The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb - Essay Example

The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb was Both a Military and Political Necessity Introduction The events and circumstances leading up to the construction of the atomic bomb strongly suggest that the decision to use the atomic bomb was both a military and political necessity. According to one school of thought the decision was entirely a military one. For example, Harry Truman, US President at the time the Atomic bombs were dropped has consistently maintained that the bombs were necessary for securing Japan’s surrender, the prevention of an invasion on the home islands and for saving US lives (Wainstock 1996, 121). Others argue however, that Japan was in a weakened state and on the brink of surrender, therefore the dropping of the atomic bomb was not necessary for bringing about the war. It is therefore thought that the US, pursuant to Cold War ideology was attempting to make a statement of power to the Soviet Union in dropping the bombs (Ford 2002, 212). Each side of the argument have merits and it is therefore impossible to rule one view out. As a result the reasonable conclusion is that the decision to drop the atomic bombs was both a military and political necessity. This conclusion is demonstrated by looking at both sides of the argument. The Military Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb Doubts about the utility of dropping the atomic bomb to bring about the end of the Pacific War during the Second World War arise out of the popular perception that the Japanese were about to surrender (Kaufman 1997, 67). However, from a purely political perspective, the primary issue for President Truman was how best to bring about the Japanese surrender and on specific terms. From a military standpoint, in the event the Japanese refused to surrender, the US would invade Japan via the home islands in November 1945 with the prospect of putting a number of American lives as well as the lives of a number of Japanese civilians in danger (Hogan 1996, 41). Japan’s willingness to fight to the last man was evident throughout the US-Japanese war. Despite a naval blockade that had essentially crippled Japan’s economy and rendered its outlying lands “defenseless to U.S. bombers”, Japan’s imperial government refused to surrender (Boyer, Clark, Hawley, Kett and Reiser 2009, 612). Although the US had scheduled an invasion of Japan for November 1945, the successful testing of the atomic bomb in Alamogordo in July 1945 provided an option that had not previously existed (Boyer, Clark, Hawley, Kett and Reiser 2009, 612). Armed with this alternative, Truman made a declaration in Potsdam in July 1945 which essentially provided the Japanese with an option. Truman issued a public warning to Japan known as the “Potsdam Declaration” that ultimately warned that should they not surrender by August 3, they would be confronted with “prompt and utter destruction” (Boyer, Clark, Hawley, Kett and Reiser 2009, 613). Japan systematically rejected the Potsdam Declaration and on August 6, Truman authorized the US military’s use of the atomic bomb (Hellengers 2001, 137). The fact is, the idea for the creation of the bomb had come about during the war against Germany and its allies. It was thought to be necessary to accelerate the end of the European war during World War II. Therefore the atomic bomb was always a military strategy and the European part of World War II ended before the bomb had been tested for its success (Boyer, Clark, Hawley, Kett and Reiser 2009, 613). It therefore makes perfect sense that the atomic bomb would be used to bring about the quick and decisive end of the war against Japan. Certainly the war weary allies were determined to end the Second World War once and for all and Japan had effectively prolonged the Second World War. The Political Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb It is popularly believed that the atomic bomb was the catalyst that intensified the Cold War giving it definition and direction. The fact is, the Soviets were preparing to invade Japan by marching into Manchuria and the US wanted to avoid Soviet influence in Japan by virtue of a claim for concessions (Leffer and Painter 2007, 58). This view is buttressed by suggestions that Japan “was on the verge of surrender” and the US was aware that Japan would surrender provided they were allowed to keep their emperor (Leffer and Painter 2007, 58). Essentially, it is argued by revisionists that the US was committed to the establishment of US primacy and to contain the Soviet’s influence in the aftermath of the Second World War (Selden and Selden 1989, xxiv). Ultimately, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had urged the US to use the atomic bomb as a diplomatic tool for the Anglo-American policy for containing post war ambitions of other nations, especially the Soviet Union, in the post war era (Leffer and Painter 2007, 60). In this regard, the atomic bomb itself was viewed as a political weapon. Additional arguments maintain that in keeping with its political ambitions to establish US primacy and to contain the Soviet’s influence in Europe and elsewhere, the US decided that the dropping of the Atomic bomb would be useful for accomplishing those goals. It was believed that should the Soviets bear witness to the immense military power that the US possessed via the bomb, the Soviets would be intimidated and would automatically back off (Selden and Selden 1989, xxiv). In substantiating this suggestion it is argued that the proof is in the US insistence that the dropping of the bomb was necessary for securing Japan’s unconditional surrender. The Japanese refused on the grounds that they should be permitted to retain their emperor, a condition rejected by the US. However, following the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the US did relent on the unconditional surrender and ultimately permitted the Japanese to retain their emperor (Selden and Selden 1989, xxiv). This fact is used to support the contention that the US could have negotiated the surrender of the Japanese without having to resort to the use of the atomic bomb. Conclusion The political and military considerations both have merits. It is certainly true that the Americans, war weary and with history to guide them, had every reason to assume that the war should be ended in such a way as to ensure that Japan did not emerge as a threat to world security in the future. The Germans reemergence after the First World War and its instigation of the Second World War was a hard lesson. It was therefore important that Japan was defeated once and for all and did not pose a future threat to world peace. The total and utter destruction of Japan and its reconstruction on specific terms and conditions was one method of achieving this end. In this regard it was a military decision. However, the fact that the US was actively commencing a power struggle with the Soviet Union in the onset of the Cold War, and the latter’s potential to have influence in Japan certainly tipped the scales in favor of dropping the bomb. Therefore there was a political aspect to the decision to drop the bomb. Be that as it may, as Taylor (2001) argues, it is easy to engage in moralization during times of peace, however that moralization is depleted in the course of the hostilities and immoralities during wartime (9-10). It is therefore impossible to state with any degree of certainty that the decision to drop the bomb was purely political or purely military. Based on the facts and circumstances explored in this paper, the decision was an accumulation of both military and political factors. Bibliography Boyer, P.; Clark, C.; Hawley, S.; Kett, J. and Rieser, A. (2009) The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People. Cengage Learning. Ford, N. (2002) Issues of War and Peace, Vol. 2001. Greenwood Publishing Group. Hogan, M. (1996) Hiroshima in History and Memory. Cambridge University Press. Hellengers, D. (2001) We, The Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution. Stanford University Press. Kaufman, J. (1997) A Concise History of U.S. Foreign Policy. Rowman and Littlefield. Leffer, M. and Painter, D. (2007) Origins of the Cold War: An International History. Routledge. Selden, K. and Selden, M. (1989) The Atomic Bomb: Voices From Hiroshima and Nagasaki. M.E. Sharpe. Taylor, E. (2001) Lethal Mists: An Introduction to the Natural and Military Science of Chemical, Biological Warfare and Terrorism. Nova Publication. Wainstock, D. (1996) The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb. Greenwood Publishing Group. Read More