Leading up to the Louisiana Purchase - Report Example

Leading up to the Louisiana Purchase In 1803, the United s was able to expand its territory by 100 percent of its size at that time, adding approximately 828,000 square miles to its western edge for the low price of $15 million (Patrick, 2003). The relatively new country brokered the deal with France, paying approximately 3 cents per acre to acquire the land that would eventually become Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Oklahoma, Kansas and Nebraska. The purchase also included significant portions of the future states of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, New Mexico, Texas, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado and Louisiana. As if this wasn’t significant enough, the country also purchased smaller portions of land that would eventually become the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan (Patrick, 2003). The original plan of then-President Thomas Jefferson had been simply to acquire the city of New Orleans as a means of ensuring farmers in the interior of the country had access to shipping lanes from the mouth of the Mississippi River. A month before the purchase was made, the territory had belonged to the Spanish. So, just how did the territory end up in the hands of the French to be purchased in such large quantity by the United States? A great deal of the territory had belonged to the French through much of the 1700s, but most was ceded to Spain as part of the Treaty of Tontainebleau. France agreed to the transfer as a means of fulfilling some of its obligations to Spain from debts owed before the war (Weber, 1992: 198). The end of the Seven Years’ War was marked by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, in which France surrendered the remainder of the territory they held, area to the east of the Mississippi and Canada, to Great Britain while Spain surrendered Florida (Hemphill, 1935: 177). But this maneuvering also gave Spain complete control over the mouth of the Mississippi. Despite the intricate dealings that happened between 1763 and 1801, the US managed to gain, through additional treaties with Spain and with England, the right to drop shipments in New Orleans that could then be loaded onto ships and transported around to the Eastern states. The French became more and more concerned about the influence of the United States upon this area and began to exert pressure upon Spain to give them back the land in question. “France must acquire Louisiana and the Floridas by negotiation, and Canada by force, as the only means to contain the US within peaceful bounds, to break their exclusive relations with England, to preserve our colonies exclusively to ourselves by feeding them with the products of our own soil and, finally, to recover both the hemispheres that preponderance to which nature entitles us” (Victor Collot cited in Morison and Commager, 1956: 372). Toward that end, France began to speak with Spain again, this time focusing upon regaining the land they had previously given away. At first, these negotiations were less than friendly as the two countries were in a quasi state of war at the end of the 1700s, but the Treaty of Mortefontaine, which was signed on September 30, 1800, freed them to speak more openly (Lyon, 1974: 109). This was the same day that the French signed treaties with the US that guaranteed friendship and fair trade between the two countries as well as a six month grace period before engaging in war with one another as a means of allowing citizens of each country to return home (Convention of 1800). The year 1800 turned out to be a very busy year for France. Once the above two treaties were signed, France went to work on recovering the Louisiana territory, as well as the Floridas, as a means of achieving their dual objectives of containing the United States and supplying their own colonies. Spain had been relatively unsuccessful at capitalizing on the new territory. Even though they held it for approximately 37 years, less then one percent of the area had been settled (Morison and Commager, 1956: 389). The few Spanish citizens that did settle there managed to make money individually, but overall, the colony cost Spain approximately $337,000 per year to maintain, a cost the Spanish court was not willing to continue (Lyon, 1974: 109). France has been aware of Spain’s difficulties since 1795 when Spain offered it back to France in exchange for the eastern half of Santo Domingo, but France was unwilling to part with this land either (Weber, 1992: 290). The two countries finally reached an agreement in October of 1800 as Spain gave the land of the Louisiana territory back to France in exchange for a throne in central Italy (Treaty of San Ildefonso, 1800). “Anxious to keep America at arm’s length from New Spain, Spain had also stipulated in the agreement at San Ildefonso that France not relinquish Louisiana to a third party” (Weber, 1992: 291), a promise that was evidently made by Gouvion St Cyr, the French Ambassador to Madrid, who was quoted as saying, “I am authorized to declare to you in the name of the First Consul [Napoleon] that France will never alienate it [Louisiana]” (Lyon, 1974: 124). However, France was not able to obtain the Floridas and the agreement between the two countries remained a secret for more than a year. Because the transfer of land to the French was a secret, the agreements Spain had with the US regarding the use of the ports at New Orleans continued to be honored throughout 1801 and into 1802. However, the Spanish suddenly revoked the right of US boats to drop their cargoes in New Orleans on October 16, 1802 (Weber, 1992: 280). This confirmed the fears of the United States that France was regaining control of the territory as they had already been expressed by Thomas Jefferson, who had informed Robert R. Livingston in April that if France returned to Louisiana, “from that moment on we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation” (Lyon, 1974: 153). To try to prevent this from occurring, Livingston, the French ambassador, had been trying to persuade France to give the United States just as much of the Louisiana territory to address their needs on the Mississippi. “Let France ceded to the United States so much of Louisiana as lies above the mouth of the River Arkansas. By this, a barrier will be placed between the Colony of France and Canada, from which she may otherwise be attacked with the greatest facility, and driven out before she can derive any aid from Europe. Let her retain the country lying on the west of the Mississippi and below the Arkansas River – a country capable of supporting fifteen millions of inhabitants. By this, she will place a barrier between the United States and Mexico, if (which I hope will never be the case) they should have the wild idea of carrying their arms into the country, and at the same time be at hand to protect the Spanish establishments against the ambitious views of any European power. Let her possess East Florida as far as the River Perdido, with all ports on the Gulf, cede West Florida, New Orleans and the territory on the east bank of Mississippi, to the United States” (Lyon, 1992: 183-184). Although the argument was that France should give this property to the United States, the offer was made to purchase it for an equitable sum. The main goal in obtaining the Louisiana territory for the US was not necessarily for expansionist dreams or thoughts of glory. Instead, the acquisition of rights to the mouth of the Mississippi was viewed as necessary for trade from the interior of the country to the eastern districts. For the French, this arrangement also appeared somewhat favorable. “They [the English] shall not have the Mississippi which they covet. Louisiana is nothing in comparison with their conquests in all parts of the globe, and yet the jealousy they feel at the restoration of this colony to the sovereignty of France acquaints me with their wish to take possession of it, and it thus they will begin the war … I think of ceding it to the US” (Finley, 1915: 123). At the same time, it was becoming clear to the French that occupation of the territory would be difficult, as would defense should the English choose to attack. The sour taste left in Napoleon’s mouth regarding the delay of transfer by almost two years of the territory from Spain also made it easier for him to ignore the stipulation that France should not give the property to a third party (Lyon, 1992: 125). Finally, France was in need of funds to help advance other interests overseas and in the Orient (Lyon, 1992: 125). This was the reason France offered the entire territory rather than simply the small area the United States was seeking. Recognizing the chance for what it was, the United States took advantage and the territory was purchased in 1803 (de Conde, 1976: ix-x). Thus, this tremendous purchase that doubled the size of the US and still today comprises almost a quarter of the nation’s land mass came about as a lucky set of circumstances. Had Spain been able to establish a foothold, it would not have been so willing to give Louisiana back to France. Had Spain not irritated France by its reluctance to hand over the territory, France might not have been so willing to break its treaty. Had France received the territory earlier and established its own foothold, it also might not have been so willing to part with the land. However, not seeing much interest, not having much invested, not able to defend it and requiring funds for other ventures, the continued offers coming from the US encouraged the French to make the deal that was to have long-lasting ramifications for the new country. Works Cited de Conde, Alexander. This Affair of Louisiana. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976. Finley, John. The French in the Heart of America. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915. Hemphill, W. Edwin. “The Jeffersonian Background of the Louisiana Purchase.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. Vol. 22, I. 2, (September 1935), pp. 177-190. Lyon, Elijiah Wilson. Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974. Morison, Samuel Eliot and Henry Steele Commager. The Growth of the American Republic. Vol. 1, Fourth Edition. New Haven: Oxford University Press, 1956. Patrick, John J. “Teaching About the Louisiana Purchase.” ERIC Digest. (August 2003). February 28, 2007 < http://www.ericdigests.org/2004-1/purchase.htm> Weber, David J. The Spanish Frontier in North America. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Read More