Phillips Disaster of 1989 - Research Paper Example

On October 23, 1989, Phillips’ 66 polyethylene plant at Pasadena near Houston had a major explosion due to gas release resulting in a big fire. The accident caused 23 deaths and at least 130 people got injured. The accident had extensive plant damage. The company officials informed that about 600 employees were at work at the time of the explosion. Due to the fire, black smoke enveloped the industrial area of Houston. Students and other people were asked to remain inside so that toxic fumes in the atmosphere.  It took almost 10 hours to extinguish the fire. 

Accident Summary

An explosion took place due to massive gas release from the reactor with almost 99% of the reactor contents released instantaneously. The explosive force is said to be 2.4 tons of TNT triggered by the unidentified source of ignition. The ignition sources could be catalyst activator, forklift, welding or cutting-torch equipment, or the electrical gear in the control rooms or in the finishing building. The debris spewed to a distance as far as six miles and seismographic data revealed the explosion at 3 to 4 on the Richter scale. The main explosion was followed by another explosion within 15 minutes when two huge isobutene storage tanks exploded. In all, there were six more explosions at the site (Bethea, Robert).

The initial explosion caused the death of 23 persons which included 21 employees from the Phillips and two were from the contractor's maintenance team. All fatalities occurred within 250 ft of the initial gas point of release (Bethea, Robert).

Causes of the Explosion

A report to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 1990 mentions the causes of the explosion and the same can be listed as per the following.

1. The Demco valve actuator mechanism was without a lockout device.
2. Phillips's operating procedure mentioned that the pipes that supply air to the valve actuator should not be connected during the time of maintenance; however, that was not the case as it could be connected during maintenance.
3. The air supply valves were in the open position to allow the airflow making the actuator rotate the Demco valve as soon as the hoses were connected. The valve lockout system was not such that it could prevent someone from opening the Demco valve during maintenance of the plant. (Bethea, Robert)

The evidence collected from the site suggested one of the following.

1. a) The lockout device was not in place with the air supply pipes reconnected and the block valve was in an open state with the leg open to the atmosphere
2. b) The lockout device was taken out from the Demco with the air supply reconnected and the block valve was in an open state with the leg closed which was subsequently opened to the atmosphere without the Demco valve relocked (Bethea, Robert).

The above actions violated the common safety norms and are considered a likely cause of the explosion.

Gas Leakage Detection System Missing

The site had no fixed gas detection system though it held a huge quantity of inflammable material under high pressure. This prevented early warning signals of gas leaks or release (Health and Safety Executive).

No Dedicated Firewater System

In an attempt to douse the fire, firewater was taken from the process water system.  The explosion had already damaged the system that reduced the water pressure. A full-fledged firewater system was not in place. The firewater pumps could not operate because fires damaged their electrical cables. Only one standby diesel pump was in operation with one pump in maintenance and another one running out of fuel (Health and Safety Executive).

Plant Safety Aspects

Some other factors that contributed to the severity of this incident can be listed as the following:

1. There were not adequate separations between buildings.
2. The layout of the process equipment was lacking sufficient space.
3. The distance between the control room and the reactors was not sufficient to carry out emergency shutdown procedures.

 The process and plant design safety aspects provide necessary cushioning while dealing with such mishaps and are quite critical while designing the layout of the plant (Wells, 1980).

It was also revealed that efficient communication was lacking or hindered as there was no proper coordination among responders. It was found that state and federal authorities not only failed to coordinate their activities but even contradicted each other and company officials.

Conclusion

The chief finding of this incident was that the emergency remedial measures were not designed keeping in mind the worst-case scenario of massive explosions. The incident establishes the need for employee training in emergency response actions. The incident also informed that the crisis management planning was not adequate after the explosion.  During such mishaps, an emergency broadcast system transmitter is very much needed so as to disseminate information by plant personnel or emergency response personnel. The site should have a backup emergency plan to reduce the causalities and damage.