Perception, Bias and the Cuban Missile Crisis - Assignment Example

 Perception, Bias and the Cuban Missile Crisis Introduction Scholars and policy makers have been learning lessons about the Cuban missile crisis that dissected virtually to all aspects of the nuclear shutdown between Soviet Union and United States for over half a century. Researchers used documents and attended conferences with the aim of distilling the events of 1962. This aims at improving the foreign policy making in US. This paper identifies the cognitive shortfalls associated with individual perception, analysis and biases associated with Operation Anadyr. The Operation Anadyr formed the largest out-of-area deployment to be made by Soviets. It was a daring plan meant to restore the strategic weapon balance between US and USSR as well as provide protection against Americans in Castro Cuba. Despite the insignificant surface fleet in USSR, their little experience in the field of tropical operations played a crucial role in their strategic and submarine nuclear weapons. During this period, United States possessed 142 atlases, 20 Minutemen, deployed hardened silos, 1 continental ballistic and 62 Titan.1 The Air Force in US possessed 639 B-52 Stratofortess, Stratojets and Nuclear bombers. The Operation Anadyr aimed at altering this balance. Its central objective involved delivery, support and deployment of five MRBM/IRBM regiments from 43rd Rocket Army. Also, the operation aimed at protecting and accompanying forces for the missile regiments. About 42,000 troops from Soviet Union went to Cuba and their ships contained SS-5 missiles. Completely unknown to the intelligence unit in US, USSR archived some documents hidden within the Island. The Perception in Operation Anadyr The Operation Anadyr involved complex deception and denial campaigns. The Soviet Union attempted to position its nuclear weapons on Cuba Island. This occurred under great secrecy that denied the US deployment information about the missiles as well as deceived the political leadership in United States about the intentions of Moscow in Cuba. Parameters defined by the Operation Anadyr required medium and intermediate ballistic missiles applied to Cuba. They also required that the operations continue before the discovery of existence by United States. The fundamental deception, in this operation, involved codename itself. Anadyr suggests a movement of the Soviet troops to Caribbean where the Intelligence analyst in US poured over the intercepted communications of the Soviet Military. 2 Anadyr refers to the name of a river that drains in Bering Sea and a remote bomber base in USSR. Only five of the senior officers knew about the actual location of the deployment. They prepared the feature of operation in a way that kept the staff scores busy throughout the week, with the secrecy being the stringent demand. Logistical of the preparation for Operation Anadyr remained equally covert, material and men used railway for transport across the northern ports in the Black Sea. On the other hand, foreigners could not access the port, and most offloading occurred under darkness. The deception and denial measures by Soviet Union opposed the arrival of the ship in Cuba. As a result, the vessels unloaded on eleven different ports so as to complicit the adversarial surveillance. The non-military material offloaded during daytime, but the military material offloaded under darkness. The Operation Anadyr also had forbidden the troops of wearing uniforms so as to make the presence of Soviet military deniable, and they instead wore the civilian attire. Furthermore, the media in Soviet Union trumped the increased agricultural assistance provided by Soviets to Cuban comrades. This acted as a false explanation for equipment and men. The Diplomatic Denial The soviets used diplomatic ruses in maintaining their guise about the Operation Anadyr in Cuba. The secretary, Khrushchev Nikita embarked on the series of trips to the republics of Soviet in Central Asia as the operation continued. During his visits, he explicitly avoided any hostile reference to U.S. Also, the Soviet ambassador to US acted as a primary instrument in transmission of diplomatic assurances of the supply of defensive weaponry to Cuba by the Soviets.3 He denied any existence of missiles in Cuba. This misinformation demonstrated the bias since the president in US believed that the ambassador was an honest diplomat. He trusted the Soviet, but the trust died when he gotten the actual photographs of the surveillance aircraft, Lockheed U-2, of the ballistic Soviet missiles in Cuba. Instances when U.S. political and military personnel allowed a cognitive bias to influence their assessment on build up of the crisis The American analysts speculated that the large ships carried nuclear-capable ballistic missiles though they lacked any definitive evidence until they arrived in Cuba. The US had earlier on tried to overthrow the regime in Cuba. The Soviets used the opportunity in placing their missiles in Cuba under the support of Fidel Castro. Furthermore, the Soviets defended themselves of only delivering defense weapons in Cuba. This never raised much alarm until later after the ballistic nuclear missile photos revealed the intentions of Soviets. However the presidents in Soviet and US meant to negotiate, but in the meanwhile, the Soviet ships were laying blockade in the sea. The political administration in US failed in implementing coherent national plan for transition to stability. Despite the presence of experienced national security team, the efforts by officials of integrating and coordinating the different planning efforts and policy objectives, failed completely. For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency in September estimate believed that Soviets would never place missiles in Cuba, but the sources from the agency indicated the presence of missiles in Cuba. The intelligence processing errors coupled with the inaccurate communication during intelligence assessments altered the policy of the administration. The moment US administration corrected the intelligence assessments and the missiles had already been delivered in Cuba.4 The actions by Central Intelligent Unit reflect the effects of process variables and output to the decision-making process. The perspective of the organization explains the effects of leadership to the dynamism in decision-making. The Cuban Missile Crisis formed the scariest mankind event that involved destruction of nuclear capabilities of the countries involved. It included a combination of the adversary friendly and trickery simplicity in analysis leading to Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviets used deception and denial though this proved imperfect since some indicators as noted by US analysts. The intelligence unit in US realized about the crisis when it was too late. The reception of USSR activities by US analysts indicates the cognitive shortfalls. They perceived the increased military traffic by USSR in Cuba as conventional military build-up. The analysts and CIA underestimated the presence of nuclear specialist in Cuba. Some biases evidently characterized US government in their assessments and judgments about the military activities between USSR and Cuba. The reaction of US analysts to HUMINT reports by Cuban exiles reveals bias. Also, added reports by journalist, diplomats and other people indicate the abundance of information that could have been effective in prevention of crisis. Most of the information from Cuba appeared imaginary and exaggerated. Crisis Indicators The indicators that US could have used include the unusual activities at the ports. Despite the military material offloaded during the night, movement for the foreigners remained restricted throughout the period.5 The Soviets also build tall cinder-block walls around the offloading areas, and they evacuated the nearby local residents from their homes. The detection of missiles could have been impossible due to the restrictions, but such restrictions indicated the availability of secret and probably harmful activities. Secondly, another indicator that could have raised the alarm is the increased magnitude of goods transported from USSR. Despite the military equipment and personnel taking the below the deck position, the ships appeared unnecessary large for carrying missiles. The US experts speculated of the ships carrying ballistic missiles since the Soviets were known to use such ships in delivering missiles. If this could have been given more attention, the US would have known the true USSR intentions. The deception and denial by USSR appeared impressive, but there still left the room for detection by the US analysts. Though the US analysts could not have reacted to every single report, the repeated suggestion for any undesirable situation deserves a second look. US could have used the confirmatory approach and Elder and Paul model in preventing the crisis. After all, most indicators appeared plainly definitive and visible for discovery with relatively little effort. Bibliography Bernstein, Barton J. Understanding Decision-making, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review Essay. International Security 25.1 (2000): 134-64. Domiminguez, Jorge I. The Missile Crisis: (Or, What Was Cuban about U.S. Decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis?). Diplomatic History 24.2 (2000): 305-15. Haas, Mark L. Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis. International Studies Quarterly 45.2 (2001): 241-70. Ketov, Ryurik. The Cuban Missile Crisis as Seen Through a Periscope. Journal of Strategic Studies 28.2 (2005): 217-31. Tierney, Dominic. “Pearl Harbor in Reverse” Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Journal of Cold War Studies 9.3 (2007): 49-77. Read More