The Collapse of the Bretton Woods - Assignment Example

International Political Economy What were the causes and consequences of the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system? Why has multilateral monetary coordination been so difficult to achieve and sustain since the 1970s? The early postwar period saw the formation of a new regulatory system within the international capitalist economy. From the 19th century regulatory system took over a connection between gold and currencies, in an effort to fasten cash to a residual type of value, and a dedication to a roughly open economy for the advancement of global trade. Yet, simultaneously the economic and political autonomy of the nation state was acknowledged, and established and legitimized within the new regulatory system (Keohane 89). The Bretton Woods system governed the regulatory mechanism of the postwar economy. Those supporters of a revival of regulation of the global capitalist economy, and a program of social transformations, as a remedy to the social and economic destruction being brought about by the control of international financial markets, will certainly claim that the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system was caused by policy choices (Grant & Wilson 33). Yet, other policies would not have stopped the collapse of the Bretton Woods system because its demise was brought about by dispassionate or objective aspects of development or growth. As explained by Harold James in his work International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Grant & Wilson 48): It required too much in terms of the coordination of national policies. Countries were more and more committed to domestic growth, while at the same time the technological forces that were driving economic growth required internationalization, of goods market but also of capital. The crisis of the Bretton Woods system can be seen as a particular and very dramatic instance of the clash of national economic regulation with the logic of internationalism. In the circumstances of 1971, the disruption of the system followed very obviously and directly from the policies of the United States. The demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system was a preliminary manifestation of the growing conflict between the nation-state structure and the natural inclinations of the productive factors to expand on a global scope. The abolition of the gold backing from the American currency was immediately followed by the closure of permanent currency relations and the removal of barriers on the flow of capital all over the 1980s, as countries were pushed to abolish national regulatory systems due to the demands of global markets. The outcome has been a chain of problems of increasing magnitude within the global financial structure (Shimko 91). In 1987, disagreements between German and American officials over interest rate strategies firmly resulted in the failure of the October stock market. So as to avoid a worldwide breakdown, financial officials, headed by the US Federal Reserve drove liquidity into the global financial structure. Such moves avoided a financial collapse. However, they contributed to the intensification of a financial bubble in Japan which later on failed in the early 1990s, pulling the economy into bigger bad debt (Grugel & Piper 58). The 1990s witnessed the 1992 sterling dilemma, and then by the disorder in bond markets in 1994 and the ensuing Mexican withdrawal. These were followed by the 1997 Asian predicament, then by the 1998 Russian default and ensuing risk to the American financial structure following the downfall of Long Term Capital Management in the same year—a risk portrayed by former US president Clinton as the severest financial dilemma in the recent decades (Grant & Wilson 104). These threats appeared to vanish after the hard selling of the ‘new economy’. However, this did not endure. The core inclinations within the international economy have resurfaced with the downfall of the modern finance bubble in the United States and the rising indications of global collapse (Grant & Wilson 115). The Bretton Woods monetary system was formed in the 1940s while the powerful capitalist countries embarked on an agenda of national regulation intended to restrain the conflicts of the global economy and hindering the growth of socialist revolution. Its collapse in the 1970s established a new phase, dominated by the growth of globalized production and the supremacy of a global financial system (Linklater 124). The United States withdrew itself from the former structure so as to sustain its status of global supremacy in the new economic system which was starting to surface. It was able to do so yet at a massive expense. The free market agenda it has quite vigorously endorsed over the recent decades has heightened all the conflicts of the capitalist production system. Simultaneously, beginning with the unilateral move of 1971, the foundation of cooperation between the powerful capitalist countries has been thinning. The shared effect of both mechanisms has formed the circumstances for large-scale political, social, and economic turmoil in the global capitalist economy in the immediate aftermath (Linklater 124-6). So why has multilateral monetary coordination been so difficult to achieve and sustain since the 1970s? Exposure to the non-system that has been established and active since the latter half of the 1970s does not encourage assurance that it signifies a sustainable enduring arrangement. It has resulted in heightened insecurity in the global environment, rising instability of capital flows and exchange rates, and a stoppage in the development of global productivity and trade. Thus, a genuinely multilateral system is needed today, in addition to national mechanisms, for steadying of exchange rates and monetary coordination (Watson 71). Defined as ‘unilateral global Keynesianism’, the GATT-Bretton Woods system operated effectively until the 1970s mainly because the U.S. was independently primed to guide, govern, and sustain the system (Watson 84). As the world became multipolar in economic ways, the U.S. was neither eager nor capable of carrying out that task. And still there is evidently a demand for strong coordination of leading developed countries’ macroeconomic policies for a productive and systematic operation of a multipolar, ever more interdependent, and open global economy. But the U.S. was particularly hesitant to take on new outside limitations on its macroeconomic policy alternatives after the 1970’s termination of gold convertibility, having believed that the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate structure was a form of liberation (Hettne 63). In fact, the U.S. had consistently perceived the multilateral system as a way of limiting less democratically and less well governed countries; the Bretton Woods organizations were never viewed as a genuine, appropriate source of outside restriction over American policies. Works Cited Grant, Wyn & Graham Wilson. The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: The Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation. Oxford, UK: Oxford Universit Press, 2012. Print. Grugel, J. & Piper, N. Critical Perspectives on Global Governance: Rughts and Regulation in Governing Regimes. New York: Routledge, 2007. Print. Hettne, B. International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder. London: Zed, 1995. Print. Keohane, R. International Institutions and state power: essays in international relations. California: Westview Press, 2008. Print. Linklater, A. International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science. UK: Taylor & Francis, 2000. Print. Shimko, K. International Relations: Perspectives, Controversies and Readings. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2012. Print. Watson, A. Foundations of International Political Economy. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005. Print. (2) Some scholars argue that global capital markets have undermined the political and social compromise of ‘embedded liberalism.” Do you agree? Why? I agree that global capital markets have undermined the political and social compromise of ‘embedded liberalism’. In every framework of state-market interplay it is evident that a certain extent of agreement between society and state influenced involvement in markets differently. Social rights states bolstered society to endorse and cultivate a ‘high road’ of economic growth in the market. Yet, developmental states organize or structure society to take part in the market but are endangered by the greater stability and power of society (Little & Smith 59). Socialist states swing between society and state as other paths to the markets, or confront an unwelcoming future if they are unable to choose either direction, just like what happened in Russia. Such issues are deepened by the dilemma of ‘embedded liberalism’ recently. The institutional safeguards which protected this cooperation between state and society from the global liberal system are being weakened, generating an unfamiliar landscape upon which new agreements or treatises are being cautiously built. Global trade has developed at a breakneck speed as a fraction of global income since the 1970s (Jackson & Sorensen 28). More importantly, from the 1980s the worth of global trade has been exceeded by the worth of internal global corporate operations as multinational industrial investment or assets has become more and more globalized. These two phenomena are downplayed by the huge amount of global financial operations impacting both the capability of the government to regulate their own economic and fiscal policy (Jackson & Sorensen 28-30). Ultimately, migration has yet again become an important aspect of highly developed countries, raising major political issues for numerous states. Although this era of globalization could be the same quantitatively speaking to the latter part of the 19th century, it is different in several ways in qualitative terms. The ties between localities and nations are more profound and immediate. Even the world-system has evolved in a somewhat different way in the prevailing century hence the present era of globalization is taking place upon a quite distinct institutional landscape (Sorensen 263). Moreover, all these strengthened features of globalization take place beside changes in social system, especially in relation to family systems and gender relations, and in social organizations, such as the use of new informational technologies and devolution of bureaucratic agencies. In addition, it has caused a quick widening of inequality between and within countries (Sorensen 263-4). This globalization phenomenon is not an outside, natural occurrence which is weakening embedded liberalism from nothing. Instead, it is a result of the hidden conflicts at the core of the postwar compromise which were concealed beneath a seemingly steady system for three to four decades. For several experts these patterns are expressed in the market, through decreasing profitability and deteriorating accumulation of capital. Several claim that this is an outcome of the toughened welfare state and labor which negatively affected corporate revenues—at this point the social rights state collide with its innate parameters (Chan & Moore 93). Yet, for others, the profitability dilemma is the outcome of the international over-competition between the major paradigms of every state framework—Japan’s developmental state, Germany’s social rights state, and the U.S. liberal state (Chan & Moore 93-94). Others are less interested in a crunch inside the market itself and in truth view markets as more and more dominant over society and states because of their ever more global institution. Global trade and competition bulldozes states and societies. Several scholars, examining the economics literature, report that unskilled, inexpert employees tend to encounter heightened labor market uncertainty despite open trade, that social security of countries are in fact endangered by the liberalization of trade and that countries could have valid justifications to restrict trade. Although a great deal of explanation has placed emphasis on competition from development states, scholars stress that there is greater low-cost competition as well among the developed countries. Greater global capital movement granted corporations greater authority to ask for allowances or privileges from societies and states (Krieger & Crahan 112). Researchers merge these studies to claim that market processes were more and more structured on a global basis, with finance, labor, production, and trade systematized through international commodity chains in a progressively cohesive international economy. Society, state, and market are in a tiered system with markets structured globally whereas states remain trapped at the national arena and society stays quite secure at the local arena. The crisis concerns the state and society, not the market. For proponents of the world system theory a dilemma of the liberal hegemonic state can be found within these external signs. They view the incapability of the hegemonic entity to structure accumulation of capital on a global scale as a usual and frequent aspect of ‘hegemonic cycles’ (Brown et al. 48). The present dilemma is created by inter-enterprise and interstate rivalry and by social tensions which are related to the rise of new structures of power. In the long run they expect to witness a new hegemon surface to control a more profoundly internationalized economy. Even though these are general assumptions, the advocates of world systems theory do suggest knowledge and acceptance of the crisis of the organizations reuniting local and global economies and social structures. The present period of globalization is characterized by the interaction between society, market, and state, and possibly a new established compromise between them, is subjected to intense scrutiny and debate. The structural reforms create difficult problems for states wanting to effectively re-create the alliances between state and society and to rebuild environments, policies, and actors. This is obviously probable to be a phase of changeover and relative turmoil to be tailed by a newly established, ever more globalized global economic system. Nevertheless, it is the political nature of this shift which will influence to a great extent several of the major components of that new system (Brown et al. 72). There are indications thus that states are adjusting, whether because of want or need, to that evolved conditions in the changeover due to embedded liberalism. The present globalization program is itself influenced by state themselves, usually alongside their own local upper class or elite groups. Global and local policy can be distinguished or divided only with enormous effort—the U.S. legal reforms after the Second World War which endorsed the ‘financial conception of the firm’ (Wohlforth 504) are currently happening globally through the worldwide transmission of Anglo-American trade and corporate law. For instance, the states have formed a specific type of market within the European Union (EU) and disregarded other guidelines and policies for organizing the market (Wohlforth 504-5). States could in fact be jeopardized by globalization yet they are also among the main players which will keep on influencing the phenomenon itself. Works Cited Brown, W., Bromley, S., & Athreye, S. Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformation. UK: Pluto Press, 2004. Print. Chan, S. & Moore, C. Theories of International Relations. London: Sage, 2006. Print. Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. Oxford: OUP, 2007. Print. Krieger, J. & Crahan, M. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. Oxford: OUP, 2001. Print. Little, R. & Smith, M. Perspectives on World Politics. London: Routledge, 2005. Print. Sorensen, G. ‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millenium’, International Relations, 20.1 (2006): 251-272. Print. Wohlforth, W. ‘Gilpinian Realism and International Relations’, International; Relations, 25.4 (2011): 499-511. Print. (3) American and European officials have criticized China for “holding the yuan at an artificially low level to assist Chinese exporters, contributing to the trade imbalance.” Analyze the domestic political sources and consequences of the Chinese government’s decision to maintain a weak currency. In your essay, identify the winners and the losers of this policy choice both in China and in the rest of the world. Discuss also the domestic political factors behind US and European calls for a change in China’s exchange rate policy. As the exports of China have developed, the policy of the Chinese government of sustaining its currency’s value artificially low has brought about worries and even resentment in Europe and the United States. China has tried to sustain a weak currency so as to guarantee that its exports stay highly inexpensive in euro and dollar. By making use of China’s massive export revenues to purchase U.S. bonds—basically loaning cash to the American government—the government was raising the demand for U.S. currency (dollar) in relation to the Chinese currency (yuan), overturning the exchange rate between dollar and yuan. China owned more than 2 trillion U.S. dollars by 2010 (Hilbert 83). American producers protested severely that by sustaining low cost Chinese exports, the weak Chinese yuan was adversely affecting U.S. jobs and companies. Paul Krugman, a prominent economist, referred to China’s strategy ‘predatory’ (Casey 92). European countries were worried as well. The U.S. government, in 2005, predicted that if China stubbornly continues its weak currency, the U.S. would label China as a ‘currency manipulator’, and the American government indicated trade embargos if measures were not implemented to raise China’s currency (Mah 99). Since 2005, China gradually permitted the value of yuan to rise. All the same, the yuan had raised its value by 2008, and China once more repaired the exchange rate. After a restored attempt in the U.S. government to implement measures against China in 2010, the Chinese government proclaimed it was abolishing the official ‘peg’ between the dollar and the yuan, yet it kept on intervening in the market, permitting the yuan to revalue only a little (Mah 99-102). It seemed that China was taking adequate steps to prevent an intense and severe response from the U.S. The exchange rate between the dollar and the yuan has wide-ranging political and economic repercussions. For China, raising the value of its currency could have some adverse outcomes. Escalations in Chinese export prices would reduce their competitiveness in overseas markets. This would probably reduce revenues for exporters and raise unemployment rates, which China feared could result in social disorder or, worse, civil war (Ferrington 75). The Chinese Commerce Ministry, committed to the goals of exporting companies, firmly opposed a reform in the policy. Furthermore, any devaluation of the dollar would reduce the value of the huge dollar reserves of China. Ultimately, numerous Chinese view the problem in relation to national sovereignty, and firmly opposed the Chinese government’s move to adjust its policy due to intense demands from the United States. It seemed that the Chinese government wanted to modify the policy, but was hindered by the general public (Bahl 64). There were risks for the U.S. too. The American government kept on experiencing huge deficits, demanding enormous borrowing. If the Chinese government cut down acquisitions of U.S. bonds, cutting down the demand, an escalation of interest rates would occur. This would diminish economic development during an economic downturn and raise the price of subsidizing the huge debt (Finn 82). Ultimately, American consumers gain tremendously from cheap Chinese products. A weakening of the U.S. currency relative to the Chinese currency would bring about price increases or inflation that further hinders economic progress. The Obama government turned down a more rigid approach toward China for other purposes—it was expecting support from China with regard to security risks from North Korea and Iran (Casey 50-52). The conflict between Chinese and American currency is not new. These same problems have emerged ever since the permanent exchange rate structure came to an end. Even though it seems that the U.S. has become greatly reliant on borrowing cash from China, China is reliant on the U.S. as well because it depends on exports to the U.S. to push economic development and to pay its debts. China and the United States have become more and more mutually dependent and mutually supporting (Phillips & Weaver 107). For the EU, the exchange rate between the dollar and the yuan also poses serious issues. The value of the yuan is fixed mainly relative to the dollar hence the dollar has diminished relative to the euro, as well as the yuan. This has raised greater difficulty for European producers to contend with Chinese manufacturers, and the trade deficit of the EU with China has escalated (Phillips & Weaver 107-8). When the global financial crunch occurred in 2008, China postponed its policy of permitting its currency to strengthen. According to Zandi, “they stopped during the crisis, and I think it wasn’t unreasonable given the turmoil and uncertainty” (Casey 95). He further argued that, “To some degree, they have been vindicated. They were very important to providing stability during the Asian [financial] crisis in the 1990s, and I think they’ve also provided some stability in the current period as well. They were kind of an anchor in the global financial system, and that has been important” (Casey 95-97). He also claims that China is spot on in stressing that their economy was one of the first to begin recuperating from the current crisis. However, according to some experts, even if Western countries could effectively encourage China to reform its policy, carrying it out hastily could rebound or miscarry. China may boost its currency by cutting down its currency holdings, yet removing huge volumes of U.S. securities would push the prices of securities downward, pushing interest rates upwards. It would be costlier for the U.S. to pay for its debt and deficit, and rates of consumer borrowing may escalate too (Hilbert 85). Holding these huge foreign currency assets furnishes China with massive political influence, according to experts. One of these scholars stated that, “It means that when [President] Obama goes to China to talk to them, he can’t be as forthright as he would like, because they might start selling, and that will affect the dollar and cause problems for the U.S.” (Casey 127). On the other hand, for China, relaxing the established policy of weak currency could be needed, but problematic. China is hesitant to continue with the revaluing of the yuan because it will aggravate the employment issues caused by the failure of exports during the economic downturn. It is a fact that China is developing fast, but that is primarily due to incentive or stimulus programs. The further the world economic recuperation progresses, the more probable is that the revaluing of the Chinese yuan will continue. Works Cited Bahl, Raghav. Superpower: The Amazing Race Between China’s Hare and India’s Tortoise. New York: Penguin, 2010. Print. Casey, Michael. The Unfair Trade: How Our Broken Global Financial System Destroys the Middle Class. New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2012. Print. Ferrington, Marcy. Currencies and Globalization. New York: Nova Publishers, 2007. Print. Finn, Jerald. China-U.S. Economic and Geopolitical Relations. New York: Nova Publishers, 2007. Print. Hilbert, Lawrence. Currency Interventions, Fluctuations and Economic Issues. New York: Nova Publishers, 2007. Print. Mah, Ben. China and the World: Global Crisis of Capitalism. New York: iUniverse, 2011. Print. Phillips, N. & Weaver, C. International Political Economy: Debating the Past, Present and Future. UK: Taylor & Francis, 2010. Print. (4) International Political Economy (IPE) studies the dynamic interaction between states and markets in a context of increasing international interdependence. How has the balance between states and markets evolved since the end of the Second World War? To what extent, and in what ways, was this balance altered by the accelerating pace of globalization since the 1980s? In your view, what were the implications of the more recent global financial crisis for (1) theoretical and scholarly debates on the balance between state and markets; (2) actual policy choices; (3) the structure of global economic governance? In your answer, be sure to combine theoretical insights with detailed empirical and historical analysis. The field of economics as a whole, and the subfield of development economics specifically, surfaced from World War II with a profound interest in market collapses as an obstacle to fast growth and development. This basically is how the balance between states and markets evolved since the end of the Second World War. The seminal work of Rosenstein-Rodan emphasized these issues, placing emphasis on lack of development as the outcome of unsuccessful coordination, and the demand for state involvement to organize the ‘big push’ (Walter & Sen 39). Policy demonstrated this thought globally and locally. Astonishing as it may look today, the aid of the World Bank in the 1950s and 1960s sustained state-initiated industrialization (Wilkinson 76). Thus, numerous events, such as the call of Third World countries for a New International Economic Order, the demise of the Bretton Woods economic structure, the sharp oil price inflation, the establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), were not being studied by either economists or political scientists. This academic discrepancy was a key motivation for the creation of IPE as a separate academic discipline (Hughes & Wilkinson 107). There is no agreement about how occurrences in IPE must be studied or interpreted. Scholars have emphasised domestic political systems, class interests, the value of shared interests, and the global power distribution as explanations for developments in the international economy. The three primary theoretical perspectives in IPE have been realism, liberalism, and Marxism. Traditional discourse in international relations (IR) has centred on the split between liberalism and realism. Because both theoretical traditions emerged from the wealthy, powerful, and influential parts of the globe, they have a tendency to focus on the interests and problems of the wealthy and influential nations of the North and ignore those of the underdeveloped nations of the South. Other theoretical perspectives of different strands to bridge this discrepancy appeared between the 1950s and 1970s and presented the contexts from the South (Sakamoto 86). These alternative theories, such as world system, dependency, and core-periphery theories, all try to shed light on the economic and political subservience of the South to the North with regard to the structural ties between the two hemispheres. Comprehensive merging of principles has taken place among different branches of the Marxist, liberal, and realist theories to generate a high level of coherence and unity (Sakamoto 86-90). In a nutshell, IPE has been focused on developments in the global order that are merely probable to become more crucial in the foreseeable future. Global financial flows and trade, which have constantly been vital, are becoming increasingly essential for the security of individual states and their peoples. Due to their importance, decisions about global economic strategy will not be entrusted to anonymous technocrats or to the private entities; they will be a priority for policymakers and their jurisdiction. The task of IPE is to accurately make sense of these issues and the actions and consequences that they create. However, if realist, liberal, and Marxist IPE theories have had problems adjusting to, or addressing, the realities of global politics it is due to the fact that these realities basically avoid the kind of descriptive and observational systems developed by their potential saviours, few of whom appear willing to embrace the fundamental vagueness and uncertainty of international relations, and the theoretical contradiction it involves (Thakur & Weiss 138). Instead, every grand theoretical perspective can be referred to as ‘realist’ in the usual way, in that each should try to reconcile specific elements of its ideology with an intractable political reality. Hence, another way to overcome methodological weaknesses is to take into consideration this fact. Realism, for instance, is a practical need in a global order of increasingly threatening and conflict-ridden political relations, but one that should be drawn upon with proper recognition of the innately indefinable feature of international relations, and the enduring necessity to strengthen its eventually unsuccessful pursuit of total representational precision with liberating, idealist, and theoretical concepts (Wilkinson 98). Every theory can provide useful contributions if used correctly and applicably. Depending on any single theory have limitations. Theoretical pluralism has numerous advantages for research, especially as research progresses. Each of the three approaches—realism, liberalism, and Marxism—has weak and strong points. Even though no approach offers a full and adequate explanation of the nature and dynamics of IPE, if brought together they offer valuable knowledge and realisations. Even though numerous theories of international political economy are thoroughly criticised, it is mostly wrong to view them as competitors over the general truth about international politics. Instead, every theoretical perspective is based on specific ideas and evidence, is limited to specific circumstances, and tries to achieve its own systematic objective. Although different theories could result in roughly persuasive arguments about the international political economy, none is conclusively ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’. Instead, every theory offers several methodologies that can be useful to the study of international political economy and understanding its complex and multifaceted nature. A reflective model demands that the scholar detach from the current situation to reflect on the long term historical route of international organization evolution. Several analysts have generated important works distinctive of the reflective perspective of the analysis of evolving international organisations. The prevailing theoretical perspective of the study of international organisations has tended toward problem-solving and rationalistic evaluation with just a few excellent works classified under the approach to reflectivist analysis on the issue of IO evolution (Walter & Sen 39). A rationalist, Keohane (2008), sums up well the dilemmas of this model. Keohane (2008) elaborates that rationalistic perspectives seem merely to address one domain of a many-sided reality—that is, they are partial, because they disregard modifications occurring in consciousness. They do not allow individuals to identify how interests alter as an outcome of adjustments in assumptions or belief systems. They complicate rather than shed light on the sources of policy inclinations of states (Walter & Sen 118). The outcome has been a basically unhistorical model of international politics, which has concretised current political structures by rejecting ‘history as process’ and ‘the historical significance of practice’ (Jolly, Emmerij, Ghai & Lapeyre 3). The combination of societal and state, long-term and immediate action that is required for current global governance systems to adjust to the arising circumstances of a postmodern period. Nonetheless, the dilemma is that given the volatility of the current transitional juncture, the needed work will be nothing like ‘trying to change the wing of an airplane while it is still in flight’ (Knight 191). It is a task that requires every degree of our creativity and that will require learning processes and reflexive change if we are to put off a catastrophe. Works Cited Hughes, S. & Wilkinson, R. Global Governance: Critical Perspectives. London: Routledge, 2002. Print. Jolly, R., Emmerij, L., Ghai, D. & Lapeyre, F. UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004. Print. Keohane, R. International Institutions and state power: essays in international relations. California: Westview Press, 2008. Print. Knight, W. A. (Ed.). Adapting the United Nations to a Post Modern Era: Lessons Learned. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Print. Sakamoto, Y. Global transformation: challenges to the state system. California: United Nations University Press, 2008. Print. Thakur, R. & Weiss, T.G. The UN and global governance: an idea and its prospects. Indiana University Press, 2006. Print. Walter, A. & Sen, G. Analysing the Global Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Print. Wilkinson, R. (Ed.). The Global Governance Reader. London: Routledge, 2005. Print. Read More