Impact of Lord Liverpools Support of the Corn Laws of 18145 on the Conservative Party - Coursework Example

?Reflections upon the impact of Lord Liverpool’s support of the Corn Laws of 18145 on the support for the Conservative Party The corn laws of 1815 were controversial, in their own time as well as when seen through the lenses of later historians. Agriculturalists then regarded them as not offering enough protection, thus endangering British agriculture in the long run and were therefore opposed. On the other end of the spectrum were those who were in favour of free trade and who opposed the Corn Laws as being a government concession to the land barons of Ireland and Britain, against the interest of the poor. The opinion of the latter is perhaps most eloquently voiced by Blake (170, p. 15) who assessed the 1815 corn laws from a distance of more than 150 years as ‘class biased’ … ‘one of the most naked pieces of class legislation in English History, and a clear sign that the capitalist ideal was not going to prevail without a struggle’, a view clearly also later held by the authors of The Black Book.1 Yet, despite the concerns of the parties involved, Lord Liverpool was able to consolidate the opposing political forces within the Houses of Lords and Commons to pass the legislation with a 126 : 26 majority. Predictably, the poorer community fared badly as a result of artificially high corn prices and the next few years were marred by demonstrations and riots, followed by the passing of various pieces of repressive legislation in an attempt to control the rioters. Yet, despite these very unpopular measures, support for the conservative party and Liverpool rose - evidenced by the voting numbers during parliamentary business over the next few years. This has generally been attributed to post war problems facing Britain as well as Lord Liverpool’s skills in presenting these to his peers. This explanations is not disputed, however, this paper poses that there is a powerful additional factor, namely that once the corn laws had unleashed unrest, a fear factor developed which did not in fact constitute support for the policies of the conservative party at all but which nevertheless caused members of the parliament to act in semblance. It is also argued that this fear was by far the strongest motivation for giving continued support to the conservative party for as long as there was a danger of further riots. There can be no doubt that the post-war problems faced by Britain in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars were grave and that the modification to existing corn laws in 1815 can be understood as a short-term measure to avoid catastrophe. Corn laws had been in place in Britain since the 17th century and had basically consisted of a high rate of import duty imposed on a sliding scale to prevent imports and encourage exports, with import duties decreasing as corn prices increased (Fay, C. R., 1932, pp 28-43). This had kept corn prices relatively low and exports high until the middle of the 18th century when, for a variety of reasons, constant corn shortages forced frequent short-term measures to suspend import duties. In 1773 the government conceded that adjustments were required to reflect the real situation and lowered import duties to operate on a sliding scale, diminishing with increases in corn prices (Fay, C. R., 1932, pp 28-43). The underlying policies were to keep the farmers employed and making profits without inflating the price of corn to put it out of reach of the poor. The acts of 1791 and 1804 served a similar purpose, each one lowering the point at which corn import duties ceased. However, the income that was supposed to accrue from the imports did not eventuate as between 1792 and 1815 the price of corn was so high that virtually no import duty was collected (Hilton p. 3). This state of affairs continued with some further adjustments until 1804, by which time the system had been severely destabilized by the Napoleonic wars 1792-1815, which were fought along economic as well as military lines. Thus both parties engaged in economic blockades, bringing horrendous food shortages for England, especially corn. The government of the day tried to avert disaster through rationing and through the cultivation of ‘marginally productive agricultural land’ (Barnes, 1930, 68-113). These measures, however had only met with limited success and between 1810 and 1814 the prices of corn were as high as 102 shilling per quarter, compared with 49 shilling before the war (Eastwood, David). The peace of 1815 added to the already complex situation in a variety of ways. There were first of all the stock-piled continental corn surpluses, which were likely to make their way into England at cheap prices almost immediately under the virtually ‘free trade’ conditions prevailing before 1815. This would at once destroy the fragile additional agricultural infrastructure that had grown up around corn in the last five years. The current import strategies would not be protection against such an influx. Liverpool had commissioned assessments by ‘Select Committees’ in 1813 and 1824 and in both instances, they had predicted that imports in large quantities would have a devastating effect on British agriculture, including massive rural unemployment and an increase in the rate of those classed as ‘the poor’, which in turn would mean that manufactured goods would have a severely reduced market (Hilton, 1977 16-18). Furthermore, these stock-piles were likely to diminish within a relatively short time frame, as Europe also had been devastated by the war to a large extent and was as yet not able to guarantee a stable supply, the glut lasting just long enough to destroy British agriculture infrastructure. ‘It was precisely because Europe could not feed England that English cultivation had to be protected and expanded’ (Hilton, B., 1977 p.22). And then there was the question of government coffers being empty. A rural collapse would almost inevitably have meant that the rural sector demand tax relief, which the government was not in a position to grant, owing to the enormous war-generated public-sector debt, another factor why it was of paramount importance to keep investments in the agricultural sector viable. In addition, the starvation imposed on Britain by Napoleonic France was still fresh in the mind of politicians and it seemed foolhardy to expose the nation immediately again to the vulnerabilities of dependency on foreign trade (Hilton, B., 1977 p.22). It is clear from the foregoing that Liverpool had powerful arguments on his side, strong enough to even prompt such self-interested agriculturalists as Parnell to support his policies, although they fell far short of what had been demanded. Similarly, committed ‘free traders’ such as David Ricardo acknowledged the need for short term measures to ease the British economy back into peace times and out of inflation, although he argued by 1817 already against the inflationary effect of the Laws (Ricardo, D., 1817 in Eastwood, D., 1996). Ricardo’s time frame is significant, since it indicates how uncomfortable free trade advocates were with the measures, despite their 1815 support. Thus the large majority that passed the corn bill in 1815 masked the fact that there were strong competing interests within the government apparatus. Unity, however, was to get a badly needed boost from the radical forces within British society. In 1816 Thomas Evans published a pamphlet calling for the redistribution of property. An immediate investigation was undertaken by the government, which discovered ‘a design to infect all classes 'with a spirit of discontent and disaffection, of insubordination and contempt of all law and religion and morality'. (Annual Register, Vol. LIX (1817), pp. 8-9, in A S Turberville, 1958 p. 170) Thus, by 1820 there were already strong voices calling the government to action, which, however, seemed reluctant to act. There was also growing dissent from within the ranks of the politicians. One faction led by Grenville, who had been among the 26 dissenting voices during the 1815 Corn Laws vote, made it clear that they believed “that there was no more mischievous and prolific cause of evil than the present proneness to over-indulgence in legislative interference” (Excerpt from Hansard's Parl. Debates, Vol. XXX, 187-204, in by TURBERVILLE op cit, p. 168). Two bills speedily followed this discovery, the suspension of the Habeas Corpus and the ‘Seditious Meetings’ bill, both in 1817, with the more urgent voices warning that “the moment the principle of reform was accepted, and the vilification of the Government and of the law was permitted, all our security was at an end” (Hansard's Parl. Debates, Vol. XXXV, 1251-61; Hansard's Parl. Debates, Vol. XXXV, 1251-61, in Turberville op cit. 171-72). A series of demonstrations followed in Brandeth and St Peter’s Fields, with government intervention in each case putting an end to the meetings. In the case of St. Peter’s Fields, government action turned an ostensibly peaceful meeting into a massacre, which clearly shocked some of the members of both houses, surmised from a comment by Sidmouth that “ (he) observed that there was nothing in the whole political situation more alarming than the conduct of responsible persons who encouraged and emboldened the disaffected. (This is) sheer weakness of mind, (being) frightened out of his senses. Unless he was prepared to go to all lengths with them, the Radicals would never make terms with him.” (Hansard's Parl. Debates, Vol. XLI, 26 in Turberville, op cit.173). Some time later Cobbett summarized his observations during this period by saying “the conduct of the Lords has always been to me the most surprising thing...terrified out of their wits.” (Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, pp. 270 in Turberville op cit 175). While the repressive measures inflicted upon the people clearly resulted in great unpopularity of the house of Lords, they seem to have provided the glue, however, that enabled Liverpool to hold the conservative party together and shore up voting support for it, despite the growing disquiet over the concern laws. This is brought into even greater relief by the fact that once the threat of revolution had passed, tensions between factions increased and re-surfaced and the conservative party split along ideological lines, centered mainly around wheat farming, Catholic emancipation and parliamentary representation of the industrial North (Goodland, G). Liverpool continued to hold the party together, making a series of small alterations to the Corn Laws. But in 1827, when he first had a stroke and then died shortly thereafter, the party divisions became more visible. By then, electoral support from all quarters had fallen significantly, evidenced in 1830 by a dwindling support in the House of Commons to 28 from 80 MPs (Goodland) Bibliography Barnes, D. G., (1930). A history of the England Corn Laws from 1660-1846 London, Leicester University Press. Blake, R., (1970) The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill, London, George Routledge and Sons. Eastwood, D., The Corn Laws and their Repeal 1815-1846, History Review 25 Sept 1996, pp1—9. Fay, C. R. (1932). The Corn Laws and Social England. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Farlie, S., The Nineteenth century corn laws Reconsidered Economic History Review 2nd ser. 18 (1965) 562-73 Goodland, G, Corn, Catholics and the Constitution: The Tory Crisis of 1827-30. History Review. 2002. P 4 pp Hilton, B. (1977) Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Government 1815-1830, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Moore, D. C., The corn laws and high farming Economic History Review 18 (1965) 544-61. Goodland, G, Corn, Catholics and the Constitution: The Tory Crisis of 1827-30. History Review. 2002. P 4 pp Turberville, A. S., (19580. The House of Lords in the Age of Reform, 1784-1837: With an Epilogue on Aristocracy and the Advent of Democracy, 1837-1867. London, Faber and Faber. Read More