Aesthetics of Architecture: An Ethical Dilemma of the Industrial Age - Research Paper Example

Aesthetics of Architecture: An Ethical Dilemma of the Industrial Age I. Introduction “…there is not a building that I know of, lately raised, wherein it is not sufficiently evident that neither the architect nor builder has done his best. It is the especial character of modern work…Ours has as constantly the look of money’s worth, of a stopping short wherever and whenever we can, of a lazy compliance with low conditions …” (John Ruskin, 1849, 37) The question is, is there any ethical justification for worshipping, or condemning, the aesthetic quality of architecture? This is the concern that will be discussed in this paper. It will out emphasis on ethical arguments about the aesthetics of architecture. There are obviously ethical arguments on non-aesthetic qualities of building, such as the economic and social developments of creating buildings, such as what types of building should be erected and for whom, the environmental impact of buildings, and others. Nevertheless, even though the response provided to these ethical concerns may influence the form, and thus the aesthetic substance of buildings, in this paper the concern will be primarily on the whether the aesthetic quality of buildings in itself can be a reasonable subject matter of moral praise or criticism (Fox, 2000). Initially, the logical response to this aesthetic concern appears clearly a ‘yes’, at least with regard to a number of buildings; for instance, Auschwitz. According to Jan van Pelt and Dwork (1996), some individuals designed the buildings of Auschwitz concentration camp. Definitely, then, these buildings were ethically erroneous. Yet this exceptional and obviously evident case underlines the difficulty of applying directly ethical criticisms at the aesthetic outline of buildings. There are two dilemmas. Primarily, is it right to held accountable the buildings of Auschwitz for the dreadful things that took place in and around them? Certainly, such criticism overlooks its right target; the moral criticism should fairly be blamed at the people who mobilized and executed mass slaughter at Auschwitz. In simple terms, moral criticism accepts moral agency, and hence is merely appropriately applied to people and their conducts or behavior, not to lifeless objects such as buildings. To be certain, ethical criticism of the significant individuals might involve those who participated in designing the buildings of Auschwitz, but remember again, the criticism is hauled at those people, not the inanimate buildings as such (ibid). As for the lifeless objects which buildings belong to, their moral blamelessness is manifested by the reality that a building erected for a wicked objective, such as a dungeon, might be eventually used for a noble purpose, such as an exposition of space or a chapel, and others. As Thomas Markus (1993) commented of Auschwitz, “for all the world this looked like a pavilion hospital’ (25). And without a doubt, it could have been; those self-identical buildings could have been planned and designed, or taken advantage of, to cure the sick (ibid). Second, even if people are morally to resist to the very being of a particular form of building due to its objective or function, such as a slaughterhouse, people might yet discover such a building aesthetically gratifying in its physical structure, just as people might recognize that a slaughterer’s axe or samurai warrior’s blade can be stunning objects. In the same way, there can be buildings which host activities people morally support or consent such as a school or hospital but whose structure people find aesthetically unpleasant. Thus, in instances where people sense justified in morally condemning a building, people need to discriminate criticism of the building due to its application from criticism because of its aesthetic substance or form (Hawken, 1993). To be certain, if people are aware that a building whose form they take pleasure from has been used for an ethically horrible use, then this is clear to influence the manner people view that building. However, the distinction just created can still apply; although people experience sadness when looking at a building built or used for morally offensive purposes, people may still recognize that the outline of such a building is aesthetically pleasant. Consider, for instance, the Parthenon in Athens. Devoid of the knowledge on the history of this architecture, people may find this building magnificent. Now, visualize that eventually people will gain the knowledge that this temple was erected for ceremonial sacrifices or ritualistic manslaughter. Would people now all of a sudden say, of its aesthetic façade, that it is morally evil, or that its structure is morally incorrect; absolutely not (Markus, 1993). While frowning on of its original function, people would more probably, and rather reasonably, carry on considering the building as a gorgeous object. From Pugin and Ruskin in the past two centuries, until the entire era of architectural modernism in the twentieth century, there has been a continuing argument of ethical criticism in architecture. Particular built structures have hence been honored, or disparaged on the basis of whether or not they have represented certain privileged moral principles. It is then relevant to evaluate three of the foremost ethical arguments which have been universally organized over the past century, and it is important to argue that none of these three offers persuasive reasons for supporting or criticizing specific aesthetic substance and form of buildings. Even when this examination of contemporary ethical criticism in architecture is approved of, there may obviously be other, more convincing arguments that would make possible for people to evaluate the aesthetic substance of buildings from an ethical standpoint (Fox, 2000). II. Ethical Criticisms of Aesthetics of Architecture Primarily, it is important to discuss and assess three kinds of ethical criticism of built structure which have been organized by a number or architectural analysts over the past century. The three arguments to be examined are, mainly, those which back up or criticize architectural outlines in terms of their structural integrity; second, those which positioned ethical justifications for supporting or criticizing a given aesthetic form; and lastly, arguments which assess buildings with respect to the concern on whether they abide by to definite supposedly desirable or progressive inclinations in a particular culture or era. Integrity and Dishonesty in Building Pugin (1841) and Ruskin (1849) were key personalities in starting off ethical criticism with regard to architecture, and fundamental to their criticism was the concern of whether the form of buildings was genuine or truthful. As Ruskin claimed, “We may not be able to command good, or beautiful, or inventive, architecture; but we can command an honest architecture: the meagerness of poverty may be pardoned, the sternness of utility respected; but what is there but scorn for the meanness of deception?” (Ruskin, 1849, 61). Ruskin identified three types of architectural dishonesties; first, structural dishonesty, where there is in the outline of the building a style of advocacy other than the genuine one; second, surface dishonesty, where the treatment of a surface is in a manner that is encourage the possibility of some kind of material which does not in fact present; as generally in the painting of wood to embody a marble, or in the painting of decorations in deceiving relief, etc; and lastly, operative dishonesty, by which Ruskin implied the replacement of cast or machine labor for that of the human hand (ibid). Therefore in discussing structural dishonesties, even though Ruskin claimed that building will commonly be the most splendid, which to a gifted eye unveils the great secret of its form, he permits that the architect is not forced to display structure; nor are people to protest of him for hiding it, any more than people should feel sorry that the exterior surfaces of the human framework mask much of its composition. It becomes, then, that the principles of right are not tightly-bounded after all. And this turns out to be a dilemma for the type of argument which Ruskin desires to maintain (ibid). On the other hand, Scott emphasizes that even if people accept that it is a morally good value to keep away from misleading or deceiving the observer, occasionally there can be a clash between this moral principle and an aesthetic value, and in such conditions why should this moral principle assume superiority? As Scott (1914) observes of the architects of the Renaissance period who sometimes put in fake windows, “these architects place aesthetic values in the scale of their importance, and where economic and other barriers stood in their way, preferred at least, and foremost, to indicate design” (153-4). The Moral Dominance of a Particular Style Apart from concerns of integrity or honesty in building, Pugin and Ruskin also declared that definite types of architectural forms were morally dominant. Specifically, both claimed that the gothic style was morally highest. For Pugin, this moral tribute was bestowed since he was a devoted Christian and he strongly believes that gothic architecture was the ultimate Christian architecture. Ruskin supported the gothic style because its outlines reflect the organic forms of nature (Fox, 2000). The problem with Ruskin’s premise is plain and simple; it is that his claims that man cannot progress in the creation of beauty without openly duplicating natural form, thus people shall without further ado finalize that all ideally attractive forms must be made up of curves are merely opposed by those who find beauty in the prescribed geometry of traditional aesthetic approach; in other words, the notion that a specific aesthetic style is morally dominant to other approaches in unhealthy (Scott, 1980). By all manners people may endeavor in arguments about the comparative advantages of various approaches. But these arguments are accurately that they are single-handedly aesthetic premises, not moral ones. For that reason, what convinces people in these cases is not some greater moral essential, but merely, though significantly, a particular aesthetic perspective and responsiveness (ibid). Spirit of the Age Arguments Both the abovementioned moral arguments about architecture pursue to discover some moral rationale for specific architectural forms on the basis of arguments on architectural form: its exposed structure in the premise of the first argument, and its outline in the premise of the second. Nevertheless, a third type of moral argument on architectural form comes from recognitions detached from substances of architectural form itself, such as some more common moral or political dispute (Fox, 2000). An instance of this type of argument is a ‘historicist’ argument which maintains that buildings should be planned and formed out of definite materials, or has a particular outline, since this echoes the developing technology of a specific period in a society’s past. This argument was extremely taken advantage by propagandists of the contemporary movement in architecture in the earlier part of the twentieth century, who argued that the architecture of the modern period should be designed from current industrial resources, “such as iron and steel, plate glass and reinforced concrete, rather than traditional building materials, such as stone and brick” (ibid, 199). In similar note, certain building outlines were reasonable since they mirrored contemporary building technology and/or manufacturing processes, such as a skyscraper which forms designed from assembled units, and others. In either instance, buildings hence constructed and designed were admired because they were liberal in articulating and conveying the culture or technology of the period in which they were constructed (ibid). But even if people could, for a particular period or culture, recognize what is unique and prevalent about architecture, the assumption that people should construct buildings which mirrors this period or culture is itself questionable. Most people would believe that they should oppose this spirit and so construct buildings which question, rather than abide by to the doctrines. In short, people still demand an independent argument for appreciating that people should, morally, act or build in conformity with the spirit of a particular age or culture (Greenstreet, 1989). III. Conclusion There is, materializing among a number of architects, a fresh means of deciding about how the built environment can be constructed. It represents an ecological understanding, a systems recognition or holism and it integrates participatory processes. Simultaneously, these signify moral and ethical thoughts as architects are weighed down to assume responsibility aside from the building itself. The notion of sustainability has turned out to be both the emphasis and the objective of this contemporary paradigm, which can be seen in an array of building forms. When architects integrate user and community involvement in the construction and development process, while simultaneously taking on an ecological scheme, there develops a reinforcing of social sustainability in addition to a growing sustainability in the physical environment (Hawken, 1993). The repercussions of involving participation go beyond modifications in the structure of the construction process and the paradigms of design, to changing the traditional relationship between specialists and users. The architect also turns out to be the catalyst of change within the contributors themselves with respect to personal and community renovation towards empowerment and proprietorship. With ecological agenda, architects are spreading out their design into decision areas, which impact upon the wellbeing of people and the welfare of the world (Talbot, 1998). The extended suggestions of this synthesis, with respect to personal and community sustainability by the imaginative endeavors of users with environmental and ecological concerns, give out new difficulties to the architect in addition to impacting the economic and moral or ethical health of the involved. References Fox, W. (2000). Ethics and the Built Environment. London: Routledge. Greenstreet, R. (1989). Law: Architectural Ethics. Progressive Architecture , 43-48. Hawken, P. (1993). The Ecology of Commerce: How Business can Save the Planet. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson. Jan van Pelt, R. and Dwork, D. (1996) Auschwitz: 1270 to the Present, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Lovelock, J. (1979). Gaia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Markus, T. (1993). Buidlings and Power: Freedom and Control in the Origin of Modern Building Types. London: Routledge. Pugin, A. (1973). The True Principles of Pointed or Christian Architecture. London: Academy Editions. Ruskin, J. (1849). The Seven Lamps of Architecture. London: George Allen. Scott, G. (1980). The Architecture of Humanism: A Study in the History of Taste. London: The Architectural Press. Talbot, R. (1998). Sustainable Construction: A Scottish Perspective. Edinburgh: The Scottish Office. Waller, B. (2008). Consider Ethics: Theory, Readings and Contemporary Issues. New York: Pearson Longman. Read More