Aristotle, on Virtue and Happiness - Assignment Example

Q1. Aristotle seems to say that an active life in accordance with virtue is a requirement for happiness. At least at Nichomachean Ethics 1098a16-17 he says that the "...human good turns out to be the soul's activity that expresses virtue." What does Aristotle mean by virtue and how does virtue figure his account of happiness? In addition to being a requirement, is it also sufficient for happiness? What do you yourself think about his answers to these questions? Answer: Aristotle sees in humans, the element of reason which is significant both because we obey to it as well as we possess it. By all the reasons that humans project themselves to possess, life is led or must be led in the sense of activity. The significance of activity is brought forth, further, in what he acclaims to be the function of man for, the function of man lies in “activity of soul which follows or implies reason” (1098a 7-8). The action that human must perform, however, should be in accordance with the appropriate virtue. What is ‘virtue’ then? Activities can relate to variety of reasons, some to the body, some to external fulfillment and few to the soul. Aristotle acclaims that those activities relating to soul has the potential and element of the highest good and none but those very actions can appropriately be deemed ‘virtuous’. Drawing itself to a sequential and natural deliverance, those virtuous acts have potentials build in within them of generating what is ‘happiness’. Happiness can be inclusive of wisdom or virtue; it could be with or without pleasure and external prosperity. Aristotle points out the paradox however, of the fact that those who are happy in the light of virtue, in themselves are the greatest witnesses of pleasure within themselves, hence with no external pleasure necessary for them. Since happiness borne out of virtue is the provider of all external fulfillments, virtue poses itself as directly proportional to happiness. Aristotle says “the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant” (1099a 13-14). No wonder then, virtuous actions are in themselves pleasant, good and noble. Thus, inclusive of being the requirement of happiness, virtue is also sufficient, the complete benefactor of the same. The properties of good, noble and pleasant belong to the best activities, those that we identify with happiness, says Aristotle. The requirement of happiness to humans is, by far and large, the greatest of all concerns and their inability to constantly achieve it is a greater paradox. If what needs to be achieved is a real happiness with its real meaning, what Aristotle says makes, most pragmatically, the greatest sense. If we perpetually conduct those activities that are not virtuous and continuously claim them as virtuous and declare them as the source of happiness, all we get is that happiness which is transitory, a pleasure. Happiness is a product of right virtue and a right virtue is a result of right activity which is further the outcome of right thought. Aristotle’s happiness is what humans are in need of. Q2. At the beginning of Nichomachean Ethics, Book II.1 Aristotle says that there are two kinds of virtue-thought and character-and in the remainder of Book II he develops an account of character virtue. Does happiness require both forms of virtue? Is one kind subordinate to the other? What light is thrown on these questions by Aristotle's discussion of virtue and happiness at Nichomachean Ethics, X. 6-8? Is Aristotle's focus on the activity of understanding in these later chapters consistent with his earlier stress on character virtue and, more generally, his earlier stated concern with politics? Consider what additional help, if any, we get in understanding Aristotle's answers to these questions from his discussion of the "most choice-worthy life" in Politics, Book VII (Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy, 913-922). Answer: Aristotle claims that there are two types of virtues, intellectual and moral (thought and character). Intellectual virtue is the one purely based on teaching, that is, it entails people’s experience and time while moral virtue is the one that comes as a result of habit. Moral virtue thus, does not arise by nature says Aristotle for, “nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature” (1103a 20-21). He says that a stone that is made by nature to fall dawn can be made to fall up no matter how many times we throw it upwards. Since intellectual virtue can be taught and moral virtue comes as a habit, a habit can also be taught. Aristotle, in this sense, seems to imply that intellectual and moral virtues are not just complimentary, but moral virtue is subordinate to intellectual virtue, for, thought can result in character. And since both virtues are proportional and complimentary to each other and our goal is happiness, Aristotle also seems to claim the necessity of both for happiness. Aristotle also deals with these questions in book X with reference to virtue and happiness. He points out that happiness is not a state, for if it were it would be achieved by those sleeping, and plants and stones. It is “good activity” and not amusement. Since we aim for happiness and the fact remains that good activities (virtuous ones) can result in happiness, and if an activity gives happiness we are ‘happy’ to do that activity, good activity is happiness. But pleasant amusements are not sought for something else and since no benefit is derived form it, we are rather injured. Aristotle’s idea of good activity is in procession and relation to all his earlier concerns including his concept of character virtue and his focus on politics. He underlines the desired end to humans as happiness which is a result of ‘human good’ in all his concerns. Character virtue is as a result of habit which is reiterated later as happiness being the result of good activity and not amusement. In character virtue pleasure is in itself a property in those people who are happy while since ‘amusement’ does not lead to end result, it rather injures. Pleasure is by virtue and amusement is by activity which is not virtuous. His concerns with politics as “science of human good” are also justified for, politics really is the most authoritative art, and the power that dictates what ought to be learnt. If the end of human good needs to be reiterated, the strongest tool would be politics, the tool that helps in the determination of knowledge. Thus, the goal of life being happiness, those activities that projects ‘human good’ is the most choice-worthy life. Bibliography Ross, David, trans. Aristotle, the Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford, New York: Oxford World's Classics, 2009. Read More