Port Security Initiatives - Research Paper Example

PORT SECURITY INITIATIVES: EMPHASIS ON CARGO CONTAINER SAFETY AND SECURITY College 22 February Since the ancient times of 3000 – 1000 BC, the easiest method in transporting goods was through water bodies. As the early world civilizations were normally located near bodies of water – the rivers Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, Indus and the Yellow River – goods for trade travel through these water routes1. In the present time, an estimated seven million containers of cargo pass through ports in the United States every year. In the port of Boston alone, one of the oldest ports since the year 1630, an estimated 1.3 million tons general cargo and 12.8 million tons of bulk fuel pass through it every year2. In 2008, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated a total 8.17 billion tons of goods, or 80% of the global international trade to have passed through seaborne channels and ports worldwide3. However, there is no international standard for security being implemented worldwide, with port security at the mercy of the host countries4. In the United States, seaborne transportation systems are vital to the national and international commerce of the country. Approximately 95% or over $740 billion or 2 billion tons of products pass through marine ports5. As majority of commercial goods passing through maritime ports of entry, the United States Department of Homeland security recognized the necessity of ensuring that the supply chain necessary for economic activity and prosperity should not be disrupted. As economic growth relies on the supply system to provide the necessary products necessary for trade, the Department treats the supply with grave importance as it “feeds critical domestic infrastructure and support (America’s) way of life.”6 As President Barrack Obama put it, economic activity relies on the global supply system and any disruption on the system, either by natural or terrorist activities, can gravely “impact global economic growth and productivity”, thus the need to address the threats and ensure the continuous flow of supply vital to trade and the economy.7 Port Security: It’s Necessity in Today’s Changing World Defence IQ defines port security as “security that refers to the defense, law and treaty enforcement, and counterterrorism activities that fall within the port and maritime domain. It includes the protection of the seaports themselves, the protection and inspection of the cargo moving through the ports, and maritime security.”8 Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the necessity of securing ports of entries came under greater attention. As the New York Times reported in an article in 2012, many terrorists have become ingenuous in hiding explosives and other destructive materials in printers, shoes and other containers. However, for weapons of mass destruction or WMDs, the Times quoted Graham T. Allison, Harvard political analyst, as saying that there is a higher possibility that nuclear weapons or attacks to the United States are more likely to come via cargo containers9. This threat is not only limited to the United States, but, to all countries of the world. However, it is not just nuclear weapons that pose a threat to America, but also chemical, biological and conventional explosive devices. In order to counter the possibility of the entry of destructive and hazardous materials into the country, the need for a more efficient and effective port security measures is needed. As the economy and way of life of nations greatly depend on the flow of basic products, we can say that the global supply chain ensures the way of life of a nation. Based on this and the possible threat of terrorist attacks or activities, the United States has formulated a strategy, the “National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security” in 2012, to provide for an efficient and secure movement of goods through securing the supply chain from disruption and exploitation and the development of a supply chain that will be resilient or could withstand or recover rapidly from threats and hazards that may fall upon it.10 In 2003, the International Maritime Organization and the International Labor Organization, formulated “Code of Practice on Security in Ports” which identified guidelines to assist governments, employers and workers on their responsibilities in line with port security. These includes reduction of risks in ports against unlawful acts, integrated health and safety guidelines, common approaches to port security, and the identification of weaknesses in security within port areas.11 The initial actions after the attacks on September 2001, was to close down all commercial aviation terminals. Necessary as the harbingers of the attacks were on airplanes. However, it should be noted that even with the heightened security around the country and the temporary closure of some ports in the New York region, “trade still flowed freely and the masses of containers continued to flow unimpeded”12 simply because these goods are necessary to fuel the economy of the country. However, the concept of port security encompasses a wide spectrum – from the entry of unauthorized weapons, dangerous and hazardous cargo, prevention of smuggling, prevention of criminal activities, cargo tampering, access and security of vital facilities, infrastructure and ships, to just plain entry of seaborne passengers.13 For the purpose of this paper, we shall focus on cargo security, specifically, cargo container security, as it is the most common form in shipping commodities within the maritime industry. Cargo Container Vans - Boom Boxes Cargo containers first came into use when it was invented in America in 1956. During those times, cargos were loaded onto pallets and loaded and unloaded to and from their origins and destinations. This process proved time consuming and inefficient. The shipping container was designed to be loaded and the transported via road, rail, and sea without being continuously reloaded from the container. It also helped reduce the cost of freight by almost 90%. Its most common sizes are the 40 and 20 foot container vans.14 These containers can carry almost anything and don not stay long in ports as they go out on trains and trucks from their ports of entries and can normally be found everywhere. It has made the transport of goods and products easier on a global scale. However, these containers have also become the object of attention as they can also carry weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Through the use of multi intermediaries to mask its true point of origin, a container van or what some US operatives term as ‘Boom boxes’, can be shipped and transported to any point in the US and deliver catastrophic and destructive results.15 With the possible threat of terrorist weapons and attacks coming through ports within container vans, there is a greater aspect in ensuring that such weapons do not pass through these methods. This however, was not the case prior to September 2001. Pre 9/11 Security Measures in Ports Prior to 9/11, security and inspection were mainly focused on crime-related activities in ports, like drug smuggling and other types of smuggling activities. Security was mainly directed towards access, physical, cargo and passenger security. Only simple measures were instituted to deter terrorism like requiring identification cards in sensitive port areas. Historically, the First Congress of the US established a system of imposing tariffs on imported merchandise in July 1789 in order to fund the federal government, and in the same month established collection districts and established the US Customs service. By the 1800s, the service focused on the interdiction and monitoring of immigrants and cargo. By this time, most of the revenue collected funded the federal government. During the period 1920 to 1933, the Prohibition Period saw the US Customs Service conducting interdiction and confiscation of illegal alcohol particularly coming into the borders of the country. During World War 2, the control of ports was given under the direction of military and the Coast guard. It was during this time that identification cards were first issued to determine access to certain areas of ports to individuals like workers, sailors and military men. These ID cards determined limited access to certain areas of a port. During the period 1970 – 1990, the focus of the port security was on the illegal entry of drugs and other illegal substances. It was during this period that C3I Centers (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Centers) were established. These utilized radar stations, radar planes and helicopters to identify and track down illegally entering planes and sea craft carrying contraband into the country. Suspected ships were also boarded by the US Coast Guard for visual inspection of cargo and manifests prior to letting it dock in ports around the country. However, by 1998, the forced boarding of vessels were suspended and only conducted on a risk-assessment basis.16 All these efforts in the past however, were directed towards identifying and preventing the entry of illegal and hazardous materials and terrorists. It was only in 1998 that a Marine Transportation System (MTS) Task Force was created to look into crime in ports and examine possible terrorist threats to people and infrastructure located within US ports. It was considered during that time that terrorists would only target passenger vessels and key infrastructure and the Federal Bureau of Investigation considered the threat to seaports in the country as relatively low.17 Current Port Security Measures After 9/11, the country’s focus was on preventing the entry of terrorists and hazardous or dangerous materials into the US orders. During one of the last video appearances of Osama Bin Laden in 2004, he confirmed that his primary agenda was in disrupting the economy of the United States and its allies. As UNCTAD reported, the global trade relies mainly on seaborne transport of goods and products – with an estimated 46,000 vessels and 4,000 ports supporting this worldwide trading and commerce, or 80% of world trade. Additionally, intelligence officials have targeted and identified cargo freighters which are believed to be owned and controlled by the Al Qaida network. These vessels could be used to transport and deliver explosive, biological, chemical and nuclear components or weapons to target cities. In Italy, police discovered a man hiding inside a cargo container bound for the US. The man had security passes for airports in the US and the container was “equipped with a bed, toilet, water supply, satellite phone, laptop computer, cameras and maps.”18 Because of the higher risk of cargo containers being used to ferry terrorists and weapons into the country, as well as the enormous impact on the economy if a major port is crippled, port security was heightened after 9/11. The RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service estimates that any attack on a major port could cost thousands of lives and incurring or even crippling the global economy from $45 billion to $1 trillion. The closure of the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports for 11 days due to a strike in 2002 alone, were estimated to be more than $6.3 billion in economic losses.19 Because of this threat, in 2002, the US established the Container Security Initiative (CSI) which pushed for the inspection of dangerous cargo bound for the US while it is still to be loaded in foreign ports. It utilized intelligence and automated information, pre-screening of high risk containers at their points of departure and used detection technology as well as tamper evident containers. The system also required ocean carriers to transmit electronically to the US CBP their manifests 24-hours prior to loading on a ship.20 In 2003, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), or the institutionalization of public-private and international partnership to prevent legitimate shipments from being used in illegal purposes was launched.21 This partnership agreement required businesses to develop procedures on security aimed at maintaining the integrity of their supply chain shipments based on the procedures developed by the US Customs and Border Protection in conjunction with the trade community. By 2005 an estimated 50% of the value of maritime cargo or nearly 10,300 companies have applied, where 5,600 companies have already been granted membership. A benefit of this system is once certified to be C-TPAT compliant, reduced inspections in the US that would equate to reduced waiting time in ports or borders and therefore faster or shorter delivery periods of goods and products.22 Additionally, the US CBP continues to implement its usual methods of visual inspection and the use of dogs in detecting other dangerous material like explosives, chemicals, narcotics, people, and biological agents inside cargo containers.23 In 2004, sophisticated Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM), designed to detect nuclear material in cargo containers were deployed in several ports of the United States. This is part of the Megaport Initiative designed to counter the threat of a ‘dirty-bomb’ attack within the United States.24 Vulnerability of the Current System Though measures have been implemented to increase the security of port areas as well as the technology to monitor the contents of cargo containers for hazardous and dangerous materials, some experts still point out to the necessity of improving the technological capabilities in ports areas. One such criticism is the inability of the current technology to detect a nuclear weapon in a container that has been shielded by lead. Another is the CTPAT system that identifies legitimate or trusted shippers. Experts contend that terrorists need only exploit the weakness in the supply chain of a “trusted shipper” and utilize that weakness to smuggle their weapons through a variety of ways in a cargo container of a trusted shipper. If ever such an event should occur, the system would have to be stricter in inspecting each and every container coming into the country, requiring stricter inspection and equating to delay or freezing the worldwide supply chain of distribution. Any successful attack through cargo containers in ports would collapse the whole system and yield significant losses to the worldwide economy.25 In order to avoid such catastrophe, the systems should be continually reviewed with the cooperation of the countries worldwide engaged in global trading. There should be standardization of security protocols in ports as outlined by Code of Practice on Security in Ports by the International Maritime Organization. In order to safeguard the integrity of containers from tampering, it has also been proposed that the technical standards developed by the International Standards Office (ISO) in tracking and monitoring a cargo container’s integrity from the loading point to its destination should adapted immediately. As an added security measure, every arriving container should not only pass through a radiation portal but also through a gamma-ray scanning machine. Radiation portals fail to detect shielded nuclear weapons but a gamma-ray machine would detect if such a shielding exists within a cargo container. Additionally, biometrics should be adapted universally in order to avoid the falsification of security passes within ports.26 Costs Versus Benefits of Upgrading Port Security As previously stated, a single attack on an American port could equate to economic losses between $45 billion to $1 trillion. The subsequent effects of the necessity to screen more thoroughly cargo containers coming into the United States, stemming from such an attack, would entail increased economic losses. Such a scenario would put the current system into chaos, where containers with perishable cargo would probably entail spoilage due to the longer time to inspect all the containers coming into ports of entry. Port cargo terminals would be crowded; cargo ships would be crowding the harbors waiting to unload their respective cargoes for inspection. This domino effect would soon slow down production in factories and down the line, lay bare or slow down the production and delivery of basic goods and services needed by the consumer.27 The effects of such an occurrence would be catastrophic to the world’s economy and would be immeasurable. Some experts estimate that indirect losses due to trade disruption would be from $100 billion to $ 200 billion dollars with direct property losses resulting from such an attack in the range of $50 billion to $500 billion and death to 50,000 – 1 million individuals.28 These figures only reflect losses stemming from a single nuclear attack, with a Hiroshima sized nuclear explosion, on a US port. Multiple coordinated attacks on several ports would further magnify these figures. In order to prevent such an attack from occurring, preventive measures need to be done worldwide in order that nuclear or other terrorist weapons of mass destruction would never leave its points of origins. A coordinated effort must be institutionalized by the global community in order to put up multiple detection facilities in every port. The cost of infrastructure alone is estimated to be around $1.5 billion.29 Compared to the losses which would possibly be incurred, the cost of setting up such facilities is insignificant. The true effects of a nuclear attack in a port in America, in terms of economic disruption and damages would never be truly estimated. The subsequent effects on the economy after such incident could never be truly foreseen. The need to prevent such an attack from happening is more beneficial to the nation and the economy. The cost estimates of the effects of a nuclear attack identified above is conservative at the least. The cost of prevention is cheaper than the cost of destruction. References Arcaini, Gianni B. “Strategic Planning for Effective Port Security.” Port Technology International. Cohen. Stephen S. Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost. (San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California. 2006). 92-95. Defence IQ. Maritime and Port Security. 2013. [Journal Article] ; Available from http://www.defenceiq.com/glossary/maritime-and-port-security/; Internet; accessed 21 February 2013. Department of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Available from http://www.dhs. gov/national-strategy-global-supply-chain-security; Internet; accessed 21 February 2013. Flynn, Stephen E. Port Security Is Still a House of Cards. Far Eastern Economic Review. January/February 2006. Available from http://www.cfr.org/border-and-ports/port-security-still-house-cards/p9629; accessed 21 February 2013. Global security.org. Container Security Initiative. Available from http://www.globalsecurity.org/ security/ops/csi.html; accessed 21 February 2013. Goslin, Charles. Maritime and Port Security White Paper. Florida: Duos Technology Inc. November 12, 2008. P. 4-5. History World. History of Trade. Available from http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/plaintext histories.asp?historyid=ab72; accessed 21 February 2013. IMO/ILO. Code of Practice on Security in Ports. 2003. P. 1-2. ISBU Association. All About Shipping Containers. 2010. Available from http://www.isbuinfo.org/all_about_shipping_ containers.html; accessed 21 February 2013. Kinsey, Tim. Future Developments in Port Security – A Port Police Perspective. Unpublished. Medalia, Jonathan. Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threats and Response. Congressional Research Service. 24 January 2005. P. 1. Naddler, Jerrold L., Edward J. Markey and Bennie G. Thomson. Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse. New York Times. June 26, 2012. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerous-delay-on-port-security.html?_r=0; accessed 21 February 2013. OECD. Security in Maritime Transport: Risk factors and Economic Impact. July 2003. P 5. Available from http://www. oecd.org /sti/transport/maritimetransport/18521672.pdf; accessed 21 February 2013. Office of the President of the United States. Preface. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. January 2012. US Custom and Border Protection. Timeline. Available from http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/timeLine_04212011.swf; accessed 21 February 2013. Vilchis, Ernesto. The Government Response: US Port Security Programs. Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California. 2006. P. 188-190. Read More