The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team - Research Paper Example

The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team 1. Introduction a. Attention step The greater war is fought as much in the media (through which information is distributed to people) as it is on the field. b. Thesis The uses of information operations are the most important military revolution in terms of how warfare is waged today. 2. Main Point #1 (no bullets) In warfare, it is important to be on the winning side of the media war because of the tremendous effect it has for the purpose of understanding counter insurgency tactics and for communicating to the local population without filters. 3. Main Point #2 (no bullets) There appears to be an emerging recognition among modern warriors that a broader and more aggressive, comprehensive, and holistic approach to information operations is necessary 4.

Main Point #3 (no bullets) For information operations to be successful it is necessary stay active and on the offensive. It is necessary to employ information operations aggressively so that the war is won not only on the conventional battlefield but also in the media. 5 Conclusion Information operations is a huge part of military success because of the way it supplements and augments actions by both winning over the local population and confusing or misleading the enemy. Over the last five hundred years, military strategy has changed enormously.

In recent years we have seen the development of smart bombs and unmanned drones. Sixty or seventy years ago our great grandfathers saw the advent of armoured cars—tanks—and the establishment of national air forces. Five hundred years ago, gunpowder began to be prominently used as a weapon of war, and it is hard to overstate the way this has determined our history and shaped our world and cannot be overstated. These are all military revolutions that have altered the way we think about conflict.

But a more recent revolution is underfoot and is currently affecting militaries around the world. The truth is that wars do not rage on battlefields alone. They are fought ideologically, politically, economically and even in the broad, amorphous realm of “information.” The greater war is fought as much in the media (through which information is distributed to people) as it is on the field. Few wars have better proven the truth behind these statements than the Iraq War, which began in 2003.

Indeed, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in 2006 that more than half the battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. The uses of information operations are the most important military revolution in terms of how warfare is waged today. It is important to be on the winning side of the media war because of the tremendous effect it has for the purpose of understanding counter insurgency tactics and for communicating to the local population without filters. Much of the American mission in Iraq has been about winning hearts and minds: without these, Iraq will simply be a boiling cauldron of resentment and rage.

It is important not only for the U.S. military to beam out a positive message about themselves, it is also important the military to listen to what people are saying. That too is part of the information war. However, these basic principles have not always been applied effectively by the American military during its long mission in the country of Iraq. The key to future success is coming up with a model that maintains the independence and authenticity of different elements of military operations while simultaneously having an overarching information rubric for various missions.

It is encouraging that there is an awareness about the lack of strategy in information operations at the highest levels of the United States military. There appears to be an emerging recognition among modern warriors that a broader and more aggressive, comprehensive, and holistic approach to information operations is necessary—an approach that recognizes the challenges of the global information environment and seamlessly integrates the functions of traditional information operations and public affairs.

Furthermore, a clear need exists for strategic and operational commanders to become as aggressive and as offensive-minded with information operations as they have always been with other elements of combat power and war-fighting functions—for example, movement and manoeuvre, fire support, intelligence, and so on. While some older generation officer may disapprove and not care much about information and its uses, they are being proven wrong on the battlefield. Americans have natural advantages with respect to information operations.

The role of the media is limited in the Arab world.1 Therefore the amount of information technology that is available to the average soldier of the United States army is not available to the insurgent. Even in the case of the US soldier, he does not fully avail himself of the information technology available to him. However, the US soldier is superior to the insurgent in the information domain because of his exposure to this technology available to him. Over the six years that serious IOs have been in use they have produced effective results in the war not only with the Iraqi insurgents, but with global terrorism.

2 Nonetheless, in order for information operations to be successful it is necessary stay active and on the offensive. It is necessary to employ information operations aggressively so that the war is won not only on the conventional battlefield but also in the media. While on the subject, it is also pertinent to note that some (not all) insurgents are media savvy and learning at a speed perhaps faster than the American military. They also have the advantage of being closer to the ground and having an easier time moulding the opinion of the locals by highlighting the excesses of the occupying forces.

The “excesses” can mean anything from losing a few men to enduring airborne strafing. In order for the allies to use information operations effectively, they have to use it strategically and aggressively. This may not eliminate the insurgents, but it will keep them on tenterhooks and it may cause them to resort to foolhardy activities that will hardly gain them any public sympathy. The importance of information operations can be gauged from events in the war that have led to the US military suspending activities that are not integrated with the media.

It is a significant truth: winning the media war is a major part of winning military combats. Few things can be as damaging as a favorable military expedition that has led to a media fiasco. In spite of its military dictum, information operation has the ability to follow through on military excursions because it offers transparency and accountability. It is also is a huge part of military success because of the way it supplements and augments actions by both winning over the local population and confusing or misleading the enemy.

Works Consulted Baker, Ralph. “The decisive weapon: A brigade combat team commander's perspective on information operations.” AIR University Library. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/2007_137873/137832.html Brookes, Adam. “US plans to 'fight the net' revealed.” BBC Online. January 27, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4655196.stm MacArthur, John R.. Second Front. L.A.University of California Press, 2004 Tallet, Frank, War and Society in Early Modern Europe 1495–1715, Routledge, London 1992.

Winseck, Dwayne. “Information Operations `Blowback.'” International Communication Gazette, Vol. 70, No. 6, 419-441 (2008)