Steve Coll's Ghost Wars - Book Report/Review Example

Steve Coll's "Ghost Wars" per our previous e-mail correspondence The terrorist attacks f September 11, 2001 in the United States compel many to think about that what actually had led up to that fateful day as well as the role f US intelligence agencies in countering such threats. Steve Coll in his book - Ghost Wars -- gives a detailed and very useful chronology and analysis f pivotal events, missteps, indecision, apathy, and ultimately tragedy up to the day before the attacks. Divided into three parts, Coll's book provides valuable insights into the US policy-making process in Afghanistan. The specifics f US policy often make an outside unsure and perplexed by the surrounding situations. One prime example includes Bin Laden and the hunt for the leading terrorist among the Talibans. Nonetheless, despite their efforts, CIA agents continually failed in their chase. Significant reasons led to their failure, including a lack f communication amongst the several groups searching for Laden, and issues regarding policy which made one groups' interest conflict or seek approval from another. In Ghost Wars, Coll describes the single best opportunity - one missed in 1999 - to decapitate al Qaeda, when spies paid by the U.S. reported that Osama bin Laden was in a mountain camp, hunting with Arab friends for the elusive bustard. But when aerial surveillance revealed the possible presence f Saudi royals and princes f the United Arab Emirates in the camp, President Clinton's national security council called off the strike for fear f hurting relations with those countries in case f collateral damage. The Americans had no interest in Afghanistan until the Soviet invasion in 1979, the point where Coll's book begins. Ghost Wars traces how the CIA decided to throw its support behind anti-Soviet rebels to create a costly and protracted war for the U.S.S.R., not unlike Vietnam, that would eventually bring down the regime. The U.S., ignorant f the history, languages and people f the region, funneled its covert assistance through Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. When the Soviets left, the CIA withdrew and allowed these two countries to build up the Islamist Taliban regime that fostered and protected al Qaeda. "The State Department warned that Afghanistan risked becoming a lawless state, a fulcrum for drug and arms trafficking, but they were not listened to by the military," says Coll, who documents throughout his book the hostility between these two agencies. "The only voices in the Clinton government against the Taliban, the only opposition, came from the feminists, to their great credit." When the CIA finally returned to Afghanistan in 1998 to try to stop bin Laden. It tried what Coll calls the Hollywood approach - ride into town, take out the bad guy and leave. The failure f the agency's tactics, heavily reliant on satellite surveillance, is chronicled in the third section f the book, which ends the day before 9/11. "United States policy in the region was shaped by indifference, passivity and inattention as much as by connivance," says Coll. He was the South Asia bureau chief for the Washington Post from 1989 to '91, when the Twin Towers terror could have been averted if only the U.S. had thrown its backing to Ahmed Shah Massoud, who might have built a coalition f local tribes and factions needed to build democracy. "He could see the big picture," says Coll f Massoud, whom he had interviewed when he was in South Asia. "He was a charismatic leader f the Northern Alliance in the Pandjir Valley and he recognized that the bin Laden problem could not be solved by one cruise missile but in the context f the Taliban and the support it was receiving from Pakistan. The Taliban was a clandestine instrument f Pakistani rule in Afghanistan." Massoud, however, couldn't get President Clinton's attention. He is the unwitting hero f Coll's book and his description f Massoud's assassination, two days before the Twin Towers fell, by bin Laden's agents posing as journalists, brings tears to the reader's eyes. What emerges from Ghost Wars is a portrait f the U.S. as an imperial power that cannot accept itself as such. Its officials speak no foreign languages and are ill at ease abroad, unable to differentiate between friend and foe. The British historian Niall Ferguson, author f Colossus: the Price f America's Empire, suggested when he spoke in Toronto last year that the U.S. would do well to learn from the old British Colonial Office on how to manage the countries it has conquered, militarily or economically. Coll does not think that could ever happen, because the U.S., having once won its freedom from an imperial Britain, has a deep aversion to empire - even to recognizing that it already has one. "It's a national characteristic to reject empire," he says. "What British colonial officers did on the Arab frontier when it was their patch f turf was, in the scientific 19th-century spirit, record the name f every tribe, every chief's name, every sub-chief, their languages. But the American national characteristic is that they want big systems, satellite technology, they want results. There couldn't be a greater difference in culture." However, he says, "there is the need f the United States to at least grapple with the fullness f its responsibilities in the world. It's the problem f integrating civilian expertise with the military. Following President Bush's response to the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001 and his declaration f war against terrorism, many critics feared the president's motives in seeking retribution. The loss f civil rights and the fear f war for many seemed to outweigh the loss and suffering brought about by the attacks. A crisis the size f the strikes is not an easy matter to dissect. There is, on the one hand, the need for slow and deliberate action on the part f leadership. On the other hand, a quick response to such an offense is often necessary to avoid further tragedy and destruction and serves to demonstrate a leader's ability to, well, lead. How does a leader exact retribution and ensure protection while simultaneously displaying wisdom and deliberation in his actions As the 9/11 Commission continues to question the inefficiencies associated with the attacks, the likelihood that the United States would have been fully prepared to fend off such an attack remains questionable. That said, a great deal f breadth most be afforded those responsible in surmising an appropriate response to such an unforeseen encounter. Not wanting to make the same mistakes as the previous administration in only carpet bombing Afghanistan, Woodward points out that more time was required to fully address the situation and determine the appropriate use f force. While the administration responded slowly to the attacks, it is the motivation behind some f its deliberation that many find troubling. Discord among the many players, confusion in the initial reports, fear and rumor offered repeated challenges to the administration as it set out to respond. One gains a sense in reading Woodward's account that the "good ole boy" network is alive and well in Washington - even in times f peril. The obvious example f this is the almost alliance-like behavior exhibited between Vice President Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. While war was inevitable and largely expected by the American public, the eagerness f the vice president and secretary f defense to retaliate often seemed juxtaposed against Powell's brooding step-child approach to cautioning the president against any actions he might later regret. President Bush told Woodward he believes in his instincts, is a gut player and never has any doubts. Despite Powell's apparent apprehension to conflict, the president forced the pace, made the right choices even if they went against his prior rhetoric, and kept the country together. By this account, he was an effective leader. The war in Afghanistan is something f an anomaly where the act f war is concerned in that the initial weapons were suitcases full f currency. This isn't the only aspect that sets this war apart. Humanitarian aid was also paramount in the president's decision to begin the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. President Bush asked his advisers, "Can we have the first bombs we drop be food" Blankets, food and clothing were distributed along with cash and weapons to Northern Alliance allies. Bush told Woodward, "I was sensitive to this [accusation] that this was a religious war, and that somehow the United States would be the conqueror. And I wanted us to be viewed as the liberator." Among the most surprising revelations f Bush at War is the glaring absence, in the myriad interviews and moutains f notes and transcripts, f any serious discussion f whether the war in Afghanistan was justified. The president's musings about honoring "God-given values," which motivated him to link humanitarian aid to air strikes, constitute almost the only mention f ethical motivation by any f Woodward's sources. Woodward's limited view confirms what other observers have said about the Bush White House: unquestioning loyalty is expected f everyone. But this does not prevent heated debate over policy options among advisers. In the days leading up to Bush's address to the United Nations in August 2002, Woodward reveals, Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld were engaged in a fierce battle with Secretary f State Powell over key elements f the speech. Cheney "was beyond hell-bent for action against Saddam," writes Woodward, and Rumsfeld agreed with him that the United States should move quickly and not wait for UN approval. But Powell succeeded in persuading the president to wait, and he was permitted to add a sentence to the final draft pledging American cooperation with the passage f appropriate UN resolutions. Critics allege that Woodward was 'easy' on President Bush in Bush at War and only slightly more critical f the administration in Plan f Attack. This may be due in part to the sway in public opinion as the nation gear up for war in Iraq. There is a sense in Woodward's account that the war in Afghanistan was somehow justified or more justified than the war in Iraq. The development and strategy leading up to the war in Iraq was on the president's agenda as early as November 21, 2001. However, it is clear from Woodward's account that while Afghanistan was the immediate business at hand, the removal f Saddam Hussein was only a matter f time. Work on the war plan was also a secret in the early stages and when partial disclosure found its way to the media, the administration presented the case as contingency planning, often insisting that there were no war plans on the president's desk. It's correct to identify that there is a pattern to U.S. foreign policies towards 3rd world countries. By examining some f the actions, military and non military, one can see that, whenever it comes to its own economical interest, the U.S. will be involved directly or indirectly. To really understand foreign main policies objectives towards 3rd world countries, one has to narrow it down to two main objectives, sanctions that are designed to impact on the poor, and enslavement f most poor countries by economic debt. Military for the most part by the CIA, has the most key roles in suppressing countries using wars and overthrowing governments indirectly. In the second segment f the documentary "What we have learn about U.S. foreign policies", John Stockwell, former CIA Station Chief Angola Task Force, and highest-ranking CIA official ever to leave the agency and go public, speaks out about the actions taken by the CIA towards 3rd world countries. There are lots f terrorist's organizations in the world today and amongst them the most popular is Al-Qaeda led by Saudi born Osama bin Laden wanted and classified as very dangerous by the FBI. Osama Bin Laden is both one f the CIA's most wanted men and a hero to many young people in the Arab world. Osama was trained by the CIA itself to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After the Soviet war Osama went back to Saudi Arabia to work for the family business but because f his anti-government policies he was expelled out f the country. He spent five years in Sudan after that until the U.S pressurized the Sudanese government to expel him out f Sudan, whereupon he went to Afghanistan. Works Cited Coll, Steve., Ghost Wars: The Secret History f the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 Read More