Charleston Super Sofa Fire - Research Paper Example

CHARLESTON SUPER SOFA FIRE TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 3 NIGHT OF EVENT 4 INVESTIGATION – Background 5 INVESTIGATION – Findings 6 RECOMMENDATIONS 8 CONCLUSIONS 8 REFERENCES 10 ABSTRACT The nine fire fighters who died June 18, 2007 in the Sofa Super Store Fire are still remembered as the “Charleston Nine”. They were killed after becoming trapped in the furniture store, due to unexpectedly rapid growth of the fire. The activities of that night prompted a major investigation involving several federal agencies, focusing on the command structure of the Charleston Fire Department and its policies regarding large commercial fires. The investigative reports do not determine if the deaths were preventable, but they do place blame on the fire department for their policies and climate. NIGHT OF EVENT At 6:07 PM local time on June 18, 2007, a fire was reported behind the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, SC, and three minutes later the fire department arrived and confirmed a fire at the side of the building by the loading dock. The Assistant Chief entered the main showroom and reported that there were no signs of fire in that area. However, when he subsequently opened a door into the loading dock, he discovered an extensive fire (NIOSH). The force of the fire in the loading dock reportedly pulled the door out of the grasp of the Assistant Chief, and he could not shut it (Menchaca). The fire rapidly escaped into the main showroom, and filled that showroom, an addition on the showroom, and the warehouse. Compounding the issue, the materials used in the manufacture of the furniture stock released large amounts of soot and toxic chemicals along with flammable gases in the smoke (NIOSH). The incompletely combusted fuel and flammable smoke collected above the drop ceiling, as well as filling the entire building with dense clouds (NIST; NIOSH). The smoke filling the building quickly disoriented the firefighters on the internal crew (NIOSH). The rapid spread of the fire trapped six men in the main showroom and three in the western addition (Nicol). Twenty minutes after the initial dispatch call, the interior crew made radio calls, broken but heard as variations of “need help” and “can't get out” (NIOSH). During the attempt to search for the missing firefighters, mutual aid fire fighters broke the showroom windows, and shortly afterward the fire was seen escaping out the broken window panes (NIOSH). The increased ventilation from breaking the glass also allowed the fuel collected above the drop ceiling to catch, causing an even more rapid growth of the fire, and greatly increasing the temperature inside the building (NIST). Several attempts were made to rescue the trapped fire fighters, and two men in distress were in fact rescued shortly before the extrication attempts had to be abandoned due to heat and flame near the reported locations of the victims (NIOSH). Forty minutes after the fire department had arrived at Sofa Super Store, the roof over the main showroom collapsed with the men still inside (NIST, 2010). All nine of the trapped firefighters died. The post-incident examination of the bodies was made more difficult due to the length of time before the victims were found, but the county coroner was still able to report the cause of death for all nine men as “carbon monoxide toxicity, smoke inhalation and thermal injury” (NIOSH). INVESTIGATION Background Despite reportedly beginning their investigation “before the ashes were cold” (Nicol, 2010), the report from National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) states that they learned of the Charleston fire from the national media. The investigation began on June 20, and continued for several weeks, involving representatives from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division, and the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration; both the NIST and the NIOSH published lengthy reports of their results (NIOSH; NIST). Originally, the city of Charleston fire department was resistant to the investigation, and the fire chief denied federal investigators access to interview the surviving members of the department. It took pressure from the head of the CDC before the fire chief allowed them to speak to the other fire fighters, including a letter which was sent to both the fire chief and the mayor of the city (Howard; Dedman). The CDC reports that while they are responsible for investigations into fire fighter injuries and fatalities, they are not able to compel departments to comply with those investigations (Dedman). The fire chief insisted several times that the department had been correct in its actions and that their policies would not undergo any major changes as a result of the fire. The mayor, Joseph Riley, also defended the department's policies, saying that Charleston had “the best chief and the best department” (Hambrick). The investigative report from the NIOSH is considered to be among the most thorough and exhaustive ever produced. Among its features were a determination of the reasons behind the rapid spread of the fire, recommendations on changes to safety codes, and a minute-by-minute analysis of the events of that night. While the report is not intended to be punitive and certainly does not blame the victims themselves, it definitively places the Charleston Fire Department as the guilty party in the deaths of the Charleston Nine (Nicol). Findings The NIST investigation determined that the fire originally started in a pile of trash outside the loading dock. The fire spread from the loading dock into the warehouse, then into the showrooms. The spread of the fire from the dock to the warehouse could be attributed in part to the lack of fire doors between the loading dock and warehouse, the large amount of combustible stock being stored, and the open layout of the storage areas. Then, smoke and flames were able to travel over the walls that separated the warehouse from the showroom as they were only partitions that did not reach the ceiling of the building. Within the showroom, the rapid spread of the fire was assisted by the failure of the three fire doors to close fully, and then by the breaking of the front showroom windows which increased ventilation to the fire (NIST). The building itself did not fully adhere to current building codes, as it lacked a sprinkler system. Additionally, the lack of fire doors between the warehouse and the showroom could be considered a violation if the warehouse had been considered a separate fire area. Both of these regulations would have been in effect if it had been known that the walls separating the warehouse and the showroom were merely partial walls (NIST). Another major issue with the structure was the existence of a steel truss roof structure, reportedly left out of the pre-planning paperwork on the location (NIOSH, Menchaca). The steel truss style roof is noted specifically in federal safety alerts, due to its propensity for hiding additional fires and combustible in the drop ceiling, a factor in the Charleston fire (Menchaca). The performance of the fire department was evaluated on communication, personal protective equipment, and water supply equipment. An investigation of the fire fighters' equipment showed that some of the personal protective equipment being worn by the victims was polyester, in violation of federal regulations, and that despite their availability, none of the fire fighters made use of the departments thermal imaging cameras that might have detected fire hidden in the drop ceiling (NIOSH; Menchaca and Smith). Some of the fire fighters on-site were not wearing their radios, and the communication issues were compounded by the presence of several fire teams, some in possession of incompatible radio equipment which put them out of direct contact with the city's fire department (NIOSH). Finally, the supply lines for the water were deemed to be inadequate due to the inordinately long time that was taken to provide hydrant hookups, the insufficient number of supply lines, and the overly long runs of the supply lines that caused a lack of water pressure (NIST). The radio traffic from the event also indicates that the police were not on site quickly enough to divert civilian traffic, and water pressure was lowered due to vehicles driving over the hoses (NIOSH). A major point of contention for this report was the command structure and departmental regulation findings. The assistant fire chief Larry Garvin reported that he followed his own city's regulations about first-response behavior, the most telling that he entered the building to look for fire in the showroom. The federal guidelines state that the ranking officer is to remain outside the building and not engage in any fire supression activities, as that better allows him to control the on-site events. Additionally, Garvin never formally announced himself as Incident Commander, nor did ever officially transfer command to the higher-ranking officer when he arrived, assuming that the command structure would be obvious (Menchaca). Fire fighters reported that the various teams from later-arriving trucks rarely set up co-ordinated activities and were simply expected to provide additional interior support when they arrived, which was performed as usual during the Sofa Super Store fire (NIOSH). RECOMMENDATIONS The NIST report gives eleven recommendations based on the events of the Charleston fire; the NIOSH report lists forty-three. These recommendations involve new and altered standard operating procedures, clarification of chain of command policies, training on proper use of personal protective equipment, and changes in municipal building codes and enforcement of those codes (NIOSH; NIST). The NIST report also focuses on future research needs to help in the development of new protocols and equipment (NIST). The changes in the standard operating procedures for the departments focus on ensuring all fire fighters and ranking officers operate in the safest and most efficient environment possible. The NIOSH report lists recommended changes in the standards written by the fire department for training of command officers, for the creation of pre-planning protocols (especially those involving neighboring departments), and for the maintenance of personal protective equipment such as self-contained breathing apparatuses, among many others (NIOSH). NIST recommends that the municipalities take on the responsibility of creating such standards, such as having state jurisdictions develop the risk management plans and guidelines for building ventilation procedures during fire suppression activities (NIST). The NIOSH report contains several recommendations on the changes that they believe are needed in the command structure of the Charleston fire department. They suggest the creation of an Incident Management System to be used during all operations. This system would ensure a clear chain of command and that the Incident Commander is identified as solely responsible for running each operation. NIOSH also suggests that the Incident Commander be held accountable for his actions at these operations and that the individual fire fighters are responsible for reporting all interior conditions to the Incident Commander at the earliest opportunity, to facilitate the decision-making process and increase accountability (NIOSH). Additionally, both reports list a need for better communication between neighboring fire departments, especially suggesting a need for compatible equipment (NIST; NIOSH). Both the NIST and the NIOSH reports indicate a need for further training, though the NIST does not list this recommendation directly. Both suggest training for fire fighters on techniques for when they become trapped or disoriented inside a building would benefit fire fighters during future similar incidents. The NIOSH report recommends additional training on the usage of the self-contained breathing systems, the thermal imaging cameras, and the proper usage of their turnout clothing (NIST; NIOSH). The NIOSH and NIST reports explicitly state that municipalities should update and better enforce building fire codes. Sprinklers, which could have saved the lives of the Charleston Nine, are recommended by the NIOSH in all new and expanded commercial structures, and by the NIST in all new furniture stores. The NIST report recommends that new fire codes be written specifically for high-fuel-load structures such as retail furniture stores, and that all jurisdictions greatly increase the aggressiveness of their enforcement programs for new and existing codes , including requiring professional certification for all building inspectors (NIOSH; NIST). The NIST report recommendations focus primarily on the need for further research. They suggest that the spread of the Sofa Super Store fire could have been better predicted if more research was done on the spread of fire on upholstered furniture, and that the issue with the showroom windows could have been helped with further research into ventilation of burning buildings. They also recommend further research into fire barrier materials, to help with the creation of new building codes, and performance metrics and resource allocation to help fire departments determine the best way to spend their budget to meet new standards (NIST). CONCLUSIONS Neither of the investigations conclusively determined if the deaths of the Charleston Nine were preventable. However, it is clear from their findings that much needed to change about the policies and attitudes of the departmental officers. The original refusal of the chief to allow access for interviews is especially telling. His behavior indicates that the chief knew his officers and policies were at least partially to blame for the tragedy that night. Perhaps if a different fire fighter had entered the building with a thermal camera and reported to Assistant Chief Garver the possibility of fire under the drop ceiling, the Charleston Nine victims would never have been sent into the building. The world will never know, but one hopes the future recommendations of the NIOSH and NIST will be followed to help prevent this from happening again. Fire fighters face the risk of death every day, and it is up to their departments and their officers to help mitigate that risk in every way possible. REFERENCES Dedman, Bill. "Charleston chief blocks fire probe, then relents." Life on MSNBC.com. MSNBC.com, 6 July 2007. Web. 25 Jan. 2011. Hambrick, Greg. "Firefighting Procedures Re-examined." Charleston City Paper 4 July 2007. Web. 25 Jan. 2011. Howard, John. Letter to Russell Thomas, cc. Mayor Joseph Riley. 3 Jul. 2007. MSNBC.com. Web. 25 Jan. 2011. Menchaca, Ron. "Local, federal guidelines in conflict." The Post and Courier 24 June 2007 [Charleston] . Web. 25 Jan. 2011. Menchaca, Ron, and Glenn Smith. "Heat sensors weren't used in fatal fire." The Post and Courier 29 July 2007 [Charleston] . Web. 25 Jan. 2011. Nicol, Susan. "NIST Releases Report on Sofa Super Store Fire." Firehouse 29 Oct. 2010. Web. 25 Jan. 2011. NIOSH. “Death in the Line of Duty.” NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. NIOSH, 11 Feb. 2009. Web. 25 Jan. 2011. NIST. “Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire.” National Institute for Standards and Technology. NIST, Oct. 2010. Web. 25 Jan. 2011. Read More