Using Naturalism in Solving Philosophical Ethics Issues - Case Study Example

Philosophical Ethics: Naturalism In coming up with an ethical theory, most people seek to identify the fundamental principles that explain value facts. For instance, they may try to describe that in virtue of which right actions are good and in virtue of which wrong actions are bad. In the past few centuries, the question of great concern to many ethical theorists has been whether there exists a scientific foundation for the principles underlying a correct moral theory. In other words, people have been asking whether they can explain what makes right actions good and evil actions wrong by considering the physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of actions. Naturalism serves as a label for the view that the answer to this query is yes. Naturalism is honestly true in determining whether an action is a virtue or not. Ethical naturalism is also known as naturalistic ethics. It is a meta-ethical theory, which holds that there exists an objective moral property whose knowledge resides in human beings (Brown, Paul, and Drakes 43). It further asserts that people can reduce these properties to entirely natural or non-ethical properties like wants, needs, and pleasures. It rejects the possible relationship between ethical terms and things that exist in the supernatural realm. Naturalistic ethics is a type of moral realism and assumes cognitivism. Cognitivism is a perception that ethical sentences can be true or false since they express propositions. However, ethical naturalism goes further to proclaim that people can communicate the meanings of the moral sentences as natural properties without using ethical terms, such as good, right, bad, or wrong. It holds that inquiry into the natural world has the potential of increasing people’s moral and ethical knowledge in just the same manner it boosts their scientific knowledge. Additionally, ethical naturalism affirms that people can confirm their ethical value by applying the scientific methods. The theory thus holds that moral facts are facts of nature. Virtue ethics such as Aristotle’s are naturalistic since the notions they bring forth are the virtues that nature supplies. People understand morality as something that nature instills into their biology through an end that life sets. Nature thus sets the point and shape of moral life. Naturalism helps in providing a ready link between value and facts, and between the normative and non-normative. It thus helps to avail resources to deal with vital meta-ethical problems. Ethical naturalism is a cognitive position that provides a base for grounding moral norms in natural facts. Human beings require cognitivism since it entails that there exist moral points. A goods-based view of a naturalized virtue ethics holds that the virtue’s goodness comes from the goodness of people’s ultimate end (Ritchard and Jeferson 26). Therefore, virtues are ethically fundamental, even though they are not theoretically central. In other words, virtues provide marks to evaluate individual human beings as a kind of a particular species. Thus, persons should judge character before proceeding to judge right actions. Ethics is proximate ends to people’s end of successful reproduction. Therefore, the ultimate end needs virtues, although the virtues do not necessarily constitutes the end. The link between biology and ethics is in the fact that humans’ ethical evaluation has a logical structure that is similar to that of other living organism’s non-ethical evaluation (Brown, Paul, and Drakes 62). For example, a good mother’s natural end is to give birth to offspring and raise them. According to Aristotle’s function argument, a human being has a function qua human being. Opponents of naturalists discard Aristotle’s strategy of trying to ascertain a thing’s function. Biology and science accounts that the function of a thing is what nature selected the thing to do or the goal-directed role it acts in a continuous system. People fail to consider a human function, and therefore humans lack biological function in the technical sense of the term. People should think of the Aristotelian function as work. The people work is what they do, their way of life, the characteristic behaviors, and processes they exemplify and in which they engage. The human beings works are their characteristic activities. People should preserve Aristotle’s insight that a good instance of a kind is that which actualizes that kind’s work well. They will then be able to make connections between function and ethic. Darwinian Theory says that no one plans or direct evolution. The process rather puts together elements of probability and necessity. The combinations of random genetic mutations pile up through natural selection. From Darwinian standpoint, humans are ingrained to replicate their DNA (Brown, Paul, and Drakes 89). It thus perceives human function to be that of total genetic proliferation. However, this Darwinian version of human function is at fault. It does not explain normative notions such as a good father or a good mother. It does not explain why some members of a particular species tend to be bad while others are good. People need a richer theoretical structure than a mere Darwinism. From a naturalistic perspective, it is reasonable to view reproductive success as a natural end. How do people perceive human beings as morally good persons? People evaluate themselves and one another along the same lines as they do specimens belonging to any species of living thing. The evaluative strategy is to get the function of the species, identify a norm, and then use that standard for individual members of the species (Ritchard and Jeferson 27). Human beings refer to the way of life of the species when framing a logical structure of the evaluation. The framework will make it is easier for one to see that individual members are right or defective qua the thing of their kind. Rosalind Hursthouse affirms that one can understand a particular character trait to be a virtue if the feature enables a person to identify one or more of four ends. The ends include the end of an individual’s characteristic freedom and characteristics means of enjoyment, its proper functioning in a social group, individual survival, and the continuation of the species. These ends are plausible human terms. Educated observation will not enable people to see the ends. However, people can unify the ends to make justifiable. Unification of the needs happens when a person sees that the ends are proximate ends serving continuation of species, genotype, or an evolved trait. If human natural end is not right, why do people suppose that its supporting ends are good? The reply to this query resides in the fact that natural end belongs to human beings since their end makes them what they are and do. Therefore, the natural end is right. According to neo-Darwinism, reproductive success is humans’ ultimate and logical end (Rouse 23). Human’s end is rightly known as good. Consequently, reproductive success is real. Values and facts differ when it comes to motivation. While values are motivational, facts are not. A motive propels someone to do something. However, facts remain so without any motivational influence. All moral imperatives are hypothetical imperatives in a particular sense, although they are in a sense unconditional (Ritchard and Jeferson 94). Moral norms turn out to become theoretical since everyone desires happiness. By nature, all human beings want happiness. Human beings will try all ways possible to avoid the misery of being caught telling lies. Therefore, people are constrained by the imperative ‘avoid anxiety by not telling lies’. It is reasonable for people to use naturalism in solving philosophical ethics issues surrounding their daily lives. It will be much easier to ascertain whether an action is ethical when people express the meaning of moral sentences as natural properties without using common ethical terms. They will gain a lot by having increased moral and ethical knowledge if they prod into the natural world. Works Cited Brown, J. B., A. T. Paul, and V. R. Drakes. Philosophical Ethics. 2nd ed. New York: Greenwich Publishers, 2005. Print. Ritchard, K., and Jeferson, M., "The Ethics of Nature." Nature 2.1 (2013): 25-28. Print. Rouse, Joseph. "How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism."Philosophical Ethics 2.5 (2010): 23-29. Print. Read More