Environmental Hazards and Risk - Coursework Example

Definition of Risk Risk has been defined as probability times consequences (Helm 1996). It has also been defined as hazard plus outrage (Sandman 1993), as well as threat plus vulnerability (Glade 2005). Helm’s definition has both strengths and weaknesses. It is strength that the definition is precise and exact (Kelman 2003. P.1). However, this definition also is “misleading” (Kaplan & Garrick 1981, p.3). It would lead one to think that risks of the same numerical value are of equal importance, however this is usually not so. The definition authenticates that a scenario of low probability and high consequence (damage) is equal to of high probability and low consequence (or damage); these two scenarios should be treated differently (Kaplan & Garrick 1981, p.3). While this view point of risk provides a foundation for risk comparison and decision making, it is not enough to describe the actual risks completely (Helms 2006). Note that in multiple scenarios, this viewpoint of risk implies that risk is the expected value of consequences. However, a single numerical value cannot describe the whole risk scenario. The other two definitions also have their advantages as much as they present some weaknesses. Lewis (1999) feels that vulnerability is a more important aspect in the definition of risk. Thus, the use of vulnerability in the definition of risk considers the processes that are involved between the risk itself and the hazard. The advantage of considering vulnerability is that it is “accretive, morphological and has a reality applicable to any hazard” and it “focuses upon the location and condition of the element at risk and reasons for that location and condition” (Lewis 1999, p.8). This viewpoint of risk together with that which considers risk as hazard and outrage emphasize more on metrics as opposed to the technical importance. These definitions are more precise and exact. As a weakness, however, these definitions leave out some significant aspects that determine risk such as uncertainty, relativity and frequency. Viewing risk as only threat and vulnerability or as hazard and outrage does not represent sufficiently the real situation of risk. These definitions can be improved. The definitions of risk should be formulated as a set of triplets (Kaplan & Garrick 1981, p.3). Furthermore, the definition should be able to incorporate various aspects of risks such as probability, uncertainty, consequence, and frequency, and relativity. Kelman (2003, p. 1) has pointed out that risk is cultural and contextual and is dependent upon first assumptions. It is the “possibility of loss or injury” and the “degree of probability of such loss” (Kaplan & Garrick 1981). Using Scientific Advice for Environmental Risk Policy & Decision-Making Environmental risk analysts often use scenario analysis, and more so, logic trees to estimate risks. The logic tree analysis often take two forms: fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. Three points can demonstrate the utility of logic tree analysis. With these risk estimation tools it is possible to hypothesize and analyse a set of representative scenarios that encompass several outcomes using distinct modelling and decision making techniques. In “a simple problem to explain and clarify the principles of risk calculation”, Henderson uses logic trees for simplification of the problem and representation of various outcomes (“A simple problem”). Furthermore, he uses Logic trees also allow ranking of risks to enable the risks with the highest impact to be mitigated first. The tools are also useful in providing a comprehensive list of factors that are essential in risk assessment. Furthermore, logic tree analysis provides a visual representation of the problem. These are also their strengths as risk estimation tools. Logic trees have also their limitations. The inclusion of almost every detail of the problem being analysed reduces the clarity of information being represented. Moreover, it might not be possible to include every detail of a complex situation that contains several components or pathways. For instance, an analysis of a volcanic eruption would be characterized by several orders of effects that would have to be represented on the logic tree. Socio-Cultural Dimension of Risk Decision-Making It is true that different people have varying perceptions of risk. Kellerman (2003) has shown that risk is contextual and cultural. Therefore, people will often understand risk depending on the context in which it is defined and their culture. Furthermore, a lay person will not view risk in the same way as experts do. Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1979) prove this in their study on how professionals and lay persons rate risks. Thus, it is more likely that a lay person would view nuclear power as more risky than other hazards mainly because it is seen as involuntary, dreadful, uncontrollable, and possibly catastrophic as opposed to the number of fatalities it could cause. Often, technical experts view risk in terms of the probability of an event happening and the magnitude or consequences of that event, while the public tend to think of risk based on the hazard posing the risk and the emotions sparked by that particular risk. Sandman (1989, p. 45) has classified the emotional aspects that determine the perception of risk as “outrage”, and concluded that to the public, risk is equal to hazard plus outrage, but to professionals hazard is equal to probability times magnitude. Risks that are seen as industrial, unfair, and involuntary are therefore often perceived as being riskier than those seen as natural, fair, and voluntary (Byrd 2005, p. 28). For instance, a community would be more worried of potential water contamination by chemicals from a nearby chemical manufacturing company that was setup without their consent, but less apprehensive of water contamination resulting from natural means. Furthermore dreaded, memorable, and exotic hazards are perceived to be riskier than ones that are not dreaded, not memorable, and familiar. For instance, a tsunami would be viewed as more risky than the depletion of the ozone layer, or the risk of mobile phones radiations could be viewed as more risky than that of floods. In addition, catastrophic risks as opposed to those that are chronic are also viewed as more risky (Byrd 2005, p. 29). The root cause of the knowledge divide between risk expert scientists and the general public can be explained by the way the two groups process information and perceive risk. While experts aims to reduce biases and maintain objectivity in the approach to risk, the knowledge of the general public is influenced by aspects such as culture and emotions. Various theories of risk can explain why different people perceive risk differently. The sociological approach to explaining risk perceptions indicate that social institutions are responsible for generating these perceptions. That is, risk perceptions are constructed by social institutions, way of life, and cultural values. The psychology approach indicate that people employ cognitive heuristics in simplifying and sorting information, which often results in biased understanding. This theory identifies several factors that determine how individuals perceive risks. These factors include newness, dread, stigma, and so on (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) discovered that people use various heuristics to assess information, and while these heuristics are useful in thinking, they can lead to erroneous judgments in certain cases. The psychometric theory that was developed under the basis of psychology approach shows that the perception of risk is largely dependent on emotions, stigma, and affect. For instance, the more people dread an event, the more people will equate higher risk to the event (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1979). The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson, et. al 1988) is an interdisciplinary approach that maintains that events are associated with individual social, psychological, and cultural factors in manner that either amplifies or decreases people perception of risk. Other Dimensions of Risk Decision-Making A) Economic perspective Spending £50M on life saving interventions would depend on a number of factors that aim to maximize the benefits of the intervention with the least cost. The first step would be to prioritize activities so that those that are more important are carried out first. Therefore, these activities would be funded firstly and completely before other less important activities are considered. For instance, if faced with a fire that that has a potential to kill people and cause injuries to people, I would first seek to rescue the lives of people and to reduce the spread of the fire to stop further impact. Therefore, the £50M would be channelled towards activities and services such as provision of ambulances, first aid and health care services, financing the rescue operation, and in extinguishing the fire. c) Institutional perspective Environmental risk management involves the interaction of institutions within a social arena process. The social arena process has various elements that are applicable as rules of engagement between participants in the context of risk decision making. These rules of engagement include boundary, scope, position, authority and procedure, information, aggregation and preference-merging, and pay-off. Boundary or participant rule is concerned about who has the access to the environmental risk management process. It spells out the people who should be involved the process of managing risk. The current tendency of risk management is towards greater involvement. Scope refers to agenda setting or rather what is to be decided. Scope can either be broad or narrow. It involves fact finding, attributing blame, proving guilt or negligence, drawing up a plan, determining site-specific issues, allaying fears, and opening remit. Position points to the hierarchy or the relationship between various players. It is important to note that players in a multiple institution set up have different ranks; some are seniors to others. Authority and procedure rule outlines how decisions should be crafted as well as how these decisions should be ordered executed and terminated. Authority can be formal or informal. The information element looks at who is permitted to what information, and under what circumstances and from whom, while preference merging points out to how goals or preferences of the different stakeholders are combined into a joint decision outcome. Pay-off refers to outcome distribution among the participants. These outcomes include costs and benefits. Environmental Risk Management Strategies There are several risk management approaches and techniques that can be adopted to address various types of risks. These approaches and techniques include science-based, precautionary, and discursive approaches (Renn & Klinke 1999, p. 23). This approach is appropriate in addressing risks in Damocles and Cyclops risk classes. For Damocles, three basic factors are considered. These are reduction of the potential for disaster, increasing resilience, and effective emergency management. For Cyclops, there are also three important aspects that must be considered. These include ascertaining the probability of a risk occurring, putting prevention measures against the disaster, and emergency management. The precautionary approach addresses Pythia and Pandora classes of risks. This strategy employs precautionary principles in strict implementation of instruments and regulations. It also involves knowledge base improvement and emergency management. In case of Pandora risks, the emphasis is on developing substitutes, reducing and containing the risks, and emergency management. The discursive management approach is used on Cassandra and Medusa classes of risks. The emphasis is on strengthening sustainable responsibility of main actors, continuous risk reduction through limitations of exposure and substitution approach, and contingency management, more so for risks under class Cassandra (Renn & Klinke 1999, p. 34). The risk class Medusa requires confidence building, knowledge improvement, and risk communication. A holistic classification of contemporary environmental risk issues identify six clusters of risks whose names are derived from the Greek mythology. These classes include the Damocles, Cyclops, Pythia, Pandora, Cassandra, and Medusa. The Damocles cluster of environmental risks includes risks that have huge damage potential, such as nuclear energy, dams, large-scale chemical facilities, although the probability that this potential would result in damage is very low. Therefore, this is characterised by low probability, high magnitude, and non decisiveness (Renn & Klinke 2004). In the class Cyclops, the probability of risks occurring is highly uncertain, while the potential for disaster is high and known. Several natural hazards fit in this cluster and include earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, El nino and floods. Human behaviour can also determine the probability of a risk occurrence and hence contributing to the uncertainty (Renn & Klinke 2004). This can be exemplified by the spread of HIV/AIDs which is dependent on human behaviour and the siting of developments on flood plains. The Pythia class is characterised by high uncertitude, which is because the probability of the risk occurring and the magnitude of the damage are uncertain. Risks that are classified under Pythia include those associated with the likelihood of sudden and nonlinear climatic alterations such as green house effect, as well as technological risks in some genetic engineering whose damage and probability cannot be estimated. In the Pandora class, the probability and magnitude of damage are uncertain. Usually these damages are revealed after they have spread widely. For instance, the damaging effects of the chlorofluorocarbon to the ozone layer were discovered long after its development and application. This criterion is also characterised by high persistency (Renn & Klinke 1999, P. 17). The Cassandra class of risk denotes risk potential with a relatively long delay between the occurrence of damage and the trigger-event (Renn & Klinke 1999, P. 18). The probability and extent of damage are relatively high and well known, but because of this delay these risks are often ignored. Examples of these risks include the “anthropogenic climate change” as well as the “loss of biological diversity” (Renn & Klinke 2004, p. 44). The medusa class of risks is characterized by the potential for social mobilization. The probability and extent of damage are low. These risks become significant when there is a large gap between the perception of the lay persons and the findings of the experts. Examples of such risks include those associated with electromagnetic fields and the use of mobile phones. Often people are affected by these risks although harmful effects are not proven statistically. Risk Communication The classical communication model depicts risk communication as a one-way transmission involving the sender, message and the receiver. However, this is not sufficient in risk communication, which involves construction of meaning. Understanding the nature and role of risk communication is important in ensuring effective risk communication. It is essential that risk information is communicated in a manner that it is easily understood by everyone. This allows people to understand the risk and take measures to protect themselves against these risks. However, simplifying information so that people understand may compromise the communication of the whole perspective of a problem, which is necessary to allow objective decision making. The nature of risk communication can be described by three inherent properties. One is the interaction process between the participants, which is referred to as the constituencies in risk issues. Risk communication is characterized by a two-way transmission of messages and information so that information is transferred and shared. The second property of risk communication is a medium that allows risk knowledge to be brokered. In this respect, language is important, and should be simple and allow clarity of the message being communicated. The third property is the driving force of changing risk issues as time goes by. The roles of risk communication are many. It is useful in identifying partners in the communication process at an early stage. Risk communication allows the anticipation of the concerns and questions of the partner before they are raised. It is also helpful in organizing thoughts and ideas as well as in preparing messages for responding to the questions and concerns. Risk communication also aims to develop messages and support information that are concise, accessible, transparent, and have clarity. It should also promote open dialogue, provide consistent information, and ensure participants speak with one voice. There are several factors that are critical in communicating risk. These include constituencies, message content, communication channels, time, and presentation. Communicating the risk of a imminent flood to a community can exemplify these factors. The constituencies would spell out who are the audience to be communicated to. The message should be relevant either highlighting the effect of the flood or advising the members of the community to vacate the area. When the message should be communicated is also crucial as is the channels of communication. The media could be used to reach a large community. Presentation refers to whether the message is written or verbal. But people do not always listen to or read these messages so it is equally important to make sure the right person/ institution is delivering the message – there has to be trust! The floods of 2007 in the UK are a very good example of this as only a very small percentage of people actually signed up to the Environment Agency’s alert messages. Future development of Environmental Risk Management It is desirable that risk management is re-defined in terms of the management of people’s knowledge of risk. Renn and Klinke (2004, p. 41) have also agreed to this proposition and further advised that a common concept is needed for evaluation and management of risk that incorporates both “social diversity and multi disciplinary approaches” as well as allows institutionalization of routines and standardization of practices. Management of people’s knowledge of risk is important in reducing the knowledge gap between the risk management expert and the general public. This is an important aspect because people perceive risks depending on their knowledge. Knowledge management would provide an opportunity to policy makers to reduce the bias in perceiving risks associated with uninformed judgement. Renn and Klinke (2004, p. 46) identifies knowledge as one component of good governance. Furthermore, a combination of precautionary and knowledge-based instruments has been advocated for management of risks associated with technology (Renn and Klinke 2004, p. 8). Managing people's knowledge of risk would also be useful in directing the public towards a certain course through provision of specific messages. Take, for instance, a potential risk of a tsunami. Making sure that people understand the nature of a tsunami as well as its effects could help reduce its risks. Therefore, it would be essential for risk managers and policy makers to ensure people who are vulnerable to this risk are educated accordingly about the disaster. This approach, however, may not always be appropriate as a risk management strategy. Management of people's knowledge of risk has its weaknesses that are inherent in the limitations of risk communication. People are not always willing to learn or to accept what they are being told. Factors such as trust, the communicator, how a message is communicated often determine the reception of the information. These factors limit the effectiveness of managing people’s knowledge of risk as a risk management approach. Reference list Byrd, T , 2005, Avoiding outrage in risk communication. On Tap. Web. 28 December 2009, . Helm, P. 1996. “Integrated Risk Management for Natural and Technological Disasters”. Tephra, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 4-13. Hendershot, DC, A simple problem to explain and clarify the principles of risk calculation. n.d. Rohm and Haas Company, Bristol. Kaplan, S & Garrick, BJ 1981, On the quantitative definition of risk, risk analysis. Vol. I , No. I. Kasperson, RE, Renn, O, Slovic, P, Brown, H, Emel, J, Goble, R, Kasperson, J, Ratick, S 1988, “The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework.” Risk Analysis. Vol. 8. No. 2. Pp. 177–187. Kelman, I 2003, Defining risk. FloodRiskNet Newsletter, No. 2. 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