Community Forestry in Nepal - Coursework Example

Community Forestry in Nepal 2009 Introduction Environmental degradation as a result of overuse of natural resources has given rise to the threat of global warming and climate change across the world (Stern Review, 2007). While carbon emissions through excessive burning of fossil fuels have led to climate change, which in turn raises global temperature and water levels, deforestation and land use for cultivation and agriculture, leads to the break in carbon sequestration as the carbon absorption by plants and trees are slowed down (Stern Review 2007). To mitigate the effects of such human-induced climate change, governments have adopted various market-based, voluntary and statutory initiatives to protect resources. While market-based solutions like the carbon trading under Kyoto Protocol introduces financial incentives and statutory steps like the carbon tax penalise carbon emissions, voluntary initiatives aim to involve companies and the community directly. The United Nations Conference on Climate Change held at Bali in 2007 placed an action plan for member countries to reduce global warming by and beyond 2012 (United Nations 2007). Besides initiating sustainable development initiatives through clean technologies, incentives for prevention of deforestation and forest degradation have been adopted as a major action plan. Over the past two decades, community-centric governance has taken the centre stage in the use and management of resources. This has been concurrent with socio-economic development plans proposed by the academia as well as practitioners by which communities have replaced institutions in the governance system. In this paper, I will first present a review of literature on community forestry and then analyse community forest groups in Nepal and see how far the governance structure has been able to satisfy the sustainability parameters as well as efficiently allocated resources among users of forest resources. Literature review According to Ostrom (1999), forest resources have attributes of other scarce resources hence management and allocation of resources is dependent on the governance pattern. In the conventional theory of allocation of common-pool resources, based on market-based solutions, it is assumed that users are not capable of allocating environmental resources in an equitable and efficient manner as environmental costs and benefits are considered to be externalities in the market paradigm. In an open-access system, users are assumed to be homogenous, with similar short-term profit-maximising motives. Hence, anyone can enter the resource system, for example, acquire property rights and sell forest products at competitive markets. Hence, government institutions and controls are deemed necessary for effective management of environmental resources. Since the 1980s, onwards, this line of thinking has been challenged empirically by political economists like Ostrom 1999 as forests in many regions of the world faced rapid degradation brought about by loss of ownership, commercialisation of forest products and technological developments. Increasingly, newer forms of governance, like government ownership with the assumption that government institutions will act in the interest of common use, of forest resources came to be advocated (Ostrom 1999). Ostrom (1999) argued that forest, irrigation systems, fisheries, ranchland and other common-pool resource users, by trial and error, have devised indigenous ways to manage resources – through changes in harvesting patterns – so that the resources are sustainable in the long run. Forest users have the early signals of forest degradation and when communities are highly dependent on forest resources, users are more likely to adopt strategies and rules to change cropping and other use patterns. Such forestry self-governance is likely to be greater when the forests are small, knowledge on the resource conditions is greater, members of the community trust each other and the community has sufficient autonomy and organisational capability to set its own rules. The aim of the development of community-based institutions is to protect and promote forest resources. Such community forest institutions were first proposed by the National Academy of Sciences’ Panel on Common Property (National Research Council 1996, cited by Ostrom 1999). Empirical evidence from many countries suggested that self-organisation groups are not recognised by policy-makers making it difficult for communities to maintain autonomy to devise indigenous mechanisms for resource use. Most of the existing empirical research on forestry governance has been on the basis of case studies and there is theoretical literature on this. In many developing countries of Asia and Latin America, there have been attempts to develop community-based forest management groups in which users of forest resources voluntarily manage pooled resources, perceiving resources to be scarce and crucial for their livelihood. Community forest groups have particularly been dominant in countries like India and Nepal (Agarwal and Chhatrem 2006). In Bolivia, among Latin American countries, a mixed governance pattern has been evolved with a number of local communities within a single municipality. Hence, local communities in Bolivia interact with a number of local governments, NGOs, regional and national government agencies for the purpose of management of forest use. Andersson (2009), however, found that among all the external actors, the communities’ interaction with municipalities have been the most effective in this respect. From case studies in Himachal Pradesh in India, Agarwal and Chhatre 2006 found that it is difficult to estimate the roles of various institutions in environmental management. The success of decentralised, community-based forest governance depends on various ecological, institutional and political economic setting. The case of Nepal Nepal is a landlocked Himalayan country with borders with India and China with 10 of the world’s highest 14 mountain peaks. As much as 35.2 percent of the land in Nepal is non-cultivable because of high altitude, while the most productive flatland of the Terai region comprises 41.7 percent of the land. According to land use classification, 29 percent of the lands in Nepal are forests, 10.6 percent scrubland and degraded forests, 12 percent grassland, 21 percent farmland, and 7 percent uncultivable land (Koirala et al. 2008). Nepal has an intensive land use, potential for hydroelectricity and other commercial use of land particularly because of abundance of river water and biodiversity. Nepal has a long history of community forestry management since the passage of the Community Forestry Legislation & Decentralisation Act in 1978 that passed on forest land from the hands of the government, which had nationalised forests in 1957, to communities. It is thought that nationalisation was in a way an attempt to usurp land by the Rana family, which rules the kingdom. One third of the land in Nepal came in private hands while the rest was with the royalty. The ostensible reason for nationalisation was to enable resource-based industrialisation in the low-income country. The country witnessed large scale deforestation after nationalisation because increased demand for forest products as well as lack of property ownership. The resulting silting of the Ganges and floods attracted global attention that finally led to the withdrawal of the forest nationalisation. Globally, by the end of the 1970s, community forestry had gained popularity in academic and policy making circles (Koirala et al. 2008). Community forestry gained momentum as Nepal became a democratic country, from a monarchy, in 1990. Even though the democratic movement remained lackluster for about a decade and a half since then, the community forestry program became an exception. Over the years, Nepal has gained world-wide recognition in the community forest programs as deforestation has been checked considerably. Since the 1990s, forest user groups (FUGs) have been responsible for the management of forest resource use. Currently, Koirala (2008) reported that there are around 14 201 FUGs, including 600 FUGs comprising only women, formed by the users themselves. These FUGs control 1 187 000 hectares of forest land. Community forests, which comprise around 25 percent of total land, earned Nepalese rupees 740 million in 2002, more than the budget of the State Forest Department, indicating higher efficiency of community forests than the state forest department. The groups identify traditional users of forests and admit new members only under specified conditions. The FUGs formulate the operational rules for forest management within its territory. Users can then enter the forest and cultivate products according to the guidelines specified by the group. Although user groups can decide on the prices of the forestry products without taking into consideration government royalties and subsidies, the users cannot sell, lease, or share rights of ownership of forest land with non-members. Members are also charged a membership fee, required to attend meetings, and undertake non-forest based community programs as well (SANDEE 2004). The Forest Act (1993) and the Forest Rules (1995) have provided sufficient powers to the community forests by codifying the rights in the legislation. The FUGs have now been institutionalised as independent, self-governing bodies provided with management rights. Through the legislation, government land has been handed over to the registered FUGs comprising traditional users of the forests. Conversion of national forests is prioritised over leasehold forests for the purpose of development of community forests. Besides the traditional use of forests, FUGs are also allowed to plant short term cash crops and non-timber products like medicinal herbs. However, with the failure of FUGs in some areas on the Terai, Forest Policy (2000) withdrew some of the rights of the FUGs in these areas, justifying it as the government’s greater ability to conserve such crucial forest tracts. These will be managed by collaborative bodies of politicians, governments, and local users rather than the FUGs (Kanel et al. n.d). Local development funds are provided directly to the FUGs. Forest development activities in Nepal are the second most crucial development expenditure in Nepal, after physical infrastructure development, in terms of resource allocation from the national budget. Although the forest act makes it mandatory that at least 25 percent of the budget of forest department is spent on forest development, FUGs spent more than the allocated amount. Some of the FUGs have also contributed to other development areas like the construction of roads, schools, irrigation canals and so on. FUGs also support agricultural production, income and employment generation, literacy, and social unity, amongst other things, as these are intricately related to the livelihoods of the members of the FUGs (Koirala 2008). Various empirical studies on community forestry in Nepal, however, have found that the benefits have been greater for richer households in the country than the poorer ones. SANDEE (2004) found that while forest incomes make up 14 percent of total income of poor households, it contributes 22 percent of the total income of rich households. The discrepancies stem from the fact that the formation and management of the FUGs have traditionally been biased towards the richer and the more powerful sections of people. Other studies have also concluded that community forestry has increased the gap between the rich and the poor in Nepal as there has been an unequal distribution of benefits towards the local elite FUGs (Koirala et al. 2008). Resource management depends on the socio-political environment that is prevalent in the country. Hence, governance of forest resources is not independent on the prevailing political economy. Nepalese society is bifurcated among the rich and the poor, the high and the low caste, male and female. Hence, any governance structure that does not take into account the existing social structures is bound to face bottlenecks. Hence, the women, the ethnic communities and the poor are excluded from the mainstream and left with lack of power and voice (Koirala et al. 2008). Although some studies have reported increased representation of marginal castes and groups of women, the predominant trend has been a bias against the marginalised. Although there has been power devolution from the central to the local governments, it has been monopolised by the local elite who often unfairly use it against women and other marginalised sections of the population. The most important success that community forests have had is in the area of soil conservation and sustainability. Studies on forests before and after the formation of community forest groups have shown that there has been an improvement in forest regeneration, plantation and growth of trees. Users implement indigenous growth on foresting that is so crucial for their livelihood. Some FUGs are also active in experimental foresting, applying new silviculture techniques. A reduced number of forest patches has been found in watershed areas (Koirala et al. 2008). However, such proactive FUGs are few and far between while most are reactive, taking action only in removing dead plants, trees, and leaf litter. Such FUGs use the forest only as their sustenance needs and do not have the focus towards long-term sustainability. There has been little sharing of best practices among the FUGs and application of advanced knowledge through NGOs and research organisations in the activities of the FUGs (Koirala et al. 2008). Besides the aim towards resource management and sustainability of the forests, the FUGS are organised to maintain sustainability of the livelihood of the members. While forests are the main source of livelihood of the members of the FUGs, the community groups are also focused towards income and employment generation programs, many of them forest-based like bee-keeping, bamboo-making, goat keeping, etc. Community forestry in Nepal also has ramifications for conflicts and conflict resolution through laws, regulations, policies, and plans. Since land, forest, and water are crucial for the livelihood of the Nepalese, conflicts over resources are common in the country. These arise because of the clash of perceived inconsistencies over rights and obligations between people. Such conflicts become even more acute when resources become increasingly scarce. Population growth and industrial use of water has particularly made water as a scarce resource in Nepal. Forest use for commercial purpose and over-use of forest land during the nationalisation days has made forests, too, as a scarce resource in Nepal. Skewed land distribution and disparities in land ownership have together left large sections of the people without any land, especially as land reform has not been followed aggressively. Large and small natural resource management programs, including the community forestry program, too have given rise to a higher scope of conflicts. New interventions have made the use of indigenous knowledge on resource use more difficult. At the same time, replacement of old institutions by new ones, without adequate knowledge dissemination, has increased the inequities in the social structure. Much of the newer institutions remain in the technological arena, which are out of reach of the common people. Therefore, resource management programs like community forestry, have failed to reach to all the sections of the people (Upreti 2004). Conclusion Thus, community forestry has seen a patchwork of success in Nepal. It has, to a large extent, been successful in the arena of environmental management, with slower forest degradation since the institutionalisation of community forestry as the dominant governance structure. However, the benefits have not reached all the sections of the socio-political structure of population. Most community forest groups are dominated by the powerful, in terms of economic, social and gender strength. The marginalised people, including the ethnic and low caste communities and women have remained marginalised in the new institutions. The new governance structure is still seen as a technological institution, where the importance of traditional knowledge is not acknowledged. References Agarwal, Arun and Chhatre, Ashwini (2006). Explaining Success on the Commons: Community Forest Governance in the Indian Himalaya, World Development, Vol 34, No 1 Andersson, Krister (2009) A New Perspective on Community Governance of Forests in Bolivia: The Role of External Organizations, Paper presented at the Meetings of International Society of New Institutional Economics at the University of California, Berkeley Kanel, Keshav Raj (2005). Ram Prasad Poudyal and Jagadish Prasad Baral, Nepal Community Forestry, www.forestrynepal.org/.../TeraiForestManagemetnEthicalView.pdf Koirala, Rajesh (2008). Kalpana Giri and Bharat Kr Pokharel, Development and Status of Community Forest Governance in Nepal, www.wiso.boku.ac.at/fileadmin/_/H73/.../Nepal/2008_SAF_Giri.pdf Ostrom, Elinor (1999) Self-governance and Forest Resources, Occasional Paper No 20, Center for International Forest Research, http://www.umich.edu/~ifri/Publications/R061-9.pdf. Accessed on October 11, 2009 Stern Reviews of the Economics of Climate Change (2007). http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm. Accessed on October 11, 2009 South Asia Network for Development and Environmental Economics (2004), Community Forestry in Nepal: Management Rules and Distribution of Benefits, March, http://www.sandeeonline.com/uploads/documents/publication/812_PUB_policy_brief_bhim.pdf. Accessed on October 11, 2009 United Nations (2007). UN Framework for Convention on Climate Change, Bali Conference. http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php Upreti, Bishnu (2004). Dynamics of Resource Governance, Resource Scarcity and Conflict in Nepal, Journal of Forest and Livelihood, 4(1), July Read More

In an open-access system, users are assumed to be homogenous, with similar short-term profit-maximising motives. Hence, anyone can enter the resource system, for example, acquire property rights and sell forest products at competitive markets. Hence, government institutions and controls are deemed necessary for effective management of environmental resources. Since the 1980s, onwards, this line of thinking has been challenged empirically by political economists like Ostrom 1999 as forests in many regions of the world faced rapid degradation brought about by loss of ownership, commercialisation of forest products and technological developments.

Increasingly, newer forms of governance, like government ownership with the assumption that government institutions will act in the interest of common use, of forest resources came to be advocated (Ostrom 1999). Ostrom (1999) argued that forest, irrigation systems, fisheries, ranchland and other common-pool resource users, by trial and error, have devised indigenous ways to manage resources – through changes in harvesting patterns – so that the resources are sustainable in the long run. Forest users have the early signals of forest degradation and when communities are highly dependent on forest resources, users are more likely to adopt strategies and rules to change cropping and other use patterns.

Such forestry self-governance is likely to be greater when the forests are small, knowledge on the resource conditions is greater, members of the community trust each other and the community has sufficient autonomy and organisational capability to set its own rules. The aim of the development of community-based institutions is to protect and promote forest resources. Such community forest institutions were first proposed by the National Academy of Sciences’ Panel on Common Property (National Research Council 1996, cited by Ostrom 1999).

Empirical evidence from many countries suggested that self-organisation groups are not recognised by policy-makers making it difficult for communities to maintain autonomy to devise indigenous mechanisms for resource use. Most of the existing empirical research on forestry governance has been on the basis of case studies and there is theoretical literature on this. In many developing countries of Asia and Latin America, there have been attempts to develop community-based forest management groups in which users of forest resources voluntarily manage pooled resources, perceiving resources to be scarce and crucial for their livelihood.

Community forest groups have particularly been dominant in countries like India and Nepal (Agarwal and Chhatrem 2006). In Bolivia, among Latin American countries, a mixed governance pattern has been evolved with a number of local communities within a single municipality. Hence, local communities in Bolivia interact with a number of local governments, NGOs, regional and national government agencies for the purpose of management of forest use. Andersson (2009), however, found that among all the external actors, the communities’ interaction with municipalities have been the most effective in this respect.

From case studies in Himachal Pradesh in India, Agarwal and Chhatre 2006 found that it is difficult to estimate the roles of various institutions in environmental management. The success of decentralised, community-based forest governance depends on various ecological, institutional and political economic setting. The case of Nepal Nepal is a landlocked Himalayan country with borders with India and China with 10 of the world’s highest 14 mountain peaks. As much as 35.2 percent of the land in Nepal is non-cultivable because of high altitude, while the most productive flatland of the Terai region comprises 41.

7 percent of the land. According to land use classification, 29 percent of the lands in Nepal are forests, 10.6 percent scrubland and degraded forests, 12 percent grassland, 21 percent farmland, and 7 percent uncultivable land (Koirala et al. 2008).

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