State and Society in 20th Century China - Literature review Example

and Society in 20th Century China Introduction China as a leading reformist in Asia had faced very little problem in the wake of the global economic downturn in 2008 and 2009. Shift from communism to capitalism in the latter half of the twentieth century led to liberal socio-economic policies. The post-Mao economy of China shunned the rigid communist machinery and adopted more lenient views on how to circulate people’s money among all strata of the society. Over the last few decades there has been a paradigmatic shift in the Chinese society in that it has espoused a consumer-oriented approach, both for domestic as well as overseas markets, to facilitate the growth of smooth and trustworthy multilateral trade relations. The consumer-centric trading model has also helped China bring down the increasing currency exchange rates, which had caused great uproars in international financial domains, particularly during the recent economic recessions. It may be noted that the Chinese society espoused consumerism with regard to currency exchange rates, amendments in property ownership acts, and de-institutionalisation of political authority over various prefectures. It is quite logical to state that such a shift in socio-economic spheres has not been an easy ride. The erstwhile communist austerity gave way to broader perspectives in all walks of life in China. Most notably, the emerging middle-class segment of the country has been able to find jobs in private sectors, but at the cost of state-owned jobs. This downsizing in state firms has implicit connection with the drooping economic conditions around the world. Standard societal structures in China have faced major challenges in sustaining the development programs the scope of which has been increasing everyday as the country is attracting more and more foreign direct investments in the economic upfront. Urbanization too has posed problems for the otherwise bureaucratic state mechanism to effectively control massive intra-country migrations (Lieberthal). Under these circumstances, China has been the center of global affairs, for better or worse, in the last few years. This paper is going to discuss the difficulties faced by the current Chinese leadership in dealing with issues of national interest. The study will also take into consideration how well the Chinese government is adept at handling such issues. Given the sheer geographical vastness of the land, it is quite apparent that the reformist means undertaken by the Chinese political regime face serious societal and economic challenges. Moreover, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that situation in China will normalize in near future either. Literature Review Chinese ideologies with regards to maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the nation were shaped by likelihood of territorial disintegration following its independence. It is because of this reason that various political regimes in China have always laid emphasis on building a strong economic foundation that can adequately sustain the enormous population of the land (Lal 13). If one traces the recent history of China, it would be clear that the Mao era witnessed development of a rigid political framework which was not in keeping with the contemporary international politics. In matters of foreign policymaking in particular, the Chinese regime has shown a typical stubbornness in that they have either wanted to satisfy their respective political factions or tried to establish an ideological base upon which policy outcomes could be implemented. Lieberthal and Oksenberg argue that foreign policymaking trends in America have followed a markedly different path from that in China. In the US, there is a hierarchical system of drafting and approving policies, headed by the top leadership of the state and the military. China, on the other hand, deploys a number of optional permutations to formulate foreign policies. Most of the Chinese policymaking principles have been grounded on ideological frameworks incorporating strategic efforts to satisfy the political will of the bureaucrats. Power relations and factional loyalty have played defining roles in the realisation and the implementation of policymaking (3). Since China is made up of various prefectures and quasi-independent societal enclaves, it is imperative for the supreme authority to devise policies that integrate a diverse spectrum of opinions and beliefs. The discriminatory nature of economy in China can be taken as a starting point to assess the potential difficulties faced by the Chinese leadership to wipe out the discordant socio-political developments. Analysis of the post-Mao situation in China clearly pinpoints how economic reforms failed to ensure a smooth and sobering economic integration in the country. Lieberthal states, “Within two years of Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping began an effort to reform the Maoist system. Deng’s own initiatives, though, have also been shaped in many ways by the complex legacies of the imperial era. (…) the reforms are highlighting the continuing difficulties rather than providing solutions” (4). It is quite evident from what Lieberthal opines that the imperial era in the history of China halted progress in a definitive manner. What it also suggests is that the present Chinese government and society in general are still encountering the tremulous backlashes of the Maoist era, but only to seek out for a new horizon of hope and prosperity. Let us examine in detail how far it is feasible to imagine China as a truly prosperous and wealthy nation in days to come. Cheung et al. argue that the stuttered progress in the Chinese society may be attributed to the fact that many provinces have been subject to disparaging investments and foreign linkages while others have been sidelined by the state controlled policies for growth and development (7). Going by the argument propounded by Cheung et al., it is very important to categorize the areas which may be of academic relevance to the thesis topic. Before we take a look at the central leadership of China, we should assess the areas of relevance to the thesis topic. That way we can streamline the pertinent points and elaborate from thereon. Political culture in China during the Mao regime conformed to rigid and institutionalized norms that did not facilitate continuous financial sharing across various offshoots of economic resources. What this meant was that the social ranks consisting of middle class workers, labors and people with other professional capacities had to look out for alternative sources of income. Quite naturally, it had an impact on the GDP of the country. Moreover, multilateral trade relations with the leading economies in the world suffered a great deal because of industrial unrests in the country. Core Chinese products have always enjoyed a reputation being at par with technological finesse assured by the best of international brands. Indigenous Chinese gadgets in particular have always been preferred by international consumers to more expensive electronic goods manufactured by reputed firms from the UK and the US. When China was on the verge of economic reform in the late 1970s, the political leadership in various provinces faced the major challenge of infusing life into the drooping veins of national economy. To counter this challenge effectively, they focused on integrating economic activities involving revenue generation, Gross National Product (GNP), industrial output, and export. However, the problem persisted as it was difficult to link the economic activities of the Chinese capital with that of the rest of the country. As mentioned earlier, the middle class segment along with a major contingency of the rural populace had set out for Shanghai in search of better fortune. Moreover, some provinces, such as Guangdong, challenged Shanghai in terms of growth and development. The industrial output of Guangdong increased and it took the authorities concerned in Shanghai out of their comfort zone. What it also meant was that a polarization of political and economic authority was on the cards, much to the concern of the central committee leadership. Foreign direct investments, which sustained the domestic economy for a long time, were hamstringed due to such polarization of the power game. However, a better control was gained following the assumption of leadership by Rui Xingwen and Jiang Zemin in 1985. A sweeping improvement was noticed in all economic areas of Shanghai, including increase in industrial output, development of the export sector, bigger investments in urban infrastructures and logistics, and last but by no means the least, growth of GNP (Cheung et al. 49). Consequently, Shanghai turned out to be a buzzing metropolis, effectively steering China in springing back to normalcy. The path was slow and painstaking, but the Shanghai local leadership could endure the pains to ensure a futuristic introduction of market economy, which is why modern China enjoys a leading position in global trade and commerce. Responding to the critical question on whether or not the regional leadership in Shanghai played an instrumental role in transforming the Chinese capital into a resource pool, Cheung et al. conclude that government was given optimum control over the tenacious process of strategic revival for the city. Policymaking was done on a reasoned conjecture that more input entails more risk, but it also promises more payout, if implemented successfully. Hierarchical notions were utilized not to bring conflict within authorities, but to take Shanghai out of the financial slump it was going through. As the rejuvenated Chinese capital began to attract more domestic as well as foreign investments, authorities could also look after the pending social issues involving urban developments, in order to generate more revenues for the welfare of the people (67-8). So it would not be an overstatement to claim that the economic revamping of China after 1985 followed a cyclic pattern, thus ensuring mobilization of both inbound and outbound resources. Structural pluralism in any society poses problems when it comes to induct a system of uniform political regulation over a vast majority of heterogeneous population. Given the pluralistic nature of Chinese society, governments at different times have faced the problem of creating a common mass consensus over issues of public interests, including standardized rates for market economy and more importantly, consumption of products within a free and fair economic mode. Presence of a grossly bureaucratic authority at the helm of political affairs has worsened the problem furthermore as several coercive means have been imposed on societal domains to throttle business and economy in general (Lieberthal). At the same time, political institutions that manage economic dealings in China are invariably influenced by big firms and their core business principles. Holding trade meetings with government officials, many top trading organizations exert their authority for autonomy. Needless to mention, the result of such entreats is not so bright for the future of Chinese economy at large. China’s recent rift with the United States over increasing dollar exchange ratio amply substantiates the current trend of deliberation as far as economic issues are concerned. What is even more concerning in the long run is that business principles need to be formulated independently of state policymaking. But regrettably as it is, Chinese entrepreneurs have too often been driven by their respective personal goals that have flouted the unwritten ethics of global trade and commerce. Violation of ethical codes will not only hamper the domestic inflow of capital within the country, but it will also embitter China’s bilateral relations with other economic superpowers around the globe. While the central authority responsible for policymaking has been accused of patronizing the shallow interests of reputed entrepreneurs, it is also worth noticeable how Chinese firms since the 1990s have espoused a pro-reformist stance free from impinging directly upon social issues (Kennedy 2). Gittings endorses Kennedy’s viewpoints, albeit sarcastically, on the prospects of a modern China. Citing the ambitious plan of implementing the ‘Four Modernizations’, which was agreed upon following the overthrowing of the Maoist dynasty, the author keenly observes the inherent fallacies that lay beneath the reasoning of the then leadership of China. The leadership was of the opinion that by constructively utilizing oil production, China could provide funding for overseas import sectors and thereby arrive at a striking distance with realizing the dream of the Four Modernizations, i.e., Agriculture, Industry, Science and Technology, and National Defence (98). It may be noted that Gittings’ observation provides a cue as to why the institutionalized system of politics failed to work in a pro-democratic manner following the Mao regime. Whatever happened before 1985 can be metaphorically illustrated as similar to jumping from the frying pan straight into the fire. The Cultural Revolution that occurred in China in the 1970s essentially sealed off the opening through which immediate benefits could have been obtained in matters of employment and industrial expansion. The United States preferred to stay watchful over the military ascendance of China. China’s preoccupation with a Soviet model of economy began to reap unproductive results as the country’s top brass started realizing the inherent follies with a framework that laid more emphasis on heavy industries than on integrating available smaller resources into a productive system. The Shanghai case study discussed earlier in the paper amply suggests how the GNP gradually increased after the induction of a new regime in the party politics of China. Another damaging consequence of the Soviet model of concentric authority was that it overlooked the much needed circulation of people’s money within domestic markets. Bulk portion of money collected as revenues was spent on national investments, denying mobilization of resources. As a result of this contrasting measure between input and output, China entered a vicious cycle of rural poverty wherein the peasants earned very little against the hard word they put in (Gittings 100). In a way, the peasants’ situation can be explained through the phenomenon of migration that occurred prior to the mid-1980s. As more and more provincial dwellers began migrating to the urban areas, rural people, who usually rely on state funding for their sustenance, faced economic depravation and lack of attention. Gittings further echoes Lieberthal’s opinion on the generic unrest caused by the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. The dreadful incidents at Tiananmen Square in 1989 served as an omen to what lay ahead of the troubled state of political affairs in China, particularly with regard to building a democratic and sovereign nation-state. Deng Xiaoping’s regime faced challenges both at economic as well as political fronts. Corruption and value disintegration hit the Chinese society during this phase as the local leadership struggled to cope with the onslaught of provincial empowerment, leading to inflation and market destabilization (224-6). Conclusion In essence, China in the late twentieth century and the early twenty first century has been trying hard to claw its way back to democratic ways backed by a stable economy and people’s rights. The imperialistic leftovers from the days of Mao Zedong and his predecessors are difficult to be cleansed from psychological alleyways of the people of the nation. Yet there are signs of progress shown by the recent governments, especially in matters of handling societal demands and economic disparities among various strata of the society. Albeit the recent state of business still calls for a radical alteration in terms of its claim for autonomy and self-reliance, the way China coped with the recent economic slump speaks volumes for the country’s overall policymaking principles. Works Cited Cheung, Peter T. Y., Jae Ho Chung, Chae-ho Chŏng, and Zhimin Lin. Provincial strategies of economic reform in post-Mao China: leadership, politics, and implementation. M. E. Sharpe, 1998. Gittings, John. The Changing Face of China: From Mao to Market. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Kennedy, Scott. The business of lobbying in China. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005. Lal, Rollie. Understanding China and India: security implications for the United States and the world. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006. Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China: from revolution through reform. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Michel Oksenberg. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990. Read More