The Battle for Fox Hill - Research Paper Example

?THE BATTLE FOR FOX HILL After the seizure of Seoul, in accordance with United Nation’s resolution to continue advance into North Korea, the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, had landed at Wonsan on October 26, 1950. The division was under the operational command of X Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M Almond, USA. The 7th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), commanded by Col. Homer L. Litzenberg, had been ordered to move to Hamhung and relieve the 26th Republic of Korea (ROK) Regiment engaged with Chinese Communists in the north. While marching on the road towards the Changjin Reservoir, also referred by its Japanese name as Chosin Reservoir, the Korean regiment had encountered fierce resistance near Sudong on October 28. Meanwhile, the Chinese forces had also checked the advance of Gen. Walton H. Walker’s Eighth Army south of the border, pushing them back to the Chongchon River. However, United Nations forces had no credible information on the numbers of Chinese troops accumulated across Yalu River on the Manchurian border by that time (Appleman, 1-5; Santelli, 35-36; Simmons, 1-12). Interrogation of 16 Chinese prisoners revealed that 42nd CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) Army had deployed its 124th, 125th and 126th Divisions to check the advance of the 1st Marine Division. On the morning of November 02, the 7th RCT relieved the 26th ROK Regiment without encountering any significant resistance. The 1st (Lt. Col. Raymond C. Davis) and 2nd (Lt. Col. Randolph S. D. Lockwood) Battalions, 7th Marines, were leading the advance, while 3rd Battalion (Maj. Maurice E. Roach) was positioned in the rear. Over the next five days, the 7th RCT fought against determined resistance from the Chinese 124th Division, pushing it north over the Funchilin Pass to Hagaru-ri. On November 13, the RCT received orders to capture Hagaru-ri and advance 40 miles north to the southern tip of Chosin Reservoir. The RCT had reached its objective by November 15. However, Smith was quite concerned over the long narrow stretch of his division against uncertain enemy size and determination. He had expressed his concerns in a personal letter to Cmdt. Marine Corps, Gen. Clifton B. Cates, stating, “I do not like the prospect of stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120 miles from Hamhung to the Manchurian border…I have little confidence in the tactical judgment of X Corps or the realism of their planning”. (Simmons, 13-35; BH, 36; Bevilacqua). On November 19-20. the Eighth Army captured the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. The 7th RCT had reached Yudam-ni by November 25. As the elements of 7the Infantry Division arrived at the eastern side of the Chosin Reservoir on November 25, the 5th RCT (Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray) had began movement to Yudam-ni. According to the plans, the 5th RCT was to pass through the lines of 7th RCT and lead the attack to Mupyong-ni west of the reservoir on the next day. On November 26, three captured enemy soldiers had revealed the presence of 58th, 59th, and 60th CCF Divisions of 20th CCF Army around Yudam-ni. On the night of November 25, a massive attack by Chinese in the west had destroyed three ROK divisions on the Eighth Army’s right flank, repulsing its advance. Now, the Chinese prime objective was destruction of the 1st Marine Division in the east. (Bevilacqua; Appleman, 7-8; Simmons, 40-47). The American high command was under the impression that China will never enter the war, and the resistance was merely a small force of Chinese volunteers. On November 27, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (Lt. Col. Harold S. Roise), launched the attack in the morning. The 7th Marines launched a secondary attack to the southwest. A temporary fall back of Chinese allowed the intermixed lead elements of the 5th and 7th Marines to make a 1 mile advance. Both regiments might have been combined under command of Assistant Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Craig, but he had departed for United States on emergency leave. Litzenberg had command authority as the senior officer. On the morning of November 27, 1st Marines had relieved the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, at Hagaru-ri. Upon arrival at Yudam-ni, Litzenberg attached the two companies of the 2nd Battalion, Dog and Easy, to the 1st Battalion. Lockwood had sent Fox Company, commanded by Captain William E. Barber to occupy the Toktong Pass, 4 miles north of Hagaru-ri. Their mission was to keep the Main Supply Route (MSR) open. Lockwood was yet awaiting transports at Hagaru with his Headquarter Company and Elements of the Weapons Company. However, transports never arrived. (Simmons, 49-50; Santelli, 38; Walker, 7). Litzenberg and Murray were yet unaware of the fact that 79th and 81st CCF Divisions were surrounding them. The 59th CCF Division was closing the trap by movement to the south towards MSR at Toktong Pass, which was held by the Fox Company alone. On the night of November 27, the temperature had dropped several degrees below zero. The weapons were no more reliable and soldiers even used hair oil and urine to keep them operational (Santelli, 38; Simmons, 54; Appleman, 56). The conditions were comparable to what Smith predicted in his letter to Cates, “I believe a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier or marine, and I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this area during the winter or providing for the evacuation of sick and wounded” (Simmons, 35). Upon reaching the highest point between Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni, the Toktong Pass, the Fox Company organized defensive perimeter north of the road on a steep saddle-like hill. At about 4,850 ft altitude, the top of the hill was eighty-yard wide shoulder of the Toktong-san. The ground further extended to the north to form a narrow saddle. The snow-covered valleys on other sides of the hill separated it from neighboring heights. In the evening, all units of the Fox Company were dug in for the night forming a U-shaped perimeter. The 1st Platoon of 62 marines and 01 corpsman, commanded by 1st Lt. John Dunne, was holding positions on the eastern slope closer to the road. The 2nd Platoon of 62 marines and 01 corpsman, commanded by 1st Lt. Elmo Peterson, was positioned across the steep western slope. The 3rd Platoon of 54 marines and 01 corpsman, commanded by 1st Lt. Robert C. McCarthy, was stretched across the wider hill top. Captain Barber had already anticipated that McCarthy’s platoon was the most vulnerable to possible enemy attacks. Following the classic defensive V positions, each platoon had moved two squads forward and one to the rear. All platoons were concentrating much of their firepower on the saddle. The rest of the company, including headquarters, mortarmen and heavy machine gun units, was responsible for the defense of the seventy-yard open space along the road (Drury and Clavin, 30-60). Captain Barber, a World War II veteran, had assumed command of the Fox Company at Koto-ri only recently. At Toktong Pass, the company was near full-strength, comprising a total of 240 officers and men. At midnight, November 27, the Chinese forces launched a massive counterattack. While 5th and 7th Marines were struggling to hold ground at Yudam-ni, the 59th CCF Division had arrived in the southeast with orders to cut the 14 miles of MSR between Hagaru-ri and Yudam-ni. At 2:07 am, November 28, advance elements of the Chinese forces had made contact with the Fox Company’s 2nd Platoon. Chinese had launched a two-pronged attack with five companies. As the Chinese spotted the command post and were trying to surround it, Barber had moved headquarters units to the upper tree line below mortar emplacements. While the 2nd Platoon was inflicting heavy damage upon the rear Chinese company on the road, the remaining four companies were rapidly climbing the hill. Due to rugged contours, they had reached the saddle unnoticed. Soon, the two forward squads of the 3rd Platoon were under heavy attack. (Simmons, 56; Drury and Clavin, 70-125). The enemy succeeded in breaching the lines and captured the northwest crest of the hill. The 3rd Platoon was badly shattered. It had suffered 15 killed, 9 wounded and 3 missing in action. Left with 8 survivors out of 35, the platoon fell back to the rear squad and reinforced perimeter down the slope. The attack continued until daybreak. With incessant efforts, the Fox Company had managed to regain the hilltop. However, despite close air strikes by Australian F-51 Mustangs, the enemy refused to abandon positions around the hill. The Fox Company had suffered 20 killed and 54 wounded. Damage to the enemy was estimated at 400-500 killed. The remarkable valor of three marines, PFC Robert Benson and Pvt. Hector A. Cafferatta, 2nd Platoon, and PFC Gerald J. Smith, 1st Platoon proved vital in repulsing the attack. Cafferatta inflicted heavy losses upon enemy by killing 15 and wounding many men of the enemy alone. Due to his acts of valor and conspicuous role that night, he was later awarded Medal of Honor. (Simmons, 56-57; Santelli, 39; Drury and Clavin,70-125) The subsequent patrols confirmed that Fox Company had been completely surrounded on the hill. Litzenberg contacted Barber and asked if he could fight his way north to Yudam-ni. However, with 54 marines already wounded, the idea seemed impractical to Barber. Peterson had informed Barber that his 2nd Platoon was running out of ammunition and they were the only hindrance in the way of enemy towards Chosin. Along with directing food and ammunition airdrops at Barber’s request, Litzenberg ordered Lockwood to take every marine at Hagaru-ri, including cooks, bakers and drivers, and form a composite force to reinforce the Fox Company. However, after 1 mile advance towards Toktong Pass, Lockwood was requesting reinforcements himself to get back to Hagaru-ri. The supplies dropped by Marine R-5D fell in front of the 1st Platoon’s perimeter and their recovery cost the company two more wounded marines. (Simmons, 63; Drury and Clavin, 126-176). American high command was still reluctant to appreciate the size and intensity of the opposition. They were yet unaware of the movement of the 58th CCF Division surrounding Hagaru-ri. The Communists forces were nearer to their objective of destroying the 1st Marine Division. At 2:15 am, November 29, the Chinese launched another five-company attack over the hill. The lines of the perimeter were thinner this time, but marines were well prepared. The assault had led the enemy deep into marine positions. However, with main effort of the 2nd Platoon, the hill top was cleared by the morning. Though Barber was hit in the leg, he continued to direct defense of the perimeter. The attack cost Fox Company 05 killed and 29 wounded. Litzenberg reached Barber over radio and offered him the option to fight back to Hagaru-ri. Barber reply still echoes the legacy of Marine Corps, “we will hold, sir.” Barber was well aware of the importance of his mission to keep the pass open. In a withdrawal situation, there was no other way to escape the rapidly building trap. (Simmons, 63-66; Drury and Clavin, 177-228). On November 29, the Fox Company had been re-supplied with food and ammunition by the air. While Barber was discussing the situation with his officers at the hill, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, Gen Douglas Macarthur, had prepared his report stating, “We face an entirely new war…It is quite evident that our present state of forces is not sufficient to meet the undeclared war by the Chinese…This command...is now faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength." At Yudam-ni, Litzenberg and Murray were now planning the breakout. The X Corps had issued orders directing the 1st Division to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. Smith in his directive to Litzenberg stated, "In our order for the march south there will be no intermediate objectives. The attack will start at 0800 on 1 December. Objective: Hagaru-ri." In order to relieve the embattled Fox Company, Litzenberg had ordered Davis’ 1st Battalion to march overland and take enemy at Fox Hill by surprise from the higher ground. (Drury and Clavin, 126-176; Simmons, 72-76). At 2:00 am, November 30, the Fox Company heard a voice coming from a loudspeaker west of the road, “Fox Company, you are surrounded. I am a lieutenant from the 11th Marines. The Chinese will give you warm clothes and good treatment. Surrender now.” The precise response was mortar and machine gun fire, which silenced the speaker shortly. Elements of the Fox Company had set up the traps earlier. Marines brutally slaughtered around three Chinese companies in their attack positions. During the 10-minute battle, only one marine was wounded. The day that followed, Marine Corsairs and Australian Mustangs targeted enemy positions. At around 1:00 am, December 01, to everyone’s surprise, the four artillery rounds fell accurately over the four enemy machine gun nests destroying their strong position on rocky knoll of the hill (Simmons, 66; Drury and Clavin, 126-176). On December 01, elements of the 1st Marine Division started withdrawal. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was moving from hill to hill against light to moderate resistance. However, the men were hungry and badly exhausted. When the battalion reached hill 1653 near Fox Hill before the noon of December 02, Barber offered a patrol to guide Davis into his position. However, Davis declined the offer. Balance of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was present on Fox Hill by 1 pm. The occupation of the hill had cost the company 118 casualties, including 26 killed, 89 wounded and 3 missing in action. All officers, except one, were among the wounded. Despite every effort of the enemy, the marines of the Fox Company had held the ground under worse conditions. They could have easily opted to move to Hagaru-ri or surrender positions to the enemy, but they continued to fight for their comrades stuck at Yudam-ni. Their determination ruined enemy plans and saved thousands of marine lives. Despite suffering severe wounds, Captain Barber continued to maintain control of the Fox Company. For his inspiration leadership during December 28-02, he was awarded Medal of Honor. (Simmons, 84-86; Santelli, 39-40). The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, then moved out of the Fox Hill on December 3, and attacked the Chinese positions down the pass. The Chinese had planned to attack the column withdrawing from Yudam-ni. However, 1st Battalion’s assault cleared the path for withdrawing units of 5th and 7th Marines. By afternoon of December 04, 1950, the entire 1st Marine Division was assembled at Hagaru-ri. The division had inflicted around 37000 casualties during the campaign at Chosin Reservoir. The battle casualties of the 1st Division included 728 killed, 3,485 wounded and 192 missing in action. Around 7,338 were the non-battle casualties, mostly frostbite. Sergeant Robert B. Gault, leader of the 7th Marines Graves Registration Section, later recalled, “That was the time when there was no outfit, you was with nobody, you was a Marine, you were fighting with everybody. There was no more 5th or 7th; you were just one outfit, just fighting to get the hell out of there, if you could”. (Simmons, 87; Santelli, 40-41; Walker, 14-15). After two days rest, the 1st Division resumed breakout to the sea on December 6. Moving through stiffened resistance, the division had arrived at Koto-ri the next day. The Chinese were persistent to prevent the withdrawal. However, the division had reached the safe area at Hamhung-Hungnam by December 11. From Hungnam, the division departed for Pusan and then to Masan. By December 20, all UN forces had been evacuated out of North Korea. (Santelli, 42; Simmons, 120). References Santelli, James S. A Brief History of the 7th Marines. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1980. Drury, Bob and Tom Clavin. The Last Stand of Fox Company: A True Story of U.S. Marines in Combat. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009. Simmons, Edwin H. Frozen Chosin: U.S. Marines at the Changjin Reservoir. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2002. Walker, John A. Fire & Ice: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign. Strategy & Tactics Magazine (No. 257). Jul/Aug 2009: 6-15. Print. Bevilacqua, Allan C. Chosin 1950: When Hell Froze Over. Leatherneck, February 2013. Web. Appleman, Roy E. East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950. Vol. 2. USA: TAMU Press, 1990. . Read More