The Cuban Intervention in Angola - Research Paper Example

“To what extent did the Cuban intervention shape Angola?” A Critical Evaluation Plan of Investigation In 1974, Portugal transferred governance of Angola to three revolutionary movements in the country who formed a transitional government for a new independent Angola. Disputes between these factions led to civil war with all three fighting for control of Angolan capital, Luanda. In 1975, Cuba embarked on full military intervention in aid of the MPLA; the faction in control of Luanda. This investigation aims to analyze the lasting effect of the Cuban intervention and the role it played in shaping Angola. My research shall include evidence from books and investigations published about the Cuban intervention since 1975. I will also refer to the Library of Congress Country Studies. In section B, I will discuss the first Cuban intervention, global response to the event, Cubas second involvement, and The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. In C, I will evaluate my sources and in D, provide an analysis of evidence. In consequence, to analysis, I will formulate a conclusion to my research in E. Summary of Evidence 1. History The Portuguese colonization of Angola began in the sixteenth century and continued until 1975. In 1974, following the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, an extreme right wing Portuguese government was replaced by a moderate democracy (Birmingham 184). At the time, three major revolutionary factions operated in Angola; MPLA, UNITA and FNLA. In January 1975, at a meeting held in Kenya, Portugal recognized the MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA as three independent and equal political movements (LOC). Further meeting in Alvor, Portugal, resulted in the agreement of independence on 11 November 1975 with a transitional government in place until that date (LOC). The transitional government, which was an equal unity between all three movements, was sworn in on 31 January 1975 (Smith 66). 2. Cuba’s First Entrance into the Angolan Conflicts Disputes quickly erupted between members of the newly formed government. Pro-western FNLA which was heavily influenced by the United States was at odds with Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA (LOC). The U.S refused to accept MPLA as a major player in the unity government due to their strong Soviet ties and Marxist inclinations (Smith 69). An arms race began between these two factions leading to the U.S. funding UNITA for the first time (LOC). Fighting which initially began in Luanda spread to the entire country. In July 1975, in response to a request by MPLA leader Antonio Neto to provide support against international imperialism, Cuba set up four centers for military training in Angola (CIA). On 11 August 1975, Cuban Major Raúl Diaz Argüelles proposed to Fidel Castro a military intervention in Angola comprising of 94 men (George 64). This number eventually increased to 500. South Africa which was supporting FNLA and UNITA had deployed forces in Angola and launched a military operation of 300 troops on October 23 (LOC). This number was raised to 10,000 troops and managed to gain much territory in Southern Angola which was previously under MPLA control and eventually reached within 100 km of Luanda (LOC). 3. The Worlds Response On 4 November, Castro approved Operation Carlota to support MPLAs control of Luanda (George 77). Carlota was Cubas first transparent support of the MPLA. Soon, Cuban forces and the MPLA were at advantage and attempts by the FNLA to control Luanda prior to Independence Day were repelled. On 10 November 1975, a final battle known as the Battle of Quifangondo resulted in decisive victory for MPLA just a day prior to independence (George). Portugal granted Angola independence on 11 November 1975 and relinquished control to the “people of Angola” (Piero 310-311). MPLA established its government in Luanda calling the territories it controlled the Peoples Republic of Angola (LOC). FNLA and UNITA announced their government, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Angola with a temporary capital in Huambo but fighting broke out between FNLA and UNITA forces in Huambo on the same day (Piero). South African forces continued to their presence in the south. Battles continued between the Cuban backed MPLA and the SADF. However, soon the international community began to criticize South African involvement in Angola and U.S. President Henry Ford claimed that “We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in “. On 27 March 1976, a total SADF withdrawal was completed (Piero). On 31 March 1976, the United Nations Security Council condemned South Africas involvement in Angola and demanded financial compensation for Angola (George). Angola was subsequently admitted to the United Nations (George 113). 4. Mission Change to Humanitarian Needs After withdrawal, MPLA became the only powerful force in Angola and Cuba continued to establish military training camps across the country. In time, the humanitarian extent Cubas involvement in Angola increased. Cuba proceeded to send large teams of medical staff to Angola whose medical sector was left understaffed after Portuguese withdrawal with tens of thousands of Cuban volunteers applying every year (George 143). 5. Cubas second involvement In 1977, SADF interference in Angola started once again (Scholtz). South Africa continued to support UNITA which proceeded to encroach north (LOC). In May 1978, Cuban forces lost 60 troops in defense of a Namibian liberation movement camp that was attacked by SADF (George 133-134). This attack was condemned by the UN Security Council (UN). Jose Eduardo Dos Santos succeeded Antonio Neto who died in September 1979. On 23 August 1981, South Africa occupied large territories in southwestern Angola (Manning-17). Following further insurgences by SADF and UNITA, the UN again demanded SADF exit from Angola and a cease-fire was signed between Angola and South Africa but was broken by South Africa on 20 May (Smith). 6. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale In December 1987, SADF and UNITA forced MPLA retreat east to the village of Cuito Cuanavale (George 206-208). MPLA appealed to Cuba which prompted a second Cuban involvement in Angola eventually numbering about 55000 troops (George). In February 1988, a stalemate had been reached and eventually in December 1988, a power accord was signed in which both South Africa and Cuba agreed to withdraw from Angola (Ellison). Evaluation of Sources Edward Georges book, “The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991 from Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale” that was published in gives a clear and valuable account of when, how and why Cuba intervened in Angola. The book refers to interviews and eyewitness reports gathered from Angolan, Cuban and South African sources to present a comprehensive evaluation of Cubas involvement in Angola. The author does not believe that Cuba simply sought to free the Angolan people and rid them of South African racism but also had an additional hidden agenda related to the Cold War and its disputes with the United States. There is also much analysis of the U.S.S.Rs intentions for Angola and its disagreement with Cuban tactics. George attempts with much success to relate happenings during Cubas intervention in Angola to Angolas and indeed Africas current day condition. In his book, “Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa” Piero presents a treatise on how the Cold War affected Africa. The book provides valuable insight into the depths of Cuban-U.S. Conflict. It also portrays a moral side of Fidel Castro that is unreported by most western sources. In his research Piero, refers to both U.S. and Cuban archives. His access to Cuban references is almost unprecedented in this field of study and offers an much appreciated holistic view of Cubas interventions in Africa. Piero conducted interviews to complement his work and include a strong first hand component to his evidence. Piero believes that Cuba often acted in its own interests and was not fully directed by the Soviet Union. Contrary to Georges point of view, Piero believes that Castros intentions in Angola were sincerely humanitarian. Analysis It is important to acknowledge that Cubas involvement in Angola did not begin with Portuguese withdrawal. In fact, Cubas ties to MPLA go back as far as 1950s and Che Guevara met with Neto in Congo as early as 1965 to found a military mission (George 22-23). Therefore, Cuba had strong ties and common interests with MPLA long before the Carnation Revolution and Portugals decision to grant Angola its independence. Angolas transitional unity government was doomed from the start and its proposition was an act of nonchalance by Portugal; a colonial power that was retreating from a country it now had little interest in. A unity government between factions that were founded by different reasons, were of different ethnicities and had different political visions for Angola could only fail. What distinguished MPLA from FNLA and UNITA and helped consolidate its position in Angola was its immediate attention to the capital Luanda. In seizing Luanda early on, the MPLA which was previously one of the weaker factions in a military sense, controlled the the most powerful center of Angolan society. It was able to use that power to make Angolans rally around them and increase international support for their position. Also, in seeking help from Cuba who were not directly involved in African racial conflicts, they distanced themselves from talk of racism, genocide and ethnic cleansing. The same cannot be said for UNITA and FNLA who were backed by a power believe internationally to be the most racist state in the world. This meant that MPLA continually had the upper hand before the international community. International press was more sympathetic to its position and the U.N. Security Council was often condemning South Africa and its Angolan allies (UN). This position also facilitated Angolas entry in the United Nations while under the MPLA government in spite of U.S. opposition to MPLA (George 113). Cuba also managed to boost its global image and gain support of the Angolan people due to its humanitarian efforts in Angola. Cuba sent medical and educational staff to Angola at a time of severe shortage and helped develop the country. This allowed Castro to tell the world that he and his forces were not simply mercenaries but had the genuine intention to develop Angola. (Piero). In contrast, South Africas involvement in Angola was not in the interest of the Angolan people but to influence Namibian politics (Piero 273-276). It was difficult to put a convincing argument to the international community that justified their insurgences in Angola. Contrary to most western sources on the subject, I dont believe that Cuba were simply a pawn in the Soviet Unions chess game in Angola. Edward Georges accounts of the conflict present many examples of disagreement between Cuba and the Soviet government especially in the second Cuban intervention. Cuba has helped to develop Angola and maintain its stability. Cuba continues to provide Angola with the medical staff required by their growing population. For Cuba, Angolan ties provide economic benefit. In view of current day U.S. sanctions against it, Cuba values what economic partners it has very highly. Cubas involvement in Angola was however responsible for export of AIDS to the island (George). Cubas first diagnosed AIDS case was a soldier returning from Angola in 1986 (Boadle). In following years, Cuba quarantined AIDS patients to prevent the spread of disease but international criticism caused them to refrain from that policy (Boadle). Presently, after implementing a free AIDS drug access program and home education, Cuba has one of the lowest rates of HIV infection in the world (Boadle). Conclusion Cubas interest in the MPLA was three-fold. The obvious aspect of that interest was the fact that MPLA leaned towards Marxist beliefs and a political ideologies similar to that established in Cuba. It also follows that Cuba supported the MPLA simply to thwart all U.S. efforts in Angola. A less obvious aspect in my opinion is that Cuba had sincere intentions to prevent a second apartheid in Angola and that was the root of its opposition to UNITA, FNLA and SADF. If Cuba wished to remain involved in shaping Angola and indeed Africa, there was simply no choice but to back the MPLA because the alternatives were the exact antithesis of communism. In my view, Cuba played a crucial role in Angola. In addition to maintaining Angolan independence and lending stability to a militarily weak national movement, it paved the way for economic growth for a people that had been oppressed for all its modern history. Not only did Cubas intervention shape Angola into the country it is today, it ensured support for the independence of nations like Namibia and the abolishment of colonialism in Africa. Works Cited Birmingham, David. A Concise History of Portugal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993 Boadle, Anthony. “Cuba fights AIDS with free drugs”, Reuters New Media. November 30, 2005 C.I.A.. National Intelligence Daily. October 11, 1975: 4. George, Edward. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991 from Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. UK: Routledge, 2005 Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, The University of North Carolina Press, 2002 Library of Congress Country Studies. "A Country Study - Angola". Library of Congress Country Studies. 28 April 2009 Manning, Susan A. Modern Dance, Negro Dance: Race in Motion. p.17. 1999 "Memorandum of Conversation (between United States and China)", National Security Archive. Owen Ellison Kahn. Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia. Transaction Publishers. 1990 Smith, Wayne. A Trap in Angola: Foreign Policy No. 62, p. 66, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1996 Scholtz, Leopold. The Namibian Border War. Stellenbosch University, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 2006: "UN Resolution 447". United Nations. 27 April 2009 Read More