The Guelph Landfill - Research Proposal Example

Turning a garbage dump into a bloom-filled haven for birds, butterflies and other pollinating insects is the vision the Guelph Pollination Initiative has for a local landfill site. Hosted by the University of Guelph and the City of Guelph, the event will focus on plans to turn Guelphs Eastview landfill into an urban habitat for pollinators by designing the 100 acres to include plant species that attract pollinators. As a Professor from the University of Guelph in a news release (2006) puts it, “We want Guelph residents and people who are interested in the project to come out…It’s about bringing people with a variety of backgrounds together to generate ideas about how pollination habitat can be built back into the landscape. Anyone can play a role in rebuilding the environment” (par. 7). This sounds like a lovely idea, and a very creative way to turn what is essentially a controversial garbage dump into something more positive…something the public can enjoy and be proud of. The City’s choice not to relocate the landfill and go with a more environmentally sound decision was a wise one, helped enormously by public input. The Implication: Social Risk vs Economics The City of Guelph had for some time known it would have to deal with the issue of a needed landfill. In fact from 1987 discussions had been sporadically on-going with little progress, the reality being that no one wants a landfill in their backyard for all of the obvious reasons. In January of 1993 a proposed dump site north of Guelp was eliminated from further consideration after opponents managed to convince city council to throw out almost three years of work that had cost nearly $3 million. It was the beginning of a back and forth battle that would discourage county involvement and place the onus of burden on the city of Guelph. The search, beginning in 1994, would be controversial, intense and difficult. Based on records the intension of including public opinion and that and of others was, at least at first, well meaning. Ali (1999) in his study of the project writes, “In order to avoid the pitting of the public against the technical consultants that had occurred in a previously unsuccessful search, Guelph City Council wished to adopt a more inclusive process in which all members of the community could voluntarily participate” (p. 1). To this end the Landfill Search Group (LSG), a Community Advisory Subcommittee of varied professionals and the (CASC), or Neighbourhood Liaison Groups made up of volunteers from all walks of life from the community and ostensibly representing the public. It would seem that things would go smoothly, but that was not the case and the public, suspicious of how the groups were selected and would perform, formed their own counter groups who, at the outset, were set against the landfill. After the LSG announcement of five potential sites, other neighbourhood groups were formed against the landfill for environmental reasons and surprisingly, on the basis that the sites which were being considered were all in lower economic areas. In essence, the latter complaints were “primarily on the basis of social equity” (Ali, 1999, p. 1) and the fact that the area was already home of a good share of the industry of the city. All of the groups came up with a list of 48 criteria on which the selection would be based, prioritized by the public which, in the end, promoted a site considerate of public health and the environment. From the beginning much of the controversy centered upon the components of priority ranking of the various aspects of the decision making process concern acceptable tradeoffs “between economic and environmental impacts…to both the community and to the City” (Ali, 1999, p. 1). The business community favored sacrificing environmental concerns [groundwater contamination] for business interests, while other groups set on protecting the environment held fast. In the end, site selection was placed in the precarious position of a quid pro quo. As Ali (1999) quoting officials writes… Although it may be said that a level of "standardized poisoning" remained and had to be dealt with, it should also be noted that the technical experts monopoly in defining that standard was broken insofar as lay participants in the GLSP could ensure that the community standards of what was acceptable were not completely ignored (as exemplified by the introduction of community Minimum Acceptability Standards in the GLSP). In stressing that no risks should be tolerated may mean, however, that the Guelph waste problem will simply be transferred to another community. Finally, it should be noted that although lay members involved in the GLSP were able to participate in the technical matters related to environmental protection, the management of economic affairs still remained, to some extent, outside their purview. Nevertheless, toward the end of the process it became quite evident that the economic actors were well represented by their elected officials as it was City Council that rejected the LSG recommended site on the basis of negative economic impacts…(Ali, 1999, p. 1) A major point of contention with the suggested sites was “hydrogeological suitability,” in short, whether the land on which the site would be located could sustain a landfill vis a vis the pollutants that would be a product of the site. In short, how well would the site protect the groundwater beneath it from become contaminated—a major concern of the public groups. Admittedly, investigations done by professional environment engineering firm, part of a $400,000 program, were dismissed in 1995 as probably unacceptable under the Environmental Protection Act. (An Order on the Withdrawal…1995, p. 3). Further reading of the Withdrawal Order (1995) confirms that public concern for the environment, particularly the groundwater contamination issue was never a real issue or complete concern from the start, and that public input in that respect was not considered as a valid option. While says the information presented to the public “must be comprehensible” (Withdrawal Order, 1995, p. 4), it also goes on to state some fairly blatant criteria in opposition to public demands, using wording such as “reasonable level of natural containment [of pollutants]” (p. 4). In the event contaminants leached into groundwater, there should be “postulated containment pathways” (p. 4). Alluding to “Detection, containment, remediation,” the paper is essentially saying these problems were to be expected on any chosen site, rather than eliminating a site because such events would not occur. The conclusion was pure effective rationalization. As Beck (1992) found, sources of danger in modern society and its decisions “are no longer ignorance but knowledge” (p. 183). It is safe to say that both those directly participating in the process as well as those who did not had something of a concern about the dangers to the environment. Regarding the process by which the location of the landfill was determined, Beck (1992) spells out a truism that connotes the impossibility of the public’s actual position in the matter. The negative affects [of technological innovation] have always found justification in rises of standard of living. Even descent over the social consequences does not hinder the accomplishment of techno-economic innovation. That process remains in essence removed from political legitimation…indeed, it possesses a power of enforcement virtually immune to criticism. Progress replaces voting… Risk and the Public Interest According to the risk society thesis (Beck, 1992), Western societies presently find themselves in situations where they must urgently confront the unanticipated side effects and by-products of industrialization that take the form of large-scale environmental risks and technological disasters. According to the risk society arguments, environmental risks were accepted and worth the risk because it was the price must pay for progress. In relation to the public vs the City in the matter of the landfill, this is never more true and the case. While appealing to the public for input the Counsel et al are actually begging for their understanding and support, knowing that in the end, while modern engineering technology would be applied, the perfection sought by the public and its interests could not and would not be attained. Beck (1992) contrasts those socio-political-economic circumstances to modern times when public focus is on risk, but does not necessarily win the day. (p. 26) While the Guelph public is well aware of the many well-publicized environmental consequences, and was somewhat duty bound to pursue a correct outcome did not mean it would be. Foremost in their minds then and now is creating a situation where public trust can be manipulated to eventually accept the risks involved in any modern technology. As Ali (1997 found, “a lack of generally trust in technology and technical expertise is now a critical variable in the management of modern environmental risks and that the GLSP represents an example of institutionalized response to this situation” (Ali, 1997, Abstract). Aside from economic and social equality issues, it is important to remember when assessing how well the public came away from its anti-landfill campaign. Take probably the most important concern, the problem of waste disposal mixed with water supplies, which Ali (1999) describes as a “toxic cocktail” (p. 1). Superimpose on that scenario the cavalier dismissal of the dangers at the altar of high technology and one can judge whether the public lost or gained in the argument. That toxins may penetrate the underlying soils of a landfill, any landfill, and contaminate a communitys drinking water supply is a known fact. It is the stuff of Erin Bachovitch. This is especially disturbing if, as Crooks (1993) states, that leachate concentrations of parts per billion [a seemingly small amount to the average observer] may very well be lethal and “…fact, it has been demonstrated that leachate may even eat through thick concrete (Crooks, 1993: 20). It is startling then that the attitude of the Guelph City Counsel, given all of this information, retained its adamant pro-business stance and rejected the first choice location for the landfill judged safer even by the engineering experts because it was in too close in proximity to an industrial park. Add to that the reality that “…although lay members involved in the GLSP were able to participate in the technical matters related to environmental protection, the management of economic affairs still remained, to some extent, outside their purview” (Ali, 1999, p. 1) In February 1995, the final site considered by the LSG (although opposed by some members of CASC) as suitable for a landfill was rejected by Guelph City Council because of the perceived potential for negative economic impact on the Citys industrial development (the site was located near an industrial business park). (Ali, 1999, p. 1) It is noteworthy that by May, 2010 of the Eastview Landfill Site Public Liaison Committee (PLC) regrets were expressed at the lack of attendance. (City of Guelph, Meeting Minutes, p. 1) The public’s success in it’s extensive recycling program and transportation of organic matter from going into the landfill had succeeded, interest had waned. Selling the Concept If one considers the landfill a boon or bust for the public the benefits that have derived from the landfill can not be discounted. And if asked, probably many member of the community would agree that the City has done a good job utilizing the project to bring positive programs that enhance the coffers and educational image of Guelph, location of a major university, such as the butterfly project sponsored by Guelph University which we will examine a bit later. For now though others, while praising the cost effectiveness of the project also question its costs. According to an article by Konieczna (2006), The City public people are also selling the government as environmentally sensitive while promoting cost savings as an aside. In 2004 it cost $80 per ton to process garbage in Guelph, including green and blue trash bags—a significantly cheaper median cost than the $100 per ton paid by other communities. And more than half of what was put out for trash went to recycling or compost, as other municipalities diverted on average only 35 per cent of their garbage from landfill. “Guelph fared equally well compared to all sizes of municipalities across the province with diversion rates of 27 per cent and spent $116 per ton to process their garbage” (par. 3-6). The implication is: better services at lower cost. “While some say the extra cost of keeping organics out of landfill is just what it takes to do our part for the planet, that doesnt wash for everyone” (Konieczna, 2006, par. 9-11), and one wonders how long it will be before the public is complaining about the costs despite regional agreements from which they profit, such as recycling. A recent study conducted for the province found expanding municipal composting programs to include the Greater Toronto Area, the Golden Horseshoe area, and other large urban centres in Ontario, including Ottawa, London, Waterloo Region and Windsor, would cost between 46 and 78 cents per household per week. But with an intimidating $3.8-million repair needed for the our own [Guelph] organics plant and the prospect of shipping organics to processors in Quebec or elsewhere, our situation looks a little different these days. Quite simply, Guelph [in maintaining its tough stance on environmental purity] has been left with a tough and expensive choice. (Konieczna, 2006, par. 13-14) Cost also present worries in programs such as recycling, a activity Geulph provides for itself and other communities. While sounding like a good money making operation for the City, people who work in the field say costs are not predictable and outlets for the recycled products can be elusive. Over time, he fear is that recyclables will become less valuable to “distributors,” less money will be made and the programs harder to justify to taxpayers, many of whom may or may not be as environmentally conscience when their pocketbooks are negatively affected. “And finding markets for recycled products is a juggling act too, said Phil Zigby, a Guelph employee responsible for finding companies to buy Guelphs recyclable materials” (Konieczna, 2006, par. 16). The public, however, is more than a cost counting entity, and the City has done a good job in cooperating with the local university to forward plans to turn the old landfill into a recreation area. A pollinating park, as it’s called, will import butterflies and bees and include flora and fauna appropriate for the region. The City is currently talking to counsel fathers to get going on a full recreational area for the old landfill set to include toboggan runs, play areas, tennis courts and an 18-hole golf course. Conclusion It may be said that the public input on the landfill certainly had an impact in terms of making the town and its technological experts work for their money. It is also clear that economics more than environmental considerations were at play. From that point of view we might say then than the public did get the best result for their effort; whether in the end the public will be completely satisfied with the result remains to be seen. Yet their victory in terms of the environment and the health and safety of the people of Guelph can not be underestimated. It is a rarity in today’s world and is proof that people in numbers can make a difference. While all of the positives put forth regarding the project’s positive impacts on the satisfy some; there are undoubtedly those who know their input was minimal and a matter of political courtesy. Has the project produced other community benefits? That can not be denied. Other questions relating to the Guelph landfill seem more a question for Beck and Ali and a their more analytical approach. As Ali concludes: Modern environmental risks have impacts that are: a) very complex in terms of causation; b) not limited by time, space or social class; c) not detectable by our physical senses; and d) are the result of human decisions. These characteristics of environmental risks introduce new challenges for the institutions that must deal with them… As we have seen in the Guelph Process, the fact that the risk of leachate contamination from a landfill is very pervasive meant that actors from a wide sector of society became politically mobilized. In order to accommodate such widespread public involvement, the City of Guelph developed a new channel in which lay individuals could participate in the technical matters related to the siting of their proposed landfill. Such a response to an environmental-risk issue had the effect of institutionalizing potential interest groups by transforming them into an advisory group (e.g., CASC), and, as Filyk and Cote (1992) observe, the advantage of the advisory group is its ability to directly communicate with the decision-makers. (Ali, 1991, p. 1). This, from an analytical point of view, makes sense. Ali chooses, as it were, to focus on the fact that the City did give the public an opportunity to be involved. This opportunity however, in the eyes of those in charge, was limited at best and in a sense viewed askance by officials who, the end, were more than willing to make decisions with significant environmental risk. Had it not been for the public and its pressure, the outcome would undoubtedly have been very different. Let us, for a moment, put pollinating parks and other projects projected for the old landfill aside, along with recycling and diversionary projects for garbage that buried would harm the environment and possibly poison the area. Guelph is a model of a community not only willing to make hard choices, and possibly expensive ones, to maintain its environmental integrity. It also speaks to its commitment to people of all economic strata in refusing to place an environmentally questionable facility in a low-income area just because it could. In the end, however, certain conclusions can be made in context. When it comes to accountability in decision making regarding projects that are environmentally important and potentially dangerous public input is not only of the essence but essential. Environmental concerns might well have been discounted without it; social standards of relevance may have been discounted. Does every side ever get everything they want? Never. That public input was reliant on science unpredictably and not always certain will always be a major setback to good decisions. Many an instance can be cited where science did not always present accurate options. The risk then of the public accepting wrong information as correct is there. Yet in term of Guelph we might assume the best. It was helpful that the information in this case was at minimum shared and positive that the public had access to information to often the province of only professionals. “In any case, the de-monopolization of techniocal knowledge and the increased lay access to technical decision-making represent forms of institutional eco-restructuring of science in the Geulph Landfill” (Ali, 1999, p. 1) In short, the public, in becoming a part of the science realized its limitations while able to apply it to their concerns. References Ali, S.H/ (1997). Trust, Risk and the Public: The Case of the Guelph Landfill Site. The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 22 (4) 1. Ali, S.H. (1999). The Search for a Landfill Site in the Risk Society. The Canadian ` Review of Sociology and Anthropology,36 (1): An order on the withdrawal of notice Wellington/Guelph proposed landfill site N-4 county of Wellington, City of Guelph (1995). Available from: http://www.ert.gov.on.ca/files/ORD/9504o1.pdf (Accessed 5 April 2011). Beck, U. (1992) Risk society: Towards a new modernity. Transl. by Mark Ritter. London: Sage. www.questia.com City of Guelph meeting minutes, PLC meeting #87. (May, 2010). Available on: http://guelph.ca/uploads/Council_and_Committees/EastviewPLC/elsplc_minutes_051310.pdf (Accessed 5 April 2011). Conference looks at turning landfill into worlds first pollination park. (2008) Press release: University of Guelph. Available on: http://www.uoguelph.ca/news/2008/03/conference_look.html (Accessed 5 April 2011) Crooks, H. (1993). Giants of garbage: The rise of the global waste industry and the politics of pollution control. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company. Konieczna, M. (2006) Guelph’s garbage dollar goes a long way. The Mercury. Available at: http://magdak.ca/articles/mercury/garbage.html (Accessed 5 Apri. 2011) Read More