Qatar-Germany Economic Relationship - Example

The Various Ways (Directly and Indirectly) in Which Qatar Could Benefit from its Bilateral Relationship with Germany Name Institution Table of Contents Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………………………. 3 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 Qatar-Germany Economic Relationship: Background ……………………………………… 6 Strategic Advantages of Qatar Airways’ Connection to Germany: Towards Economic Diversity ………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 a) Qatar’s Shift to Economic Diversity ………………………………………………….. 8 b) Qatar Airways ………………………………………………………………………… 10 c) Investment in Non-Oil/Gas Sectors ………………………………………………….. 13 d) Qatar, Germany and the European Union (EU) ……………………………………. 15 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………….. 16 References …………………………………………………………………………………….. 19 Appendices ……………………………………………………………………………………. 21 Executive Summary In recent years, Qatar has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world. In fact, over the four-year period between 2008 and 2012, it was the world’s fastest growing economy, its real GDP growing at an annual rate of 12.0 percent. It is not only that the country possesses an enormous wealth of oil and gas, but that it has successfully leverage this wealth to propel itself to the world economic stage, its hydrocarbon sector (alongside service sector) being the key propellants of the 2008-12 growth. However, many have also pointed out that Qatar’s economy is over-dependent on its oil and gas. This is noteworthy considering the increasingly growing predictions of decreasing oil and gas deposits in the wider Gulf region. Such predictions have prompted a number of layers in the region (including Qatar) to look for other ways to boost and protect their economic strengths both in the present and in the future. Participation in the international trade arena is seen as a vital strategy. In recent years, the trade relations between Qatar and Germany have grown. This relationship is seen as not only beneficial to Germany. As it were, it (the relationship) is seen as bearing vital strategic importance to the Qatari government. This has to do with Germany as an independent country, but also as Germany as a key member of the European Union (EU), an increasingly key player in the global marketplace. This report examines the various ways in which Germany offers potential strategic benefits to Qatar, citing the various economic advantages therein. Part of the focus will relate to Qatar Airways and its ties with and to Germany. Finally, this report will provide recommendations on how the Qatari government can leverage this relationship to optimize its advantages to its macroeconomic indicators. Strategic Importance of Germany towards Qatar Introduction The bilateral relations between Germany and Qatar go beyond just oil and gas sectors or Qatar Airways. The trade relations between the two countries involve cars and machinery, aircraft, chemical products, electrotechnical products, iron and ironmongery, and other production lines. Indeed, exports and imports between the countries have experienced notable growth. For example, between 2008 and 2009, German imports from Qatar grew by 114.1 percent (an increase in value of 0.03 billion to 0.07 billion). Although in the same period German exports to Qatar dropped by 32.5 percent (from 1.60 billion to 1.08 billion), it is still worth noting that the figure remained higher than German imports from Qatar. Oil and gas account for the biggest proportion of German imports from Qatar, while consumer goods, hardware, electronics, electro-technics, machinery and automobile and their spare parts account for a larger proportion of Qatar imports from Germany (Doha Bank, 2011). However, as noted, these relations may bear more benefits beyond just simple import-export trade. As it were, in recent years, the EU and Middle East have grown closer. In fact, like everyone else, the Middle East has shifted its attention largely to the EU, which arguably possesses the largest consumer-market in the world today (Primor, 2004; Javedanfar, 2005). Qatar certainly has interest in the EU. Germany is not a key market on its own merit, but is also a vital player in the EU. It could, therefore, be a vital link to other key EU players. This could be of strategic importance to Qatar. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the potential strategic benefits that Germany could offer Qatar: Direct strategic benefits (that is, Germany as an independent entity) Indirect strategic befits (that is, Germany as a key player in global arena, including in the EU) Qatar-Germany Economic Relationship: Background Qatar already has a direct economic link with Germany via a “contract for the promotion and protection of investments” (Qatar-Germany Business Forum, 2013), as well as an air transport agreement that has existed since 1999. Moreover, in 2002 and 2011, the German Business Council Qatar and the Qatar Germany Partnership were established respectively. These two have acted as a platform and union for long-term sustainable Germany-Qatar companies’ cooperation (Qatar-Germany Buisness Forum, 2013). These platforms have seen significant increased economic relationship between the two countries. For example, from January to September 2012, Qatar’s imports into Germany amounted to EUR 635m. In about the same period (January to October 2012), German exports into Qatar fell by about 36 percent, reaching about EUR 1bn year on year. However, despite that drop, that year (2012), Qatar was still number110 in terms of German imports and number 66 as Germany export partners. Discussions for further economic relationships have been ongoing, including the need to implement a double taxation agreement (Doha Bank, 2011; Mukherjee, 2013; Qatar-Germany Business Forum, 2013). German companies in Qatar have been primarily involved in the plant, construction and manufacturing service sectors. Qatar, domestic investments have also seen a shift from just expanding the oil and gas sector towards other sectors, such as transport, healthcare and city planning projects. Indeed, there still are many opportunities for German companies in Qatar, especially within the many infrastructural developments that will take place in the years leading to the 2022 World Cup. These include the construction of stadiums, the extension of sewage and energy management in the capital Doha, as well as the expansion of Qatar’s rail and road network. Qatar highly values German technology and there will be many more opportunities for the transfer of technology between the two countries, especially in the energy sector (Qatar-Germany Business Forum, 2013). “German know-how can be of high worth in the course of the diversification of Qatar’s economy and for the expansion of its infrastructure” (Qatar-German Business Forum, 2013, p.1). On its part, Qatar has in the past years been involved in a good number of German projects and companies. The most notable of these is its investment in Volkswagen and HOCHTIEF, two of Germany’s major corporations. Overall, Qatar enjoys a considerably high ratio of investment. Its Gross capital formation reached the whopping amount of US $44.9bn, and a GDP rate of about 45 percent (Mukherjee, 2013; Siddiqui, 2013). Strategic Advantages of Qatar Airways’ Connection with Germany: Towards Economic Diversity There are various ways in which one can examine this question. Generally, though, air transport has been known to e tied to various economic benefits for the countries directly linked by an air travel network. In this case, one can look at both the direct and indirect benefits of air travel. There are direct monetary and non-monetary benefits, such as gains from Qatar Airways’ travel to German cities. In this case Qatari is seen as an independent ad worthy entity in Qatar’s economy. There are also indirect benefits, such as how Qatari airways operations benefit other sectors of the economy (such as tourism, trade, among others) (Baker, 2010). Ultimately, the benefits of Qatar Airways’ connection with Germany are part of the government’s efforts to achieve its long-term economic sustainability into a future where its oil and gas reserves may run out; that is, the pursuit of economic diversity. Qatar‘s Shift to Economic Diversification Qatar, as already noted above, has relied heavily on the export of oil and natural gas (hydrocarbons) for its income Selling gas, especially to “resource-poor Asian countries” (Euromoney, 2013), has enabled the country to join the super-rich nations in the world. Today, according to the IMF (cited in Euromoney, 2013), based on the parity of purchasing power per capita, Qatar is one of wealthiest nations in the world. However, there has been increasing predictions that oil and natural gas deposits in the region will run out in the not too-distant future. The industry is likely to face competition from other sources and forms of energy (such as renewable energy sources). These new discoveries are likely to disrupt not only global production, but also pricing. For example, according to Euromoney (2013), Australia is likely to surpass Qatar as the world’s third-largest producer of natural gas by 2020 and the US is leading the way to become the biggest exporter of shale gas. In the last few years, therefore, the Qatari government has turned its focus away from the largely oil- and gas-driven economy (which is public-sector driven). While the oil and gas sectors are likely to remain then source of income for the country in years to come, the government has shifted its attention towards economic diversification (Hvidt, 2013). In this respect, the Qatari government plans to fund its national budget by using non-petrochemical means by 2020. Moreover, the government has undertaken a number of efforts, including the privatization of a number of sectors, such as water and power, and telecommunications sectors, as well as the education sector. The government’s diversification efforts have also targeted the gas sector, which has seen substantial government investments in recent years. Equally, the government aims to expand (through domestic and foreign investments) other non-oil/gas sectors, such as trade, tourism, real estate and transport (particularly air travel) sectors. The government has also drawn a 20-year healthcare and IT plan, and aims to invest $18 billion into welfare and education (GSDP, 2008; GSDP, 2011). Scott (2013) reports the plans of the Qatar Tourism Authority (QTA) to contribute 3 percent of the country’s GDP by 2030. This is part of the Qatar Tourism Sector Strategy 2030, which will see the government invest $20 billion over the next 20 years. At the moment, the tourism sector contributes a meager 1 percent of Qatar’s annual GDP. Achieving this goal would have significant and far-reaching implications on the country’s economy. For example, achieving the 3 percent target would lead to a boom in the job market. In 2012 for example, Qatar’s tourism sector contributed 1.8 percent of all jobs in the country (that is about 19,900 jobs). By 2030, as a result of the growth targets, the tourism sector would contribute about 5.3 percent of the total job market. According to Scott (2013), this would be about 107,000 jobs. Unlike Dubai, however Qatar’s plan does not aim to target low- and mid-income tourism. Instead, it plans to focus primarily on high-end luxury retreats and business travel. Business tourism is seen as more lucrative than leisure tourism. Already, business travel tourism accounts for a large proportion of tourism in the country. Euromoney (2013) observes that hosting the 2022 World Cup has encouraged the country to undertake an aggressive economic diversification drive. Investment in hardware includes high-speed rail and road networks served by new airports and ports. The country’s diversity efforts have been reflected in its desire for global prestige through the acquisition of foreign assets, including football clubs (such as France’s Paris Saint-Germain [PSG]), Hollywood studios (such as Miramax) and marque shopping malls (such as Harrods). The following discussion shows how Qatar Airways has directly contributed to the country’s economy, as well as to other sectors of the economy (that is, indirect benefits) towards a diverse economy- owing to its connections to Germany. i. Qatar Airways Indeed, in the past few years, there has been growth of Arabian Airlines into Germany. This has been one of the key areas that have facilitated economic and trade relationship and growth between the Arabian region (including Qatar) and Germany in recent times. For example, the Emirates Airline has sine adopted a strategy to fly to secondary airports, targeting the passengers who have no choice for non-stop intercontinental flights. By May 2009, various Arabian Gulf airlines (Emirates, Gulf Air, Etihad, Saudi Arabian and Qatar Airlines) served major German cities, Franfurt and Munich. Emirates Airline was the only one that served Dusseldorf and Hamburg, and Qatar Airways was the only one that served Berlin (Grimme, 2010). Generally, over the five years between 2003 and 2008, Arabian carriers saw their supply increase by over 100 percent. “The number of seats offered increased from about 52,327 per month in January 2003 to 107,344 in July 2008” (Grimme, 2010, p.4). Saudi Arabian Airlines showed the least growth in terms of seats offered as it did not have in place an aggressive expansion strategy as the other Arabian Gulf carriers. The three leading Arabian Gulf Airlines in terms of presence in the Germany market (at the time) were Etihad, Qatar and Emirates Airways. Emirates led the pack with 56,416 seats a month. Qatar Airways was second with 23,240 seats a month and Etihad was third with 16,875 monthly seats (Grimme, 2010). Regardless, Qatar Airways has on its right significant growth into the German market. The number of monthly seats that it provided in 2008 was the result of a remarkable growth since 2003 (albeit with a few fluctuations). Appendix IV shows the monthly seats (for departures from Germany) growth rates for the major Arabian Gulf Airlines and one can see Qatar Airways did enjoy its own remarkable growth. On 7 July, 2010, Qatar Civil Aviation Authority and German Civil Aviation Authority concluded talks in Doha that saw the two countries revise the Air Transport Agreement signed between them in November 1996. This saw a number of changes, including the increase of the number of weekly flights from Qatar to 5 German airports from 21 to 35 flights. Most importantly, the implementation of this agreement would be accompanied by policy changes. For example, the Qatari government would adopt open skies policy to expand the connection of Doha International Airport to other operational international air transport networks. The main goal of this was to increase the movement of both passengers and cargo between the two countries to boost bilateral trade between them (Qatar Civil Aviation Authority, 2010). To build further on its rising reputation, Qatar Airways joined Oneworld, the third largest global airline alliance. The Qatar Airways, therefore, became the first airline from the Gulf to join an alliance of international significance. Oneworld has high-profile members, such as Air Berlin, British Airways and American Airlines. The purpose of joining the alliance was “to synchronize the flight-networks of the respective member airlines and to provide the offers of all partners to the service user” (Qatar-German Business Forum, 2013, p.12).Qatar Airways brought into the alliance 110 passenger aircrafts that operated 120 destinations in 70 countries, as well as Doha as a vital Middle East hub. Most importantly, the alliance would place Qatar strategically as a destination of business and tourism, which means increased economic activity and profits. In this respect, Qatar Airways (and the Aviation industry at large) has been a major growth engine for the country’s economy. The benefits of the Qatar Airways are not only to Qatar, but also to its trade partners, such as Germany. According to Dube Tradeport (2012), “the air cargo industry accounts for an estimated 35 percent of the value of goods exchanged worldwide” (p.4). Air cargo can be a part of or distinct from the network passenger airlines core business, covering areas such as: distinct chain of distribution; uni-directional market; heavy paperwork; diverse nature of business; special handling; less sensitivity to routing; and high security requirement levels, among others. Generally, air cargo transport: facilitates new air services to regional and international markets; facilitates cargo growth; stimulates investment in the private sector; supports and enables new chains of export, as well as inclusive high-value manufacturing; and supports and strengthens the perishable goods and tourism sectors. Ultimately, this stimulates domestic economic activities and creation of employment (Lomments, 2013). According to GSDP (2011), for instance, Qatar enjoyed a 9.5 percent GDP growth in the middle of the Global Financial Crisis. This would not be possible if it relied on foreign airlines. For example, the company’s operations have facilitated the creation of both direct and indirect job opportunities to not only people in the country, but also those in other countries. For example, the company helped create 8 percent of jobs in Germany during the financial crisis. Investment in Non-Oil/Gas Sectors Speaking of investment in non-oil/gas sectors, the focus is not only on Qatar but also its trade partners’ investment in its private sector. On one hand, Germany is one of the countries where Qatar has many of its sovereign funds allocated. Qatar companies have invested in German companies. For example, Qatar Holding has a 9.1 stake in Hochtief (German’s construction major, 10 percent stake in Porsche, 17 percent stake in Volkswagen and 3.04 percent stake in Siemens. Other Qatar companies have invested in Germany’s private sector (such a hospitality sector). Moreover, while Germany is still said to lack the infrastructure to import Qatar’s gas, the latter expects to manage this in the near future. Even then, a Qatar company (Qatar Petroleum) has sponsored major events in Germany (such as in Berlin) as well as Germany companies in Qatar, such as ExxonMobil and Shell (Mukherjee, 2013). German companies (including ABB, Allianz, Aktor, Debaj, Deugro, Deutsche Bahn and Siemens, among others) have also invested in a number of sectors in the Qatar. German companies, for instance, have a strong presence in the Qatar’s construction sector. Germany’s “Albert Speers has designed the main stadium for the 2022 World Cup” (Siddiqui, 2013, p.1), and Deutsche Bahn has signed a contract of €17bn to construct the Qatar Railway project. This will be a four-line metro system consisting of 98 stations. The high speed train line will be allow speeds of up to 350 kilometers (or 220 miles) per hour. The joint venture will see the Qatari Diar (a state-owned property and infrastructure development firm) owned a 51 percent stake and Deutsche Bahn own the remaining 49 percent stake. German companies still continue to offer their expertise on various infrastructure development projects happening in Qatar. Moreover, Deutsche Bank’s entry into Qatar’s financial services market has boosted competition in the sector. According to Al-Muharrami (2010), the performance of commercial banks is influenced by the structure of the market in which they operate. The entry of foreign banks into Qatar has prompted a number of policy changes in the country’s financial service markets. For example, monopoly by state-owned institutions in Qatar’s banking sector has caused the banks to lack the sustainability, with the government having to intervene through various regulation schemes. The policy changes have started what could provide the country’s key banks global competitive advantage. The GTZ, a German organization, has been providing support to the Secondary School for Industrial Technology (located in Doha). The GTZ, in this regard, has seconded three experts who are part of its international services (Siddiqui, 2013). The German International School of Doha started by the German government in 2008 is a major cultural investment. It aims to teach the German language to many Qataris. But more than this, the school is seen as a major source of employment for many German’s in the country. The German Ambassador to Qatar, Angelika Storx-Chakarji, is quoted saying of the school, “it will become the center for more activities for the 1700-plus Germans in the country” (Mukherjee, 2013, p.1). These may seem as like largely one-sided deals, benefiting manly the German firms. Besides, Qatar’s stakes in its investments in German companies (like Volkswagen) are not as lucrative. However, it should be remembered that in the end, Qatar is getting what it lacks the technology and the skilled manpower to build. Besides, most importantly, the responsibility over the development and integration of the rail network remains in the sole hands of the Qatar Railway Development Company. Qatar, Germany and the European Union (EU) In the early years of the millennium, the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]) were in discussions with the European Union (EU) over the formation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for a number of years. The first breakthrough in this respect was made by 2005, with the requirement that the GCC states reach a Customs Union agreement. As a consequence of this agreement, the GCC would charge a 5 percent uniform rate on all imports, enabling them to negotiate with the EU a single unit. Qatar has partly enjoyed from this collect agreement. However, as an independent nation, it has also enjoyed particular advantages. Its improved relationship with German, a key figure in the EU, is likely to provide a number of further advantages (Javedanfar, 2005). Increased trade is one obvious advantage. It has been argued that the EU enjoys this more than GCC countries do. Still one cannot ignore that companies in the GCC states also enjoy significant benefits. For example, the majority of EU’s exports into the GCC are large machinery, including power generation plants, mechanical appliances, medical equipment, electrical machinery items and airplanes, among others. Qatari Airways has been a direct beneficiary. For example, it was among “the first airlines to order the new Airbus A380” (Baker, 2010, p.5). Moreover, the Free Trade Agreement has facilitated tariff free import of EU goods into the Qatar market. This is very important considering that the demand for these products in the Qatari market is forecasted to increase. Although Qatar will not enjoy the same level of exports (in terms of size and impact) into the EU, it is still important to note that the EU will be a vital part of Qatar’s economic diversity goals by providing the market for its non-oil exports (such as agricultural products, handicraft and textile). The differences in export level, it is important to note, have to do with the lower monetary value of the non-oil Qatari exports (Javedanfar, 2005). Still it is vital to note that there is adequate market for such products rather than none. In the same respect, Qatari government has taken efforts to actively encourage foreign investment in its non-oil sectors (including real estate, telecommunications and power). Further FTAs with the EU will obviously facilitate increased the investment of EU members into the country. The gas sectors, for instance, is expected to become a major attraction of for foreign investment from the EU. The Qatari government encourages foreign companies to enter the gas sector via joint ventures. Already, France’s TotalFinaElf have joined in. The country’s power sector is also likely to attract investors (Mukherjee, 2013). Conclusion In conclusion, as this paper shows, the strategic benefits of German towards Qatar are not as direct as some would like to think. Germany, in itself being a major trade partner of Qatar, offers its own advantages. This comes in various forms, including Qatar Airways’ links to Germany. However, in other cases, these advantages are associative; that is, attached to other far reaching factors, such as Germany as a vital member of the EU. It is, however, not easy to decide which one are directly attributable to the Germany-Qatar relations. Yet, all the factors cited are possible benefits that Qatar could enjoy in its ties with German- even if some are only inferential. Generally, increase air traffic of Qatar Airways to Germany constitutes one of the key airline networks that account for the airline’s popularity and rising strengths in the global air travel market. This presence, in other words, is part of Qatar Airways’ good financial and reputational fortune which is a vital contribution to Qatar’s annual GDP. Moreover, these connections mean that Qatar has a direct export line for its goods to, as well as imports from Germany. That is a direct transportation of air cargo and passengers (expert expatriates and other tourists) (Baker, 2010; Grimme, 2010). However, there are other intangible benefits. Qatar’s Airways’ links to Germany has facilitated good relations between these two countries. This has been manifested in other areas, such as bilateral trade (import/export volumes, two-way investments between the two countries among others). Related to this, there are several potential (direct or indirect) advantages that Germany’s key role in the EU might offer Qatar. True, Qatar has benefited from the FTA between the EU and the GCC. Still, it would not hurt to have particular allies within the EU that could b of particular advantages to Qatar’s interests (GSDP, 2008; Baker, 2010; GSDP, 2011). Ultimately, Qatar is focusing towards a sustainable economy in the future, one that rests on a diverse economy, considering that the profits from oil and gas sectors are said to be facing various competitive risks: decreasing oil deposits; the rise of new industry players (such as the likeliness of Australia to surpass Qatar as the world’s third largest natural gas producer); and increased attention towards renewable energy sources, among others. As part of diversity, Qatar needs not only market for its non-oil/gas products, but also: investors into novel sectors of its economy: and non-oil/gas sectors in which to invest in foreign countries (such as Germany and its EU partners), among others (GSDP, 2008; GSDP, 2011; Hvidt, 2013). In other words, Qatar knows its strengths and weaknesses in relation to its long-term ambitions. By reaching out, the country is getting itself strategic partners that can address its weaknesses for it, while also complimenting its strengths. References Al-Muharrami, S. (2010). Analysis of Competitiveness in Qatar Banking Industry. International Journal of Business Innovation and Research, vol.10, 1-14 Baker, A.A. (2010). The Aviation Industry as a Growth Engine, Qatar Airways, Berlin (Germany) Doha Bank (2011). Germany is emerging as Major Trading Partner for Qatar, Doha Bank Press Release, May 15. 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The International Community and the Conflict, 11(2) Qatar-Germany Business Forum (2013). 3rd Session of the German-Qatari Joint Economic Commission, No.1, February. Retrieved 20 May 2014, http://www.numov.org/de/publikationen-de/qatar-german-business-forum/doc_download/1069-february-2013 Qatar Civil Aviation Authority (2010). Update Air Transport Agreement between Qatar and Germany. Retrieved 19 May 2014, http://www.caa.gov.qa/en/update_air_transport_agreement_between_qatar_germany Scott, V. (2013). To Diversify Economy, Qatar Strives to Attract More Tourists Doha News Oct. 23. Retrieved 19 May 2014, http://dohanews.co/to-diversify-economy-qatar-strives-to-attract-more-tourists/ Siddiqui, S. (2013). Qatar Business Forum in Berlin to Boost Trade Ties with Germany, March 03. Retrieved 20 May 2014, http://qgbf.numov.org/ APPENDICES Appendix I: Qatar Economic Indicators Source: Adapted from Deutsche Bank Research (2013) Appendix II: Bilateral Germany-Qatar Relations Source: http://vae.ahk.de/en/qatar-landing-page/about-qatar/bilateral-relations-with-germany/ Appendix III: Foreign Trade between Germany and Qatar Source: Adapted from Qatar-Germany Business Forum (2013) Appendix IV: Available Seats of Arabian Carriers on a Monthly Basis for Departures from Germany Source: Adapted from Grimme (2009) Appendix V: Available Seats of Arabian Carriers in July 2008 from Germany Airports Source: Adapted from Grimme (2009) Read More