Aspect of Military Intelligence: Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence - Research Paper Example

?Revisiting Abu Ghraib: HUMINT and Counterintelligence Deployed in the Global War Against Terror Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence constitute an integral aspect of military intelligence. It consists of a set of techniques and strategies designed to extract information from human sources that would aid in the fulfillment of the objectives of the military. It has been used throughout history in the interrogation of human prisoners from the opposite warring state. The Geneva Conventions and its protocols, as well as the Convention Against Torture, provided the safety mechanisms to ensure that no prisoners would be abused or subjected to torture. In 2004, however, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal erupted, putting the US’s human intelligence and counter-intelligence strategies at the center of international attention and generating massive criticism from human rights advocates. The perceived human rights violations that the Iraqi prisoners were subjected to were condemned and highlighted the need to review and make reforms in human intelligence and counter-intelligence in the military. This paper is an attempt to revisit exactly how human intelligence and counter-intelligence were deployed by the United States in Abu Ghraib. It begins by first discussing the rationale and purpose of HUMINT and counterintelligence, then it proceeds to discuss the means with which these strategies were deployed by US soldiers in Abu Ghraib, and finally, it looks into the reforms that were undertaken as a result of the worldwide controversy that was generated. The rationale and purpose of HUMINT and counterintelligence The primary justification for HUMINT and counterintelligence is reposed in the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, to wit: The United States faces substantial challenges to its security, freedom, and prosperity. Transnational terrorism, continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), asymmetric warfare, extremist movements, and failed states present severe challenges to a just and stable international order. Our ability to meet these challenges is threatened by the intelligence activities of traditional and non-traditional adversaries. Our adversaries – foreign intelligence services, terrorists, foreign criminal enterprises and cyber intruders – use overt, covert, and clandestine activities to exploit and undermine US national security interests. (2007: iv) In essence, therefore, the primary rationale for the adaption of HUMINT and counterintelligence is to adequately respond and neutralize the threats posed by the opponent. More specific to the Iraqi context , military intelligence and counterintelligence experts were purposely deployed in Abu Ghraib in a calculated effort to enforce an active quest in eliminating the fatal problem of insurgency. The same was also done in the hopes of gathering intelligence advantageous in maintaining a more viable democratic Iraq. The person in charge of Abu Ghraib in 2004, Brigadier General Jane Krapinski, “was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War” (Hersh, 2004). This strategy faced a number of challenges, not least of which was the nature of Iraqis their training and culture that makes them choose death over surrender. Another important purpose of HUMINT and counterintelligence specific to the Global War on Terror is that in Iraq, “it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish insurgents from citizens within the population” (Lane: 2009, 3). Hence, to avoid fatalities, it became necessary to extract inside information from insurgents that were captured. How HUMINT and counterintelligence were deployed: Abu Ghraib and the issue of human rights Abu Ghraib, which was already a prison in Iraq even before the war broke out, served as a significant place in gathering intelligence for the coalition forces. The originally Iraqi prison -- uninhabited and abandoned after its fall to the coalition forces -- was occupied, scrubbed and cleaned to serve as a detention prison manned by United States forces (Hersh, 2004). It became an ideal place for the US to extract information from their detainees. Most of those detained were arrested during regular inspections and operations. The ones targeted for HUMINT, however, were the ‘high value’ detainees who are suspected of being the principals or masterminds of the insurgencies (Hersh, 2004). These people were kept and imprisoned as a means of counterintelligence (CI) to ensure that no insurgent would be able to return to their group equipped with material to be used against them. Special Agent DeBatto who testified against the cruelty in Abu Ghraib was also a former U.S. Army Counterintelligence specialist. In Iraq, DeBatto led a tactical HUMINT team or THT whose primary objective is to gain actionable intelligence. These are valuable information which paved the way for many operations such as one involving the capture of the notorious sons of Saddam Hussein, Uday and Qusay. But the leakage of the photographs and videos took attention away from the valuable information extracted by HUMINT and focused attention on the cruel and inhuman conditions of the detainees. There had been blatant violations of the rights of the prisoners as the photographs that leaked out of Abu Ghraib confirm. The report filed by Major General Taguba on his inspection of the institution was a graphic representation of how the prison was run (Hersh, 2004). The pictures which started the whole controversy were proof enough of the culpability of the participants. The flagrant torture of the army subjected the detainees into performing sadistic acts which included sodomy, violence and intimidation. The abuse of the prisoners was comparable to the German torture employed during World War II (DeBatto, n.d.). There were explicit photographs that included a man masturbating in front of another which makes it even more repulsing as doing such are illegal and taboo in Islam. Some were stripped of their clothes while there are those who were intimidated by attacks of military dogs. The MPs were commissioned to become the prison guards of Abu Ghraib. SSG Frederick, the primary suspect in the abuses during the investigation, led his team and was later dismissed (Hersh, 2004). None of the means employed by them is permissible under any HUMINT or CI standards. Worse, Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence was not used appropriately and failed to maximize its potential in Abu Ghraib. Worse, there was an atmosphere of acceptance and routine which encouraged the personnel to continue with their abuse (Scherer & Benjamin, 2006). Reforms and Recommendations After 2004, the United States Congress has enacted a number of reforms to ensure that the scandal of Abu Ghraib will not repeat itself. For example, investigations have been conducted against those who have been pinpointed as perpetrators of torture and human rights abuses. Regulations on greater transparency have been put in place. Human rights advocates have spoken clearly against torture. The practice of hiring private contractors to conduct interrogation has also been put under scrutiny. Since 2009, the Abu Ghraib is now an Iraqi prison, but its lessons should remain with us and guide future military intelligence strategies. What needs to be changed are not individual policies, but the over-all mindset that renders human rights prescriptions optional, rather than sacred; and torture an acceptable strategy in the name of tactical advantage, rather than an antiquated form of warfare. To quote Human Rights Watch: “This pattern of abuse did not result from the acts of individual soldiers who broke the rules. It resulted from decisions made by the Bush administration to bend, ignore, or cast rules aside. Administration policies created the climate for Abu Ghraib….” Works Cited DeBatto, D. (n.d.). Testimony of former U.S. Army Counterintelligence Special Agent DeBatto, Previously assigned to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade in Iraq. Web. 31 July 2011. Hersh, Seymour M. “Torture at Abu Ghraib”. The New Yorker. 10 May 2004. Web. 31 July 2011. Human Rights Watch. “The Road to Abu Ghraib”. Human Rights Watch. 8 June 2004. Web. 1 August 2011. Lane, G.M. “USMC’s Lack of Human Intelligence Doctrine.” United States Marine Corps. 20 February 2009. Web. 1 August 2011. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America”. Director of National Intelligence. (2007). Web. 31 July 2011. Scherer, M., & Benjamin, M. “The Abu Ghraib Files: Standard Operating Procedure". The Salon. 14 March 2006. Web. 31 July 2011. Read More