Criminal Justice, Procedure, and Human Rights - Coursework Example

RUNNING HEAD: AN ANALYSIS OF MANSLAUGHTER IN THE UK An Analysis of Manslaughter in the UK: Corporate Manslaughter Date An Analysis of Manslaughter in the UK: Corporate Manslaughter Introduction The Homicide Act 1957 is the current law under which the two general forms of homicide fall - murder and manslaughter (Geary, 1998). Murder, in which there is intent to kill or inflict serious bodily harm is outside the scope of this discussion. However, the second type of homicide, manslaughter under current law takes one of two forms: voluntary manslaughter, where there is intent to harm or kill but circumstances mitigate the offence to varying degrees depending upon the facts of the case and the defendant is "excused liability for murder because some mitigating factor may be present" (LAWCOM 237, 1996: p. 2) and involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary homicide, in this case, is necessary to discuss more fully as it is the primary focus of proposed changes to the law which be discussed shortly. Involuntary Manslaughter: The Current Law Involuntary manslaughter, as the term implies, is defined as a killing where the defendant had neither criminal intent nor thought of causing death or grievous bodily harm to the victim. Lacking mens rea, involuntary manslaughter implies according to Tufal (2006: screen 1) that "the defendant will probably not have contemplated the death of the victim at all." If a defendant is convicted, the bench has a wide range of sentencing options ranging from life imprisonment to discharge without condition. Of course, these are the extreme limits and the judge imposes sentence based upon the facts of the case. Although by statute there is no distinction drawn between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, that is to say there is only one crime manslaughter, in general the distinction between the two are commonly acknowledged. There are two major categories that fall within the scope of involuntary manslaughter. These are: "Constructive Manslaughter which entails manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act Manslaughter by gross negligence" (Tufal, 2006: screen 1). In order to fully understand the distinction between the types of involuntary manslaughter, review of pertinent case law is necessary. Constructive Manslaughter Constructive manslaughter assigns guilt to the defendant even though they may not have intended the injury or death of the victim and a reasonable person may not have conceived that the death would result, but the responsibility for the death, none the less, is found in the commission of an illegal "quite unconnected and possibly minor unlawful act" (LAWCOM 237, 1996: p. 13) which resulted in the death. As found in Creamer1: A man is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when he intends an unlawful act and one likely to do harm to the person and death results which was neither foreseen nor intended. It is the accident of death resulting which makes him guilty of manslaughter as opposed to some lesser offence. In R v Mitchell2, at appeal the court found that several criteria must be met in order to establish that manslaughter due to an unlawful act had been committed. Upon decision the court found that to be convicted the following four conditions need to be met: The defendant committed an illegal act The act was dangerous in that a reasonable and sober person would recognise the inherent danger of act committed The death of the victim resulted from the act The defendant intended to commit the act even though they may not have foreseen the consequence of the death of the defendant In order to understand the criteria of each point required to show cause for a guilty verdict of involuntary manslaughter, it is necessary to review the case law for each of the above points. R v Franklin3 established the precedent that the defendant must have committed an unlawful act in order to be convicted of manslaughter. This was upheld in R. v. Lamb4. In R v Dalby5 the court attempted to establish that the defendant's act must be directly aimed at the victim. The court in allowing the appeal stated that "where manslaughter was based on an unlawful and dangerous act, it had to be an act directed at the victim which was likely to cause immediate injury, albeit slight." The court in Larkin6 further defined the scope of involuntary manslaughter in that the court found in this case that the a criminal act must be committed but also dangerous and as stated previously in that a reasonable and sober person would recognise the inherent danger of act committed. The court further explained its point in R v Church7. The court held that the defendant acted in an illegal manner and found that a sober and reasonable person would find in a manner that involved a risk of injury a person. According to Tufal (2006b: screen 1) the court further defined dangerousness stating "the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting there from, albeit not serious harm." The test of what constitutes the knowledge that a sober and reasonable would hold with regard to the particular case was further described in R v Dawson8 where the court held that the a sober and reasonable person is entitled to any reasonable knowledge the defendant might have had, but no more. The defendants were convicted and appealed. The appeal was successful with the court finding: (a) if the jury acted upon the basis that emotional disturbance was enough to constitute harm then, they would have done so upon a misdirection. A proper direction would have been that the requisite harm is caused if the unlawful act so shocks the victim as to cause him physical injury. (b) Regarding the test for determining whether or not the unlawful act was dangerous, he stated: This test can only be undertaken upon the basis of the knowledge gained by a sober and reasonable man as though he were present at the scene of the crime and watched the unlawful act being performed he has the same knowledge as the man attempting to rob and no more (as cited in Tufal, 2006b: screen 1). Having examined the definition of constructive manslaughter and reviewed pertinent case law and rationale examination of the second type of manslaughter with which a person may be convicted under current law is presented below. Gross Negligence Manslaughter In general terms a person is said to have committed gross negligence manslaughter if their behaviour was so extremely careless or negligent that the act itself was directly responsible for the victim's death. According to LAWCOM 237 (1996), although gross negligence manslaughter is usually thought to apply only to professionals (i.e. doctors, ship captains, police etc) in the carrying out of their duties in an official capacity, gross negligence can also apply to normal everyday people in certain instances such as when driving a car or hunting. In R v Bateman9 the court further limited the definition of involuntary homicide (Goldsmith, 2003: p.11). In this finding upheld in Andrews v DPP10, the court found that: The facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment. According to LAWCOM 237 (1996: p. 14), Bateman, at appeal, defined that four major elements must be present to meet the criteria for gross negligence manslaughter. These include: 1. the defendant owed a duty to the deceased to take care; 2. the defendant breached this duty; 3. the breach caused the death of the deceased; and 4. the defendant's negligence was gross, that is, it showed such a disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime and deserve punishment The problem lies in the fact that the jury must decide whether the criteria for a guilty verdict are met and the rules of law in this case are very often inconsistently applied. That, coupled with the fact that the very definition of gross negligence is defined by the very terms it is attempting to define make the application of law problematic. Instances of this have been cited in cases such as R. v. Lamb11 which was discussed in the previous section. Adomako12 clarified the four points required to show gross negligence. In this case the duty of care was further defined to show that a risk of death must be present not merely a risk of injury. In Adomako the court "makes it clear that the prosecution is obliged to prove that there was a breach of a duty of care which caused the death and, if so, that such a breach should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore criminal" ("CPS 141/01, 2001: screen 1). The Lord Chancellor in Adomako found: The Court of Appeal held that except in cases of motor manslaughter the ingredients which had to be provided to establish an offence of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty were the existence of a duty, a breach of the duty which had caused death and gross negligence which the jury considered to justify a criminal conviction; the jury might properly find gross negligence on proof of indifference to an obvious risk of injury to health or of actual foresight of the risk, coupled either with a determination nevertheless to run it or with an intention to avoid it but involving such a high degree of negligence in the attempted avoidance as the jury considered justified conviction or of inattention to failure to advert to a serious risk going beyond mere inadvertence in respect of an obvious and important matter which the defendant's duty demanded he should address (183A-D). Since Bateman there have been several other cases which further convoluted the definition of gross negligence13 which defined recklessness. However, Adomako held that Bateman was the determinant factor in showing cause for gross negligence. In addition to the two above mentioned types of manslaughter, there are special cases of gross negligence which will be briefly noted. Motor manslaughter, failure of duty to act and subjective recklessness are three special cases of manslaughter with each being dealt with slightly differently. Problems with the Current Law According to LAWCOM 237 (1996) there are two main problems with the manslaughter law as it exists now. Firstly, is the wide scope encompassed by the law itself. Depending upon the facts of the case the degree extent of the defendant's actions can range from just short of murder to professionals whose actions create a serious error leading to the victim's death to a person whose actions although minor in action result in the death of the victim. This wide degree of 'guilt' currently found in the law leads to much ambiguity and many believe the law should allow for varying levels of severity with regard to the defendants actions.14 A major contention with the current law involves cases where if not for the unforeseen death of the victim the act which led to the death is so trivial in nature that not for a 'fluke' for lack of a better word of nature the death never would have occurred15. Although Adomako clarified that gross negligence is the measure used in cases of death resulting from professional dereliction of duty, some areas with regard to this still need clarification. In Adomako, according to LAWCOM 237 (1996), precedent was set so that the jury is responsible for deciding if the defendant is guilty. In effect, "this leaves a question of law to the jury, and, because juries do not give reasons for their decisions, it is impossible to tell what criteria will be applied in an individual case" (LAWCOM237, 1996: p. 24). Further findings in Adomako converged certain concepts of both criminal and civil court proceedings and findings which may or may not be equally applied in criminal court. Negligence has a specific defined nature in civil court and has not been tested in criminal proceedings. LAWCOM237 (1996) brings forth the point that in cases such as Adomako where the defendant's actions led to the death, the term negligence should not have a negative consequence. However, they warn, that when tested in cases where there was not, per se, an action but rather a lack of action, or omission on the part of the defendant, there is no precedent set in civil law to convict on this basis. "In tort, however, there is probably no liability if the defendant abandons an effort to care for someone and that person dies, unless he causes harm through his own incompetence" (LAWCOM237, 1996: p. 24). By codifying the acts of omission as well as manslaughter in general any ensuing confusion would be alleviated and the general populous would understand simply what does and does not constitute a breach of the law. Ethical Considerations Having examined the law in its current state as evolved from precedent, briefly we will touch on the ethical or moral implications of what 'should' constitute criminal liability with regard to manslaughter. According to LAWCOM237 (1996), there are three main areas for consideration when determining liability: "Mens Rea, the Belief Principle and the Principle of Correspondence" p. 29). We will briefly touch on each. The principle of Mens Rea assigns guilt only when the defendant knowingly or intentionally caused the outcome.16 However, there is a body of thought that failing to consider the possible outcomes should be considered an indication of fault. In the strict sense of mens rea that would not apply. LAWCOM237 (1996) through review concluded that in certain cases lack of forethought could be considered a chargeable offence in certain circumstances which they further termed as "culpable inadvertence" (p. 33). The definition of this term contains several principles. Firstly, the injury or harm resulting from omission of the act must have been obvious. This is further defined by the common principle of what a reasonable person would infer if in that position. - The omission could result in serious injury or death. The second criteria for establishment of culpable inadvertence is that the defendant themselves if they had considered the omission of the act would reasonably be able to see that the omission could result in serious injury or death. Therefore, in this case LAWCOM237 takes into account the mental capacity, age, and other factors in determining whether a person is capable of seeing how the omission could result in harm regardless of how a reasonable person may be able to perceive the identical situation. In summation LAWCOM237 (1996: p. 36) stated "it must be on the basis that her conduct was culpable although her failure to advert to the risk of death or serious injury was not." The LAWCOM237 further found that in cases where the outcome of death was merely by chance and there was no way that the series of events which began with the defendant could have foreseeably resulted in death there should not be culpability for the death. We consider that the criminal law should properly be concerned with questions of moral culpability, and we do not think that an accused who is culpable for causing some harm is sufficiently blameworthy to be held liable for the unforeseeable consequence of death (LAWCOM237, 1996: p. 40). In concluding, LAWCOM237 found that culpability should only be established for unknowingly causing death: 1. when she unreasonably and advertently takes a risk of causing death or serious injury; or 2. when she unreasonably and inadvertently takes a risk of causing death or serious injury, where her failure to advert to the risk is culpable because (a) the risk is obviously foreseeable, and (b) she has the capacity to advert to the risk. (pp. 40-41). Having reviewed the current law as it applies to manslaughter; we will now examine how current statutes deal with the issue of corporate manslaughter. Corporate Manslaughter Salomon v Salomon17 defined a corporation as a separate legal entity from that of an individual. Since that time the law has evolved to where corporations can be held liable for the actions of their agents (i.e. those who control the corporation). Additionally, the corporation can be held vicariously liable for actions of employees "wherever an individual employer would be so liable" (LAWCOM237, 1996: p. 67).18 That the corporation can be held vicariously liable for an act or omission of an act was established by means of several precedent setting cases.19 There have been several recent challenges to the legality of prosecution of a corporation versus an individual within the corporation. In Seaboard Offshore Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport20 at appeal the conviction was overturned stating that although the ship was, in fact, operating unsafely at the time of the accident the manger could not be held liable as he had taken appropriate measures to ensure the smooth, safe operation of the ship. On appeal the court ruled quite differently in the case of British Steel Pic.21 Citing the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the court found that wording of the Act at s3(1) which stated "so far as reasonably practicable" to be an absolute leaving no room for finding otherwise. The court has also found the vicarious liability may lead to conviction even if management has expressly forbid an employee from engaging in a certain act or acts. This was also determined in the Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd22 Interestingly in this case the company had put in place a system to ensure compliance, but the court found that immaterial.23 Another area of the current law which applies when vicarious liability is inapplicable is the principle of identification. According to LAWCOM237 (1996: p. 74), "introduction of this principle enabled criminal liability to be imposed on a corporation, whether as perpetrator or accomplice, for virtually any offence, notwithstanding that mens rea was required, and without having to rely on statutory construction." This is exemplified in the courts findings in H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd.24 The problem arose, however, as to who was considered to be the controlling principles of the corporation. Case by case determination was made on whether a particular individual should be held liable or an entity such as the directors or upper management. However, after much consternation it was determined that when originally applied the cases deciding that murder or manslaughter must be committed by a human being, did not take into account nor have foreknowledge of the concept of the corporation and therefore, a corporation could be indicted for manslaughter (Bourne, 2000). In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass25 the complexity of this issue is demonstrated more fully. In the findings the court differed on who should be considered the controlling overseers within the company.26 The first case in Britain where a corporation was held responsible for the death of a person is found in Kite and OLL Ltd27. However, it should be noted that in this case and the only one where a conviction applied, the corporation was owned by one person. The major problem with the corporate manslaughter law as it stands now is the ability to determine who within the corporate structure is liable. The frustration lies in knowing in certain cases that there is guilt and being unable to bring those who should be found liable to justice. The corporation has become a shield to protect wrongdoing leading to the death of innocent citizens. Proposed Changes to the Corporate Manslaughter Law Wells (1993)28 in explaining part of the problem of prosecuting a corporation stated: Critics have complained that the structure of the criminal law, whose concepts of mens rea and conscious intention or risk-taking assume the mechanisms of human, individual, choice and decision-making, are simply inept when applied to companies. This is the reason, it is suggested, for the failure to apply the criminal law effectively to damage and injury which occur in the course of companies' operations. To remedy this LAWCOM 237 (1996) reviewed four major changes to the current law as outline below: 1. Vicarious Liability 29 2. The Principle of Aggregation30 3. Establishment of a new 'corporate regime'31 4. Application of the elements of killing by gross carelessness to corporations32 Corporate Manslaughter: The Proposed Bill The proposed Corporate Manslaughter Act 2005 (hereafter referred to as CMA) is based largely on recommendations set out in LAWCOM237 (1996). According to the Corporate Manslaughter Bill Team's (2005) proposed act, the law would be based upon the corporation's management failures in determining liability.33 The CMA does limit to a certain extent the liability of the Crown in broad policy matters without direct services to the citizenry and also in specific instances covered elsewhere in statute. For the focus of this act, therefore it was necessary in order to ensure that the Crown was not, per se, immune from prosecution, to establish the grounds for which in all cases CMA applies. This was accomplished through establishing that CMA applies in cases, corporate or Crown, where a duty of care applies. This falls into two general categories: "as employer or occupier of land, when supplying goods or services or when engaged in other commercial activities (for example, in mining or fishing)" (CMA, 2005: p. 11). CMA, in essence, addresses the widely accepted problems previously noted in applying statues based on individual responsibility to an entity where individual actions or responsibility becomes clouded and may not be readily apparent. To achieve this, the focus of CMA is on the failure of management as the main tool in assessing culpability for death resulting from these actions or inactions. In short, SMA replaces the identification principle previously discussed with a form of corporate responsibility. According to CMA (2005: p. 12) this allows senior management conduct to be considered collectively, as well as individually. This does not mean that we have replaced the requirement to identify a single directing mind with a need to identify several, nor does it involve aggregating individuals' conduct to identify a gross management failure. It involves a different basis of liability that focuses on the way the activities of an organisation were in practice organised or managed. The law is not looking at individual breaches or failures for prosecution under this statute. Rather, it is a means of addressing widespread systemic problems within the strategic framework the corporation or organisation that has resulted in the death. In drafting the act in this manner, corporation actions are handled collectively, but in addition individual acts by senior management personnel can also be prosecuted. It is important to note that SMA applies on the strategic level as stated above. Therefore, senior management failings to properly manage the corporation are the focus of the new law. This implies and as spelled out in SMA require that senior management officials be those employees who are chiefly responsible for the decision making and/or actual carrying out of the company's management strategies. This, in effect, eliminates the culpability of low level personnel with minimal input into the direction and policies of the corporation. These further details the culpability is at the local level of the organisation or corporation in most instances. For example, in the case of a multinational corporation the local office of the corporation is seen as the body from which the strategic direction is derived. Applying the law in this manner allows prosecution regardless of the size of the corporation - from single store operation up through multinational corporations as detailed above. CMA is also directed at serious breaches of corporate policy. According to CMA (2005) it is not the intent to use the law to police corporate management policies, but rather to protect the public in grievous situations of gross negligence. To that end, this is as LAWCOM237 outlined to be defined as "conduct that falls far below what can reasonably be expected in the circumstances" (CMA, 2005: p. 13). CMA further defines this by including a series of statutory criteria for specifically defining this. Although not all inclusive, these will enable the court to more fully access and define what constitutes such a failure. CMA further is applicable to corporations and Crown bodies but not to unincorporated bodies where it was determined that manslaughter laws currently in effect are more applicable. As has been displayed throughout this paper, the need for reform of the law with application is necessary due to the inherent difficulty in criminally assessing culpability to an entity using statues devised for individuals. CMA removes this barrier. With regard to Crown prosecution as stated there is no overall immunity granted to organizations merely because they are sanctioned by the crown. In addition to incorporated Crown bodies CMA details a list of additional Crown bodies which fall under this statute. This list is not all inclusive, rather it is still evolving so additional entities will most likely be added to those which may be prosecuted under this statute. Certain Crown branches are in particular not covered under this statute due to security reasons. These include the military and security and intelligence agencies. These bodies fall under other means of review and are not considered for application of CMA. Likewise unincorporated bodies are not covered under the new CMA. The organisational structure of such entities precludes prosecution under CMA. This however, does not mean they are exempt from responsibility. Individual members may be charged under current statute and the Crown recognises that future laws could very well expand the scope of CMA to include unincorporated entities. The question raised with this is that of police forces which are unincorporated. The Bill team is currently working on means to include police departments within the scope of CMA, as well they should. An important feature of CMA is that the corporate act or lack of action must have caused the death of the victim. Further there must be sufficient proof that management seeing their defect did not attempt prior to the death to remedy the situation. As with the current law regarding manslaughter causation needs to be established as has been described previously in this paper. This intervening act which can break the direct link of culpability as determined by CMA: An intervening act will only break the chain of causation if it is extraordinary - and we do not consider that corporate liability should arise where an individual has intervened in the chain of events in an extraordinary fashion causing the death, or the death was otherwise immediately caused by an extraordinary and unforeseeable event. (CMA, 2005: pp. 17-18). As CMA deals with corporations not individuals, individual sanctions are not applicable under the new law. However, this does not preclude prosecution of individuals for individual offences under separate statute. For the purpose of this paper, however, we are concerned with the sanctions which may be imposed on corporations or organizations found guilty of offences under CMA. Obviously it is impossible to jail a corporation, so the proposed law offers financial penalties to corporations found guilty. CMA (2005) stated that depending on the facts of the case the penalties could be severe in nature. However, the Bill team was unsure how to address the imposition of financial sanctions against Crown entities as, in effect, the Crown would pay the crown. The author would suggest that although treading closely with issues dealing with civil law perhaps sanctions levied against organizations should or could be applied to non-profit bodies which could benefit the greater citizens through imposition of these penalties. Also noted was that as additional sanctions the organisation can be held responsible for remedial actions to correct the problem. This would be court sanctioned and would ensure that the offence, at least within the specific context, would be repeated. Corrective action would be dictated and monitored to ensure compliance. The author is unsure exactly what body would ensure this compliance and develop the steps necessary in the corrective action plan but obviously something must occur to ensure the management failure is addressed and corrected quickly. Even though the new CMA involves corporate entities the Bill Team in drafting CMA determined that investigatory responsibility still remains with the police and prosecution with the Crown. Additionally, no prosecution of a corporate entity will be permitted under CMA without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. That is, the DPP will ascertain if charges are warranted. This will alleviate public concern that unsubstantiated charges will or can be levelled by individuals or other entities for the sole purpose of causing financial hardship upon a corporation or as a means to discredit their reputation unnecessarily. Concluding Remarks The need for corporate accountability in instances where gross negligence on the part of the corporation is evidenced through failures in their management practices has long been noted. It is frustrating as a citizen to see the death of innocent people and know that someone is responsible yet limitations within the current laws do not allow for a conviction. This resulted, albeit unintentionally, in a real or perceived immunity of corporations and could easily, if it had not already, evolved into corporate impunity and disregard for the law with respect to this issue. As was demonstrated earlier in this paper the current manslaughter laws have been ineffective in brings to justice those responsible for deaths involving corporate wrong doing. CMA will address this issue and ensure the great protection of all the state's citizens as a result. This new law does not add new burdens upon corporations or other entities which may be prosecuted under its statutes; rather, it sets a framework based on entity prosecution in the same or similar manner that current statutes place a framework for individual prosecution under similar laws. Corporations should embrace this new law as it specifies their responsibility and will ensure equitable prosecution across all sizes of corporations and other affected organisations. Understanding what the law expects and demands will enable the corporation to align their strategic direction with their corporate responsibility to the state. CMA removes the guesswork of what that may be. Finally, in instituting this new law the public will finally be able to overcome the years of frustration felt by the inability of successful prosecution for offences involving death that were previously unsuccessful. CMA will benefit all British citizens and move us towards a safer, more equitable Britain. References Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 HL Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co. [1842] 3 QB 223 BOURNE, A., 2000. Essential company law. 3rd Ed. London: Cavendish Publishing. British Steel Pic [1994] 1 WLR 541, 545E-G; [1995] ICR 586 CMA Corporate manslaughter: the governor's draft bill for reform, March 2005. Corporate Manslaughter Bill Team, Home Office, London: The Stationery Office. CPS 141/01 The death of Henry (Harry) Stanley, 13 December 2001. [online] The Crown Prosecution Service website. Available from http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/archive/2001/141_01.html [Accessed 2 April 2006] Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72 Criminal Justice Act 1925 GEARY, R., 1998. Essential criminal law. 2nd Ed. London: Cavendish Publishing GOLDSMITH, Rt. Hon. Lord, QC, 15 July 2003. A review of the role and practices of the Crown prosecution service in cases arising from a death in custody. Her Majesty's Attorney General. London: The Stationery Office. Great North of England Railway Co [1846] 9 QB 315; 115 ER 1294 HART, H. L. A., 1968, Punishment and responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, New York: Oxford University Press. Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159, 172 Homicide Act 1957 Kite and OLL Ltd. Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994, unreported Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217 LAWCOM 237. Legislating the criminal code: involuntary manslaughter Item 11 of the sixth programme of law reform: criminal law, 4 March 1996. The Law Commission. London: The Stationery Office R v Bateman [1925] 19 Cr App R 8 R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 R v Church [1966] 1 QB 59 R v Franklin [1883] 15 Cox CC 163 R. v. Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 R v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 Seaboard Offshore Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1994] 1 WLR 541 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 TUFAL, A., 2006a. [online] Involuntary manslaughter. Law Teacher.net Website. Available from http://www.lawteacher.net/CrimePages/Crime15.html [Accessed 1 April 2006] TUFAL, A., 2006b. [online] Unlawful act manslaughter. Law Teacher.net Website. Available from http://www.lawteacher.net/Criminal/Homicide/Invol%20Mans%20Cases.htm [Accessed 1 April 2006] Read More