The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - Assignment Example

Gulf of Tonkin Incident and Americas Deeper Involvement in Vietnam The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred over two days in August 1964. The first engagement involved the U.S.S. Maddox (DD-731) patrolled the waters off North Vietnam on August 2. The ship encountered three North Vietnamese Navy(NVN) patrol torpedo boats. The Maddox detected three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo patrol boats. Shots exchanged resulting in minor damage to the Maddox; the destroyer returned fire and hit all three NVN boats. Maddox called for air support and aircraft from the USS Ticonderoga (CVS-14) arrived and strafed the boats, sinking two and leaving one dead in the water and burning. CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 The news of the action arrives in Washington, D.C. 3 August 1964. McNamara places a call to President Johnson at 10:30 a.m. The two discuss how to handle the crisis. Johnson suggests McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk go to Capitol Hill and brief the members of the House and Senate Armed Service and Foreign Relations Committee, Johnson suggest limiting the group to 15 to 20 people. He suggests to McNamara to brief Speaker of the House John McCormick, Senator Mike Mansfield Senate Majority Leader and ask him to gather the "proper people" CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 .McNamara suggests Senator Everett C. Dirksen Senate Minority Speaker of the Senate, to assist in briefing his colleagues. CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 Johnson directs McNamara to state "they fired on us. . .we responded". CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 This event became the cause celebre for all that followed in Vietnam. The question rose in after years revolve around whether President Johnson used the two incidents to launch a full-scale effort to destroy Communism in Asia. North and South Vietnam divided at the 17th parallel into separate nations, one Communist, and the other Democratic, in 1954 after the end of the Indo-China War, set the stage for the ongoing conflict that would end in 1975 with a unified Communist nation. The protocol called for elections in both countries to decide which form of government would rule. The two candidates, Ho Chi Minh leader of the north, and Ngo Din Diem, leader of the south, campaigned for the Presidency of the new Vietnam. Diem denounced the elections on the reasonable basis he would lose to Ho. The North Vietnamese protested against Diems decision. While they wrangled, the North Vietnamese began sending agents into the South to launch a war of liberation. The South Vietnamese had trouble battling, the National Liberation Front, known as the Viet Cong. The United States sent thousands of advisors into the South to advise and train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Part of this effort involved Operation Plan 34 A (Op-34A). This involved small parties of South Vietnamese troops raiding the North Vietnamese coast. American advisors or intelligent agent accompanied some of these raids. The Navys part of OP34A, called Desoto had destroyers loaded with communication equipment to monitor North Vietnam communications. The Seventh Fleet command was unaware of OP-34A, and believed the North Vietnamese attacked over the disputed international waters issue. The North Vietnamese naval commander of the area ordered his boats to attack without informing the naval command in Hanoi. The Maddox intercepted the messages for the boats to attack, and made ready to fight if necessary. The first conversation on Tonkin Gulf revolved around the fear that the Senate and House would hold hearings. The meeting Johnson wanted McNamara and Rusk set up, set the tone of what would follow when the news of the second attack reached Washington. Johnson did not want political opponents think he was soft on Communism. He specifically mentions Senator Barry Goldwaters statements that he would "blow them off the moon". CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 Johnson decides they need to show that if they shoot at us, youre gonna get hit". CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 Johnson felt that the United States could send its ships into international waters. This included most of the Gulf of Tonkin. Johnson orders the Maddox reinforced by the C. Turner Joy (DD731). The story of what happened that night fueled a action fiercely debated for 40 years.. The examination of signal traffic from Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Seventh Fleet, through CInC Pacific Ocean, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined action taken by the appropriate commanders. The State Department stated that U.S. warships should be more than 11 nautical miles from North Vietnams coast. The rules of engagement specified that U.S. forces not authorized to fire on North Vietnamese naval units unless they fired first. CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 Maddox and Turner Joy entered the Gulf of Tonkin, battle stations manned and ready. The destroyers picked up surface and air blips indicating that North Vietnamese torpedo boars and aircraft were closing to attack. The destroyers maneuvered radically and called for air support. Lieutenant Commander James Bond Stockdale the led the Combat Air Patrol (CAP) from U.S.S. Ticonderoga led his section to the scene of the action. Stockdale vectored his flight along the azimuth of the enemy boats and aircraft and found no torpedo boats or planes. CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 The reports arriving in Washington state that Stockdale and his aircraft confirmed the presence of enemy air and naval units in the vicinity. Johnson broaches the subject of retaliation by bombing North Vietnamese naval and air bases. .Johnson orders the National Security Council meet and discuss the means to launch a retaliatory strike against specific targets in North Vietnam. Captain John D. White commander on the scene, after evaluating all intelligence, sent a signal to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, that he doubted any attack occurred that night. Sharp ignored Whites assessment and reported the initial signal of the attack. CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 This distorted view of events took on a life all its own. McNamara reposts Stockdale reported sighting enemy torpedo boats and destroyers near the Maddox and Turner Joy. Stockdale, later shot down and captured, stated in his memoir that there were no boats or aircraft near the destroyers. This coincided with Whites assessment, that anomalies, probably confused the officer and men in the Combat Information Center on both ships. Sharp, as noted, sends original signal reporting the attack. Johnson orders McNamara to call a meeting of the Security Council and plan a retaliatory air strike. This meeting places the United States on an irrevocable path to war in Vietnam. The Security Council meeting shows no taped conservations of the meeting exist but, a memorandum reports McNamara enters announces news of a second North Vietnamese torpedo attack and Johnsons directive for retaliation lead to discussions on how to proceed. Rusk says that the State Department response is not ready; Secretary of Treasury C. Douglas Dillon states, "There is a limit on the number of times we can be attacked by North Vietnamese without hitting their naval bases". CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 Johnson decides to launch an air strike; the numerous comings and goings of Cabinet heads, put the press on the trail. The Associated Press and United Press are sunning stories about the second attack on the U.S. ships in international waters. Johnson authorizes the Department of Defense to release a statement. The Joint Chiefs and McNamara struggled to "overcome the lack of clear and convincing evidence an attack had taken place" CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 Herricks report arrived as noted cast doubt on the whole attack scenario. The report was ignored as Johnson begins to brief senior legislators and produces a resolution drafted by the NSC condemning the attack and authorizes airstrikes on North Vietnam. Johnson with Congressional leaders shape what became the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf of Resolution wass the under pinning of the justification to commit U.S. resources in escalating American involvement in Vietnam. Once the decision to launch air attacks taken, Johnson and McNamara craft a strategy to shape public opinion and prepare the ground for placing American pilots in harms way. The Pentagon authorizes Sharp to order any American destroyer attacked would pursue the attacker to its base and destroy the boat and base. CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 The August 2, 1964 occurred in daylight, and there is no question this attack took place. The August 4, attack is the one that has generated controversy. Reports from Seventh Fleet report two critical radars used to detect air and surface threats, were not operating properly. CITATION Boo10 \l 1033 Malfunctioning radars give false echoes or report threats that are not. The "battle" of August 4, 1964 is now generally believed not have occurred; Admiral Stockdale reports no enemy ships or aircraft in the area. The planes all carried radar to find targets. There were no enemy in the area and Stockdale spent years in captivity fearing the NVA would discover he led the air attack, and reported no enemy in the area. Captain Herrick, CITATION Sep10 \l 1033 commanding the destroyers in the gulf that night, reviewed the radar intercepts, and what he saw convinced them that no attack had taken placeecretary McNamara and President Johnson operated on the basis that both attacks occurred. The President as we have noted above, did not to appear weak on communism in light of Senator Goldwaters criticism and how he would handled overt and invert Communist proxy threats to independent nations. Johnson also reported that many of his supporters urged to take a firm stand against North Vietnams aggression. Senior political and military leadership desire to retaliate for the attacks blinded them to facts that put in doubt the circumstances. As noted above Pentagon officials received information, Herricks and Stockdales reports. Stockdale reported no contact with enemy forces, and doubted any attack took place. Herricks that reviewing the radio intercepts, and radar logs made him doubt that the task group had faced an attack that night. In the end, the efforts of American administration to appear hard on communism blinded officials when a mature study of both attacks would allow actual events to reveal themselves. President Johnson used flawed information to commit the United States to a shooting war that sucked the U.S. deeper into a war with no apparent end. Works Cited ,Books LLC. Gulf of Tonkin. Books LLC, 2010. office of the President. "National Security Archives." george washington university. 2003. http://www.gwu.edu./nsarchiv (accessed Secember 11, 2010). Prados, John. "The Mouse That Roared State Department in the Vietnam War." Nationa Security Arnchive. http://www.nsc.gov (accessed December 12, 2010). Separtment of Navy. "Selected Documents Tonkin Gulf." Naval Historical Center. http://www. navy.mil.nhc (accessed December 13, 2010). Stockdale, James and Sybil. In Love and War. 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