The Peloponnesian War - Importance to Greek Politics - Coursework Example

The Peloponnesian war: Importance to Greek politics OCC South field Name Course Professor’s name Date The Peloponnesian War – importance to Greek politics The ancient Greece was fragmented into many individualistic small states ruled separately by different identities. They were popularly known as city-states. Among these city-states Athens and Sparta were the most prominent ones. If Athens could have been called the cultural soul of Greece, Sparta was its military icon. Ancient Greece flourished around these two city-states almost in two separate groups - the Delian league led by Athens and the Peloponnesian league led by Sparta. Most of the other city-states either joined Sparta or Athens to keep up their existence. Eventually these two city-states became two power centers of Greece and indulged into a battle of supremacy against each other. This war between Athens and Sparta was known as the Peloponnesian war. The importance of the present study lies in the fact that as one of the ancient modern civilizations; studying the history of Greece has always been a privilege. Furthermore the Peloponnesian war was one of the very first kinds of civil war that led to massive alterations in nature of politics in Greece. The Peloponnesian war eventually led to the alteration of leadership of Greece, replacing Athens with Sparta as the most powerful Greek city-state. The background of the Peloponnesian war was a culmination of events that hovered around jealousy, insecurity and hunger for power. During the Greco-Persian war Athens and Sparta fought side by side. In the initial stages of the war role of Sparta was much more prominent (480 BC to 479 BC) than that of Athens and Sparta became the leader of the Hellenic League. (Fine, 332) Sparta was mainly a land-based power depending on its infantry for military success. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes; IX) It was never that powerful in terms of naval power. While powerful Spartan infantry was more than sufficient to lead the Hellenic League against Persians on land and to drive them away from Greek soil, it was impossible for them to maintain the success in Persian territories of Asia and Aegean. A naval leadership soon became inevitable for such campaign against Persia in Asia and Aegean and in such circumstances Athens that was primarily a naval power came in the forefront (478 BC). This event marked the initiation of rise of Athens as the prime Greek city-state ahead of Sparta. Again according to some scholars the Hellenic League at this point was subdivided in two parts. The Naval wing of Hellenic League became Delian League and it was headed by Athens. The land wing of Hellenic League went under Sparta and became known as Peloponnesian League. (Fine, 1983, 332) Spartans never took that in light heart. Furthermore, to their dislike Athens had also rebuilt their wall and that had secured the city against any alien attack. In these circumstances a clash between Sparta and Athens was about to begin, centering on a Helot revolt. Spartans were about to launch an attack on Attica to tame the Thasian rebellion (465 BC), but were hindered by an earthquake; Helots who were slave to Sparta revoked a revolt against the Spartans at this point. (Cartledge, 186) Badly cornered, Spartans called for help from its past Hellenic compatriots and Athens sent a group of 4000 soldiers to help the Spartans. Spartans were not very sure of the goodwill of the Athenian soldiers and thought they might join the enemy at the battlefield. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes, 499) Such suspicion led them to refuse the Athenian group of soldiers from joining the combined force of all the other allies. Though the combined force of Sparta and its allies comfortably defeated the rebellious Helots, yet peace remained a far cry on Greek soil. Such an action on behalf of Sparta led to serious disgust in Athens and they felt dishonored. In retaliation, Athens helped the defeated helots to resettle in Naupactus a city in Corinthian Gulf. (Fine, 351) Furthermore it went into form alliances with Thessaly, Argos and Megara. Argos was longtime enemy of Sparta and Megara was fighting a battle with Corinth a powerful Spartan ally. These events evoked the first Peloponnesian War (459 BC to $45 BC) that ran over a period of 15 years and fought between Sparta, Corinth, Aegina and some other city-states on one side and Athens on the other. This war was termed as the first Peloponnesian war and it brought mixed outcomes for the Athenians. The combined army of Corinth and Epidaurus defeated Athens at Halieis but Athens scored with the victory at sea in Cecryphaleia. By this time Aegina was well alarmed of the aggression of Athens in Saronic Gulf and entered the battle with its powerful naval power to join the Peloponnesian allies. However they were defeated in a decisive sea battle against the Athenians and their city was siege. To take advantage of Athenian deployment in Aegina, Corinth led an attack to Megara but was defeated in the final battle, after the first battle remained indecisive. Sparta entered into the first Peloponnesian war in a much later stage and that in a quite indirect way. Spartans were proud Dorians and when a war broke between Doris and Phocis, they took the side of Doris. On the other hand Phocis was an Athens’s ally and this brought the two giants face to face. Though Spartan force managed to defeat the Phocis’s force but an Athenian fleet blocked their way back through the Corinthian Gulf. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes; 499-503) Having no other alternative the Spartan army moved towards Boeotia. Threatened by the concentration of Spartan army in Boeotia; Athens led many troops towards Boeotia and the two city-state met each other at the battle of Tanagra (456 BC). Athens lost the battle but the Spartan force without conquering Attica went back to Sparta. (Fine, 354-356) However the Athenians came back with a decisive victory at Oenophyta (456 BC) to occupy all the Boeota except Thebes, Phocis and Locris. (Fine, 368) Surrender of Aegina followed soon and the Spartan docks at Gythium were soon come under the Athenian ravage. (Fine, 353, 356) Corinthians and Sicyonians were not to let loose; Chalcis at Corinthian Gulf was occupied by the Athenians. (Rawlinson, 143; Fine, 380) These early success of Athens in the First Peloponnesian War were attributed to Athenian control on Megara an important port of that era situated at Corinthian Gulf. On one hand it facilitated harboring of back up ships for war and on the other Athenian rowers could easily had access to inland. The Athenian success was short lived followed by successive defeats at the hand of the enemy. Athens suffered a massive loss at the hand of Persia in Egypt; the Athenians lost much of its naval power. (Fine, 359) They were left with no choice but to consolidate their position again and restore the Delian Legue. By this time the Athenians encountered another loss at the hands of Thessalian force. (Thucydides, 200) At this circumstance Athens entered a truce with Sparta named as peace of Callias. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes, 503) This 5 years peace treaty extracted sometime for Athens to consolidate at Aegean. However when Pericles called for a pan Hellenic congress to determine the future tract of Greece; (Fine, 364) Sparta refused to join and liberated Delphi from Phocis. In retaliation Pericles led an army to Delphi to restore it to its previous status. (Sacks, Murray and Bunsen, 183) Worsening the situation for Athens, Boeotia announced revolt against Athens and was successful; after defeating the Athenian force in battle of Coronea. This defeat led Athens to abandon Boeotia, Phocis and Locris. Inspired by the success of the Boeotia, Euboea and Megara revolted against Athens. (Fine, 368) Spartans also launched an attack on Attica at the same time taking advantage of the situation. Sensing the unfriendly environment and continuously worsening situation Athens took initiative to enter in a peace treaty with Sparta, popularly known as “Thirty Years Peace” (445 BC). Following this treaty all the confiscated land of the Peloponnesian city-states were returned by Athens and each side agreed to respect each other’s alliances. (Fine, 368-369) The first Peloponnesian war destroyed the Athenian dream of a uni-polar Greece and “Thirty Years Peace” laid the foundation of a bi-polar domination of Greece in the years to come. The Thirty Years Peace was short lived, but the truce soon went through an acid test when Miletus declared revolution against Athens in 440 BC. However Sparta abstained from fuelling this revolt otherwise that could have drawn Athens into far more danger. With Sparta keeping aside, Athens managed to destroy the revolt. (Fine, 369-372) However, following a conflict between Corinth and Corcyra the treaty came at the verge of breaking. Corinth was to invade Corcyra and Athens decided not to intervene, but it strategically placed a small group of fleet and site of them was enough for Corinth to abandon their mission to Corcyra. This event was followed by a series of instruction towards Potidaea a colony of Corinth regarding dismantling its wall; dismiss the magistrate of Corinth and allowing any future deployment of magistrate in Corcyra from Corinth. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes, 27-28) All this together brought the untimely abolition of “Thirty years Peace” and the Delians and the Peloponnesians were once again at war. Sparta called a summit of all the members of the Peloponnesian League to discuss the possibilities of raising a war against Athens. The Corinthian repeatedly stressed on declaring war against Athens to sustain Sparta’s reliability among the other members of the Peloponnesian League. Finally most of the members of the Spartan assembly agreed that Athens had broken a truce and announced a war against Athens (431BC). (Cartledge, 198-199) The Peloponnesian League was a land based viral force and they concentrated on reaping up their advantage on Athens regarding infantry. Apart from Corinth none of the other members of the League possessed a substantial naval force. The Second Peloponnesian war started with the Archidamian war (431 BC to 421 BC). Spartans were determined to corner Athens solely based upon their legendary ground force. On the other hand Athens had a supreme naval command unmatchable by any from the Peloponnesian League. So both way concentrating on ground force was far more reasonable for Sparta and thereby the Peloponnesian League. Invasion of Attica at the very first phase of the war thus followed a simple principle; confiscating land around Athens and thereby depriving the Athenians of any access to their land resource. However this plan had a major setback. Unlike others Athens used its access to sea as a gate to accumulate resources, that’s why when Spartans invaded Attica, citizens left their lands and went on to hide behind the Athenian wall. Furthermore considering the ever-sensitive Helot issue back at Sparta; it was not possible for Spartans to stay abroad leaving their motherland for long (it might have evoked a revolution in Sparta led by the Helots). They also had to look after the farming back in Sparta. All these combined led to the fact that loses for Athens from such invasion was nowhere substantial. At the advice of Pericles, Athens too avoided any direct confrontation with much powerful Spartan force. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes, XV-XVI; Kagan, 27-42) Such a defensive motive of Athens suddenly changed after the demise of Pericles in the Athenian Plague (430 BC to 429 BC). Cleon replaced Pericles and led by a clever general Demosthenes Athens registered some quick success at Boeotia, Aetolia and Pylos. The position of Pylos soon became the Spartan concern since the main driving force of the Spartan life (the Helot slaves) started to flee from Sparta and took shelter in Pylos under the Athenians. Soon Athens registered important victories at the Battle of Pylos and that of Sphacteria. (Kagan, 360; Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes, 201) However as a retaliatory action Brasidas the Spartan general invaded Amphipolis an important Athenian location in terms of treasury. In the Battle of Amphipolis (422 BC) Cleon and Brasidas both met their end and a truce was signed between two giants. (Fine, 484-486) This truce named as Peace of Nicias (421 BC) lasted for six years. This truce was broken down with the Battle of Mantinea (418 BC) fought between the democratic coalition of Argos, Athens, Mantinea and Arcadia against the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans. (Kagan, 334-339) The Spartans joined the combined force of Lacedaemonians and Tegenas in the later phase of the war resulting in a unanimous victory for the Spartan coalition against the Athenians. Battle of Mantinea might be considered as a pivotal point in Athens – Sparta rivalry, since after this battle Sparta came back from ashes and Athens never really recovered. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes, XXI) In a dilapidated state Athens went on under the leadership of Alcibiades to help Sicily against a Syracuse aggression and that further worsened the situation. Alcibiades had a postponed conviction against him back in Athens owing to alleged religious crime. After reaching Sicily when he was called back to Athens for conviction, he fled to Peloponnesus (Meyer, 104-105) and informed them that Athenian military effort to Sicily was for gaining advantage over Sparta using Sicily as a launching base for attack. Agitated enough, Sparta sent Gylippus to Sicily with substantial reinforcement. (Thucydides, Hammond and Rhodes, 365-367) By that time Nicias the Athenian general at Sicily managed to register substantial success over the Syracuse and was waiting for the winter to get over for wrapping up the rest of victory. However Gylippus at first defeated Nicias and then Nicias and Demosthenes together to obliterate the entire Athenian force at Sicily. (Meyer, 105) Spartans were determined to improve upon their previous mistake of letting Athens get free time and again even when it was cornered. By that time the Spartans realized their previous mistake of not staying long enough on Athenian soil and built a fort near Decelea to prevent Athens from getting access to their land around the year. Furthermore it helped Sparta to rob Athens of its silver mines. The only way of sustaining for Athens was through costly sea transport. The defeat of Athens in Sicily apparently announced the end of its domination and it seemed that it’s a matter of time now before it slithers into oblivion. (Fine, 494) Athens restored its situation to some extent in the following years. Under Alcibiades it fared better against the Spartans at the Battle of Syme (411 BC). (Kagan, 89) Alcibiades also helped Athens to restore its democratic system after a brief rule of 400 oligarchs. (Langer, 60; Ploetz, 68) Furthermore, Athens managed to be victorious in a series of battles between 410 BC. to 406 BC. That restored much of its previous land area and re established its financial base. Among those battles Battle of Arginusae (406 BC) is worth mentioning; it witnessed Spartan loss of 70 ships against the 25 ships of the Athenians. However an incomplete abolition of Spartan fleets even with a clear opening advantage initiated severe outrage in Athens and six of the responsible fleet commanders were executed. (De Souza, 69; Meijer, 109-110) This irrational action had left Athens vulnerable in future naval conflicts. Sparta soon consolidated under Lysander a skill full naval commander who was a tactful diplomat as well. Lysander carefully measured his moves and realized the state of infancy of Athenian Naval force losing six of its top commanders. Without any delay he launched an attack to Hellespont, which was considered to be the main source of food grains for Athens. Enemy occupancy of Hellespont would have led to starvation for the Athenians, therefore the Athenian naval force engaged into a decisive battle against Lysander at Aegospotami, only to be defeated to its routes. (Munn, 198-199) Facing starvation Athens laid down arms (404 BC) against Sparta and its allies followed soon. Though Corinth and Thebes debated over the enslavement of all the Athenians and destruction of Athens but owing to Spartan good will Athens was left to survive without its fleets, wall and possessions abroad. (Munn, 201-206) In conclusion, the Peloponnesian war was a battle between oligarchic Sparta and democratic Athens. Moreover it is a battle between the most power full infantry and strongest naval power of that time. This war gradually paved the way for a political alteration in Greece. The lead baton was transferred from the hands of Athens to that of Sparta. Again Sparta might be considered as the greatest enemy and biggest friend of Athens, since for Sparta, Athens managed to keep up its existence and later following the Corinthian war kept on playing an important role in Greek politics. References Thucidides, Hammond, Marlin and Peter John Rhodes. The Peloponnesian War: A new translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Fine, John V.A. The Ancient Greeks: A critical History. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1983 Cartledge, Paul. Sparta and Lakonia: a regional history, 1300-362 BC. London: Routledge, 2002. Rawlinson, George. A manual of ancient history. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1869. Thucydides. The History of Thucydides. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, 1829. Sacks, David, Murray, Oswyn and Margaret Bunsen. A Dictionary of the Ancient Greek World, Volume 1995, Part 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Kagan, Donald. The Archidamian War. New York: Cornell University Press, 1990. Meyer, Jack. Alcibiades: Fact, Fiction, Farce. Bloomington: Trafford Publishing, 2009. De Souza, Philip. The Peloponnesian War, 431-404 BC. London: Osprey Publishing, 2002. Meijer, Fik. A history of seafaring in the classical world. London: Routledge, 1986. Kagan, Donald. The fall of the Athenian Empire. New York: Cornell University Press, 1991 Langer, William L. Chronological Encyclopaedia of world History: Ancient, Medieval and Modern. Surrey: Genesis Publishing, 2006. Ploetz, Karl Julius. Epitome of ancient, medieval and modern history. Orlando, FL: Houghton Mifflin company, 1911. Munn, Mark Henderson. The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates. California: University of California Press, 2003. Read More