Kant Critique of Pure Reason - Essay Example

[Supervisor Kant Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues at great length in the Critique of Pure Reason that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated by means of theoretical reason. By restricting knowledge in this manner Kant notoriously makes room for faith, that is, in this case, for a practical proof of the existence of God, which he develops in the Critique of Practical Reason. Kants reasons for rejecting theoretical proofs of the existence of God have received considerable attention. For throughout his pre-critical period, but especially in his The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763), Kant believes that there is a theoretical proof of the existence of God. One would naturally expect Kants criticisms of theistic proofs as developed in the "ideal of pure reason" (that is, the third chapter of the first Critiques transcendental dialectic) to apply in straightforward ways to his earlier attempts at a theistic proof. However, Kant rejects the three traditional arguments just as he does in the first Critique. Given that Kant rejects all theoretical proofs of Gods existence in his critical period and given that he did not take his critical objections to the traditional proofs to apply to the theistic proof developed in Kant’s work, what is his justification for rejecting his pre-critical argument for Gods existence? For it reveals that Kant continues to endorse his pre-critical argument, though he weakens its conclusion by positing God as merely a regulative rather than a constitutive principle. By weakening the status of the arguments conclusion in this manner Kant hopes to avoid any conflict with his general claim that the existence of God cannot be proved while still being able to invoke God in certain epistemic contexts. For it is still appropriate to ask what Kants justification is for rejecting the original (or full-strength) conclusion of his pre-critical theistic argument. That is, why does Kants argument not establish Gods existence as a constitutive principle? Kants argument for the existence of God is based on an analysis of the concept of possibility. Its basic idea is that the existence of a necessary being is the only condition under which the possibility of objects in general can be made intelligible. For possibility requires not only that a concept contain no contradiction, but also that there be a content to the concept that would be available for thought. However, the content of the concepts of things can be provided only by something that exists necessarily, namely God. Accordingly, the argument proceeds in three stages. The first stage establishes the principle of contradiction as the formal ground of possibility, the second stage proves the existence of something that can supply the content of concepts, and the third stage shows that this something not only exists, but exists necessarily and in fact must be God. The first stage of the argument establishes what Kant refers to as the formal element of possibility. This element is the law of contradiction, according to which those things thought together in a concept are compared to determine the possibility of the thing to which this concept is thought to refer. If a concept fails to meet this criterion, that is, contains a contradiction, the concept and the thing to which it is thought to refer are deemed internally impossible. Kant presents this stage of the argument accordingly: Once it is accepted that all possibility presupposes some existence, it is fairly easy to establish that this existence is necessary. For if the existence presupposed by all possibility did not exist, nothing would be possible. If nothing is possible, then nothing can be thought. Therefore, since the nonexistence of that which grounds thought cannot be possible, that which grounds thought must exist with absolute necessity. While this argument differs from Leibnizs explicit claims about possibility insofar as Leibniz does not specifically acknowledge any material element or ground of possibility, Kant clearly thinks that the argument is based on considerations that Leibniz and his followers could not easily reject. Kant is pointing to an inconsistency here between Leibnizs theory of complete concepts and his views on existence. Leibniz holds that existence is perfection, or a positive simple predicate, and that since God contains all perfections he must likewise contain existence. Kant recognizes that this conception of existence is inconsistent with the Leibnizian position that God is in possession of complete concepts of possible things. If existence were a predicate and the complete concept of an actual thing contained existence, then we could not refer to a thing as possible and as actual by means of the same concept. Kants general positive statement about existence is that it "is the absolute positing of a thing. Obviously, the critical Kant cannot accept the argument without qualification. However, it is far from clear what it is about this argument that Kant rejects and, more importantly, what his reasons are for rejecting it. In light of the fact that Kant presents this basic argument form repeatedly throughout his pre-critical period (from the Nova dilucidatio in 1755 to the Inaugural Dissertation in 1770), it is unlikely that Kant has become aware of some simple mistake in the argument. What might seem more probable is that Kants change of perspective in transcendental idealism or the "critical turn" somehow invalidates the fundamental structure of the argument. Not only does the emergence of transcendental idealism in its full form coincide with the rejection of his precritical theistic proof, but transcendental idealism is a doctrine that is central to Kants entire project. Yet how exactly does transcendental idealism reveal the fallacy involved in Kants pre-critical theistic proof? Transcendental idealism might seem to be crucial to Kants rejection of his pre-critical theistic proof in a number of ways. Second, Kants argument in the transcendental deduction, which establishes that applying the categories to sensible intuition establishes their objective reality (that is, can result in knowledge), might be taken to show that we cannot attain knowledge of Gods existence. Since no intuition of God is possible, the concept by means of which we think of God cannot be shown to have objective reality and thus no knowledge of God is possible. Since the content of all other concepts is derived from limiting the concept of the ens realissimum, all other possibilities are derived from this original possibility, that is, all possibilities are grounded in God. So, not only does Kant link the material ground of possibility and God, but he does so in a way that is fundamentally the same what Guyer says in his book Kant Critique Of Pure Reason (Guyer, 65). For in them Kant seems to be endorsing his pre-critical argument, but rejecting its conclusion. The solution to the puzzle that Kant seems to develop most consistently is first to distinguish between constitutive and regulative principles and then to maintain that the pre-critical argument establishes God merely as a regulative and not as a constitutive principle. The original question remains, however, albeit in modified form: What exactly is Kants reason for relegating God to the status of a regulative principle? Recall that the structure of Kants pre-critical argument is expressed by the claim that God is a necessary condition for possibility (insofar as God alone can function as the material ground of possibility). Accordingly, if God does not exist, then neither does any possibilities (for example, those possibilities that are actualized or thought by us). Since at least some possibilities must exist (for example, when they are actualized), God exists. Given that God is simply a necessary condition of something obvious, it is difficult to see why the conclusion that God exists must be merely regulative, that is, and one must proceed only as if God exists. Rather, one would seem fully entitled to the claim that God does exist. Kants diagnosis of the error committed in the arguments of the antinomies can be represented in the following fallacious syllogism. The first premise is: if the conditioned is given, then the entire series of all of its conditions is likewise given. The second premise is: objects of the senses are given as conditioned. This type of argument is fallacious according to Kant because the premises are not true for the same set of objects (in the same relation). More specifically; the mere fact that an object is given in intuition does not imply that all of the conditions for that object are also thereby given: in intuition. In short, the search for the conditions of empirically given objects is a regulative principle. This diagnosis might be thought to apply to Kants pre-critical argument for the existence of God as follows. The mere fact that God is a necessary condition for the sensible world does not mean that the intuitions that help to constitute the sensible world will contain all of the worlds conditions. Further, because the sensible world is conditioned by conditions that we have not yet discovered in intuition, reason demands that we continue searching for the totality of conditions for the sensible world, that is, we must proceed as if God (who contains the material conditions of possibility) created the sensible world. (Fisher, 1) Reasons concept of the (intelligible) world demands that the world be completely determined and thus that all of its conditions be given--a demand Kant sometimes expresses by qualifying the world "as a totality." What generates contradiction in the case of the antinomies, however, is not present in Kants pre-critical theistic proof. For in asserting Gods existence the argument does not advance an empirical claim, that is, it makes no claim about the sensible world as such. Since no claim is being made about a sensible object, the fact that every sensible object must be conditioned is not inconsistent with the claim that God exists. For in the case of Kants pre-critical theistic proof these premises would be true of things in themselves. The first premise is true because the conditioned possibilities require God as their material ground or condition and the second premise is true because the possibility of things in general are given in thought as conditioned. Accordingly, the resolution of the antinomies cannot be applied to Kants pre-critical theistic proof. Ultimately, Kants justification for claiming that God can be established only as a regulative principle is based on his distinction between reason and the understanding. Both faculties are principles of unity. The understanding applies to objects that are given in intuition, uniting its manifold under concepts in a judgment, whereas reason considers judgments, uniting them (as major and minor premises) in a syllogism. However, reason is not restricted to syllogisms. For the understandings concepts are necessary for the unity of any object given in intuition in such a way that one can say that the understanding is constitutive of such an object, whereas reasons unification of judgments (for example, in the form of syllogisms) does not pertain to the objects per se, but rather to judgments about objects. (Guyer, 110) The status of Kants justification here is rather uncommon. For it claims that our idea of God can function merely as a regulative principle because only reason is in a position to represent God and reason does not constitute objects. Since it ultimately rests on Kants analysis of reason and the understanding, its strength is directly related to the strength of this analysis. For one might even object to the unity of theoretical reason. In particular, one might accept Kants idea that reason seeks the unconditioned for any conditioned object, but reject his claim that the object of reason is always the understandings judgments. For it might be the case that reason seeks the conditions for conditioned objects and not just the judgments about objects. If theoretical reason lacked unity in this way, it would allow Kant (or the defender of such a position) to reestablish the existence of God insofar as his pre-critical theistic proof, along with this slightly modified account of reason, could establish that our idea of God must function as a constitutive principle. Works Cited Fisher, Mark, Eric Watkins; Kant On The Material Ground Of Possibility: From The Only Possible Argument To The Critique Of Pure Reason. Department of Philosophy, Emory University, Bowden Hall, Room 214, Atlanta, GA 30322-0241, or Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126. Guyer, Paul. 1990. Kant Critique Of Pure Reason. 1990. Prometheus Books; Reprint edition (September 1990). Pp 110 Read More