Cybernetics Control and Management Control - Assignment Example

?Running Head: Management Accounting Management Accounting [Institute’s Cybernetics Control and Management Control There are several different meanings of cybernetics and several experts who have affected the course of cybernetics. Cybernetics takes as its area the configuration or revelation and requisition of standards of regulation and conveyance. Cybernetics treats not things however courses of acting. It doesn't ask "what is this thing?" however "what does it do?" and "what would it be able to do?" Because various frameworks in the living, social and innovative planet may be grasped thusly, cybernetics cuts over numerous accepted disciplinary borders. The notions which cyberneticians improve along these lines structure a meta-disciplinary dialect through which we might better comprehend and alter our planet. Throughout the period when Anthony's accounting based approach to management control picked up prominence (1960s), the organizational hypothesis written works greatly slanted to a systems-theory perspective. This tendency impacted management control hypothesis and it got indivisible from organizational theory as a rule. To grasp the profundity of the impact that system theory had on management control hypothesis, it is vital to examine the primary tenets of systems theory. In addition, it is imperative to inspect the crux parts of the systems perspective as it affected the route in which classical theory evolved. The systems perspective was established in cybernetics and general systems theory (GST). Norbert Wiener's (1948) cybernetics idea illustrates the methodology of correspondence and control around individuals and machines to achieve alluring goals and to guide the automatic standards discovered in human biotic frameworks onto machines frameworks (Kloot, 1997, p. 49). Cybernetics is concerned with programmed regulation and control of living beings and conglomerations. It is said that cybernetics utilization a negative sentiment circle acted for by setting objectives, measuring accomplishment, contrasting accomplishment and objectives, bolstering back qualified information about unwanted fluctuations into the procedure to be regulated, and rectifying the procedure. As per this perspective, a management control handle in its best disentangled structure is comparative to a specialized control prepare, looking like the control of the high temperature of a room by a thermostat. Anthony's accounting control philosophy was effortlessly interlaced with the notion of robotic controls (Otley, et al., 1995, p. 44). In any case, the GST tries to clarify conduct by mulling over the interrelationship of parts as opposed to the nature of the aforementioned parts. A system is a gathering of interrelated parts functioning all in all. Particularly, a system is an arranged or complex entire; a collection or fusion of things or parts framing an intricate or unitary entire. A conglomeration, thusly, could be acknowledged a gathering of interrelated parts filling in general. There may be diverse subsystems that could be associated with structure much bigger systems. The systems view expects that to remember completely grasp the capacity of the entire systems; the interrelationships around diverse parts must be grasped. A framework is said to have a border, and hinging on the level of communication by the systems with its external border, a framework might be acknowledged either an open framework or a shut systems (provided that it doesn't collaborate with the earth). From the systems view, a conglomeration is made out of information, process, and yield parts, and additionally associated subsystems with a plainly outlined framework verge. As clear from the expositive expression, the framework theorists and the cyberneticians joined both hypotheses to demonstrate capacities of conglomerations and all the more in particular the capacity of administration control frameworks. The degree of the impact by cybernetics hypothesis on administration control studies was so apparent that an audit of administration control articles distributed in books and diaries between 1900 and 1972 uncovered that all these articles were dependent upon cybernetics standard (Kloot, 1997, p. 49). Numerous customs in cybernetics have existed side by side since its starting. One is concerned with round causality, show in mechanical growths outstandingly in the configuration of Pcs and automata--and gem its savvy declaration in speculations of processing, regulation and control. A different custom, which rose up out of human and social concerns, accentuates epistemology--how we come to know--and investigates hypotheses of self-reference to comprehend such phenomena as self-rule, character, and reason. A few cyberneticians look to make more others conscious planets, while others look for simply to grasp how individuals and their surroundings have co-advanced. Some are fascinated by frameworks as we watch them, others in frameworks that do the watching. Some look to advance strategies for displaying the relationships around measurable variables (Kloot, 1997, p. 49). Others plan to grasp the discourse that happens between models or hypotheses and social frameworks. Early work looked to characterize and apply standards by which frameworks may be regulated. Later work has endeavoured to comprehend how frameworks depict themselves, control them, and order themselves. Regardless of its short history, cybernetics has improved a concern with an extensive variety of techniques including individuals as animated coordinators, as offering communicators, and as self-governing, capable people (Otley, et al., 1995, p. 44). Managerial cybernetics, utilizing Stafford Beer's computerized model (which dates back to the early seventies), all the more as of late regarded as the Viable System Model (VSM, calls for outlining settled progressive conglomerations where each business unit in the chain of command is self-sufficient however much as would be prudent, yet is likewise subject to a few controls from its upper administration meta-system. Said meta-system stands for a more general level of the progressive system. The capacities of this control incorporate damping of motions between the subunits (operational control), arranging exercises of subunits to realize synergy for the entire(administration control), vital arranging (i.e., choosing how the conglomeration might as well develop and address updates in the nature), and for the most part coordination and equalizing of administration control choices with vital ones. Lager contends that this structure is essential for survival. In fact, it assembles some cutting edge administration strategies and theories might be translated as halfway provisions of the VSM (Otley, et al., 1995, p. 44). Abolishing Budgeting and Beyond Budgeting In simple terms, a budget represents a plan, most likely to be in quantitative terms, approved prior to the respective period by the top management, for attaining certain objectives. In this competitive and cutthroat business environment, every business wants to succeed through higher revenues and profits, low costs, greater EPS, high customer loyalty and satisfaction, ever increasing market value and market share. However, experts agree that attainment of these objectives is not possible with planning the business activities in the optimum manner. Budgets represent a step in this planning through which organizations ensure the optimum allocation of organizational resources such as human, physical, financial and others and ensure their effective and efficient utilization. Budgets represent the expectations of management and limitations on the expenses that the organisation can bear for that given period of time. Furthermore, they also help in measuring organisational and individual level performance (Neely, et al., 2003, p. 25). Although, budgeting represents one of the oldest performance management, expense control and management control technique, in the past few decades, it has been the centre of massive criticism from the side of experts and researchers. Budgets have failed to meet the demands of the competitive business environment as they have failed in identifying waste and areas of improvement. Furthermore, they fail to support quality initiatives such as total quality management, just in time, continuous process improvement, activity based costing and others. More importantly, experts have criticised that not only the entire process of budgeting is lengthy and costly but at the same time, it also sets a ground for micro management by the top management and respective supervisors (Hope & Fraser, 20032, p. 252). According to the experts whose brain child is beyond budgeting, at its core, beyond budgeting is the philosophy of realising employees the chains and limitations of the top-down performance contract and allowing them to use the resources of the organisation in an attempt to increase customer delight and organisational profitability. There are empirical studies which prove that intellectual assets account for 80-90 percent of the shareholder value for today and human resource is the most crucial resource for organisations. However, the time and energy that is spent at creating, negotiating, adhering to an evaluating budgets fails to add similar level of value (Hope & Fraser, 20032, p. 252). With an organisation, there are two types of performance contracts. The first performance contract is between the executive leaders and their shareholders, which can also be termed as the “earnings contract”, according to which they promise the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth which is also the ultimate objective of any organisation. The second contract is the budget contract which is between the top management and the operating managers of the company through which they delegate the responsibility for achieving agreed outcomes. However, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the budget contract is nothing but an outdated system of remote-control management through which allows the top management to live in the fantasy that they can force the front line managers into taking decisions dictated by them. The proponents of traditional budgeting assume that Setting or negotiating fixed financial targets increases the profit potential Financial incentives represent the best approach towards enhancing motivation Annual plans maximise the chances for organisations to capitalise on market opportunities Leaders are right people to make choices about resource allocation and optimisation Financial reports and objectives provide necessary information for organisational level decision making However, the problem with all of these assumptions is fundamentally flawed and incorrect. First, setting fixed financial targets is similar to telling a motor race driver to complete every lap in a certain fixed time. It does not “teach him how to win” nor does it take into account the external and internal factors that would impact, either positively or negatively, his chances of achieving these objectives in every lap or at every stage of the game (Neely, et al., 2003, p. 25). Second, financial incentives can motivate people to undertake certain tasks but that change within behaviours can never be long lasting or sustainable. The “do this, get that” approach is also short term and fails to impact attitudes, beliefs and loyalty in the long term. Third, in an ever changing and competitive business environment, stringent annual plans, as is the case in several organisations, hinder the ability of people in responding to the rapidly changing environment and aligning the tasks with organisational strategy. Fourth, when people sitting in the head office are allowed to make all decisions about resource allocation and optimisation, the same ends up creating an environment where decisions are made irrespective of the changing ground realities. Fifth, although, financial results do indicate the bottom line organisation, excessive reliance on the same diverts attention from the real causes of shortcomings or improvements within financial performance (Hope & Fraser, 2003a, p. 201). Several organisations, large and small, multinational and local, belonging from several diverse industries have successful implemented the Beyond budgeting initiatives and produced impressive results. Toyota, Southwest Airlines, Svenska Handelbanken, Aldi, Ahlsell, ISS, World Bank, Sightsavers International and others are some of the organisations that have championed the cause of Beyond Budgeting and rejected the traditional budgeting principles and approaches. Implementation of beyond budgeting principles allows organisations to create radically decentralised organisations which are more adaptive to the changing micro and macro environmental forces. The six adaptive process principles which are at the heart of beyond budgeting are Ensuring the availability of resources as per the need and requirement of the operations and front line managers Converting action planning into an integrative and inclusive process that takes place at every step rather than once or twice in a year Link rewards and feedback with the relative improvement Set goals that are aimed at maximising the profit potential of the company Engage in internal marketing and coordinate actions within the entire organisation as the demand changes Measure performance through a wide variety of financial and non financial performance indicators It is important here to note the fact that beyond budgeting principles represent an excellent fit for organisations that are operating within fast changing, competitive and responsive environments since they thrive on adaptability, change and responsiveness. Most of these organisations are from sectors or industries which are booming or the industries which are still growing as they attract more competition and change. However, the traditional budgeting approach does not appear to be a misfit for organisations and industries which are characterised by stability, less competition and less competitiveness. These businesses prefer centralisation of resources and decision making and traditional budgeting approaches provide them with just the right platform to exert control at the expense of inefficiency (Hope & Fraser, 2003a, p. 201). Influence of Culture on Management Accounting Practices There is empirical as well as theoretical evidence to suggest that cultures with high degree of uncertainty avoidance such as Greece, Portugal, Guatemala, Uruguay, Belgium, El Salvador, Poland, Japan, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, France and others are highly likely to institute strong, explicit and comprehensive management accounting procedures (Hopwood, 2009, p. 288; MacArthur, 2006, p. 12). Their budgeting is highly likely to be comprehensive with details of all expenditures and expenses and they are least likely to divert from these budgets and rules as in the absence of same, they would presume chaos would break within the organisation. The financial reporting and management accounting techniques are less likely to provide any room for creativity and innovation to individuals (Williams & Seaman, 2001, p. 450). MacArthur (2006), with his research, begins with examining the proposition put forward by several experts where they argue that US should adopt some of the German management accounting techniques. However, the author end up concluding that although, the suggested management accounting techniques have generated significant gains for German corporations, they are likely to be a mismatch and misfit for US corporations which have a different culture, thus, accepting that national and organisational have a strong impact on the choice of management accounting systems (Hopwood, 2009, p. 288). Sidney Gray extended Hofstede’s framework of cultural dimensions to four dimensions of financial accounting sub-cultural values which are as follows Authority (professionalism versus statutory control) Enforcement (uniformity versus flexibility) Measurement (conservatism versus optimism) Disclosure (secrecy versus transparency) Hofstede’s analysis of cultural dimensions, along with the above mentioned financial accounting sub cultural values reveal why certain countries have adopted a different financial accounting and management accounting systems. This is one of the reasons why Germans have shown a strong disposition towards conforming to tax requirements because of the low uncertainty avoidance as a moderate individualism. This translates into the fact that Germans, in general, refers to adhere to the rules set out by the policymakers are they are also open to the possibility to put the collective interest of the society ahead of the group interest (Williams & Seaman, 2001, p. 450). For example, research reveals that the high uncertainty avoidance of Germany and low uncertainty avoidance of US translates into several different management accounting systems within the United States, whereas, a handful of few management accounting systems within Germany. Furthermore, research also reveals that a correlation between countries with high uncertainty avoidance and their management accounting systems assigning cost centres within the organisation (Hopwood, 2009, p. 288). Over the past few years, the complexity of the business environment, competitive pressures and ever changing business environments have forced several companies to assign several projects to their employees. These projects team are now being managed with a matrix organisational structure. Besides other things, in a matrix organisational culture, an individual is likely to report to more than one boss, something which decreases the uncertainty of operations. The same is true for Germany but not for the management accounting systems of US and UK (MacArthur, 2006, p. 12). To furnish exact administration bookkeeping qualified information that aides directors settle on exceptional choices and reply inquiries, German conglomerations utilize numerous well trained profession administration bookkeepers to run refined and exhaustive administration bookkeeping frameworks that furnish refined information dissections and qualified data (Jarvenpaa, 2007, p. 120). To guarantee that the informative data is related for administration purposes, expenses are incorporated in reports to administrators in a manner that may not be worthy for money related reporting, for example promoted evaluated future support costs. Towering exactness assists decrease the lack of determination natural in choice making, which is imperative for a country like Germany (MacArthur, 2006, p. 12). In the United States, management accounting frameworks have a tendency to be substantially less refined and thorough, and the informative content gave is more totalled and less point by point (Hopwood, 2009, p. 288). Exceedingly organized situations are supported by nationals of countries that have a culture of strong uncertainty avoidance. It is no astonishment, accordingly, that German associations regularly utilize formally combined GPK and Prozesskostenrechnung (Pk)—process cost accounting frameworks to assist guarantee that directors make short-and lifelong choices dependent upon administration bookkeeping qualified information in a predictable and foreseeable through a conglomeration and as time goes on. In the United States, GPK is described using terms such as “marginal costing” and “contribution margin accounting.” (Jarvenpaa, 2007, p. 120) Furthermore, it is apparent that countries such as US and UK allow their employees to take much more risks and demonstrate a higher level of creativity and innovation through the easing the controls of their management accounting systems. Once again, experts have tried to explain the same through the high level of individualism and low level of uncertainty avoidance in these countries (Williams & Seaman, 2001, p. 450). Moreover, there are reasons to believe that it is primarily due to cultural differences that countries like Germany, with low uncertainty avoidance, are more likely to rely on internal calculations, whereas, countries like UK, US and Canada have greater flexibility at assigning lesser importance to internal figures (Hopwood, 2009, p. 288). Furthermore, important here to note is the fact that management accounting systems have a much greater probability to reflect national culture as they are decided upon by organisations by themselves as compared to financial accounting systems. Financial accounting systems are imposed on organisations from international systems, regulators and policymakers (Jarvenpaa, 2007, p. 120). A widely discussed aspect of comparative management accounting literature is that whether western countries like UK, US and others, which demonstrate a high degree of short term orientation, are more titled towards short term management accounting goals. Similarly, countries such as China, Japan, Korea, Germany and others demonstrate more long term orientation within their cultural orientation. Empirical studies have shown the same within the management accounting systems of these countries (Williams & Seaman, 2001, p. 450). Transfer Pricing Policy Responsibility centres (cost, profit, revenue or investment centres) are an essential feature of decentralised organisations. The performance of these autonomous or semi autonomous responsibility centres is evaluated through standard cost, divisional profit, ROI, market share and other financial and non financial measures (Eccles, 1985, p. 541). Therefore, the modern management accounting system strives to attach a dollar figure to the performance of these responsibility centres after taking into account all the internal transactions. In that respect, the transfer price represents the price that one division, department or unit of the company charges another division, department or unit of the same company for a product or service rendered to that department (Hirshleifer, 1996, p. 183). Therefore, it appears that the prime purpose of transfer pricing is to ensure optimal decision making within decentralised organisations and maximise the profitability of the entire organisations (Schjelderup & Sorgard, 1997, p. 285). However, the fact that is that several multinational organisations use transfer pricing policy to shift earnings to a more tax friendly jurisdiction, which is one of the reasons why transfer pricing strategy has come under severe criticism from the side of authorities in the recent past (Gox, 2000, p. 330). Proponents of transfer pricing policy believe that the same fosters an environment where local and regional managers have greater control and accountability of their decisions. Rather than allowing one division to reap the benefits of the services and value-added by another division. It allows the corporations to trace the value added by each division and then reward that division or unit accordingly (Hirshleifer, 1996, p. 183). The focus here is to explore that within an organisation that is highly decentralised and characterised by high levels of divisional autonomy, transfer pricing policy becomes redundant and unnecessary. However, the fact is that in the aftermath of financial crisis, global economic meltdown and European Sovereign Debt Crisis, businesses all over the world are finding it difficult to sustain their earning and profitability while governments and policymakers are forced to increase the corporate tax rates so that they could decrease their deficits (Gox, 2000, p. 330). Nevertheless, towards the end of the day, the same translates into an even tougher environment for businesses. When local businesses cannot take advantage of transferring their wealth to different tax jurisdictions, multinationals companies that faced different tax policies can do the same (Schjelderup & Sorgard, 1997, p. 285). Since it is their goal to maximise the wealth of their shareholders, corporations should make effective and efficient use of transfer pricing policies to avoid taxes as much as possible without violating the laws (Hirshleifer, 1996, p. 183). Furthermore, abolishing transfer pricing policy would demolish and chances of coherence, coordination and support within the divisions or units of a corporation, regardless of the fact, how autonomous or decentralised they are. Consider the example of Unilever and Procter and Gamble, which are a multinational conglomerates operating in dozens of countries all over the world (Eccles, 1985, p. 541). They are operating in several sectors and different autonomous and independent groups and divisions, which are engaged in radically different businesses with dissimilar business models, core competencies and strategies (Hirshleifer, 1996, p. 183). However, towards the end of the day, all of these divisions, products, brands, units or departments are working towards achieving the mission statement of Unilever, which states that a constant strive to achieve “the highest standards of corporate behaviour towards everyone we work with, the communities we touch, and the environment on which we have an impact”. If the central management of Unilever sitting in the headquarter in UK and Ireland were to allow its autonomous and independent units and departments to abolish transfer pricing policy systems and interact with each other as two separate business entities, then rather than striving to achieve that common mission and vision (Eccles, 1985, p. 541). Rather than showing flexibility, consideration and compassion, they would treat their sister concerns as customers, suppliers or distributors and try to maximise their returns, whenever they would feel that their bargaining power is maximum (Gox, 2000, p. 330). In fact, there is this possibility that when a certain division has a limit supply of some products or services that are required by another division of the same corporation, the first corporation might refuse if it can fetch even a slightly higher price in the market. The first division might make a greater profit out of that transaction but when the dust settles, the corporation would is likely to explore that the losses incurred by the second division outclass the profits made by the first division (Schjelderup & Sorgard, 1997, p. 285). In the same manner, P&G has worked hard to ensure that regardless of the fact how diverse and unrelated they businesses, brands, products and divisions may be, they align their operations around their mission statement of “We will provide branded products and services of superior quality and value that improve the lives of the world’s consumers, now and for generations to come” (Schjelderup & Sorgard, 1997, p. 285). For the success and sustainability of P&G, it is vital that all the departments and divisions of the organisations align their activities around this single objective. Transfer pricing policy, in an unorthodox way, has the capacity to hold the organisation together as glue (Hirshleifer, 1996, p. 183). In fact, Shor & Chen (2009) confirm that when used strategically; transfer pricing policy can act as a collusive device. Furthermore, the results even indicate that when corporations use transfer pricing policy within their organisations, it not only has a positive impact on the firm but also the entire industry and marketplace (p. 585). The research also asserts that industry wide strategically adopted transfer prices are sustainable within the long term (Gox, 2000, p. 330). Simple Person Model of Decision Making in Capital Budgeting While discussing the first stage of decision making process in capital budgeting, which is the triggering, King (1975) highlights the fact that when investment opportunities occur from different sides, the choice between these opportunities puts individuals in a laborious and painful process. In fact, the process is so risky and troublesome that individuals are likely to take measures to avoid the decision making process. This is true because the sponsors of the project suffer a high degree of personal risk and the level of reward that they receive from the project, even if the project goes successful, is not considerable. However, if the project goes sour, it leaves an undesirable mark on their profile for the coming years. Human beings have inbuilt personality defence mechanisms which are automatically triggered in stressful situations to screen out unpleasant thoughts and information. Experts agree that one of the most powerful of these defence mechanisms is denial through which individuals protect themselves. Therefore, it is highly likely when certain individuals, in their respective individual capacity, are asked to make decisions in terms of indentifying these investment opportunities; they are likely to avoid these triggers until the need for the same becomes extremely pressing (Herbst, 2002, p. 47). For example, in a certain organisation, the operating manager might not highlight the opportunity or building or purchasing a new plant, despite knowing that the existing plant is about to collapse, the manager is most likely to sit on the prospect of capital investment rather than actively going to the top authorities to identify the same. This is true because once the manager approaches the senior management with the same, he would be assigned with exploring the several dimensions and dynamics of this project and it will be his responsibility to see this projection to completion at all costs (Gurnani, 1984, p. 25). Once the first two stages of triggering and screening are over, the third of definition comes into play. By this stage, the organisation and the individuals involved within the process will have a vivid outline of the projects and some individuals who have identified those projects would be assigned to further explore the various dynamics and dimensions of the project and come up with a broader picture. Important here to note is that at this stage, a certain level of commitment develops from the side of the individuals who are making an attempt to draw this broader picture. In fact, the very act of collecting information creates an implicit relationship because in some manner, the person collecting this information and presenting this outline will develop a soft spot for the project (Herbst, 2002, p. 47). Furthermore, as the search for information broadens, organisational level commitments are also made and the same goes on to the point where the people involved with the project end up making so many tacit promises that investment becomes inevitable. More importantly, when the project is criticised by other individuals, the people involved with the supervision of collecting information for the project, due to their tacit promises and implicit relationship, will feel that the criticism is directed at them rather than the project, which would trigger a response from their side to defend the project at all costs (Gurnani, 1984, p. 25). Although, the fourth stage of evaluation remains at the heart of the scientific decision making process, King (1975) argues that it should be labelled as “justification” rather than evaluation as in practice, at this stage, the conclusion reached by companies is often put as “everything that we have researched has confirmed our original assumptions”. The fifth stage of transmission, where information about the project is transmitted to the central or top management of the organisation, as argued by King (1975) is highly political and subjective. Although, on paper, it might appear that the transmission stage occurs once the evaluation of the project is done, the fact is that the top management receive information about several capital budgeting projects days, weeks or even months ahead. The way in which they receive this information, the source, his presentation style, the environmental factors and other also impact the first image or perception that they end up forming about the project. Furthermore, the fact is that the entire process of transmission is extremely political as it goes through several stages of management hierarchical. At each level, individuals do not ask the question that whether or this project is good for the organisation but first and foremost, they ask the question that whether or not they can risk reputation and name in front of their bosses by recommending or approving this project? Can they afford the fallout from when if this project fails? The final stage takes place when the project is finally referred to the top or central management of the organisation, who assume the responsibility for providing a final go ahead. Proponents of scientific decision making process argue that this stage ensures alignment of the project with the strategic objectives of the company, critics argue that operating managers, who, as experts, are likely to present the project outline to the top managers, who are not experts, do not provide them with much choices or alternatives. In most cases, the top management team is often faced with the choice or whether or accept or reject the project and empirical evidence suggests that total rejection rarely occurs (Gurnani, 1984, p. 25). Furthermore, even the top managers are likely to accept certain projects because if they were to reject a certain project, indirectly, the same would cast doubts over the ability and capability of their operations manager. It would also cast doubts over the selection criteria of the organisation and the board might begin to think that whether or not such operations managers or general managers should be allowed to make operational decisions. References Eccles, R. G. 1985. The transfer pricing problem: A theory for practice. Lexington: Lexington Books. Gox, R. F. 2000. Strategic transfer pricing, absorption costing, and observability.  Management Accounting Research, Volume 11(3), pp. 327-348. Gurnani, C. 1984. Capital budgeting: theory and practice. The Engineering Economist, Volume 30(1), pp.19-46. Herbst, A. F. 2002. Capital budgeting: Theory, quantitative methods, and applications. Harper & Row. Hirshleifer, J. 1996. On the economics of transfer pricing. The Journal of Business, Volume 29(3), pp. 172-184. Hope, J., & Fraser, R. 2003. Beyond budgeting. Schaeffer-Poeschel. Hope, J., & Fraser, R. 2003. Beyond budgeting: how managers can break free from the annual performance trap. Harvard Business School Press. Hopwood, A. G. 2007. On trying to study accounting in the contexts in which it operates. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8(2-3), pp. 287-305. Jarvenpaa, M. 2007. Making business partners: a case study on how management accounting culture was changed. European Accounting Review, Volume 16(1), pp. 99-142. King, P. 1975. Is the emphasis of capital budgeting theory misplaced? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Volume 2(1), pp. 69-82. Kloot, L. 1997. Organizational learning and management control systems: responding to environmental change. Management Accounting Research, Volume 8(1), pp. 47-73. MacArthur, J. 2006. Cultural influences on German versus US management accounting practices. Management Accounting Quarterly, Volume 7(2), pp. 10-16. Neely, A., Bourne, M., & Adams, C. 2003. Better budgeting or beyond budgeting?  Measuring business excellence, Volume 7(3), pp. 22-28. Otley, D., Broadbent, J., & Berry, A. 1995. Research in management control: an overview of its development. British Journal of management, 6(1), pp. 31-44. Schjelderup, G., & Sorgard, L. 1997. Transfer pricing as a strategic device for decentralized multinationals. International Tax and Public Finance, Volume 4(3), pp. 277-290 Shor, M., & Chen, H. 2009. Decentralization, Transfer Pricing, and Tacit Collusion. Contemporary Accounting Research, Volume 26(2), pp. 581-604. Williams, J. J., & Seaman, A. E. 2001. Predicting change in management accounting systems: national culture and industry effects. Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 26(4), pp. 443-460. Read More