Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War - Term Paper Example

Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War In his book, Buchanan aims to destroy Churchill’s reputation claiming that he was overrated, tries to prove that Hitler was never a threat to United States or Britain, and that World War II was unnecessary. In general, the book is a critique to Churchill, and the events leading to World War II. According to Buchanan, Winston Leonard S. Churchill is one of historical person in the world in the fields of writing, politics and military. He is most famous for his participation in the Battle of Britain savoring the nation from Adolf Hitler’s quest for world conquest. Churchill’s reputation did not come in a silver plate. He strategically positioned himself in places, usually the wars that would advance his fame (Buchanan 12). He went through numerous adventures and ensured he wrote books and articles about them. Churchill was an excellent writer thus many of his works sold well. Consequently, he received a Nobel Prize in literature in 1953 for his works. His reputation grew globally for his sharp wit and rhetoric. Buchanan begins his effort by discrediting Churchill’s involvement in the events leading to the World War I. Buchanan highlights irrelevant facts without explanation of their significance. For instance, Buchanan claims that Kaiser Wilhelm II, grandson of Queen Victoria, “let the opportunity slip” for the alliance with Germany, while in fact Britain evidently tried to campaign for the alliance (Buchanan 76). Buchanan portrays Britain as giving a single chance for the formation of the alliance. This is incorrect as the “opportunity” lasted for more than forty years, from 1898, and German declined in each instance of the British approach to the alliance formation. Later in the book, Buchanan quotes Kaiser Wilhelm II talking on the formation of the Anglo-Germany alliance, but he indicates no date of the statements. Buchanan leaves the reader with the impression that these statements came after the slipped opportunity to form an alliance, but it was made in 1901 when Britain was seeking the alliance with Germany without success. His ignorance on the timeline and irrelevant facts become his technique of critique in the rest of his book. Buchanan then tackles the Moroccan crisis of 1901 and 1911. Interestingly, these international incidents were results of Germany, and only dates are illustrated. The author omits the Australian-Hungary Empire crisis of 1908, which had the backing of Germany. These omissions of important crisis and other events that led to the emergence of World War I gives the reader the impression that Germany was clear of any blames in the build up to the war. Buchanan illustrates theories of British and French diplomatic backroom meetings against a pacifist Germany whose only intention were to protect their colonies. Buchanan next issue of concern is defending Kaiser. He quotes Churchill reflections to Kaiser after the war. Buchanan dedicates several pages to quoting Churchill and vindicating Kaiser with the impression that he agrees with the statements. He clears Kaiser off any blames and proceeds to point a blaming finger on Churchill, as the person behind Great Britain’s involvement in World War I (Buchanan 165). He highlights Churchill take-over of the British Navy and his attempt to overpower the Germany in the production of Ships. He however omits Churchill efforts of implementing a naval holiday, which would decrease the number of ships that Britain and Germany were producing. Here, Buchanan’s criticism of Churchill is evident, as he does not note Churchill’s attempts to stop the naval arms competition. Churchill had personally desired to meet with the head of Germany Navy, Admiral von Tirpitz, and sent a letter to the then Prime Minister requesting to participate in the Kiel week, where he envisioned a friendly conversation with the admiral. His request did not get a thumps up. Nevertheless, he sent part of his fleet to the event, which later collaborated with the Germany forces in the funeral of a German Officer killed while flying a British seaplane. From the book, the reader gets the expression that Churchill was craving for war, and manipulated the neutrality of Belgium as an entrance to the war. In real sense, Churchill, and the British cabinet in general, were concentrating on the domestic issues after the assassination of Ferdinand. A month after the assassination, and Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia, Churchill has not envisioned Britain’s role in the crisis being changed from that of a spectator to an active participant. Churchill concerns for Belgium grew large with the declaration of war to France by Germany. In contrast, Buchanan claims that the British did not care for Belgium, and quotes a historian concern on the disgust of Churchill over King Leopold II administration of the Congo colony. Buchanan further downplays the Belgium’s neutrality treaty of 1839 by calling it a seventy-year old treaty, thus emphasizing on the unnecessary interventions of its guarantors. Buchanan is completely wrong in his conclusion that Belgium’s neutrality was a last minute resort for Britain to participate in the war, as Russia, France, Britain and Germany had observed the treaty for more than seventy-five years. Buchanan, in his pre-World War I pages, collects quotes and pieces of statements from Churchill as he was preparing for the Royal Navy. With these statements, Buchanan portrays Churchill as warmonger. He quotes on the letters that Churchill sent to his wife, saying that “he was geared up and happy”. The problem with the quote is that it picks a part that is very liable to misrepresentation of Churchill’s position on the war. If Buchanan had quoted the letter a little longer, he would have seen Churchill’s concerns on the outcomes of the War engagement. It is agreeable that Churchill prepared for the war, but Buchanan’s imposition that Churchill wanted, or more accurately lusted, the war is not completely accurate. With the end of the World War I blame games, Buchanan goes to the aftermath of the war. He begins his arguments on the Treaty of Versailles, and bases it as the foundation for Hitler’s rise in Germany, which is globally acceptable by all historians. According to Buchanan, the treaty’s design was to make Germany weak and make her dependent on other countries to prevent its rise to a super power again. Buchanan does not mention Germany’s treaties imposed on France in 1871 and Russia in 1917. Critically thinking, these were the base for imposition of the treaty of Versailles. What the politicians designed was an exact example of what Germany had designed for France and Russia. Here, Buchanan seems to apply double standards. In contrast to Buchanan’s perception, Churchill had always perceived the treaty as wrong. Instead of illustrating his stances in 1918 and 1919 on the composition of peaceful terms with Germany, Buchanan quotes Churchill in his timeline 26 years later on the realization of the Hitlerism, which was born out of the Versailles treaty. Buchanan next stop is the events leading to World War II. He argues that if Britain had not given a war guarantee to Poland in 1939, thus bringing Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India and the United States, the German-Polish war would never have been the six years of battle that consumed fifty million lives (Buchanan 476). He emphasizes on the 1939 guarantee as the most decisive event that lead to the World War II, not the 1938 appeasement at Munich. His argument is that Germany had all the rights to readapt the Sudetenland from Czech, but the British guarantee to Poland was a foolish idea, as British could not help the Polish from Hitler’s attack in 1939. Inc conclusion, Buchanan begins his writing at the end of the nineteenth century, and ends it at the World War II. Winston Churchill takes much of the center stage for his “role” in the British participation in the European war of 1914 and the German Polish war of 1939. Buchanan illustrates evidence that Kaiser Wilhelm II did not want war with Great Britain; neither did Hitler, 30 years later. Buchanan proves this by quoting Hitler’s admiration of the British Empire and its people, and his desire to make an alliance with her. He concludes that Germany did not want to conquer the world; rather what Hitler wanted was the Lebensraum in the east of Germany, not to the west. Nevertheless, no historical event exists in a vacuum and even short civil wars can be quite hard to forecast. Buchanan blames the Great Britain for intervening in WWI and WWII, which he justifies, but does not consider the potential disaster that would have arose without the intervention of Great Britain. Work cited Buchanan, J. Patrick. Churchill, Hitler, and “The Unnecessary War”: How Britain Lost its Empire and the West Lost the World. New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2009. Print. Read More