Risk Perception of Katrina Hurricane in the USA 2005 - Coursework Example

Name: xxxxxxxx Tutor: xxxxxxxx Title: Risk Perception of Katrina Hurricane in the USA 2005 Institution: xxxxxxxx Date: xxxxxxxx Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Hurricane Katrina affected both the psychological and physical health the victims in New Orleans. The catastrophe was mainly traumatic to African American community as well as the low incomers within the region. A good number of them were rendered homeless and separated from their communities as well as their social networks. Nearly 60% of the possessions were completely destroyed. The effects were also felt of facilities such as health institutions. This led to the worsening of the situation because the affected individuals could not be attended too. The region experienced destruction of medical records, as well as reduction in health clinics and hospital beds. The increasing level of evidence has led to the proposal being made; the disaster had both long as well as immediate adverse effects. There were mental and physical health consequences. 6 A survey conducted on returning New Orleans individuals by CDCP, (Centers for disease control and prevention) reveal that over 50% of respondents had signs of a feasible requirement for mental treatment. An assessment of families living in FEMA subsidized trailers or hotels undertaken in Feb. 2006 exposed greater rates of disability amid children caregivers, as a result of psychiatric problems such as anxiety and depression. The study also revealed greater rates of chronic health problems around 50 percent, amid children from these families (Kim et al, 2008). 6 Factors influencing risk perception 8 Individual and community response to Hurricane Katrina 10 Conclusion 15 Bibliography 16 Introduction Risk perception refers to the subjective judgment that individuals make about the relentlessness and nature of a risk. Numerous theories have been put forward to explicate why different individuals make dissimilar approximations of the seriousness of risks. For several years, risk perception has turned into a subject of interest for practitioners and scholars in development and disaster stories. With the increase in the severity and number of catastrophes, risk perception is being viewed as a significant factor in social construction of disasters and risks. Practitioners and researches have raised questions of why individuals expose to risks, if they perceive the risks they are exposed to and if they look for protective measures or seek assistance or help to safeguard themselves against risks. Misleading or wrong perceptions are therefore understood as strong susceptibility factors. According to Nathan (2010), risk perceptions usually have different backgrounds. They therefore need to be analyzed as both restrained by social factors as well as entrenched in a combined and individual life strategy. For that reason, it is fundamentally considerable to know the precise level of risk awareness of exposed individuals, but it is rather important to comprehend their discourse of perception in a hazard perception strategy ingrained in a wider livelihood or life strategy. Hurricane Katrina’s probability distributions, normal and Poisson Warrick and Hsu (2005) notes that the disintegration of New Orleans levees brought about a greater impact to the return periods via the mere model of Saffir Simpson categories which were mainly considered to take place less often. The levees were overtopped due to the fact that they were mainly designed for group three storms. Hurricane Katrina on the other hand was a category 5 occurrence. Consequently, being aware that Katrina was in a different category other than 5 at landfall, there was a transformation of the defense to category four. Hurricanes are generally classified based on the peak wind speed. However, the incident is one dimensional. The disparaging wind swath in a number of storms is mainly quite insignificant, mainly when compared to the entire size of a storm. An illustration inform of a Satellite of a storm can be grossly deceptive due to the fact that the outer cloud defense can easily go further than 2 and 3 times the radius and destructive wind. Although the maximum peak winds at landfall in the Mississippi were recorded to be 120 -130 miles in every hour; the winds in New Orleans were less. There was insignificant destruction of wind in a number of family buildings. This only represented about 70-80mph regime. A good number of destructions were mainly due to the trees falling and the excess floods. Within New Orleans region, the consequences of Katrina almost expected. The 80mph that were experienced have a return period of about 85 years as noted by Watson & Iman, (2006). Basic epidemiology of hurricane Katrina Hurricane Katrina affected both the psychological and physical health the victims in New Orleans. The catastrophe was mainly traumatic to African American community as well as the low incomers within the region. A good number of them were rendered homeless and separated from their communities as well as their social networks. Nearly 60% of the possessions were completely destroyed. The effects were also felt of facilities such as health institutions. This led to the worsening of the situation because the affected individuals could not be attended too. The region experienced destruction of medical records, as well as reduction in health clinics and hospital beds. The increasing level of evidence has led to the proposal being made; the disaster had both long as well as immediate adverse effects. There were mental and physical health consequences. A survey conducted on returning New Orleans individuals by CDCP, (Centers for disease control and prevention) reveal that over 50% of respondents had signs of a feasible requirement for mental treatment. An assessment of families living in FEMA subsidized trailers or hotels undertaken in Feb. 2006 exposed greater rates of disability amid children caregivers, as a result of psychiatric problems such as anxiety and depression. The study also revealed greater rates of chronic health problems around 50 percent, amid children from these families (Kim et al, 2008). The resultant outcome is that the survivors with low levels of social, economic and health capabilities are considered vulnerable to the negative of the calamity. They also experience somewhat steeper declines in both physical as well as emotional health results. It is a common phenomenon that social support reduces stress considerably. According to Kaniasty and Norris, (2008), inadequate support is one of the hazard factor that bring about post traumatic stress disorder Hurricane Katrina risk as the product of probability and consequences Hurricane Katrina is perceived as the most critical natural crisis in the history of United States. The entire destruction produced by Hurricane Katrina disaster, which was powerful and large hurricane and catastrophic flood, greatly surpassed that of all other major disasters, like the 1906 San Francisco fire and earthquake, the 1992 Hurricane Andrew and the 1871 Chicago fire. The devastating effects of hurricane Katrina were felt even before the storm reached Gulf Coast on the 29th day of August 2005. In Gulf Mexico, the catastrophe hit the offshore energy infrastructure and compelled evacuation of over 75% of the 819 manned oil platforms of the Gulf. Two days prior to the landfall, the United States energy corporations approximated that the approaching hurricane had already lessened oil production in the Gulf Mexico by over a third (Dyson, 2006). Cost benefit analysis of Hurricane Katrina The catastrophe after Hurricane Katrina demonstrates a massive failure of the cost-benefits analysis. The levee system of the city was designed for a category three. Amid the more important pre-storm failures that led to scope of the destruction experienced in New Orleans were insufficient levees as well as poor supervision of construction of the levee by Army Corps of Engineers. Warrick and Hsu (2005) note that other factors included wetland policies together with under financing of restoration efforts, which resulted to absence of natural barricades and absorption of the flood water. Merely addressing standards and procedures of engineering design is not likely to be adequate to offer a suitably consistent level of safety. There is a need to solve dysfunctional relationships amid federal and local governments, and local and federal agencies responsible for real design, construction and sustenance of flood protection systems. Majority of these groups are required to promote their technical capacities a long term cost that can clearly demonstrate a discreet investment at local and national level, considered that stakes as displayed by losses in the hurricane Katrina event. Reliable funding and steady commitment, shorter construction and design timeframes, comprehensible lines of responsibility and authority and improved coordination of different system functions and elements are all required. Factors influencing risk perception According to Perry and Lindell, (2006), racial and cultural groups react to mediated crisis and risk communication depending on their perceptions together with their pre-established manners of thinking. In addition, the way messages are created, the channels utilized and probable language barriers are vital variables to effectiveness of risk and crisis communication and dissemination of information. Issues of culture and race haven’t been extensively in risk and crisis research as in other segments of mediate communication. However, past study has displayed racial minorities as being naturally hit hardest in the events of disasters as well as other cataclysmic incidents. In the U.S. risk and crisis messages are usually broadcast in English only, leaving several minorities at the exposure of dangers. For instance almost a third of New Orleans” Spanish speaking dwellers spoke poor English, raising the query of the requirement for communication of risks using several languages (Lacy& Hilfinger-Messias, 2007). In regard to seeking information, research has displayed that people are highly likely to direct information searching towards those individuals who have identical attributes and it may be reasonably presumed that racial minorities have fewer identical others search for information and less media outlets distinguished as similar. Perry and Lindell (2006) notes that in addition, the idea that ethnic and racial minority have a less probability of acknowledging a warning or risk message as convincing without confirmation of message from other members, particularly interpersonal networks has been ascertained, therefore generating a delay the time of response after Hurricane Katrina disaster, interpersonal conduits were of greater significance to minorities than Caucasians. After Hurricane Katrina, Caucasians were signified as perceiving the disaster as more of a risk then African Americans. This implies that the messages that were received didn’t sufficiently generate alarm, worry, or fright (Spence et al, 2007) Gender is another vital factors influencing risk perception because males and females perceive risks differently based on their effort to seek risk related information. Diversities based on gender have come out in information searching after disastrous incidents. After Hurricane Katrina, females highly engaged in searching for information about the disaster than males. They also placed more significance on information concerning water and food, as well as shelter, evacuation, rescue efforts, larger affect of the storm and location of medical care. According to Lanchlan & Spence, (2007), males comprehend instructions from a mediated source better than females, even though they show reduced levels of information searching. Numerous reasons explicate the observed diversities in increased information seeking and tendency for females to interpret a relational orientation into problem solving orientation. Information seeking is an outcome of both emotional and physical needs. Information assists reduce ambiguity and generate consonance meets the instant needs of protection after a disaster. Individual and community response to Hurricane Katrina A number of people make decisions on a daily basis, nevertheless, decision making in the event of a catastrophe is highly distinctive and possesses a major connotation for the entire society. Hurricane Katrina apparently revealed that there is need for extensive planning. Well organized accountability and speedy implementation. The eventual outcome of the catastrophe that was experienced was mainly conditioned by the level of perception of the vulnerabilities and the susceptibility together with the manner in which the factors influenced their ability to implement the final decisions. Aldunate et al (2005) argues that the peak of decision making can easily act as a detriment of when the issues are not tacked according to the stipulated guidelines in the most appropriate way. Though this kind of proposal creates an outstanding beginning point for acquiring knowledge of the way individual come up with choices in case there is any hazard, the probability is that each of these situations are likely to be met in any form. Various decisions are the resultant outcomes of multifaceted situations that are experience between different groups of people, environment being one of the factors. For instance, in arbitrary illustration of evacuees that was examined almost immediately after the occurrence of the Hurricane Katrina, a good number on of evacuees confirmed that though they had a number of cases of hurricane, they had a sentiment that they were not equipped with the right information regarding vacating the place when an order is issued by the local officials. This clearly reveals that their perception of the occurrence may have been associated with the data that was channeled on as well as the trust they had in the relevant authority. Hence, despite the prevailing conditions where people are faced the same compelling obliges of nature, they respond in different manner. This is due to the fact that in most cases, decisions are influenced by a varied number of factors. Chiefly, an apparent risk by a community or a single person is believed to be a significant element of decision making (Aldunate et al, 2005). Perceived risk is usually described as comprising two components; individual’s evaluation of a natural risk and individual’s susceptibility. The evaluation of a natural risk is usually associated with physical attributes such as individual’s shelter, the distance from forecasted region of the occurrence of a disaster, structural consistency of security means like levees. Emrich and Cutter (2006) argue that defenselessness is largely described as the capacity to anticipate, deal with, resist and convalesce from the consequences of a usual risk. Influences on acuity of risk are inhibitory or protective. Protective factors entail increased resources both intellectual and financial, a supportive societal network as well as household preparedness when combined; these elements have a huge impact on susceptibility, because susceptibility subsists in balance with these highly inhibitory and protective factors. Therefore if the aim of catastrophe preparedness is to make the best use of the rightful decision making within the sub-optimal situations, it is believed that whatever have an effect on risk awareness usually has a greater impact. Among the upcoming lessons that can be learnt in both the short long term and the immediate aftermath of the Hurricane is the responsibility that community based networks as well as community organizations have always taken in the event of such disasters. Preparedness and recovery measures are very crucial. The large number of faith based together with community organizations have, in most cases, been on the ground and frequently stayed in the forefront in the measures that hasten recovery purposes. There re other bigger organizations such as Red Cross Society (Emrich & Cutter, 2006). Epistemic and Frequents Conceptions of Probability Evaluation of regional hurricane rate and the system model covers the state components of HPS. This involves closure structure and operations, availability of electric power, failure approach of floodwalls in creating protective measure to certain region. In order to assess the real state of HPS, there is needed was evaluate reliability of single structures, systems among other components that were set up (Cappelli, 2007). This was important considering that the process helps in identifying the risk a waiting when the structures are exposed to considerable loads and the after ward effects of the hurricane. The situation in New Orleans can only be comprehended in its historical context, because it is a city which is well developed within the internal fight against flood risk, but has always been under-valued the level of risk exposed to. In quantifying the risk imposed by the floods frequent occurrences, therefore remains methods used in prevention of water floods entering the protected areas. By contrast, the protected areas were found to posses other risks, for instance water could enter protected areas as result of rainfall or from the ground water. After the renewal focus on flood protection for the city following a Hurricane Betsy, there is was no comprehensive use of risk analysis techniques in designing and planning on new defenses. The flood defenses or protective systems were designed to withstand the storm surge which is associated with hurricane e project. New Orleans’s risk preparedness, particularly for the protected areas were divided into basins and further into smaller basin-units with an intention of controlling the overtopping water floods. The region division was achieved by considering the internal drainage mechanism and basin within each unit. This was done objectively to strengthen parameters and the system foundation conditions as it seed essential to quantify the risk anticipated by the hurricane protection system. This was useful in determining amount of water expected to reach the region’s protected areas. Ultimately, it was a protective measure aimed at preventing overtopping water volume entering through the hurricane gates that remained open to allow for water flow back of water released from the pumping stations (Plotnitsky, 2009). However, the New Orleans remains under threat of being hit by major hurricane for every 19 years. This can be elaborated better in regard to the flooding risk uncertainties triggered by wave elevation. It is one probable reason to the frequency of persisting problem, considering that the New Orleans has suffered five worst direct hurricanes since the beginning of 20th century. All these were witnessed from 1915, 1947, 1965, in 1969 and in 2005, which are reported to have coursed a storm surge and widespread floods. The varying environmental situations and conditions can easily influence the performance of the large hurricane as well as flood protection projects. Both scientific and engineering advances together with methods can easily lead to assumptions upon which the projects are based (Emanuel, 2005). Probability Distribution and Event Tree Event sequences have evolved over the period through interaction of the dynamics in the system of man, machine, and processes and on the environment too. In the conversional event tree, there is an analysis of level 1 of PSA and the accident progression analysis of level 2. Though the temporal data presented may be of great help for a given sequence in first level and on the event scale in the next level is not given, often the traditional tree will develop an effect line as opposed to a time line (Emanuel, 2005). However, the decisions reached has to concern the investments in developing systems that are designed to control natural danger, for instance the event tree designs best natural hazards control measures considering the quantitative information collected. The risk analysis process involves two states considering the primary state of New Orleans HPS. The information collected during the IPET studies presents an analysis on the conditions, with the pre-Katrina system analysis not indented to rule off the risk anticipation but rather provide the right hind cast of risks related to the HPS (Bister, 2002). This is crucial considering this gives a basis by which the HPS improvement measures are measured. Similarly, it is through this form of analysis that a reliable evaluation process, considering performance of different elements in the system that prediction of system failure and providing reliable corresponding risks. The protection system on contrast is only attainable through use of analytical concepts and through use of specialist elicitation models. On overall, the hurricane protection system often comprised of a number of mechanisms and structured processes. All the structured processes are independently maintained and operated by identifiable boards. The IPET team report reveals a several consuming steps essential Conclusion Hurricane Katrina a great natural disaster in that cause massive destruction in United States, particularly the city of New Orleans. Different groups of individuals perceived Hurricane Katrina differently their pre-established ways of thinking. Therefore certain groups of individuals perceived Hurricane Katrina catastrophe as more of a risk than other groups making them to be greatly exposed to the disaster. Decision making during a natural catastrophe is distinctive and has an immense implication s for individual and communities, as well as the society as a whole. Katrina phenomenon revealed the need for an extensive and swift implementation of the decisions. Accountability is also a crucial but the ultimate negative outcomes that individuals experienced during Hurricane Katrina was conditioned their susceptibility and their perception of hazards, and the way through which these factors influence their ability to come up with decisions about the disaster. Bibliography Nathan, F., 2010, Disaster risk perception of people exposed: Are we asking the right questions? Journal of Psychology of Risk Perception, 145-156. Aldunate, G., Robinson, E., & Pena-Mora, F., (2005). Collaborative distributed decision making for large scale disaster relief operations: Drawing analogies from robust natural systems. Complexity, 11 (1), 28-38. Emrich, T, & Cutter, L, 2006, Moral hazard, social catastrophy: The changing face of vulnerability along the hurricane coasts: The Annals of the American Academy,604, 102-112. Spence, R, Burke, M, Lachlan, L, & Seeger, W, 2007, Crisis communication, race and natural disasters. The Journal of Black Studies, 37, 539- 554. Hilfinger-Messias, K, & Lacy, E, 2007, Katrina related health concerns of Latino survivors and evacuees. Journal of health care for poor and underserved, 18, 443-464. Dyson, E, 2006, Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster, Perseus Books Group, New York. Perry, W, & Lindell, K, 2006, communicate environment risk in multiethnic communities, Sage, Thousand Oaks CA. Bister, M. and K. A. Emanuel. (2002). Low Frequency Variability of Tropical Cyclone Potential Intensity. Interannual to Interdecadal Variability . Cappelli, G 2007, "I reckon I know how Leonardo da Vinci must have felt-- ": epistemicity, evidentiality and English verbs of cognitive attitude. New York: Pari Publishing. Emanuel, K. A 2005, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30 years . Nature , 483-485. Plotnitsky, A. 2009 Epistemology and Probability: Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and the Nature of Quantum-Theoretical Thinking, Springer, London. 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