Drug Lords and Domestic Terrorism in Afghanistan - Research Paper Example

Running head: DRUG LORDS AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN Drug lords and Domestic Terrorism in Afghanistan (school) Drug lords andDomestic Terrorism in Afghanistan Introduction Terrorism has now become one of the major issues in the global scene. It has led to various issues and incidents of violence against military, government, and civilian populations. In the Middle East, it has become even more violent, especially with the Muslim extremists being engaged by the Allied troops led by the United States. In recent years, drugs have entered the domestic terrorism scene with drug lords supporting various acts of terrorism against the US military troops and the indigenous population in Afghanistan. The media reports significant Taliban resistance within Afghan borders, training camps in Pakistan, and opinions on US troop encounters with the Taliban. However, not much has been reported on drug lord territories and border controls in Afghanistan, or drug lord contributions to terrorist activities against the Afghan population and the US troops. In recent years, reports have emerged on the financial support given by the drug lords to the Taliban in order to frustrate the US troops. This paper shall discuss the impact of these drug lords to domestic terrorism in Afghanistan. A review of the relevant literature on the subject shall first be presented. This will be followed by the methods used in this study. The results and findings for this study shall follow, and concluding remarks will reevaluate the implications of this study. Body Background Although Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, it is by far considered the largest exporter of illegal drugs with street values amounting to $60 billion (Singh, 2011). The actual profit of the country for these drugs is only a small fraction of such amount. Most of their drug trade is on opium with thousands of hectares of farm lands allocated for the cultivation of poppies (Singh, 2011). Narco-terrorism is the term which has been associated with the involvement of drug lords in domestic terrorism. Due to the limited international ties and organization for the Afghani drug industry, opium is usually turned over to the ethnic nationals in other countries, with common routes going through Tajikistan (Traynor, 2003). Such opium eventually supplies about 90% of Europe’s heroin trade and drug use in Pakistan and Iran. The hawala system (money transfer), drug money is allocated to terrorists (Byrd and Buddenberg, n.d). Studies have been able to also establish that through the hawala system, drug dealers, businessmen and traders have been able to secure safe transfers of drug money in order to eventually be allocated to terrorists in Afghanistan (Byrd and Buddenberg, n.d). Drug lords have also been known to utilize the hawala system in order to gain access to their funds and to transfer such funds to terrorists, including the Taliban forces (Byrd and Buddenberg, n.d). According to Tan (2007) Taliban forces use such funds in order to purchase guns and also to entice impoverished young adults to join their cause. In effect, the financial support which these terrorist forces have been able to gain from drug lords has been used to secure their efforts against the government and against American as well as coalition forces (Tan, 2007). Methods This study is a descriptive research, evaluating available data which seeks to discuss drugs and their impact on domestic terrorism. Various articles from journals, books, and news articles shall be assessed in relation to this topic. A specific set of data in relation to drug lords and their relationship to domestic terrorism in Afghanistan will form part of this analysis. Such analysis shall be presented based on the critical assessment of available information as well as correlations made by experts. Findings For a long while, Afghanistan has experienced difficulties in securing a stable and centralized government. It was under British control at one point and was later controlled by various autocrats who were under influence from the Soviet Union (Chandra, 2006). Unfortunately, violence has long been an issue in Afghanistan and these moments impacted seriously on the state’s ability to secure stability. For a while, Afghanistan more or less exhibited all the qualities of a failed state (Chandra, 2006). Warlords, militias, as well as drug lords laid claim to various properties in Afghanistan. As a result, the country became an ideal place for the cultivation of opium (Mankin, 2009). Violence and the lack of stable governance caused anarchy to dominate the country; and as a result opium cultivation and trafficking became an accepted way of life for the people. Since 2001, the invasion of the coalition forces increased the cultivation of opium driving these levels to 193,000 hectares in 2007 (Lacouture, 2006). From that time, this narcotic trend has persisted. The deterioration of Afghan security conditions caused by the NATO and the US defeat of the Taliban troops placed the country at the point of insurgency; moreover, it also reenergized the opium economy (Risen, 2009). Insurgent leaders and drug lords also combined their efforts against their common enemy – the American troops and the Karzai government. Under these conditions, the NATO and the US, as well as the Afghan government have been fighting a war against drugs and a war against terror (Ames, 2008). As the NATO is fighting insurgents, the Afghan and the American troops are seeking to secure an anti-drugs policy; and the drug lords and insurgents are working with each other to compromise the stability of the Karzai government as well as to support drug operations and opium trade (Ames, 2008). The present understanding of these wars contradicts the fact that the country is becoming a narco-terrorist state (Risen, 2010). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the impact of the drug trade on the American efforts towards stability in the country has been devastating (Singh, 2011). The link between insurgency and the opium industry has been very much apparent. About 62% of the deaths from coalition forces have been seen in the southern Helmand province which is the main opium producing province in the country (Lacouture, 2006). Moreover, the Taliban is the beneficiary for about 70% of their income for the sale of opium. In addition, the Taliban has been able to access arms and funds from the drug lords in return for protection. To further support to the insurgent activities, there seems to be a reliance on crop eradication policies which has secured a wide recruitment pool of impoverished farmers (Chandra, 2006). At some point, the Taliban started offering these farmers $200 a month to join their organization. This is a very enticing figure, especially for police officers who only make $70 a month and for farmers who live on less than a dollar a day (Lacouture, 2006). The economic failures of the state have caused the legitimization of the drug trade; moreover, the political and security failures of the state have also led to the justification of the insurgent activities (Byrd and Buddenberg, n.d). In terms of politics and security, the drug lords and insurgents rely on a steady stream of able and willing Afghans. The drug eradication policies have not considered economic, political, and societal elements, elements which, in the first place have driven farmers to produce opium. Such drug policies have therefore been driving these farmers further into insurgency in order to gain much needed support and protection (Chandra, 2006). Many farmers do not also have much choice on what to grow as they are also threatened by the Taliban if they would not grow opium. It is therefore apparent to note that there is a significant link between insurgency and the drug industry, especially as both elements have come to spur and benefit each other (Chandra, 2006). Any attempts therefore to resolve one issue would also have to consider attempts to evaluate the other. As violence and lawlessness caused by the narco-industry has posed significant threats to Afghanistan, anti-narcotics and counterterrorism policies have been evaluated. However, these policies seem to be ineffective (Singh, 2011). The failures of antinarcotics policies in Afghanistan seem to relate to the basic lack of security in the country, the pervasive corruption, and the unbalanced goals of the programs which only seek to secure eradication of the narcotics trade (Singh, 2011). These failures highlight the link between political warfare and economic conceptualizations; they also highlight the importance of reassessment and integration for counternarcotics and counter-insurgency elements. Significant insecurity in various Afghan provinces is a serious threat to the agents seeking to establish effective anti-narcotics policies and operations. Reports from the UNODC indicate that the link between security and opium cultivation in the south and western provinces is strong (Lacouture, 2006). About 60% of these villages, since 2006, have been evaluated as very poor and have experienced daily threats to their security (Lacouture, 2006). In addition, the security conditions in these areas have gradually deteriorated throughout the years with more insurgents attacking NATO and US troops. The response of coalition forces have also led to the escalation of violence in the region, especially with hundreds of air strikes carried out in a matter of months by the US troops alone (Chandra, 2006). The escalation of violence after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 along with the propagation of the narco-economy caused the state to lose control and eventually collapse (Singh, 2011). Based on the Congressional Research Service, the illegal drug trade compromised the efforts to stabilize Afghani economy, to establish the rule of law, and to restore a legitimate economy (in Lacouture, 2006). The Taliban was able to fill the security gaps created by the unstable government by offering other security options for the people. In addition, the eradication programs and mobile attacks carried out by the anti-drugs agents also increased the security issue in the country, thereby prompting Afghanis to seek assistance from the Taliban (Lacouture, 2006). In addition to the deterioration of the Afghan state, corruption also presented a major issue for the country (Risen, 2009). The opium economy is a major source of corruption and serves to compromise the various government institutions especially those which relate to security. There are unfortunate cues of infiltration by the drug industry into the deeper government levels and into the other newer government agencies (Risen, 2009). In effect, the opium trade is considered a major threat to nation-building, the rebuilding, and the stabilization of the country. Persistent corruption in the country has serious implications in relation to the elimination of the narcotics issue (Ames, 2008). Such corruption contradicts the same moral issues which relate to the narcotics trade. Moreover, the eradication efforts seem to increase corruption especially with provincial agents being paid to oversee the opium operations. The end result is an eradication policy which discriminates against class, often negatively affecting the impoverished farmers. Conclusion Drug lords in Afghanistan have now become part of the domestic terrorism issue as it has become apparent that they are financially supporting the terrorists. These drugs lords are also targeting the local population as well as the American troops in an effort to protect their drug trade. The issue in Afghanistan is a cycle of violence and instability, with the impoverished and unprotected Afghanis on one side and the Taliban forces and drug lords on the other. As a result, American troops and coalition forces have experienced major issues in implementing antinarcotics policies. The antinarcotics programs are also not targeting the main issues driving the drug trade in Afghanistan. For which reason, domestic terrorism in Afghanistan would likely persist and continue to threaten the peace and stability of the country. References Ames, P. (2008). NATO troops can attack Afghan drug barons. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/nato-troops-can-attack-afghan-drug-barons-957541.html Byrd, W. and Buddenberg, D. (n.d). Introduction and Overview. Afghanistans Drug Industry Book: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/publications/afghanistan_drug_industry.pdf Chandra, V. (2006). Warlords, drugs and the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan: The paradoxes. Strategic Analysis, 30(1): 64-92 Lacouture, M. (2006). Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan: Counternarcotics and counterinsurgency. Retrieved from http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/39 Mankin, J. (2009). Pakistan & Afghanistan: Domestic pressures and regional threats: Gaming the system: How Afghan opium underpins local power. Journal of International Affairs, 63(1): 195-209. Risen, J. (2009). U.S. to hunt down Afghan drug lords tied to Taliban. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/world/asia/10afghan.html?_r=0 Risen, J. (2010). Propping up a drug lord, then arresting him. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/world/asia/12drugs.html?pagewanted=all Singh, A. (2011). Narco-Terrorism: A case study of Afghanistan. Scholar’s Voice: A New Way of Thinking Centre for Defence Sciences, 2(1): 75-88 Tan, J. (2007). Insurgency in Afghanistan: Merging the war against drugs and the war against Taliban. Nanyang Technological University. Traynor, I. (2003). Afghanistan at the mercy of narco-terrorists. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/30/afghanistan.drugstrade Read More