The Siege of Port Arthur - Essay Example

The Siege of Port Arthur: Factors that Determined the Outcome Number The Siege of Port Arthur The Battle of Port Arthur in the course of Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) was fought in the vicinity of the deep-water harbor and Russian naval base located at the apex of the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. The siege lasting from August 1, 1904 to January 2, 1905 was apparently the most extensive and violent confrontation between the Russia and Japan in history. The port was widely seen as one that had the best defenses around the world during the late 19th century, and thus could decide the outcome of any battle in favor of the defenders. But during the First Sino-Japanese War, Japanese forces on the offensive quickly took the area from the defending Qing China soldiers in just a couple of days. The quick successes during the past conflict, and pride by the Japanese forces in their capacity to overrun any reinforced defenses erected by the Russians, created a more long-drawn confrontation around Port Arthur with higher numbers of casualties than the invading forces had anticipated. This paper examines how various land and sea operations in the vicinity of Port Arthur affected the conflicts outcome. Modern Weaponry The confrontation at Port Arthur witnessed the introduction of modern military technologies by each side of warring armies in an attempt to tip the balance in their favor. Citino (2013) notes that the technologies would later be used in different 20th century battlefields, especially in World War I. The military equipment deployed by both sides included heavy 280 mm mortars with capacity to fire up to half-a-tone shells over a 5 mile distance; smaller rapid-firing howitzers, machine-guns, bolt-action magazine guns, barbed wire barriers, electric fences, tactical radio communications, sophisticated searchlights, hand grenades, trench combat, radio jamming, and the employment of customized naval mines for land warfare (Hamby, 2004; Albro, 2005). As Hamby (2004) has said, the main reason for the siege was the undercover reconnaissance carried out by the British Edward VII, which prompted Japan to believe the French was a tacit sympathizer of the Russians. Russian troops were in the naval base under a lease agreement with Qing administration of China. It was in the backdrop of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that Britain was keen on inciting suspicion of France switching her support against Japan. Port Arthur was the only naval base that Russia could use in the Far East because warships would dock easily due to its adjacent waters being ice-free (Albro, 2005). In light of this, maintaining control of this region was of immense strategic significance to the defending Russians and definitely played an important role in the long-drawn war. Massive forces and defenses The Russian troops holed up in Port Arthur’s defense positions under Major-General Baron Anatoly Stoessel were strong enough to tilt the balance in their favor, if not trigger a significant long-drawn conflict and challenge to the invading Japanese troops (Hamby, 2004; Albro, 2005). With a 50,000-man strong army and 506 guns alongside the crews of the Russian naval vessels at the port, the defenders were keen on winning any attacks on their positions (Citino, 2013). According to Albro (2005), the Russian forces would remove the weapons from the vessels to increase their pace and invincibility on land warfare as well. The fact that the whole populations of people in Port Arthur in the early 1900s, being slightly above 80,000, it is conceivable two-thirds of the inhabitants were soldiers who could decide the conflict their way. In addition, Russian reinforcements to the Port Arthur defenses encompassed a multi-perimeter design with overlying fields of artillery use including exploitation of the natural topography to their benefit. However, by 1904, a number of the defenses and barriers were still under construction, as there were limited resources for the program because some had been rechanneled elsewhere in the Pacific to support military developments (Hamby, 2004). This was a major weakness of the Russians that arguably contributed to their loss of the region to the Japanese. The outer perimeter wall of Port Arthur was lined with raised grounds in the Hsiaokushan and Takushan hills adjacent to the Ta-ho River overlooking the base to the west. In addition Namakoyama and Akasakayama hills to the west also provided important defense positions that had the potential and did help to slow the enemy progress during the war. Aware of the military significance of the hills, Russia spent the better part of period preceding the war and even during the war, by building heavy fortifications in them (Hamby, 2004). An estimated 2 miles behind this line of defense was the preexisting stone wall build by the Chinese as the encirclement of the Old Town of Lushun, stretching from the lower region to the Lun-ho River to the northwestern region. The Russian military had extended the wall westward and southward, enclosing the entry points to the port with concrete barriers, machine gun installations, and linking trenches. The massive build-up of fortifications symbolized the Russian seriousness under General Stoessel to defend the facility at any cost. With these enclosures, the Russians did not foresee the possibility of depleting the supplies, which significantly had an impact on their defeat after the extensive siege. Confronting the Russian troops was the Japanese Third Army of about 90,000 men. The Japanese were armed with 474 artillery guns commanded by General Baron Nogi Maresuke. This sheer show of military might by both sides, with almost comparable weaponry and the number of army soldiers had pointed to the likelihood of a long campaign that could end in favor of the Japanese if the troop numbers were not anything to go by (Hamby, 2004). Military strategy and seamanship Prowess As Hamby (2004) has said, both sides of the campaign demonstrated high level of determination and military strategy in a manner that made the eventual outcomes unpredictable. For instance, since no plans had been put in place to facilitate proper signal sharing with the Japanese destroyer flotilla invading Port Arthur, the better-staffed attacking forces were unsure of the outcomes of the initial offensive. By the early hours of 9th August 1904, the now rejuvenated Japanese destroyer flotillas were under the command of Admiral Togo had advanced to 20 miles from Chifu to link up with the other fleet. The Japanese commanders had decided that the best opportunity for the main battle fleet to lead the attack had come. Togo changed course for Liau-ti-shan to confuse the enemy. At 0800HRS Admiral Dewa was deployed for a reconnaissance mission to survey the Port Arthur anchorage and enemy activity (Citino, 2013). With four vessels, the reconnaissance team was ordered that in the event that they encountered a considerable Russian resistance in the seas, they were supposed to divert the enemy fire towards Togos heavily equipped soldiers who would be stationed somewhere southwards of the contested area. This was a clever attrition strategy which was aimed at wearing the military assets of the defending Russians in confusion in order to tilt the balance in favor of the attacking Japanese forces. Proper intelligence gathering also worked in favor of the Japanese (Albro, 2005). Shortly before the war, Admiral Dewa had immediately advanced to an area within the range of Port Arthur to see to his side’s penetration of the seemingly well-prepared Russian fleet under the cover of morning mist. The Russian vessels consisted of a dozen 12 battleships and cruisers, one-third of which appeared to be out of order. But the remaining battleships, in addition to some destroyers, mining crafts, and gunboats outside of the entrance to the harbor, though parked haphazardly, could have had the potential to present a significant challenge to the Japanese soldiers. Team Dewa maintained the course during their advancement to within 8,200 yards from the precious Russian defenses without raising the enemy suspicion. Stationed within a range of about 7,500 yards, the team leisurely gathered the intelligence without the threat of fire (Citino, 2013). The Japanese noted the ‘successful’ strike by the first destroyer and moved away to brief Togo. But because Dewa had stopped far away from the Russians during his intelligence mission, his assessment of the situation was inaccurate (Hamby, 2004). The Russians had made proper preparations for a serious military challenge against the Japanese. Oblivious of the Russian forces’ status, which included properly manner strategic defenses and their readiness, Admiral Dewa sought the authority to strike, noting that the situation would work in favor of his troops. That was not to be since the Russians had not lost the morale of defending the base. What followed was a stalemate between the Russians and the Japanese Third Army under Nogi Maresuke, a commander known for his samurai traits. According to Hamby (2004), the siege was fought with massive losses of life and remarkable courage being exhibited by both sides. However, after five months of Japanese siege on the strategic Port Arthur, the Russians were cornered and had no major successes to register. The new supplies dwindled, leading to their surrender in January 1905. Whereas, the naval war at the port had precipitated no serious warship losses, some of the Japanese vessels had to retreat under heavy fire coming from the defenders’ warships and batteries entrenched in the cliffs overlooking the waters, thus earning to them some a small wins. The Russians suffered 150 casualties compared to less than 100 on the Japanese side (Albro, 2005). The effective strategy of the invading Japanese led to no Japanese ship being sunk, despite their vulnerability to the entrenched Russians. Regardless of the ‘stalemate’, both side suffered almost similar damages and victory would be measured by whichever side took control of the strategic port. Albro (2005), logistics also contributed to the outcome of the battle. Owing to the fact that Japanese had a better ship repair facility in Sasebo, they had a higher capacity to respond to artillery damages to their vessels than the Russians who had a smaller repair facility at Port Arthur (Citino, 2013). That alone arguably reenergized the Japanese that they would not suffer serious damages to its ships, thus contributed to the eventual Japanese victory. Conclusion Generally, various land and sea operations in the vicinity of Port Arthur affected the conflicts outcome. The high number of soldiers on both sides; Russia’s strategic defense locations and massive forts on the hills; symmetric military technologies; and battleships served to extend the siege longer than either side had anticipated. On the other hand, Japan’s extended siege on Fort Arthur, more troops, dry-dock and better ship repair facilities; intelligence gathering and general determination to win the war tilted the balance in their favor after five months of battle. The Russians may have feared to deploy more of their battleships or assets due to lack of a proper maintenance facility at Fort Arthur, considering that at least three of their ships had grounded at that time. Political pressure from home may have also worked against their military gains. References Albro, W. (2005). Russo-Japanese Wars Greatest Land Battle. Military History, 21(6), 58-65. Citino, R.M. (2013). Japans First Big Surprise. Military History, 29(5), 48-57. Hamby, J.E. (2004). Striking the Balance: Strategy and Force in the Russo-Japanese War. Armed Forces & Society, 30(3), 325-356. Read More