International Terrorism Q&A - Assignment Example

International Terrorism: Questions The text offers three sources of (or reasons for) violence in the Middle East. Which of the three sources do you think is most responsible, if any Explain your answer. Also, given these sources, what do you think can and/or should be done to secure a lasting peace in the Middle East 2. What is Hamas Hizbollah Islamic Jihad What are the differences between them Are these groups a threat to the United States If so, how so Under what circumstance, if any, should we negotiate with terror groups such as these 3. Describe the Kurdish conflict and the PKK in detail. Who are the peoples and nations with a stake in the conflict What are the concerns or objections of all sides of the conflict Do you believe that the Kurds are deserving of their own nation-state Or is it simply a fact of life that Kurds will remain a minority in every country they occupy, whether, Turkey, or Iraq, or elsewhere Feel free to consult and cite other sources in addition to the text as you compose your answer. 4. Discuss the rise of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. What are bin Laden's key issues What attacks or attempted attacks have been linked to Al-Qaeda (include the years) How should America's go about combating bin Laden and Al-Qaeda Or, if you prefer, should we make peace somehow with that organization 5. As you consider everything you have learned about international terrorism, in your opinion what are the most important facts or elements of the material that can be instructive for American foreign policy or counterterrorism efforts Is there anything you have learned or have come to believe (about threats, opportunities, etc) through this course which you sense is not taken seriously enough or even considered by government officials What would characterize your approach to terrorism if you were in a position to advise the President or other high-ranking government officials International Terrorism: Answers Answer to Question 1: The main reason for the violence in the Middle East is the issue between Israel and the Palestinians, a conflict that has gone on for centuries and is rooted in the question of learning to respect the rights of people to settle on land they call their own and learning to live with one another. Every other issue cited as a possible reasons, such as the power struggle among Arab states and the growing clamor for an Islamic state, contain the same deep-rooted cultural biases (White, 2006). The Palestinians and Jews claimed the same piece of land at different times in their history. Thus, generations of these people have felt bound by the duty to care for their heritage. Like other nations, they equate honor with the justice principle of claiming what they consider to be rightfully theirs. The problem is that in their efforts throughout history to exercise honor and seek justice, much bad blood has been spilled, and that instead of making them realize the futility of fighting over real estate, the blood that has been shed only serve to continue driving both nations to engage each other in an escalating and never-ending quest that they mistakenly hope would lead to peace. Peace would continue to be elusive in the Middle East because of poor political leadership, not only in the Middle Eastern countries but also in the superpower nations, and because of poor education as regards acceptable modes of behavior as a member of a community of nations where people need to respect each other's human rights, but also as regards the virtues of liberty and democracy. When these defects of poor political leadership and education occur in the majority of developed and developing countries, terrorism will continue to have a fertile base on which to thrive. Co-existing in peace and with respect, even among Muslims and Jews, believers and non-believers, is possible provided the people are happy and contented to live together in peace. After all, the same troubles such as petty crimes and land-grabbing are common even among people of the same ethnic background, but unscrupulous politicians magnify the nature of some conflicts and inject as an excuse the long-simmering ethnic rivalries between Arab and Jew to further their own motives. In other words, by not agreeing to compromise, these same politicians continue to live in the past and view the world through the same glasses as their ancestors (Bove & Kaplan, 1995). This is where political leadership plays an important role. What the world needs is a leader who can bring the feuding leaders together, themselves good leaders of Middle Eastern nations including Israel, and then negotiate the peace. Each leader, in turn, must be good enough to secure the full cooperation of their respective nation to make the peace work. Otherwise, these good leaders would be open to opposition by radical groups, as happened in Israel after Rabin, who agreed to peace with the Palestinians, was himself assassinated. The political leaders of the Middle Eastern nations must be strongly committed to peace, and they should be strongly supported by the U.S., the E.U., and the U.N. The world already knows how the U.S. managed to invade a sovereign nation in 2003, and it must never allow this to happen again. Terrorism is a complex problem and the solution is not easy to come. However, the world has shown that there is no problem too complex that it could not be solved by people who are willing to sacrifice for a noble cause. Peace in the Middle East is one such problem, and the world needs a new generation of leaders courageous, intelligent, and wise enough to work it out (Andersen, 2004). Answer to Question 2 Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad are three militant groups operating in the Middle East to promote the struggle against what they perceive to be the unjust occupation of their land by the nation of Israel. All three have as their common aim to recover the land occupied by Israel, to eradicate the Israeli state, and to establish in its place an Islamic state. Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya or Islamic Resistance Movement) was formed in 1988 as the Palestinian branch of the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood. It is the armed resistance movement of the Sunni branch of Islam, operating primarily in Gaza, Judea, and Samaria in Israel. It rose to prominence during the Intifada (uprising) in the Gaza strip, carrying out violent attacks and suicide bombings against civilian and Israeli military and security targets. Its charter calls for the destruction of the Israeli State and its replacement with a Palestinian Islamic state in the lands currently occupied by Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza strip. Hamas shares many common goals and adopt similar strategies as the Shi'a militant group Hizbullah of Lebanon, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah, although some are its ideological rivals. Like Hizbollah, Hamas sponsors social services in the Gaza district and, in 2006, won a majority of seats in the Palestinian legislature. Although there were reports that Hamas has began calling for attacks to be made on targets in the U.S. because of the political, financial, and logistic support it extends to Israel, no such attacks attributed to Hamas have been made against targets outside Israel (White, 2006). Hizbollah (Hizb'Allah or Party of God) was formed in 1984 as a resistance group fighting for the liberation of Lebanon from Israeli invaders who occupied the Southern part from 1982 to 1985. Inspired and supported by Ayatollah Kohmeini who was then ruling Iran as a Shi'ite Islamic Republic after successfully ousting the Shah, Hizbollah consisted of Lebanese who belonged to the Shi'a sect of Islam. They were the first to use suicide bombings, assassinations, and the capture of Israeli soldiers for torture and execution as a tactic of humiliation against the enemy. However, its victories only provoked retaliation by Israel against Lebanese targets (Norton, 2007; Qassem, 2005; Shapira, 1988). Although Hizbollah denied it at the time, the group and not the PLO as had been widely believed is credited with the 1982 assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese Christian political leader Bashir Gemayel who had just then been elected President, the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1984 attack on the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut, and the kidnapping and detention of US and other Western hostages in Lebanon. In 2004, Hizbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah publicly admitted after the death of one of its senior terrorists that the group had been working with the PLO for some time and that it gets support from Syria (Alagha, 2007). Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ is one of the oldest militant Palestinian groups in the Gaza strip that had its origins in the 1970s. It is committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war (or Jihad) and vehemently opposes the Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian Authority. The U.S., because of its support for Israel, has been identified as the militant group's enemy, but it has not carried out any attacks on U.S. soil. It is headquartered in Syria, receives funding from Iran, and conducts operations against Israeli and Israeli-related targets in Jordan and Lebanon. It conducts attacks in October to commemorate the 1995 murder in Malta of a former leader. There are reports (Wright, 2001, p. 95) that PIJ is a front of the Hizbollah and is its militant armed group, attacking non-Israeli targets in Europe, and that it was also responsible for bombing the U.S. Marine barracks and embassy in Lebanon in 1983. These three groups have a global network, are vehemently anti-Israel and against those who support Israel like the U.S., and do not show signs of letting up on the struggle against what they perceive to be a legitimate cause. Terrorist groups like these should not be trusted because the key principle on which they base their actions - that a noble end justifies even criminal means - make it easy for them to justify just about anything, even lying blatantly during official negotiations. Terrorist organizations use fear to meet political ends and can only be thwarted by using fear. These groups are organized and have a clear formal structure and are supported by their host countries, so any efforts to thwart their power should make use of the formal government structures in place in those countries. Terrorists always operate from a base with the approval of their host governments. Answer to Question 3 The Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) or the Kurdistan Workers Party is primarily a separatist movement that seeks an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. The PKK changed its name to KADEK and then to Kongra Gele Kurdistan, although PKK is still used by the movement. It was established in the early 1970s as a Marxist-Leninist group with the goal of forming an independent socialist Kurdish state. The goal has been modified into winning some autonomy for the Kurds. It was led by its founder, Abdullah Ocalan, until his capture in 1999. Geography, politics and history have conspired to render 30 million Kurds the largest stateless people in the Middle East. The Government of Turkey, where most of these Kurds have settled, has long denied the Kurdish population, located largely in the southeast, the basic political, cultural, and linguistic rights. The PKK did not resort to terrorism until the mid-1980s when it started using kidnappings and suicide bombings against civilian, military, and state targets. Targets have included foreign tourists, Turkish diplomatic offices, and regular civilians. When efforts by the Turkish armed forces pushed PKK to retreat to bases in northern Iraq, the group changed its focus to the use of political means, but when this failed, the group once again turned to terrorist tactics. The PKK's ultimate goal is the creation of an independent socialist Kurdish state in a territory which it claims as Kurdistan, an area that comprises parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria, and northwestern Iran. These four countries oppose the formation of a Kurdish state which would mean cutting a portion of their territories. Over 37,000 people have been killed in the Turkey-PKK conflict since 1984 from terrorist acts against civilian and military targets, mostly in Turkey. The situation of the Kurds is similar to that of ethnic groups displaced by war in the Middle East. The solution to their problem is complex, because unless all four independent states where the Kurds claim some territory agree to give up the lands, the same conflict between Israel and Palestine will continue to plague the four states affected. The Kurds have two other choices: first, to convince one of the states to give them land, and second, to learn how to integrate themselves into the societies where they currently live. Integration does not necessarily mean losing one's identity, and it is a better option than losing one's life. Again, the solution is not as straightforward as that, because although these four countries are predominantly Muslim, they do not trust one another (Global Security, 2007). Answer to Question 4 Osama bin Laden is the son of a wealthy Saudi Arabian businessman. Raised a Sunni Moslem, he studied at a university in Riyadh where he was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, bin Laden joined a militia of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdullah Azzam, establishing military training bases in Afghanistan and founding a support network that provided recruits and money through worldwide centers, including the U.S., which together with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported the campaign of the militias against the Soviet army, which admitted defeat and left Afghanistan in 1988 (White, 2006). After the Afghan War, bin Laden and Azzam founded Al Qaeda to capitalize on the network they had established during the war. When Azzam was assassinated in 1989, bin Laden became the undisputed leader, sending fighters to wars in Somalia, the Balkans, and Chechnya to fight the Soviets until the collapse of the USSR in 1989-90. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda opposed the U.S. stationing of military troops during the first Gulf War in 1990, and from then on declared a campaign of terrorism against the Saudi rulers and the U.S. Bin Laden was deported in 1992 and his Saudi citizenship was revoked in 1994 (White, 2006; Kushner, 2004). From 1991 to 1996, bin Laden and Al Qaeda launched attacks in Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia with the help of Iran. In 1996, he moved to Afghanistan and allied with the ruling Taliban which he considered the model of an Islamic state, and it was from here that in 1998, bin Laden and several leading Muslim militants declared a jihad against America. There followed bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, an attack against a U.S. destroyer in Yemen in 2000, and its most devastating attack in the U.S. in September 2001. Bin Laden's wants the establishment of Islamic states governed according to Sharia law, the overthrow of the Saudi ruling family whom he considers as false Muslims, the expulsion of American troops from Saudi Arabia and from the Middle East, and the punishment of what he calls the four enemies of Islam: Jews, Americans, heretics (includes Christians), and the Shi'ite Muslims. Bin Laden also opposes any other political system like democracy, communism, or socialism because these are not compatible with an Islamic state (Kushner, 2004; White, 2006). Al Qaeda and bin Laden are closely intertwined and depend on a wide global network of funds, recruitment, and terrorist agents. The best way to remove the threat is to remove the head and to destroy the network by tracking down and putting a stop to the financial transactions that allow the network to operate. Negotiating with terrorist groups only gives them time to regroup and solidify their position, so negotiating with Al Qaeda is not feasible. Given America's capability to track down criminals, it is only a matter of time before bin Laden is caught. Answer to Question 5 Any advice to the President or some high-ranking government official about terrorism would include six lessons I learned from this course. The first lesson is not to negotiate with terrorists but with duly-elected governments. Negotiation may be seen as a way to save innocent lives, but past lessons show that it is a means of publicity for the terrorist cause and that terrorists follow a different moral code and readily repudiate agreements. Negotiating may save some lives now, but doing so only endangers more lives in the future (White, 2006; Heymann, 2001; Lapan & Sandler, 1988). Second, terrorist organizations have to be dealt with as criminal organizations, which they are. The moment a terrorist organization raises its head, the power of the law must hit hard and fast. This is easier said than done because terrorist organizations are fluid and difficult to track down with accuracy. Even the majority of members of terrorist organizations are afraid to suffer and die, and when they realize the futility of terrorism, they would resort to political means (Victoroff, 2005). Third, the effective long-term solution against terrorism is to win the hearts and minds of the people who support terrorist organizations. Many of these terrorist organizations carry out social activities using legitimate institutions to improve their image or as a channel for raising funds and making their cause more widely known, gaining more sympathizers. Any anti-terrorist effort must show the positive alternatives to the utopia that terrorists propose to the society that supports them. Fourth, there is a need to improve the intelligence capabilities of the U.S. that has been neglected since the end of the Cold War. This is a lesson the U.S. learned the hard way on 9/11, when it had the information it needed about the threats to national security, but because the intelligence services were weakened by internal politics and poor financial support, it could not act as decisively as it used to do (Rosendorff & Sandler, 2004). Fifth, the destructive arsenal that terrorists can use against legitimate governments is quite extensive and can go beyond guns, bullets, and explosives. We must expect that terrorists are developing the use of weapons of a biological, electronic, or psychological nature that would inflict more casualties and greater damage to social infrastructure (Victoroff, 2005). Lastly, expect that terrorist organizations would sprout from the least likely places, including for example right-wing Americans who oppose trade with China, or disillusioned immigrants from Asia and Latin America who are already in the country. This may seem like paranoia, but the most effective way to fight terrorism is to uproot it even before it springs up by being one step ahead. Reference List Alagha, J. (2007). The shifts in Hizbullah's ideology: Religious ideology, political ideology, and political program. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Andersen, M. (2004). All the power: Revolution without illusion. New York: Punk Planet Books, p. 178 Bove, L. F. & Kaplan, L.D. (1995). From the eye of the storm: Regional conflicts and the philosophy of peace. New York: Rodopi Press, p. 217. Global Security (2007). "Profile of Kongra-Gel Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)." Globalsecurity.com. Available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/pkk.htm [Accessed 28 October 2007]. Heymann, P.B. (2001). Dealing with terrorism: An overview. International Security, 26, 24-38. Kushner, H.W. (2002). Encyclopedia of terrorism. London: Sage, p.160. Lapan, H.E. & Sandler, T. (1988). To bargain or not to bargain: That is the question. American Economic Review, 78, 16-21. Norton, A.R. (2007). Hezbollah: A short history (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Qassem, N. (2005). Hizbullah: The story from within. Beirut: Saqi Books. Rosendorff, B.P. & Sandler, T. (2004). Too much of a good thing The proactive response dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48, 657-71. Shapira, S. (1988). The origins of Hizballah. The Jerusalem Quarterly, 46 (Spring), 115-30. Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 3-42. White, J. R. (2006). Terrorism and homeland security (5th ed.). New York: Thomson Wadsworth. Wright, R. (2001). Sacred rage. New York: Simon & Schuster. Read More