Geneva Convention Asylum agreements provides for surrogate protection to those failed by their home countries.5 Filling the void of a “factual breach of bond” between the citizen and the motherland, the law affords protection to the vulnerable as a result of their countries neglect.67 Although UK may, in certain peculiar circumstances, treat asylum applicants differently, the state’s right to do so must be guided obligatory principles under international human rights law.8 The United Nations Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status clearly recognizes asylums sought in the pretext of persecutions perpetrated by the state or sections of the populations, including close relatives that do not subscribe to the standards set forth by the existing law.9 Indeed, the international law specifically ICCPR, Article 18(1) guarantees ‘‘everyone the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’’. While Hannah may be a member of the Phalsi faith-a religion that she shares with numerous diehards including a terror suspect recently found with a home-made bomb at Gatrow Airport, it is unclear as to whether there are associative links between the terror incident and the Phalsi faith. There are cognitive indications that Hannah suffered discriminatory treatment in her home country, Xibi, and so her asylum case is acceptable within international asylum standards. Article 14 ECHR guarantees enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and consequently bars discrimination on the basis of colour, sex, race, language, political opinion, religion, national or social origin, associational link with a national minority, birth, property, or any other status. The complexity of the Act placing such matters at the mercy of a ministerial order only serves to place asylum law beyond the reach of domestic violence victims.10 There seems to a departure between the provisions of the act with regards to the right to liberty as prescribed in Article 5(1) ECHR, sets out the circumstances under which a person may be denied the right of his/her liberty. As described by Lord Hope of Craighead, the right to liberty is “a fundamental right” enjoyed by everyone who happens to be in the UK, regardless of his or her citizenship”.11 There is a link between Hannah’s extraditions to her membership to Phalsi faith on grounds not justifiable under the provisions of the laws mentioned above. According to the European Union Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 on the Standards for Asylum Seekers Reception, “persons with special needs should be received with specific attention designed to meet their needs”. 12 In particular Article 17 obligates member states to take into account the vulnerability of a person seeking an asylum, which includes those subjected to torture and/or psychological violence. Hannah’s application asylum motive requirement clearly grasps the appalling phenomenon of domestic violence meted at her in Xibi, her home country. In Fornah v SSHD (2006), a 15 year old girl sought for asylum in the UK fleeing the civil war in her home country, Sierra Leone. This girl resisted return, even though the war was over then. The reason for her resistance was that she belonged to small minority group back home with a cultural expectation of forceful female genital mutilation. Accordingly, the House of Lords, like the lower courts, held that this was a likely occurrence.13 Indeed, under the asylum law, her fears of persecution membership a particular social group (women not yet circumcised) were well founded within the law. The courts as well as the parties involved in the case not only recognized that female genital mutilation was inhuman and degrading, but was in violation of ECHR standards. Thus, the UK extradition order could put her at that risk should it materialize. The criteria used to arrive at deportation order leaves a string of questions as to whether the process took into account the binding agreements between states. Hannah is at risk of further assaults if removed from the UK, and so she should be heard. Case 3 Inappropriate disposal of litter is acceptably unethical, anti-social and unpleasant, and so should be discouraged within realms of applicable laws.14 However, the illegality of littering towards prosecutory courses should not pass the allure of punitive extents at the expense of a fair trial. Under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA Order 1994), Duty Bodies, Airports inclusive are basically responsible for keeping their environments clear of litter and refuse. Dave found himself serving a jail sentence that, perhaps, was not intentional. The case of the airports’ “on the spot fine” policy delineates open-ended environmental policing powers to unaccountable authorities with the risks of unprocedural processes to a fair trial. The practice brings to the fore a watered down justice system brought on to the pavement with “judges” interpreting the law as they see fit. On the spot fines policy/law adopted by LockemUpPLC is a one sided approach that strictly pursues punishment at the expense of the positivity that laws are meant to propagate. LockemUpPLC was under a legal duty to issue a penalty notice for any offence committed within the airport with reasonable time limit to offset the fine. The policy of the spot fine subjugates the principle of fair trial under the legal justice system and amounts to procedural impropriety. The normal requirement of a notice serve an important preservative measure against any accusation, especially for those apprehended in the course of offending. It is utterly impossible to predetermine an involuntary offence, and so the issue of walking with an already prepared fine validates the idea of being guilty before an offence contrary to the normal court assumptions. Indeed “everyone charged with any offence is presumed innocent until proved otherwise according to the law.15 Bibliography Aleinikoff, Alexander, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of ‘Membership of a Particular Social Group,’ In Erika F. et al (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). Anker, Deborah, Refugee Status and Violence AgainstWomen in the “Domestic” Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question (2001) 15 GEO. IMMIGR.L.J. 391, 401. AtleGrahl-Madsen, The Emergent International Law Relating to Refugees:Past-Present-Future, in Peter M. & Gudmundur A. (eds.) THE LAND BEYOND: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON REFUGEE LAWAND POLICY (Martinus Hijhoff Publishers, 2001). Hunker, Thomas, Generational Genocide: Coercive Population Control as a Basis for Asylum in the United States (2005)15 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 133. Mukherjee, S., Crime Trends in Twentieth Century Australia (Australian Inst. of Criminology and Allen & Unwin, Sydney 1981). P., Ruddock, A new framework – counter-terrorism and the rule of law. (2004). The Sydney Papers, 16, 113. U.N. High Comm. for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Jan. 1992) 65, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1. UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 ConventionRelating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Oct. 1, 2008)189 U.N.T.S. Statutes and Cases A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 3 All ER 169. Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA Order 1994). European Convention on Human Rights, c. 6. European Union Council Directive 2003/9/EC. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), c. 3, 7 & 18. K & Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46 [2007] 1 AC 412 (HL). OJ (L) 31/18 (2003). “EU Reception Directive”. Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1, HL. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Saleem [2001] 1 WLR. Secretary of State for Education v Tameside M.B.C. [1977] AC 1014 Read More