Analysis of Thomas Friedmans The World is Flat, and Tarek Barkawis Globalisation and War - Book Report/Review Example

1 Introduction Globalisation is the twenty-first century's buzzword and the focal point of intense controversy. Economist, political scientists andsociologists, not to mention journalists are active participants in this debate, with one side contending that globalisation will herald a new age of increased global prosperity and democracy whereas the other side insists that globalisation will, indubitably, expand the divide between North and South and compound the problems of inequality and poverty. Given the controversial and contemporaneous nature of the phenomenon, it is hardly surprising that countless books and articles have been published on globalisation. Of these, two shall be analysed and critiqued for the purpose of identifying each of the author's positions on globalisation and the state, on the one hand, and the effect of globalisation on international relations, on the other. These two books are Thomas Friedman's The World is Flat, and Tarek Barkawi's Globalisation and War. 2 Globalization and the State As pertains to the concept of the state within the era of globalisation, neither of the authors engages in the explicit discussion of this question. Their position on the question, however, is implied throughout each of their works and, a close reading indicates that they adopt diverse positions. Friedman, a globalisation proponent and optimist, believes that globalisation has minimalised the role of the state in both the economic and, interestingly enough, political spheres. Globalisation, as he argues, implies the triumph of rational economic considerations over, often emotional and ideologically-based, political ones. The state, in other words, has not simply been eliminated as a market-player but, to a great extent, it no longer has the requisite power or capacity to impose its will over the market nor, indeed, to stand in the face of globalisation. To protect their status and maintain their control and authority over their territories, states customarily imposed artificial barriers to the movement of people, goods and services, let alone information, across borders. With these barriers in place, the world was a vast space, comprised of politically and economically sovereign nation-states wherein states primarily governed on the basis of political ideology. Not only that, but as major market players/shapers, states based economic and market decisions on ideological considerations. Globalisation did not, according to Friedman, simply flatten the world, as in make it infinitely smaller (9-10) but it effectively minimalised the role of the state. Trade networks, inextricably connected nation-states together, concomitant with the emergence and proliferation of the information highway, implying the interconnection of cultures and diverse peoples, rendered states incapable of controlling economic activities within and across their borders any more (Friedman, pp. 8, 45, 74, 102-103). Globalisation, in other words, rendered politics/state, an instrument of economics/trade/market, as opposed to the traditional and historic voice-versa. The state, from Friedman's perspective, has been flattened by the force of globalisation and, positively so. By claiming that globalisation has flattened the state, along with the world, Friedman does not mean that the state has been rendered ineffective. The state still has a role to play within the context of globalisation, although that role may be very different from its earlier one. Rather than an overtly political role which renders economic considerations subservient to ideological ones, the state now plays the role of coordinator, or protector of national economic interests. It does so, as may be inferred from the entirety of Friedman's treatise, not because it has been bought out by big business' but, because globalisation has rendered the national interest an undeniably, and overtly, economic one. In order to protect its national interests, as it is expected and required to do, the state need protect its economic interests and the representatives of those interests. Therefore, even though the state does not intervene in the market, globalisation has imposed a predominantly economic role upon it whereby it functions to forward economic interests, to expand its trade network, to integrate itself more fully into the global economy and to create the internal socio-political and economic conditions requisite for the attraction of foreign direct investment and outsourcing contracts (277). Globalisation has changed the role of the state, according to Freidman, but the state still plays a role. Barkawi similarly believes that globalisation has changed the role of the state and, just as does Friedman, portrays the state as a significant actor within globalisation. This, however, is the extent of the similarity between the two authors, primarily because their implied definitions of globalisation differ. Whereas Friedman primarily defines globalisation as an economic and trade phenomenon, or force, Barkawi adopts a multi-faceted approach, projecting globalisation as a cultural, political, economic and military phenomenon. Economics, in other words, is just one of globalisation's many facets and by no measure is it the more important one. Divergent definitions of globalisation imply differences between each of the author's conceptualisation of the role of the state within the era of globalisation and the role that the state plays in the promotion of globalisation. Whereas Friedman persistently argued that the state, as in the political body, has been flattened by globalisation and no longer can, even if it should desire, play a role in the halting of globalisation, Barkawi perceives of the state as the force behind globalisation. In other words, the state in not influenced by as much as it is the influencer of. The question now is, how Friedman argued that technological and trade networks instigated globalisation and that, as a matter of fact, globalisation was, by and large, imposed on the state. Contrary to Freidman's premise, Barkawi projects the state as the instigator of globalisation and war as the medium through which it forcibly imposed globalisation upon the world and the nation-states and peoples, therein. War, as defined by Barkawi, does not simply imply military aggression but, more importantly, it entails the entrance of one country/culture into another, the establishment of a communication network between the peoples involved in the conflict and, in many cases, the imposition of fluidity upon national boundaries and the consequent emergence of economic relations. In other words, war is a globalising force, if globalisation is to be defined as the erosion of national boundaries, the meeting of cultures and the emergence of a network of relations between diverse people. While there are those who may find Barkawi's theory on war as a globalising force difficult to digest in light of the fact that war implies adversarial relations between nations whereas globalisation implies cooperative relations, current events establish the veracity of his argument. One need look no further than Iraq to realise that beneath the turmoil and destruction, the country and its people are being drawn out from their isolation and into the globalised world order, whether through trade, cultural or political relations. As may be inferred from the entirety of Barkawi's argument, it is erroneous to claim that the state has been eroded by globalisation. The state, as a war machine and as the primary player in conflict, is the main force behind globalisation. From this perspective, globalisation is an aggressive phenomenon and not a pacifist one as Freidman asserts. While Barkawi's argument strongly suggests that the state influenced globalisation and is the primary player in its propagation, proliferation and sustenance, the fact remains that generalisations are impossible. Some states have influenced globalisation while other states have found themselves in the position of its being forcibly imposed upon them. States which possess the requisite military prowess and are motivated by the imperatives of expanding their trade networks and expanding the parameters of the global market, have instigated and influenced globalisation and, continue to play a fundamental role in defining and shaping it. On the other hand, states which do not possess the required military strength and whose economies and industries are underdeveloped, implying a lack of motivation for the expansion of the parameters of competition, find themselves in a position wherein globalisation is imposed upon them. Such states play a reactive, not proactive role in globalisation, as may be inferred from Barkawi's argument. That means to say, they react to globalisation by utilising a host of economic survival strategies, from the attraction of foreign direct investment to aligning with the globalisers. Prior to explicating the theoretical base of both arguments, it is important to emphasise the very different positions which Friedman and Barkawi adopt vis--vis globalisation. Whereas the one believes that globalisation was instigated by trade and technology, the other believes that it was propagated by states via their war machinery; while the one believes that globalisation has, by and large, rendered states instruments of economic concerns and interests, the other believes that globalisation is the instrument through which states exert their control over others, implying a greatly expanded politico-economic role for some nation-states. In other words, both authors adopt contrary views on the question of the role of the state in globalisation and within the era of globalisation. 3 Theoretical Foundations The theoretical foundation, upon which Friedman seems to draw his international relations vision, is liberalism. In order to explain and justify this statement, it is necessary to correlate between this IR theories and Friedman's treatise. Within the context of a world rendered flat by capitalism globalisation, economic relations between nations have effectively led to the pacification of relations. The success of capitalist globalisation is predicated on the flattening of accents'(27) an the adoption of "common standards [to] create a flatter, more level playing field"(52). What Friedman is suggesting here is that diverse people are beginning to speak in the same way and nation-states are starting to adopt the same standards, completing the eradication of the barriers between nation-states. As far as he is concerned, and as he explicitly states, the flattening of the world occurred through the force of trade and the concomitant emergence of multiple, and inextricable, forms of economic collaboration between nations (74, 143, 158). Within the parameters of a world in which trade and economic interests have superseded ideology and have effectively eradiated the barriers between nation states, conflict recede and pacifism asserts itself. The primary concern of nations becomes the maintenance of stability in order to facilitate the flow of trade and protect third multitudinous shared economic interests. This is Friedman's position and this position does not simply draw from the liberal theory of international relations but faithfully echoes it. The liberal theory of international relations maintains that the proliferation of trade networks between nations, predicated on the removal of artificial barriers to trade, creates a chain of interdependency which nations would subsequently not seek to threat through conflict and war. Trade and shared economic interests solidify the relations between nations, creating a complex global network of interdependency, and establishing multiple chains of various levels of communication between people, thereby offsetting the possibilities of war, conflict and politico-economic disruption. If one compares the general premise of the liberal theory of international relations with Friedman's understanding of the same, one would realise that there exists a definite correlation between the two. Indeed, similarities are such that there exist no differences between them. It is, thus, that the selection of the liberal theory as Friedman's theoretical base is both justified and valid. As regards Barkawi, all evidence points towards the fact that he basis his understanding of globalisation and international relations on the realist theory of international relations. As per the realist theory, the state is, by definition, a military machine with primarily expansionist objectives. Within the sphere of international relations, states are the primary actors and their actions are determined by the dual goals of maintaining/establishing hegemony and of protecting/maintaining their sovereignty. These goals determine the utilisation of military power, both as the primary strategy for the satisfaction of these objectives and for the protection of national interests. Often, these national interests are realised through aggressive expansionism, culminating in the hegmon's internationalising its culture, often language. The history of colonialism bears this out, just as does the current era of neo-colonialism/globalisation. Barkawi's definition of globalisation and his insistence on the existence of a definitive link between globalisation and war is fundamentally founded upon the realist theory of international relations. As earlier noted, the primary difference between Friedman and Barkawi is that while the one perceives of globalisation as a pacifist enterprise, the other views it as an inherently aggressive one. In other words, whereas Friedman perceives of globalisation as having followed in the wake of economic liberalisation, Barkawi projects globalisation as having followed in the wake of military conflict and war. Indeed, globalisation is an international relations enterprise imposed upon weaker state by the global hegamon as a strategy for securing and expanding the scope of its politico-economic interests. International relations, as may be inferred from Barkawi's treatise, does not unfold through collaboration and cooperation between nations, as the liberal globalists maintain but, its framework and trends within are dictated by the hegamon. Insofar as the hegamon determined the globalisation of capitalism, of its own economic principles and ideology, to best suit its interests, it instigated globalisation and imposed it upon the global family of nation-states. In other words, globalisation is the by-product of war and, as such, is immediately consistent with the realist theory o international relations. In light of the immediate correlation between Barkawi's IR perspective and the realist theory, one can safely conclude that realism functions as his theoretical foundation. 4 Critique Friedman's work is highly unconvincing and the reader almost feels as if he is building his treatise through a fact-selection process, wherein he includes those facts which support his argument and deliberately excludes those which undermine it. For example, he repeatedly emphasises that the evolution of the Internet has flattened the world (158); that outsourcing has flattened the world (143) and, that the world has been transformed into a "level playing field" (52). The implication here is that technology and trade have effectively ensured the evolution of multitudinous networks of interest between nation states and that the globalization of capitalism has determined that all participants (nation-states and the corporations, economic actors which represent them) equally benefit. Needless to say, this is a highly selective view of globalisation. Nation-states do not equally benefit. The internet may have made the world smaller place but the fact remains that it is only accessible to a minority of the global population; that is, the populations of the West and the educated upper socio-economic classes of the underdeveloped, or lesser developed nations. Within the parameters of the latter, the majority have neither the equipment (telephone, computer and electricity) to access the internet nor the educational/linguistic means to do so. In other words, the Internet has, arguably, only established a network of interconnectivity between an elite minority of the global population. Similarly, the notion that trade benefits all participants is hardly an accurate representation of the reality. Suffice to say that outsourcing has only targeted a minority of countries, with the implication being that only a few have benefited from this phenomenon. Likewise, only a handful of non-industrialised nations have emerged as active players in the global economy and accordingly, have not benefited in any way that is remotely comparable to the benefits accrued by the industrialised nations whose marketplace and consumer base expanded consequent to globalisation. Last but not least, Friedman's treatise is weakened by his repetitive use of the flatness metaphor. The concepts of flatness, breakdown' of hierarchies (45), and "level playing fields" (52) give an impression of equality. Apart from the fact that equality is the very antithesis of capitalism, to claim that globalisation has created equality between nations or people, at least from the economic perspective, is hardly factual. Accordingly, in light of his one-sided argument and highly selective use of facts, Friedman's work is ultimately unpersuasive. In direct comparison to Friedman's one-sided, often illogical, defence of globalisation, Barkawi's work emerges as much more valuable, at least from the academic perspective. His argument on the interrelationship between war and globalisation is novel and, for the most part, persuasive. There is no doubt that war, often accompanied by military conquest and the recreation of political and economic systems in the image of the hegamon/the conquering state, has contributed to the spread of globalisation. Similarly, there is little doubt that while globalisation may have affected fundamental changes in the role of the state, it has not, reduced the state to a secondary actor. Therefore, from this perspective, the general framework of Barkawi's treatise is highly persuasive. Nevertheless, there are minor details which function to somewhat weaken Barkawi's argument. War may have instigated globalisation but it is definitely not the only force t have done so. Equally, states may have maintained their status, although somewhat altered, following globalisation but, not all have. The economic factor, which Barkawi largely glosses over, has played a fundamental role in the instigation and proliferation of globalisation if only because, in a great majority of instances, it was a war-motivator. Furthermore, while nation-states remain important players in the globalisation era, only a handful are. The status of the hegamon has, undoubtedly, been enhanced by globalisation and, to all intents and purposes, has transformed it into the major global player. The sovereignty and status of industrialised nation-states has also not been undermined by globalisation and arguably, has been served by it. The status, however, of non-industrialised countries, of the lesser developed nations, has been severely undermined by globalisation, to the extent that their sovereignty is a topic of debate. Barkawi largely glosses over these two points, indicating that he is determinedly looking at globalisation from a single perspective. 5 Conclusion It is apparent that both authors adopt diverse views, not to mention definitions, vis--vis globalisation. Friedman defines it in positive, even glowing terms, refusing o acknowledge the possibility that globalisation may not be the means by which wealth, prosperity and political liberty will proliferate. Globalisation, from this perspective, is intrinsically pacifist. Barkawi takes a different position, adopting a critical perspective on globalisation and defining it as a phenomenon whose spread is fundamentally dependant upon war. To an extent, the divergent positions expressed, often refusing to acknowledge any shred of validity in the arguments posed by the opposite camp, is reflective of the highly controversial and divisive nature of globalisation itself. Ultimately, the book that the reader fids himself/herself most drawn to will be determined by his/her stance on the globalisation debate. Read More