The Process of Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer - Term Paper Example

Ethical Implications of Human Somatic Nuclear Transfer (Cloning) for Infertile Couples Introduction The procedures that created the sheep Dolly could also be applied to human cells. The process of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) involves transferring of a donor’s nuclear DNA into an oocyte from where the nucleus came from. Reproductive cloning is described as the application of SCNT to produce embryos (Balint 729). The cloning of Dolly involved transferring the nucleus of a ewe’s somatic cell to an oocyte of a sheep, and then the cells were combined via electrofusion to create an embryo that have the ewe’s genome (ASRM 804). Yet, the use of SCNT to help infertile couples produce their own offspring has been ethically problematic. The possibility of using SCNT for human cloning has created intense debate among professional groups, religious organizations, scholars, ethicists, and policymakers. An Ethical Analysis of SCNT for Infertile Couples Once an infertile couple seeks in vitro fertilization (IVF) to help them produce an offspring of their own, extra embryos are normally produced than because it is probable that certain embryos will fail to implant in the human female’s uterus (Balint 730). Extra embryos allow several attempts at implantation. Yet, when an embryo successfully implants, the extra embryos are not needed anymore by the couple. These remaining embryos may be donated to other infertile parents, given to research organization, or destroyed. In several nations, like the United Kingdom, idle embryos should be exterminated after several years of being unused (Balint 730). Before analyzing the ethical issues inherent in the use of SCNT for reproductive cloning, it is important to first identify the risks and effectiveness of extracting and processing stem cells for medical use. Recent studies on human hematopoietic stem cells extracted from bone marrow discovered that these cells are in fact useful and safe as a component in the reconstitution of the bone marrow of a person damaged by too much exposure to chemotherapy and radiation administered to cure several kinds of malignancy (Lo 270). On the other hand, there is no evidence or information thus far regarding human embryonic stem cells. A review of current studies and opinions reveals a divergence of belief about the possible uses of embryonic stem cells. Some studies discovered the ability of stem cells to survive in their unnatural conditions, but others discovered that they split naturally. There are also uncertainties about the mechanism of gene expression of such cells. Moreover, the intensive telomerase functioning, needed for continuous cell division, creates uncertainties about the possible susceptibility to carcinogenesis (Lo 270-271). Such varied evidence strengthens the proposition for further research and supports the importance of a more differentiated cell groups for this objective. Donating new oocytes for research poses serious ethical issues concerning the medical hazards of the retrieval and price of oocyte. Female donors in the U.S. can receive thousands of dollars as payment for their oocytes. Compensating oocyte donors may commodify the entire process, which raises ethical concerns for some. Furthermore, the relationship between the researchers and a female in IVF may create concerns about influencing the IVF patient’s reproductive purposes (ASRM 805). Debate over oocyte donation for research is especially intense due to the Hwang incident in South Korea, wherein broadly welcomed reports of obtaining human SCNT lines were discovered to be forged. Besides scientific fraud, the incident was condemned for improper compensation of oocyte donors, a way too many medical problems, and improper process of informed consent (Lo 271). Likewise, there are quite a few strong oppositions to the utilization of SCNT for human reproduction. Primarily, due to mistakes that happen during genetic material reprograming, replicated animal embryos were unable to stimulate major embryonic genes, and brand-new clones misinterpret a certain number of genes (Murphy 187). The possibility of serious congenital imperfections would be too high in human beings. Moreover, even as SCNT may be performed without risk in human beings, some protest that it would harm human dignity and weaken established cultural, religious, moral, and ethical principles. A cloned offspring would have a singly genetic parent and would be that parent’s genetic match. In such condition, cloning would label offspring as “products of a designed manufacturing process than ‘gifts’ whom their parents are prepared to accept as they are” (Lo 272). Cloning, in addition, would intrude upon the “natural boundaries between generations” (Lo 272). Therefore, cloning for infertile couples is broadly regarded as an ethical violation and is legally prohibited in several states. Cloning embryos would not include the eugenic principle of replicating the genomes of identified persons believed genetically needed, but it would create disquieting concerns. In a particular situation, a woman who underwent abortion may donate the terminated fetus’s cells to childless couples. In another situation, a couple may attempt to clone a naturally aborted fetus with the intention of conceiving and gestating an offspring with the same genome as the one that was naturally aborted (Lo 272). If the miscarriage happened due to causes aside from genetic defect, wherein another pregnancy putting the same genome would be disastrous, the effort to replace a naturally aborted fetus could be a technologically viable endeavor sometime in the future. In another situation, a woman who planned to continue her pregnancy to term may ask that fetal cells be extracted for future cloning to produce a set apart duplicate sibling. She may think of this, for instance, if she was not likely to be pregnant again on her own (Murphy 207). Therefore, the major questions that arise from these scenarios are: would the objections to somatic cell cloning be valid as well to fetal cloning? Formulating laws that approve or prohibit variations in cloning with purposes would assist in guaranteeing justifiable cloning laws. Carson Strong, medical ethics professor at the University of Tennessee, argues that (Murphy 209): The cloning of many kinds of mammals—sheep, mice, cows—provoked considerable public resistance to the idea of performing SCNT to produce a human being. After that initial response came more modulated responses that opened the door—at least a bit—to the idea. One philosopher concluded that reproductive cloning is ethically defensible, but only for infertile couples who cannot produce a genetically related child in another way. Several medical ethicists, like Carson Strong, disagree with some of the widespread criticisms against cloning. They do not agree that it creates too much risk on individual uniqueness. A cloned offspring will have a life of its own. They believe, as well, that cloning could be carried out without risk, if not sooner, then later. Neither do they agree that it is essentially a risk to the relationship between the child and the parents or that it would result in the commodification of children. They are also doubtful that authoritarian governments would be capable of exploiting this process for their own interests (ASRM 805). Because they believe that risks can be dealt with, they argue that cloning should be accessible to infertile couples. They argue particularly that it is ethically justifiable for use by infertile couples who really wanted a child of their own. They believe that cloning is reasonable because it strengthens the desire of the couple to take part in the formation of an individual and toughens the love between the man and woman (ASRM 805). Moreover, it gives infertile couples the opportunity to experience childbearing. Hence, they argue that if cloning can be performed without risk, SCNT should be allowed for infertile couples who want to have children of their own (Balint 730). One argument states that SCNT is not ethical in any way, regardless of the purpose. This argument has influenced the development of preventive laws in some countries and recommendations for local preventive policies in the United States. This argument claims that SCNT for infertile couples and other purposes disrespects traditionally valued beliefs and practices. Natural childbearing involves the creation of an offspring through the combination of two genetic lines (ASRM 805). In contrast, reproductive SCNT implies the creation of an offspring by means of asexual process utilizing an obtainable genome. Such procedure is basically a deviation from natural conception wherein the genome of the offspring is distinctive from either parent. For supporters of this argument, no condition or purpose would defend reproductive SCNT because the process itself is believed to be unethical (ASRM 805; Balint 731). Several of these advocates oppose reproductive SCNT because they think that uncertainties about cloning human beings must be considered as a measure of what is naturally undesirable. Those who refuse to give their opinion about reproductive SCNT believe that the procedure is currently unethical due to the risks for the offspring, but they are still hesitant to agree or disagree to the procedure. They have fears about the possible effects of reproductive SCNT on the child, the family, and the larger society. If SCNT were accessible to infertile couples, its effect on the child would probably differ depending on the circumstances and family situations. The impact may be negligible, or it may be advantageous if the offspring affectionately shared the genome of a much-loved parent. Even though the offspring would have the nuclear DNA of the parent, s/he would undergo his/her own aspects of gestation, nurturing, and socialization (ASRM 806). Furthermore, the offspring would mature or develop in a single uterine location and share the oocyte’s donor mitochondrial DNA. Such ideas believe that existing problems regarding SCNT for infertile couples can be surpassed, which are very hypothetical at the moment (ASRM 806). However this appears in the remote future because circumstances like major developmental defects, abnormal aging, and fetal demise are barriers to utilizing the genome of a healthy person for reproductive SCNT. Another cluster of concerns relate to the effect of reproductive SCNT on families, couples, and individuals. The conception of a much-desired offspring for couples or individuals who are sterile or genetically at-risk could have beneficial outcomes in families wherein genetic likeness is very important. A condition wherein couples have different levels of genetic connection to an offspring may or may not be problematic (Balint 731). This is not different from settings wherein the children of a family have different genetic compositions due to remarriage, adoption, and so on. Nevertheless, this new likelihood highlights the unidentified effect of reproductive SCNT on families. SCNT for infertile couples may create new family problems. Other issues would emerge if the process were broadly used in a variety of contexts. Fertile individuals who do not have a reproductive mate and do not want to resort to donor gametes may apply for reproductive SCNT. Couples or individuals who do not have medically valid purposes to use reproductive SCNT may turn to the procedure to choose a specific donor of somatic cells with qualities they desire. Depending on how many processes were carried out, SCNT could have troubling impact on families and between sexes if individuals have the freedom to decide whether or not to combine their genes with another person’s genes (ASRM 806). Some are saddened by what they see as the disintegration of the traditional two-parent family. Extensively available SCNT for infertile couples could speed up this disintegration. If SCNT were accessible only to infertile couples or those genetically at-risk, it could be performed occasionally as to have minor effect on society. Anyhow, demand for such expensive and difficult process may be negligible, specifically due to developments in other types of infertility procedures (Lo 273). In contrast, there is no assurance that the application of reproductive SCNT would be thoroughly regulated. A widely raised issue is that potential parents would choose donors of somatic cells based on their good qualities and such prospective donors would demand high compensation for their exceptional genomes. The eugenic inclination to intentionally look for individuals who are believed to be outstanding gene lineages could encourage a genetic determinism that weakens the distinctive ability of every person for individual growth (Balint 732; ASRM 806). SCNT for infertile couples may also promote too much value on genetic likeness, limit genetic variation, and damage the capacity of human beings to adapt to their environment. Conclusions This paper have discussed several ethical issues concerning the possibility of somatic cell nuclear transfer for infertile couples who really want to have children of their own. In the concluding analysis, taking into account the potentials of SCNT in reproduction and research, alongside the numerous ethical dilemmas inundating the issue of human cloning, the responsibility to determine whether human cloning should be performed is on the hands of those who aspire to replicate human embryos, either for reproduction or research. At present, the points given by supporters of human cloning are insufficient to justify the use of current advancements in human cloning. Works Cited American Society for Reproductive Medicine. “Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer and Cloning”, Fertility and Sterility 98.4 (2012): 804-806. Print. Balint, John. “Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research”, Albany Law Review 65.3 (2002): 729+ Print. Lo, Bernard. Ethical Issues in Clinical Research: A Practical Guide. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2010. Print. Murphy, Timothy. Case Studies in Biomedical Research Ethics. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004. Print. Read More