Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons - Research Paper Example

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons History of the CCW The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was initially accepted by 52 s in Geneva, on October 10, 1980. The Convention entered into force in December 1983. Its general purpose is illustrated by the full title of the Agreement: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Despite identifying several major issues which arguably compromise the CCW as an effective international instrument, Dr Philip Spoerri, in delivering a statement to the Third Review Conference in 2006, on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, referred to the 1980 Convention as ‘a cornerstone of international efforts’ to protect civilians and spare combatants (Spoerri, 2006). Nevertheless, some of its serious limitations, and a perceived ineffectuality led Mathews to describe the CCW in the 1980s as ‘a neglected treaty’ (Mathews, 2001, p.997). Despite this, interest in the CCW was somewhat renewed as global interest in the devastating effects of anti-personnel mines increased. This movement was galvanised by the formation, in 1992, of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which was joined by many States, as well as some Non-Governmental Organisations. Under this pressure, a CCW Conference was arranged for 1995/6 – the First CCW Review Conference, in Vienna. In the three decades since the original CCW was agreed, its competence has been considerably extended, to cover, for example, domestic armed conflict, laser weapons intended to cause permanent blindness, and restrictions on landmines and booby traps. The CCW currently incorporates five Protocols. Protocol I restricts weapons containing non-detectable fragments; Protocol II restricts landmines and booby traps; Protocol III restricts incendiary weapons; Protocol IV restricts blinding laser weapons; and Protocol V sets out guidelines for removing and safely destroying explosive remnants from former war zones. Negotiations are taking place in three rounds in the present year in order to conclude a new Protocol on cluster munitions. Fig.1. The Structure of the CCW. Source: The United Nations Office at Geneva: Disarmament. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Effectiveness of CCW Among the reasons for the CCW’s relative ineffectuality is, as Abramson points out, that the Convention ‘lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms, and spells out no formal process for resolving compliance concerns’ (Abramson, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) At a Glance). Additionally, and State which has signed up to the Convention is able to leave it at will. The mechanism for doing so is simple: the State in question must notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their intentions, and a year later, they are free from their obligations under the Convention. The States party to the agreement have also, crucially, been unable to formulate an effective means of enforcing compliance to its protocols, and to the spirit of the Convention. This lack of real and effective compulsion for recalcitrant parties has been a problem for many agreements regulated by the United Nations. However, in recent years, signs have been growing that the political will behind such reforms is growing in such influential States as the United States. Fig. 2. States which have ratified Protocol V of the CCW States which have ratified Protocol V are shown in pink; those which are party to the CCW but have not ratified Protocol V are shown in dark gray. Source: WikipediaCommons. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010) The failure of many States signatory to the CCW to ratify all of its provisions is another factor which weakens the influence of the Convention as a whole. At present, the UK, for example, has ratified only Protocols I-IV. While the UK delegation claims that it hopes o ratify Protocol V soon, there is little indication of this at present (UK Permanent Representation to the conference of Disarmament, 2010). Indeed, the efficacy of the CCW is surely lessened by the fact that States only have to accede to a minimum of two of its five protocols in order to be party to the Convention as a whole. This allows some States to satisfy domestic and international opinion by being seen to adhere to the Convention, while in reality only adhering to those Protocols which least affect its perceived commercial and military interests. The UK is not alone in failing to accede, as yet to Protocol V. It is joined in this category by some of the major military players, and fellow permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, including the United States, China and Russia. Additionally, no provision has yet been made on small-caliber bullets, an issue which has caused much concern among Human Rights groups. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, in its address to the Third Review Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, expressed concern over the development of ‘bullets which explode within the human body (Spoerri, 2006). Such materiel would presumably be regulated by a Protocol on small-caliber bullets. Abramson was surely right in identifying the two most controversial issues for the CCW as whether they should negotiated on restricting or prohibiting cluster munitions, and whether they should negotiate on restricting or prohibiting the use of anti-vehicle mines (Abramson, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) At a Glance). As Wiebe, Brehm and Borrie put it, it is ‘clear that CCW delegations disagree on what approach to take to take to defining, prohibiting, or regulating other munitions’ (Wiebe, Brehm and Borrie, 2008). Some very influential and militarily significant States, which are also party to the Convention, notably the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, have opposed restrictions on both of these weapon types. There are clearly very deep splits of opinion among the States party to the CCW, given that against Russia and China, the United States of America has strongly supported negotiations on restricting the use of anti-vehicle mines. The United States, in turn, flatly opposed negotiations on cluster munitions restrictions until as late as June 2007. Even after this shift of opinion, the United States seems to regard a total prohibition as undesirable. Divisions between those States which seek to regulate, and those which are satisfied only by total prohibition of certain weapon types has been a major stumbling block to progress in conferences of the CCW. The effectiveness and practical utility of the CCW as a legal instrument is somewhat compromised by the open divisions among its signatory states over what should be restricted, how tough these restrictions should be, and whether there are any grounds for imposing a total ban on any types of munitions. These serious and continuing disagreements, which have been only partly amenable to solution by negotiation, have a deeply negative impact on the influence held by the CCW. Taking the 1995/6 First Review Conference as a case study, we can observe several of the factors which have curtailed the effectiveness of the CCW. The central issue at this Conference was whether an agreement on the restriction or prohibition of landmines should be negotiated. The State delegations began the Conference in a distinctly divided atmosphere. A group of some 20 States proposed a total ban, a group which had grown to around 40 States by the end of the Conference. Opposed was a group of States who were open to the notion of strengthening the provisions of Protocol II, but who were unequivocally opposed to an outright ban on the use of anti-personnel mines. These difficult negotiations, referred to by Mathews as ‘a long and torturous process’ (Mathews, 2001, p.1000) progressed at such a sluggish pace that the date for the end of the Conference had to be twice extended, moving into the following year. Eventually, some agreement was reached, with the CCW being extended to deal with internal armed conflict as well as international conflict, and with all member States being obligated to prevent violations of the Protocols, and, if and where violations have occurred, to impose appropriate sanctions on the transgressors. However, in a pattern which has become common with the CCW, the failure to agree on an outright prohibition of landmines led to such frustration among the large group of pro-prohibition States that they decided to work outside of the CCW mechanisms and conclude a separate agreement. As the cluster munitions issue would later lead to the Oslo Process, so, in 1997, did the pressing issue of landmines lead to the ‘Ottawa Treaty’, or the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction’. Mathews seems almost to present the Ottawa Treaty as a total indictment of the CCW’s cumbersome mechanisms and ineffectual approach, when he states that by June 30, 2001, 117 States had ratified the Ottawa Treaty, while only 85 States had ratified the CCW, with Protocol II only being ratified by 59 States, and Protocol IV by just 56 States (Mathews, 2001, p.1002). Indeed, he goes on to suggest that some States might see the Ottawa Treaty as a replacement for an apparently defunct CCW. He poses the question, ‘Why do we need to join the CCW if we have already joined the Ottawa Treaty?’ (Mathews, 2001, p.1004). As Abramson records, by 2007 some members of the CCW had again become so frustrated by the failure to reach conclusive agreements, especially on the issue of cluster munitions restrictions, than in February 2007, a group of States, led by Norway, opened independent negotiations to impose a total ban on cluster munitions (Abramson, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) At a Glance). By abandoning the CCW mechanisms, and the controversy-plagued Review Conferences of the Convention, as a means of pushing through extensions of the competence of the CCW, these member States demonstrated a severe lack of faith in the ability of the CCW to bring about real reform in the use of weapons which cause indiscriminate harm to civilians, or excessive injury to combatants. The work of these States culminated in the Oslo Process in early 2007, which was concluded with a Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Dublin in May 2008. The CCM was signed by delegates of 94 States (notably more than the CCW attracted in 1980) at the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008. By May 2009, 96 States had signed, 35 of which had had some involvement in manufacturing, trading or using cluster munitions in the past. There are now 107 signatories to the CCM, and 37 States have ratified the agreement. Fig.3. States which have signed and ratified the CCM Source: Cluster Munition Colation: Treaty Status. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010] The records kept by the UK Delegation to the CCW demonstrate that, despite the best of intentions on the part of some States, the Convention signatories have been unable to overcome the major controversies with which they are faced. Delegations are due to meet on three occasions in the course of 2010, with the aim of producing a new Protocol, which will restrict the use of cluster munitions. The comments of the UK delegation regarding the first meeting, held from 12-16 April, under the Chairmanship of the Philippine representative, Jesus Ricardo Domingo, is quite representative of the problems faced by Conferences of the CCW: ‘Despite his best efforts to inject some enthusiasm and energy into the debate, old problems that have divided the room before resurfaced’ (UK Permanent Representation to the conference of Disarmament, 2010). It is obvious why some delegations consider the Review Conference system to be ineffective. As well as the effectiveness or otherwise of CWW mechanisms in compelling agreement among the signatory States, we should also consider whether the CCW has had any impact in actually reducing the use of indiscriminate and disproportionately damaging conventional weapons in war zones around the world. It is deeply worrying that despite Protocol II on landmines, the use of such munitions underwent an almost exponential growth throughout the 1980s (Wiebe, Brehm and Borrie, 2008). Mathews supports this, writing of ‘the pioneering nature but limited impact of the CCW in the 1980s’ (Mathews, 2001, p.991). In the 1980s, anti-personnel mines caused extensive damage, and actually became more readily available, and more affordable, than they had been before the CCW was concluded. By 1992, up to 120 million landmines had been deployed in parts of 64 States worldwide (Mathews, 2001, p.998). Furthermore, the very wording of the agreement is in parts ambiguous, and does not involve the sort of uncompromising compulsion which one might expect or hope for from such a Convention. As an example, it compels signatories to ‘effectively ensure’, with regard to cluster munitions, that ‘unexploded submunitions would no longer function as explosive submunitions’ (Wiebe, Brehm and Borrie, 2008). As Wiebe, Brehm and Borrie (2008) point out, ‘effectively’ is ‘a very open term’. Perhaps this ambiguity reflects a lack of political will on the part of several signatory States to firmly commit themselves to the spirit of the agreement. This is supported by the lack of agreement on producing a timeline for the conclusion of new Protocols. While the issues covered by the CCW are desperately urgent for those in war zones, or those living in former war zones containing considerable unexploded material and explosive remnants, some major military States, including India, the United States, Russia and Pakistan have questioned whether a timeline is needed at all. These States are among the major producers, purchasers, and stockpilers of military equipment. During preparatory discussions in the course of the 1970s, it was decided that the CCW should function as a framework convention. By being divided up into several Protocols, it permitted the possibility that new Protocols could be concluded and ratified, to take account of potential future developments in armament technologies and combat methods. There is some debate over whether the flexibility and adaptability of the CCW has made it more or less effective as an instrument. SWOT Analysis of CCW In some ways, the CCW has made some notable advances and considerable successes. Among these is the agreement of Protocol IV on laser weapons. As Mathews asserts, this was ‘regarded as a landmark in arms control history’, because it was negotiated even before such weapons had ever been deployed in a battle scenario (Mathews, 2001, p.999). The CCW was undeniably pioneering in its way – when it was concluded in 1980, it stood as the first treaty since the 1920s which regulated conventional weapons. However, as Mathews notes, it ‘was seen as a very modest achievement’, as many of those who had urged its creation ‘felt that military considerations had been given much greater priority than humanitarian concerns’ (Mathews, 2001, p.996). It certainly does seem that some of the more reluctant and recalcitrant signatories to the Convention, and notably the United States, Russia and China, are also those which are among the world’s top producers, exporters and stockpilers of weaponry and munitions. These major military players have proved particularly reluctant to adopt firm new Protocols, and their role at Review Conferences had largely involved watering down proposals put forward by less militarily significant States. A key weakness of the CCW is therefore, perhaps, that although it needs the support of major producers, exporters, purchasers, and stockpilers of military materiel in order to enjoy any efficacy on the ground, the involvement of such States in the negotiation process leads to a considerable moderation of any proposals put forward. This paradox does much to explain the fact that while many signatories sought complete bans on several types of conventional weapons, the CCW has done no more than lay out regulations and limitations for their use, while some items, such as small-caliber bullets, were not even included in the original agreement. Of course, in some ways, the CCW has become a stronger instrument over time, as its competence has been extended. For example, in 1996, Protocol II was strengthened, and now requires States to enforce compliance with the Convention with their own territories, and, where violations occur, to ensure the execution of justice. The CCW has also been extended to cover, for example, internal armed conflicts, and the restriction of laser weapons. The frustration felt by those State delegations which, in 2007, broke away from the CCW process in order to engage with the Oslo Process on cluster munitions, in echoed by Wiebe, Brehm and Borrie, when they ask, ‘is nothing better than something, if that something doesn’t make a difference to people on the ground?’ (Wiebe, Brehm and Borrie, 2008). As to the lack of verification mechanisms, surely the CCW would be more effective if it requested that all signatories should provide information of their relevant activities in all areas covered under the Protocols of the Convention. Aside from the strengths and weaknesses of the CWW itself, external conditions have both helped and hindered the progress of the CCW in various ways. In terms of the negative influence of external events, the growth in the use of some particularly indiscriminate conventional weapons, and especially anti-personnel mines, during the period since the CWW was first concluded, has somewhat undermined the credibility of the CWW as an international instrument. Conferences of the CWW had grave difficulty in reaching agreement on what action to take in limiting and/or prohibiting these weapons, despite intense public pressure in countries worldwide to send a firm message urgently. The increased use of cluster munitions and public pressure to act quickly to incorporate them into the CWW also caused deep divisions among signatories – so much so that many States decided to act outside of the CWW’s official mechanisms to conclude a specific treaty to deal with this issue. Even in 2010, the CWW is struggling to complete the formulation of a new Protocol dealing with cluster munitions. The length of time it has taken the CWW to respond to both anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions show that, despite the apparent flexibility of the CWW, in terms of the ability to add new Protocols to the Convention as and when the need arises, member States have, in reality, found it difficult to reach a real consensus, even when pressed to do so by public opinion and humanitarian crisis. Of course, in other ways, external factors have worked in favour of the CWW. In the period since the CWW was first enacted, militarily significant States have gradually come under increasing pressure, often from their own people, to take a more responsible attitude to the weapons they use, produce and export. Partly for this reason, many States which were opposed to the very notion of a Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons are now signatories to the treaty. While the CWW is by no means universally accepted as a guideline on the use of conventional weapons, and while many States which have signed up to it in principle are yet to ratify some of its Protocols (notably Protocols II and IV), progress has been made. Future of CCW As of April 2010, 111 States had ratified the CCW (UK Permanent Representation to the conference of Disarmament, 2010). The three conferences to be held in 2010 have the aim of establishing a new Protocol which will restrict the use of cluster munitions. While it seems likely that the deep divisions among signatory States may defeat this attempt to build a strong Protocol, the prohibition of the use of inaccurate cluster munitions is one of the great future challenges of the CCW. The International Committee of the Red Cross urged the CCW States to place a ban on inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions, to ban the use of cluster munitions near populated areas, and to destroy and remaining stocks of inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions (Spoerri, 2006). There are some signs that, in some militarily significant States at least, the political will behind such measures is strengthening. On March 11 2009, in the United States, President Obama signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act for 2009, which has no time limit, and contains a provision that no cluster munitions should be transferred or sold unless the submunitions are proven to have a functioning rate of at least 99%, and that they must ‘only be used against clearly defined military targets’ (Brehm, 2009). While Brehm points out that this document still contains many open and potentially ambiguous terms, it is certainly much more restrictive than previous US legislation on the use and trade in cluster munitions. In other States also, there have been signs of an increasingly firm commitment to some conclusive action on cluster munitions. Spain took the decision to unilaterally destroy all of its stockpiles of cluster munitions – a clear gesture of intent that was expected to be followed by several other States. Brehm justifiably opines that this ‘bodes well for the effective translation of treaty obligations into concrete national implementation measures’ (Brehm, 2009). Apart from such unilateral action on the part of individual signatories, there are some key points that should be borne in mind by conferences of the CCW, if that Convention is to become an effective instrument for the protection of civilians and combatants worldwide. Mathews proposes three main objectives which would ensure this – ‘to recognize and reaffirm the relevance and value of the CCW; to promote increased acceptance of it, with a view to achieving universality; and to increase respect for/adherence to its provisions’ (Mathews, 2001, p.1004). The first objective is of fundamental importance. At present, membership of the CCW is low in relation to membership of other international treaties, and even in relation to some other international arms agreements. The CCW would enjoy far greater force if it was granted the confidence on an overwhelming number of States, and if those States who sign up to it were to ratify all of its Protocols. There has certainly been progress in this respect, given that many of world’s largest producers and stockpilers of weapons are now signatories to the CCW, despite having expressed deep concerns about any such agreement when proposals were first drawn up in the 1970s. However, much more remains to be done, if the CCW is to gain the international legitimacy needed for it to function as an effective Convention. Just as important, however, is the need for mechanisms to ensure compliance to the Protocols of the CCW. Apart from requesting that individual States ensure its application in their territories, the Convention has little binding force on its signatories. In order for the CCW to be afforded with more respect on the world stage, such mechanisms must be introduced. What form such mechanisms should take is a difficult question, but a Peer Review Mechanism, such as that which was instituted to encourage better governance among African States, might be a starting point. We should not denigrate the achievement of the CCW, and over the past three decades, the groundwork has been put in for the Convention to eventually become an effective international instrument. Keeping this progress in mind, it would be imprudent to abandon the CCW in favour a new Convention, which would quite probably go on to face many of the same internal divisions and controversies that have affected the performance of the CCW. Instead, the existing Convention must be reformed from within, and should perhaps aim to eventually incorporate those treaties, such as the Oslo Accords and the Ottawa Treaty, which were born out of frustration at the CCW’s lack of action. Overall, therefore, I am inclined to support Mathews’ conclusion that, once some alterations have been made, and with some positive action and political will on the part on member States, the CCW still has the potential to play a very useful and significant role, as part of the ‘tapestry of treaties’ which aim to protect those involved in and affected by warfare (Mathews, 2001, p.1008-9). In this capacity it can stand alongside and supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War, together with its 1977 Additional Protocols. Bibliography Abramson, J. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) At a Glance [Internet], Arms Control Association. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Borrie, J. (2008) A Global Year of Action on Cluster Munitions [Internet], Disarmament Insight. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Brehm, M. (2009) On this day...change can happen! [Internet], Disarmament Insight. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Brehm, M. (2009) A step towards a U.S. cluster munitions ban? [Internet], Disarmament Insight. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Cluster Munition Coalition (2010) The Solution [Internet], Cluster Munition Coalition. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Cluster Munitions Coalition (2010) 107 States on Board the Convention on Cluster Munitions [Internet], Cluster Munitions Coalition. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Fitzgerald, D. (2009) CCW Protocol V State Parties [Internet], WikipediaCommons. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Mathews, R.J. (2001) The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons: A useful framework despite earlier disappointments. International Review of the Red Cross, 83 (844) December, pp. 991-112. Spoerri, P. (2006) ICRC Statement to the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons [Internet], International Committee of the Red Cross. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010] The United Nations (1980, 1995 and 1996) Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects [Internet], United Nations. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. Disarmament [Internet], The United Nations Office at Geneva. Available from: [Accessed 23 July 2010]. 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