Wireless PKI Security and Mobile Voting - Research Paper Example

Computer Sciences and Information Technology of Introduction The article is an analysis of wireless public key infrastructure technology. It discusses the developments in public key infrastructure (PKI) technology, the integration into mobile phones as well as wireless PKI. The article further identifies the stakeholders in the technology as well as the components. It further highlights the operation, security and risks of the wireless PKI. A discussion on mobile voting (M-voting), and requirements and recommendations of the technology then follow. In general, the article explains the components and operation of the wireless public key infrastructure technology. Wireless PKI and Mobile Voting The public-key infrastructure makes it possible for the electronic authentication of users to web services, signing of documents as well as text encryption. The PKI uses certificate authorities to link user identities and respective public keys. The technology has the ability to support critical security functions including e-voting, digital signing as well as bank transactions (Tepandi, Vassiljev and Tahhirov, 2010). That may be in compliance with some requirements by certificate authorities, the PKI environment or user registration process (Chen, Mitchell, and Martin, 2009). There has been development in the technology with banks in Estonia recognizing ID-card-based PKI. Transactions beyond certain limits require authentication and authorization using the ID card. The country also applied electronic voting in their elections starting from the 2005 local elections (Tepandi, Vassiljev and Tahhirov, 2010). Although the ID-PKI technology has its advantages security wise, it poses a challenge in that it requires an ID card reader and a computer. Availability of ID-card readers may be a problem. That necessitates the use of portable gadgets and in particular mobile phones. Phones integrate the three components that security-critical applications require. The three components are the card, the reader and the computer. The use of mobile phones for authentication and digital signing provides users easy and secure access to services. The Mobiil-ID technology in Estonia eliminates the need to have a card reader physically. Through its SIM card, it incorporates private authentication keys and digital signatures with the normal SIM card functionalities (Tepandi, Vassiljev and Tahhirov, 2010). That way, it makes it possible for personal identification and authentication via mobile phone. Mobiil-ID uses wireless PKI and the system has the ability to support mobile money transfer systems. The stakeholders in the technology include the USIM card developers, USIM card personalization provider, USIM card logistic service providers and the WPKI management entities. Each of these has a role to play in the development of the technology. Whereas the developers make the cards, personalization providers load the cards with information while the logistic service providers supply the cards to registration authority offices. The users of the WPKI include providers of applications, clients to the application providers as well as their services. As more institutions adopt the Mobiil-ID technology, there are concerns over its security. Such concerns have led to the evaluation of the technology’s security especially in 2009 when there were plans to use it for voting. The risk analysis took a systematic approach and focused of stakeholders, systems and processes. The aim was to identify the assets, threats and risks of the technology as regards the various components. The threats may fall under three categories: general threats, technical threats and m-voting threats. Assets vary depending on the usage of wireless PKI. As for risks, they entail the availability, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information. All that sums up to security of information. Although availability of WPKI services does not form a major risk, future developments may lead to its being a serious issue. The evaluation of the technology determined about 50 major WPKI risks. There was then a comparison of the risks with those in ID-PKI. The results showed that some risks have a higher occurrence than others do. Those with higher occurrence probabilities and those with greater impacts on WPKI seemed to be composites to other risks that were simpler. The risks can fall into two categories: those affecting computers and those that affect mobile phones. Whereas those attributable to computers affect both WPKI and ID-PKI, those attributable to mobile phones are WPKI-specific (Doherty, 2014). The research further evaluated the WPKI-specific risks with the aim of establishing those that are manageable, acceptable and transferrable. Some WPKI-specific risks are manageable. An example is a man-in-the-middle type of attack. MITM would involve encryption, communicating through virtual networks as well as the use of firewalls to secure the local area networks. The risk of an MITM attack is low. There is need for more safeguards if the technology serves in a national election. That would protect it against any attacks during the time. Another manageable WPKI-specific risk would be attackers in internet cafes. Unlike the MITM attack, here the system authenticates the attacker rather than the user (Tepandi, Vassiljev and Tahhirov, 2010). The attacker is not an intermediate between the user’s connection and the application server. The attack requires little or no prior preparations or setting up a deception website. To avoid the risk, an AP could need to cancel both requests where there is multiple-authentication requests occur simultaneously from the user. Where WPKI-specific risks are not manageable or their probability is material, they require attention. The right decision would be to accept them or transfer them. Mobile phones are more vulnerable to social attacks than ID cards. WPKI shows responsiveness to mobile phone attacks as well as attacks on computers in case of ID-PKI (Nakhjiri, and Nakhjiri, 2005). There should be compatibility between the MO’s infrastructure, organization and operational procedures, and security requirements of WPKI applications. Independent auditors should assess such compatibility although the audits do not eliminate the risk. That necessitates acceptance of the risk. The possibility of MITM attacks occurring between Ps and users is higher with the use of WPKI comparable to ID-PKI. In comparison to other authentication systems, the WPKI-enabled methods can stop many types of attacks. On the other hand, ID-PKI authenticates users based on both their certificate and public-key certificate. Such a feature makes the MITM attack impractical (Tepandi, Vassiljev and Tahhirov, 2010). The addition of digital signing from the user’s end would help minimize the WPKI weakness. A real-time MITM become more complex in the process. Making the authentication process session-aware would increase WPKI security. Implications of ID-PKI The application of ID-PKI would complement the existing practices for the implementation of i-voting. Electronic voting requires extra security to ensure confidentiality and auditability while maintaining integrity (Raina, 2003). There are various variations of electronic voting depending on the country. There are proposals to improve electronic voting systems. All the innovations aim at boosting transparency so that results are acceptable as legit. Concepts such as the digital envelope that is in use in Estonia may prove workable. Such a system would guarantee transparency as individuals can verify their individual votes. Under the concept, the inner envelope carries the encrypted vote while the outer envelope carries the digital signature. Authentication of the vote is by the digital signature while encryption of the vote is through the system’s public-key. Verification of the results requires a voter’s private key. The determination of the suitability of a voting scheme would depend on type of the election and how critical it is, the legislation that supports it, logistics involved, technological infrastructure as well as security of the systems. WPKI Requirements and Recommendations Under m-voting, where WPKI risks are less serious comparative to those of ID-PKI, they can be ignored. The safeguards for manageable risks constitute the WPKI requirements and recommendations. M-voting authorities should come up with and evaluate from time to time WPKI requirements (Raina, 2003). There should be a procedure applicable in the selection of the USIM card developers, personalization developers as well as card logistic service providers. There should also be a strict procedure to audit personal identities to verify citizenship. The procedures should be similar to those of issuing Identity cards. The m-voting administration should also strive to create awareness about social risks. That would ensure people are more careful with their phones, USIM cards as well as ID cards and in the process minimize phone security breaches. The handling of USIM card private keys, PIN codes and secret keys should be in a confidential and secure manner. Voter anonymity should be maintained and the mobile application should not store PIN codes in any way. During the authentication process, the AP’s should require less obvious identification information. Simultaneous multiple authentications by the same user should also be cancelled. Since an ID card is an official document, it places some obligations on the holder. There needs to be regulation on USIM cards for WPKI similar to that on ID cards for m-voting purposes. The system should also provide equal chances to all voters to avoid discrimination. SHA-2 variants and 2048-bit RSA should be components of certificates of WPKI for M-voting. Conclusion The integration of the physical and e-identity is possible using mobile phones for the authentication and digital signing. Improving the security of such technology is critical, as it is important for future developments in the field. Security analysis on WPKI reveals three categories of risks: manageable risks, minor risks and WPKI-specific risks. The analysis was independent of m-voting. WPKI is therefore practicable given the implementation of the requirements in i-voting. References Chen, L., Mitchell, C.J. and Martin, A. (Eds.) (2009). Trusted Computing: Second International Conference, Trust 2009 Oxford, UK, April 6-8, 2009, Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science / Security and Cryptology). Berlin: Springer. Doherty, J. (2014). Wireless and Mobile Device Security. Burlington: Jones and Barlett. Nakhjiri, M. and Nakhjiri, M. (2005). AAA and Network Security for Mobile Access: Radius, Diameter, EAP, PKI and IP Mobility. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley. Raina, K. (2003). PKI Security Solutions for the Enterprise: Solving HIPAA, E-Paper Act, and Other Compliance Issues. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley. Tepandi, J., Vassiljev, S. and Tahhirov, I. (2010). Wireless PKI Security and Mobile Voting. Computer, 43 (6), p54-60. Read More