U.S. Military Campaign Planning for OIF from 2002 to 2007 - Admission/Application Essay Example

Evaluate U.S. Military Campaign Planning For OIF from 2002 To 2007 Operational design and art provide a connection between tactics and strategy —they assist the joint force component commanders to administer actions, which will generate the conditions to accomplish strategic objectives, as well as the desired end state (Mullen 29). Operational art is mainly regarded as the sphere of senior commanders (those managing a dual force or Service/functional part of a joint force) due to the education, experience, judgment, intuition, and vision projected of senior military officers and essential to link the precise actions of the joint force to extensive strategic end states (Mullen 29). Operational design goes beyond operational art’s vision with an artistic methodology, which helps staffs and commanders understand the nature of the operational environment, the difficulty facing them, and potential broad answers to the crisis. The operational design utilizes various design tools (elements) such as a line of operations, objective, and decisive point, which help the commander and staff create and purify the wide-ranging approach that will direct detailed planning. Overview of OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom, abbreviated as OIF, was started on 20th March 2003, but some significant considerations were made before this time (Mullen 29). The urgent goal, as affirmed by the Bush Administration, was to eradicate the current regime, including demolishing its capacity to employ weapons of mass destruction, as well as making them available to terror groups (Gordon and Trainor 13). The greater goal included assisting Iraqis to construct “a new-fangled Iraq, which is free and prosperous.” Understanding of the Operational Environment (OE) and Definition of the Problem One method to visualize and understand the operational environment (OE) is through using a set of interacting systems (Mullen, 33). This is not a fresh approach as the United States military is at ease thinking of the key elements of a foe’s air defense mechanism, the workings of their own logistics system, or the nature of a nation’s social or political systems. Portraying systems, as well as their associations in graphic forms can ease a universally shared understanding of the operational environment in the midst of inter-organizational partners, thus promoting fused action. The United States used a systems-thinking approach, which refers to a manner of studying and working within interactively multifaceted systems, to understand the OE of Iraq. These complex systems were those that were more characteristic of the OE. The commanders knew that they should be transparent with minors and persuade them that their ideas, views, and perspectives are priceless to the victory of the organization (Mullen, 33). The commanders knew that they must be careful to avoid organizational hurdles and be willing to share the work of command, including permitting staff officers and subordinates to exercise experimentation and health initiative. None of this was new as prominent commanders had done it before. The message here is that these conditions were fundamental to the practice of design. They were tested before, and where they are absent, the design simply did not work. The commander knew that in order to tackle such an OE, they had to establish a baseline, set specific conditions, which were essential to the OE, and define the problem accurately. Iterative and interactive discussion, as well as critical thinking, assisted the JFC and staff to comprehend and explain the problem. The commanders knew that they had to fight successfully to complete the process and withdraw all their forces from Iraqi and Kuwait. They also wanted to restore Kuwait's legitimate regime. Thirdly, the commanders wanted to guarantee the stability and security of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations (Mullen, 45). Finally, the commanders wanted to guarantee the safety of American citizens abroad. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Initial Operational Approach For a majority of the United States law-makers, the 11th September 2001, terrorist attacks heightened or catalyzed general concerns that weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of major terrorists (Gordon and Trainor 67). Echoing on those concerns, the initial National Security Strategy used by the Bush Regime, in September 2002, stressed on the policy of defensive, or anticipatory, act, to prevent hostile acts by the enemies, even if doubt remains as to the place and time of the enemy’s attack. All through 2002, the affirmed position of the United States was to forcefully seek Iraqi agreement with United Nation’s Security Council Resolutions about the inspections regime, as holding out the likelihood of United Nation’s Chapter VII act if Iraq did not obey (Ricks 98). Strengths The U.S. Could Not Be Easily Manipulated Some of the strengths that the U.S. showed people are that they could not be easily manipulated. According to the Bush Administration, unlike other regimes, using force was a key way of dealing with the enemy (Gordon and Trainor 67). Hence, the Bush Administration immediately deployed the U.S. Army to deal with anybody who would not agree to the rules. A crucial advantage of this approach was that Bush was able to take down major enemies such as Saddam Hussein (Dale 9). Well Equipped Army Also, the use of force, as well as high-level tech, made is easier force the U.S to transverse around Iraq, which was also a technique that spared their lives (Mullen 57). A person could only image what could have happened to the U.S. troops if they had decided not to use force in these people. Finally, U.S’s approach to the Iraq war made it hard for their enemies to take advantage of them because they feared their high-level tech (Ricks 98). Weaknesses Inadequate Protection of Troops However, some of the weaknesses of the U.S. approach to the Iraq war were that they failed to protect the lives of their troops fully. This is because quite some U.S troops lost their lives due to the fighting. Also, U.S.’s approach created tension all through the world as people feared that a religious war would occur between the Christians and the Muslims. High Cost Also, the approach cost the United States taxpayers quite a huge amount of funds. Financial experts calculated that the war cost the United States almost $4 trillion (Ricks 99). How Planners and Commanders Assessed the Campaign For military planners, as well as their commanders, the guidance to utilize a rationalized force reflected an essential change away from the Powell Doctrine, recognized after the previous head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which argued that force, when used, must be overwhelming. The planning procedure began early (Gordon and Trainor 56). Before Thanksgiving, back in 2001, President Bush requested Secretary Rumsfeld to create a plan for government removal in Iraq, and Secretary Rumsfeld right away gave that task to the commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), known as General Tommy Franks. The planning procedure for combat operations was at first very “close hold,” linking only some key leaders, as well as small groups, of confident planners at every level. As the procedure progressed, the number of people involved increased, but key individuals of the plans were still compartmentalized, such that fewer people had accessibility on all aspects of the plans. In the summer of 2002, military planners and commanders created an alleged “hybrid” version of two plans that reflected vital elements of the “Running Start” plan which meant beginning with an air raid then launching the ground war as other ground forces flowed into terrain (Dale 24). Explicitly, the plan urged for: Presidential notice five days earlier; 11 days to transport forces; two weeks for the air raid; the launch of the ground raid while ground forces continued to flow into terrain; and a total raid, which would last up to four months. This arrangement, accepted for action, went on to be recognized as the “5-11-16-125” event even after the numbers had changed. By January 1st, 2003, at the CENTCOM Conference of Commanders hosted in Tampa by General Franks; the plans had combined around a modified edition of “Generated Start” (Gordon and Trainor 57). The process incorporated an extremely short initial air operation, including missiles and bombs — a couple of days, instead of a couple of weeks. The number of forces, which would start the ground battle continued to be altered, usually downward, in successive days. On 29th January 2003, Army commanders discovered that they would go into Iraq with only two Divisions — less than their projections to that point had echoed (Ricks 158). Elements of the operational design Some of the significant elements in the operational design included termination, the center of gravity and decisive points (Mullen 128). Termination Effective or successful planning cannot take place without a clear perceptive of the end state and the circumstances, which must be present to end military operations (Mullen 129). Recognizing when to terminate or end military operations, as well as how to safeguard achieved advantages, is vital to attaining the national planned end state. Center Of Gravity A center of gravity refers to a source of moral or power, physical strength, as well as resistance (Mullen 133). A COG is the hub of all movement and power, on which everything relies. For the U.S to emerge victorious in this war, they had to study all important stakeholders in this warfare and gain their support, as well as know the parties that were in support for Iraq. The COG element assisted them friendly advisories who could assist them take down the Iraq regime. Decisive Points Commanders identified decisive points, which assisted them to determine how and where to apply pleasant capabilities to take advantage of adversary vulnerabilities (Mullen 134). A decisive point was a geographic area, critical factor, specific key event or function, which, if acted upon, then allows a commander to create a marked advantage over an opponent or contributes significantly to attaining success. The Degree to Which Current Joint Planning Doctrine Incorporates Lessons from OIF The current joint planning doctrine incorporates lessons from OIF in that; it is instituting an approach centered on using targeted operations accomplished by special operations forces, airpower, and the intellect community, along with cooperating with partners to accomplish its goals. The Bush Administration did not incorporate special operational forces, which are mostly used in keeping the peace, but decided to use forcefully (Gordon and Trainor 107). However, the current doctrine decided to use special operations forces through which is managed to bring down some of the most wanted terrorists such as Osama Bin Laden. Since 2002 to 2007, Bush made small progress in defeating the insurgency or offering safety for Iraqis, while it has overextended the United States Army and reduced support for the war among the American citizens. Even though the idea of withdrawing at that time seemed to be a blunder, also staying on course, by all means, proved not to improve the matter (Dale 49). The new doctrine thought that a new approach would be needed in order to win in Iraq. This is why the new doctrine opted to remove the American troops from the nation. With no clear strategy in Iraq, the former doctrine had little chances of bringing success to the U.S, and that is why the new doctrine incorporated more ideas which would help it succeed in Iraq (Mullen 167). Conclusion Even though the Bush approach was successful considering that he took down Saddam Hussein, such a strategy will need at least a decade of dedication and a huge sum of taxpayers’ money, which will result in prolonged U.S. casualty rolls. However, this is the price, which the United States needs to pay if they are to achieve their commendable goals in Iraq. Are the American soldiers and American people willing to shell out that price? Only by offering them a clear strategy or approach for victory and a full interpretation of the sacrifices needed can the regime find out. Also, if the American citizens are not up to the task, then the regime must accept that it should settle for a much more humble goal: leveraging its fading influence to outsmart the Iraqis in developing a friend out of Iraq’s next despot. Works Cited Dale, Catherine. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress. N.p, 2008. Web. Gordon, Michael and Trainor, Bernard. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Print. Mullen, Mike. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning. N.p, 2011. Web. Ricks, Thomas. The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin Books, 2009. Print. Read More