Aviation System Safety - Assignment Example

Aviation System Safety OVERVIEW A coin has two faces. Similarly, Aviation can also be projected as a coin with one face portraying the commercial aspect while the other faces exhibiting the safety related issues. For an engineer it is a herculean task to keep the coin standstill such that both the faces can be distinctly viewed. The management focuses on keeping the commercial aspect on the top. Often capitulating under the pressure of the management several safety norms are sacrificed whose repercussions are catastrophic. There are certain things which are beyond human control like weather, earthquakes and so on. These are governed by natural forces on which Humans have no control. But there are certain steps which we can take to prevent our self from the damage. Aviation also highlights the fact how we aim to prevent our selves from any disaster. Rules, Regulations and protocols are the building blocks of aviation. If an engineer ignores them then there can be serious lapses in the safety. There is nothing in this world costlier than a human life. No body in the world would like to die in an Air Crash. Therefore, to sustain human existence we have to keep Safety as our Priority. Introduction With the advent of new CEO my job as a safety manager will become arduous. The new CEO has his own ideology and strategies in carrying forward the business. He has his opinion on safety which actually is not so encouraging. He has a mindset about safety in aircrafts which I’ve to try to influence. What I also know is that it won’t be a cakewalk. Now I‘ve steer this flight of safety away from the turbulence of commercialization. The flight path not only has the dark clouds in the form of new policies but also strong winds as deadlines. It is one such flight which cannot be landed on the runway of experimentation or parked under the hangar of risk. It requires 100 percent dedication and there is no scope for error. There are no new types of air crashes — only people with short memories. Every accident has its own forerunners, and every one happens either because somebody did not know where to draw the vital dividing line between the unforeseen and the unforeseeable or because well-meaning people deemed the risk acceptable. Beginning In flying I have learned that carelessness and overconfidence are usually far more dangerous than deliberately accepted risks. — Wilbur Wright in a letter to his father, September 1900. Before I begin to paint the image of safety on the canvas of aviation and illustrate its importance to my new CEO, I believe that every aspect of my work is like my own child and I’ve to take responsibility for it. So I’ve to anticipate my boss queries and be prepared to answer them in an ethical and precise way. So when my new CEO unequivocally explained that he wanted profits and nothing but profits and that in his dictionary there is no word called second chance. He would not tolerate any flight being cancelled due to maintenance on the aircraft. He had left me with only two options. 1. To be prepared to pack my bags and leave 2. To convince him in how maintenance is equal to more profits While former option was easy but it wouldn’t be of any help to me. So I had to stick to the latter. I had to prepare a concrete plan which would fulfill both of our whims. Sir, with due respect, I reciprocated, I appreciate your concern of profitability. But I would like to only stress on the fact that maintenance is equal to profits. I would like to corroborate my statement by giving you some examples. In the past we had been getting complaints of malfunctioning air conditioning unit on our Boeing 737 series. Six out of 10 air crafts have such problems much to our ignominy. Because of this problem we have lost many of our frequent flyers. Some of the Pilots have refused to fly the plane. The paucity of apt spare parts simply adds fuel to the fire. But after such a pandemic problem of mal functioning of the A.C units, I along with board members had decided to completely replace the critical components of the A.C units on all our jets. The results of our move were truly remarkable as we no longer faced any problem related to the A.C units. None of our planes after the replacement have been grounded due to inaction of the A.C. later that year we also earned ourselves a reputation of being a five star air line in terms of safety. Today we face stiff competition from all corners. Our rival airlines get the spares from Boeing earlier; our planes are late because of sloth of air traffic controller leading to delayed flights. These problems only compound to further delaying of our flights. Unfortunately we are blamed for it. All our efforts seem to go in vain. The vast majority (80%+) of incidents & accidents are caused by human error. Error is a natural condition of being human! It is a primary function of personal development. We are all error prone, even the most experienced engineers and managers including myself. Management should not be surprised when Human Error occurs! But they should be surprised if systems of work are not robust enough to contain that error. Let me put it like this way. •1 accident = 30% reduction in tourism •Low safety standards –economic impact •Safety and offshore register •ICAO/EU/IASA assessments You must be cognizant about ‘Qantas’. One of the leading airlines of Australia has impeccable safety record for 40 years. It’s because of which it has earned the title as the safest airline. Their cash registers are ringing because of this fact. God Forbid, if our airline meets an accident in future then probably our insurance company may cover all financial expenses of the crashed aircraft but it would not be able to secure our loyal passengers. We are engulfed in such competition that some other airline would counter upon our weakness. We would bleed so much that we would succumb to our financial injuries. It’s high time that we start selling safety rather than peanuts in the plane. I perceive the fact the maintenance does not come at the cost of peanuts but if its ignored then rest all our lives we’d only have to eat peanuts. History of air crashes have time and again asked us to learn from the mistakes. I would like to mushroom one such accident. 31 January 2000; Alaska Airlines MD83; near Pt. Mugu, CA: The aircraft was on a flight from Puerto Vallarta, Mexico to San Francisco when it crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 20 miles (32 km) northwest of the LAX airport. Reportedly, the aircraft was diverting to Los Angeles and started a rapid descent from about 17,000 feet. All 83 passengers and five crew members were killed.  The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly’s acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines’ insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly. Contributing to the accident were Alaska Airlines’ extended lubrication interval and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) approval of that extension, which increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would result in excessive wear of the acme nut threads, and Alaska Airlines’ extended end play check interval and the FAA’s approval of that extension, which allowed the excessive wear of the acme nut threads to progress to failure without the opportunity for detection. In the accident above the fault was not of the engineer instead it was of the management under which the engineers had to relinquish. The lubrication interval for the MD83 was scheduled after 1500 hours but they neglected it under the pressure of management and the result of it is all in front of us. I’m sure that you will agree that we would not want our airline to be on the crash database By discussing such accidents I know that I’m only further disturbing you. But it’s just that reality is cruel and we cannot afford to be lenient towards maintenance. Accidents affect us directly and indirectly. These costs include: Direct costs-These are incurred during replacement or repair of equipment and property damage. The treatment and compensation for injury and losses to persons further compound to bills. Indirect Costs- These are associated with a variety of less obvious but often more extensive factors, including: Loss of productivity and business, legal costs, the hire of replacement equipment, reduction of cash flows, increased insurance premiums, loss of goodwill, etc. Often these penalties can extend over a considerable period. Hull insurance deductibles (excess) are generally set at 1 – 2 per cent of the hull value. At the low end of the scale, a $1,500,000 hull loss would represent a cost to the owner/operator of some $30,000. The deductible for future hull insurance would also be likely to rise. To further demonstrate the prices I would like to showcase a not so pleasant picture of an aircraft. A recent report from the USA showed 42% of hull losses were maintenance induced accidents. Also 80% of emergency landings and 85 % of in-flight engine shutdowns were related to maintenance errors! We know that in aviation most maintenance induced incidents and accidents have a small number of common themes. We also know that there is a difference between what we say we do and what actually happens and this relates to the applied company culture, expressed as “it’s the way we do things around here”. “Great things are not done by impulse but by a series of small things put together” Today if the airline has to burgeon then it has to carry its employees. The management has to give an opportunity to grow and extol its employees. By appreciating I not only mean in giving the employees the promotion but also trying to stop the adroit employees from leaving the company and giving an opportunity to try their hands on to newer technologies and aircrafts. My View: A Learning Culture milieu should: Be supportive of the staff and management. Encourage open reporting. Engender honest participation by all. Accept that mistakes will happen. Seek to learn from its mistakes and errors. Treat those involved in the errors justly. Consider the implications of management’s actions and their systems in all incidents. These are not excuses or my intentions to oppose your thoughts. I also aspire to be a part of a great airline. All these efforts are only to tell you that I’m with the airline, for the airline and because of the airline. I truly subscribe to the decisions taken by you. I hope that I’ve managed to influence you positively. Last but by no means least I’m sure you would agree that “The Value of maintenance can be measured and the value of reputation can only be treasured”. Safety Is No Accident! The Safety Culture of your maintenance organisation is of your making and can be used to reduce the risks to your business The Choice is Yours References 1. http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/AAR0201.htm NTSB. 3/13/2009 2. Edwards - Improving the E M Safety cultureV2 3. http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/douglas.htm 2/13/2009 4. Federal Aviation Administration (December 2000) System Safety Handbook (FAA, Washington, USA) Read More