Middle East: Focus on the History of Egypt - Research Paper Example

Middle East: Focus on Egypt’s History Introduction The Middle East is the region derived from West Asia and a section North Africa that encompasses nations with similar cultural, religious and historical affiliation. Among the countries in the Middle East is Egypt. Being the only nation from Africa, Egypt has had a great impact in the Arab Middle East in terms of its political administration, economic dimension, and population and Arab culture. The country is the largest economy in the Arab world, having some of the most advanced and innovative telecommunications and infrastructure companies. Other sectors in the nation are also at the verge of global recognition such as agriculture and tourism. In understanding its development and future stake in the Arad World, it is worth noting that its cultural diversity and social economic trends hailed from past far-reaching heights instigated by former presidents, especially the late Gamal Abdel Nasser who reigned from 1956-1970. President Nasser journey to power introduced several governmental policies that shaped the development of Egypt’s international relations, economic diversity and cultural concerns in the Middle East. While undergoing the Egyptian transition to independence, Nasser’s profound social and national changes resulted to the alienation from certain allies, political stagnation and development of strategic concerns to maintain in economy building. President Gamal Abdel Nasser 1918-1970 Gamal Abdel Nasser was born in 15th January 1918. He studied in Alexandria and Cairo and later joined the military Academy in 1938. He joined the Army and was an appointee in the Infantry Regiment in Assiut as an officer. Since part of Sudan composed the Egyptian Kingdom, Nasser went to work there but was transferred from back to Egypt as a Military Academy instructor. His promotions led him to the General Staff Academy still as an instructor. His popularity and role among the Egyptians however increased after his participation in the First Palestine War of 1948. The success of his troops and the experiences from the war drove his interest in the Egyptian hierarchy. Bureaucracy through corruption, lack of political transparencies and defective judicial systems, faced the current government at the time. In addition, the British occupation in the country increased the hatred towards the then government’s authoritarianism. Nasser led the organization of undercover officers “The Free Officers” and in Egyptian El-Dhobatt El-Ahrar. Despite the events, Nasser still maintained his military cover and reached the Colonel status. The status and the commitment of this undercover group led to the overthrow of the Egyptian King Farouk. He pronounced himself as prime minister in 1954 and began plans to reconcile the nation. The introduction of land reforms and the referendum for a new constitution increased his recognition that led to his first presidential term in 1956 (Sam 6). Nasser presidential policies faced down the world superpowers. His aim was to keep the western powers away from Egypt to emphasis on its independence and nation building. Since most of the people at that time were poor with no engagement in social and economic responsibility, Nasser promoted the freedom, wealth creation and economic stability. The idealism and his dedication to the Egyptian people well being promoted the mobilization of Egyptian resources. However, his actions instigated the reaction of other presidents from other countries that feared their alienation to Egypt’s economic development and impact in the Middle East (Robert 77). Infrastructure Developments and International Relations Nasser’s regime ensured infrastructure freedom and engagement, education opportunities, medical services and amenities, and democratic welfares that encompassed political and socio-economic reforms. The involvement of European and American powers in the development of certain economic policies in Egypt and cooperation by the Nasser’s government also helped in providing monetary and technical aid to develop the infrastructure. The involvement helped to counter the lack of local technical expertise in developing the nation. However, such involvement from the international community led to the adoption of certain practices that jeopardized already established international relations. This was mostly experienced with the development of the Suez Canal and the Aswan High Dam. Aswan High Dam As the British reached their homestretch of Egypt colonization, their offer in the development of the Aswan Dam reintroduced their stake and responsibility in Egypt’s economy building. The project was a flagship of the first years of the International Development Aid System (IDAS) that involved the financing of developing economies. The project was and is still the biggest infrastructural development of economic importance to Egypt and the world. Funds donated by the German, French, American, British and Egyptian governments to the World Bank helped implement the first phase of Aswan Dam (Terje 205). The Aswan high Dam was constructed in a three-year period, between 1960 and 1971. The project was estimated to cost around $1500 million (Jill 104). The involvement of the British and the Americans in the project instigated doubt from the former. According to the British, especially in London, Americans were known to influence and lure other nations with dollars for the sake of developmental projects and denouncement of colonialism. However, this was a strategy to intrude in the economic and political dimension of the country requiring the U.S assistance. Such was with this project whereby the U.S opted the to hold up financial aid to Egypt asserting it was the only country in the Middle East capable of absorb and invest large amounts of aid and utilize it rationally. At the time of the Aswan High Dam project initiation, Israel had announced the need of economic aid for national development. The American Embassy in Cairo had even gone to extents of providing interdepartmental machinery from America for economic assistance, a move that was secretly engaged in a Defense Agreement event. The competition from America ensured British engagement in ensuring that their export and trade concerns were not risked amid U.S political reaping of Egypt. Several policies developed in London concerning their economic involvement in Egypt questioned their intention. President Nasser failed understanding with the British led to his proclamation that Britain was an enemy to Egyptian developmental policies (Terje 206), hence the jeopardy of the Egypt-Britain relations. Americans relented on their support to Egypt, as the British announced effects towards a U.S-Egypt relation. They also produced a statement, as a response to Nasser’s declaration from the British foreign office that could indict President’s Nasser irresponsibility to ensure economic sustainability with foreign investors. Their standpoint stated: “One of our strongest means of pressure on the Egyptian Government at present as the fact that they are unable to obtain any foreign investment in Egypt, so long as conditions remain unsettled there owing to their failure to come to terms with us. This means that they cannot get on with any of the economic reforms, or schemes on which they have set their hearts, such as the new Aswan. This of course affects their popularity in Egypt and makes their position uncomfortable. Economic aid from the United States would thus relieve them of one of their major anxieties and .remove an incentive to reach settlement with us.” (Terje 207). The Americans continued offering financial aid to Egypt in order to reverse its relationship with Israel. At the same time, the Anglo-American relations were prone to set backs as American relied more on their affiliation to Egypt rather than Britain. In 1954, Dulles insisted on the British and French indulgence in ensuring that the American policies in the Middle East failed. The then prime minister of Britain, Churchill and the president of the U.S, Eisenhower embarked on a mission to form Middle East front that could denounce Nasser’s administration and terming him as a military dictator. This was with the creation and signing of the Base Agreement. Eisenhower denied to sign the agreement but maintained that America could offer military aid upon being signatories. On July 26, Eisenhower signed and continued interlinking arms to Egypt, a move that maintained Britain reliance on the U.S to resolve their Egyptian standoff. This relationship between the U.S and Egypt continued until the neutrality of Egypt in the cold war, which was not a strategy of the U.S since it had interests in the new created nation, Israel (William 286). In addition, Nasser’s engagement with a communist nation China and the acquisition of arms from the East led to temperamental relations amid the U.S and Egypt. The Suez Canal Crisis Upon the receipt of the United States and Britain withdraw from the Aswan High Dam project; the USSR took charge as the official financers. However, another channel of economic importance in the Egyptian economy was under the contract of the French and the British, the Suez Canal. Controlled by anger from the withdrawal of UK, and US in July 1965, Nasser publicly announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. This was a strategy to finance the share of Aswan high Dam construction formerly done by the US and UK. The impact of the announcement led to the loss of ownership and profits to the British and French, whereby the former had in 1954 signed an agreement on the conduction of business of the canal in Egypt. Despite Nasser offering full compensation to the two nations, the nationalization, led to the development of the Suez Canal Crisis and precipitated international crisis entangled the problems of ownership and operation of the Canal. This strategy led to his support and popularization by other Arab nations as a means to denounce British imperialism and gain of key developmental structures to the people of Egypt. Nasser’s interests to his people described his agony of remembering a huge population of the Egyptians died and suffered while constructing the Canal under force; hence, he had to return the favor by offering sovereignty to the people in regards to the canal (William 286). Seizure of the canal meant that the oil acquire from the Middle East could not get to Europe. In addition, the discussion from the 22-nation meeting conveyed in London showed interests and protests against President Nasser’s decision as it was termed “a barrier to attaining freedom of navigation on a waterway on vital international importance. President Nasser failed to attend the meeting amid reports that it was to make the Suez Canal Company an international company citing that “The system proposed is bound to be considered and treated by the people of Egypt as the hostile infringement upon their rights and sovereignty. The crux of the present situation is, in our opinion that the proposed system, in itself and, in what has accompanied it, and what it involves, aims at securing for a group of users of the canal Control of it by their taking over its operation.” (Aureswald 48). International shuttle diplomacies began to take place all over the world, with neutral parties proposing the creation of the Suez Canal Users’ Association that could provide Britain, France and Egypt equal stake in controlling the canal. President Nasser still recanted the decision leading to a British-French-Egyptian dispute. Britain and France in retaliation joined Israel and provided military training and aid, as an indirect strategy to attack Egypt. Israel involvement was due to President Nasser’s policies that claimed to be a threat to Israel after he initiated the acquisition of territories surrounding the Canal. In October 29, the Israelis invaded Egypt and three days later the British and French soldiers joined the reclamation war of having control of the canal. They invaded strategic positions and the psychological focal point of the Egypt and its defense. In retaliation and as a strategy to continue fighting the attacks, volunteers were provided with guns to help in the fight. In addition, the sight of the destroyed military tank by the enemies sought Nasser’s confrontation with other angles other than the physical engagement in the war. He raged a political war to other nations by instilling strict residency and citizenship policies on the foreign nationalities especially to the British and the French. Those that did not comply were obligated to leave the country. The United States refused to engage in the war due to its fear that the USSR could act in a rational capacity to support Egypt (David 51). The intervention of the UN to declare a ceasefire required the British and French troops to leave the canal and the withdrawal of the Israelis. In the event of and after the attacks, Nasser reacted in a contemplative manner to secure the interest of his people, a move that made Eisenhower to result in neutralization of the crisis. He insisted that British and French were pushing Nasser. Egypt never asked for any military assistance during the war, a move that made the UN through the US to bring peacekeepers in the Canal Zone. Nasser also advocated for the sinking of eight ships to prevent passage of western ships in the canal, sabotaging of the oil pipeline that ran into Iraq and the destruction of three major pumping stations across the Canal. However, the Suez Crisis led to the death of Egyptian soldiers with others being captured by the Israelis. Since Nasser had military experience, he assumed the position of Egypt’s military commanders and refuted the ultimatum of the British to have himself surrender to the British Forces. These actions continued to heighten his popularity in the Arab World, except with Israel. International traffic, destruction of the canal and economy deterioration from the western nations led to the closure of the canal (William 286). The Suez Canal and the involvement of the USSR with Nasser’s governmental projects lead to the standoff of the United States and the United Kingdom. President Eisenhower relied on international policies to react accordingly to the crisis, a move that took the then Prime Minister of Britain, Anthony Eden and France Premier Mollet by surprise. The actions of Egypt were through to influence the direction of other Arab nations, and engaging in reverse actions could see the U.S oil reserves ran out of oil. In addition, Nasser pioneered the efforts of the Pan-Arab movement that oversaw the threat of the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The latter was earlier adopted to enable smooth penetration of the US in the Middle East. Eisenhower tried all efforts to sabotage the continued support of Nasser in the Arab World from his self-proclaimed union of Arabs against imperialist control of the West (Jankowski 85). Involvement with the Cold War At the time of the Suez Crisis and sabotaged relationships between Egypt and the western nations, the cold war was going on in many parts of the world. The reactions and political perspectives that President Nasser used during this period never missed any opportunity in his development ideologies and his Pan-Arabism notions. Nasser’s policies and control of Egypt made him an important key player in the Cold War. President Nasser announced Egypt’s intention of positive neutralism in the war. This made the US turn to the only option of influencing a Middle Eastern nation, Israel, as Egypt turned to USSR support. Egypt also refused to be signatories to the Baghdad Pact, an alignment of Anglo-Arabian nations; Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, the United States and Britain. Nasser instead signed the Czechoslovakia Agreement in 1955 that increased Egyptian and USSR co-corporation. The jeopardy of the relationship in relation to the cold war led to the engagement of two consecutive wars with Israel, disengagement with the West and the pronouncement of Arabian union, hence the inevitability of the cold war to justify Nasser’s actions. However, the three way strategy of pan-Arabism, neutrality and social Revolutionism failed a great deal in the Nasser decided to intensify the prioritization of the Arabian nations during the war. “The dynamics and geopolitical strategies of the war led to the entanglement of Egypt to the Arab-Israel war of 1948-1949” (Ruud et al 284). Kennedy-Nasser Relations John Fitzgerald Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower. His ascent into power changed most of the foreign and military policies earlier initiated by his predecessor. Since the cold war was on, Kennedy managed new U.S policies of the cold war and its involvement in the war and simultaneously calculating his political power. In addition, he had to recover the controversial relationship that resulted to the withdrawal of the British, France and Israel troops in Egypt. However, the intentions of the United States were to lay close focus to competitive actions by Russia and to increase its Arab penetration. Kennedy studied and analyzed the relations as a strategy to mobilize the lost relationship with economy determiners in the Arab world, especially Egypt. Kennedy attempted to consolidate the relationship of the U. S and Egypt as a means of stealing Russia’s regional policies to Egypt and the Middle East (Nathan 336). The relations of the two presidents’ grew because of having similar leadership and personal characteristics that masked their role in the Arab world. Both leaders exchanged letters that maintained their interest in positive development and concern of their citizens. The attempts of increased letter correspondence between the two enlightened Kennedy on the channels to use in regaining its influence in the Arab World. Kennedy’s reign in the second year had overseen the exchange of 91 letter s and messages with President Nasser. Both leaders engaged their charisma in developing principle values and legitimate polices that adjudicated for imperialistic freedom and dignitary calls. President Nasser embedded his trust towards Kennedy since he was aware of his intention regardless of them maintaining their administrative policies, Boston aristocracy for Kennedy and Revolutionism for Nasser (Robert 81). Additionally, the insistence by Nasser to mend the broken Anglo-Egyptian relationship and the resolution of the Arab-Israel war gave Kennedy the assent to develop a personal rapport with Nasser. Nasser enjoyed good relational experiences with the then Ambassador of Egypt to the U.S, John Badeau among other confidants to President Kennedy. Though no physical meeting was ever initiated, the U.S resulted in sending economic assistance and food aid to Egypt. Grain shipments were flagged off from the U.S to Egypt and over $423 million disbursed for economic projects. However, the relationship turned sour again after Nasser engaged in the Yemen Civil War and made harsh utterances. The rapprochement of the Kennedy-Nasser relationship was also affected by the invasion of Egypt into Saudi Arabia, a nation that was a close ally of U.S. foreign dilemma of marinating Saudi’s support and the fostering of Nasser and U.S relationship led to the complete American retaliation of luring Egypt again. Nasserism in the Middle East and broken relationships with the west led to the fallout of the Pan Arabism, collapse of the union with Syria and the creation of reckless foreign policies, that saw Nasser interest in the Yemen War. Many global nations resolved to the tragic rule of Nasser and his incapacitation to enhance Middle East corporation. A new political paradigm had already developed with other Arab nations developing relational links with the West, such as Saudi Arabia. Continued engagement of Nasser in the Arab-Israel war continued to develop his poor political record, especially in reaffirming and remodeling international relations for the benefit of Egypt as compared to his first years in power. Works Cited Robert, Bowker. Egypt and the Politics of Change in the Arab Middle East. New York: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010. David, Auerswald P. Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Nathan, Citino J. “Support ant friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S-Israel Alliance,” American Jewish History, 92(2), p 231-233. 2003. Robert, Rakove B. Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World. London: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Ruud van Djik, William, Glenn Gray, Svetlana, Svaranskaya, Jeremi, Suri and Qiang Zhai. Encyclopedia of the Cold War. New York: Routledge, 2013. Terje, Tvedt. The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political Ecology and the Quest for Economic Power. Chicago: I.B Tauris, 2004. William, Kellogg, O. American History the Easy way. Boston: Barron’s Educational Series, 2003. Sam, Sam. Gamal Adbel Nasser. London: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2004. Read More