The Italian Bond Spread - Essay Example

?The Italian Bond Spread: Its Transformation from Berlusconi’s Third Regime to Monti’s Administration and Beyond Introduction The bond spread or yield spread is the difference between two debt measuring instruments such as a high-risk bond versus a risk-free or stable bond and the difference is used to help investors decide which bond to invest on (Barrios, et al., 2009). If the yield spread between a high-risk and a risk-free bond are low (low basis points), capitalists would invest on the high-risk bond since it is stable in comparison with a risk-free debt measurement, with less risks of losing investments or not earning interest (default). This stability makes the bond more attractive to other investors. However, if basis points are high, investing is riskier and more prone to default, plus investors must be paid higher premiums, which cost corporations money, making the bond less attractive and harder to sell since there is no asset growth but only decline (Elton, et al., 2001). For example, there is lesser risk in investing in government or treasury bonds compared to corporate bonds (owned by corporations) because the former consistently earns interest, but the yield is less because the interests do not fluctuate like the latter. But when investing on corporate bonds, if basis points are low and nearly as stable as government bonds, there are less risks and better returns, making the bond highly sellable. The basis points are also used to assess the credit ratings of a company or country, and high basis points versus a stable reference means higher risks of investment since fluctuations give less assurance of a good return on investment. Government bonds of stable countries are used for these measurements and other relatively unstable entities are rated based on the bond spread compared with stable bonds. Countries with low bond spreads pose lesser risks for investments, while those with high bond spreads have higher risks for losses (Barrios, et al., 2009). Countries that suffer from financial crises have high basis points and bond spread compared to more stable nations because there is uncertainty in earning interest. This shows how most countries get their credit and stability ratings ranked among investors. The European sovereign crisis during the second quarter of 2010 increased the bond spread of most members of the European Union (EU), including Italy. From 2008, Italian banks survived and prevented abrupt losses using the traditional business model and limited support from the government (International Monetary Fund, IMF, 2011). But the Greek and Irish crises increased the bond spread for most EU countries, causing a decline in government securities’ value and higher risks of investments on the affected countries. Aside from the European and worldwide economic crisis, Italy suffered from other internal problems such as economic and political systems, like economic fragmentation and the people’s lack of trust in national politics (Bastasin, 2012). In addition, reports of both the Left and Right government coalitions’ inability to create long-term solutions while creating counter-productive reforms and programs did not stop the economic crises’ effects, serving only a few sectors of the government and not all Italian people (Cline & Wolff, 2012). Other issues in Italy affected the people’s economic perception like over-reliance on non-permanent government work contracts, devaluation of some public services like health services and educational institutions, people’s deterrence from spending, and the increasing unemployment rates from the lack of support for small and medium-sized firms (Di Quirico, 2010). Also, the previous administration’s problems decreased the standing of the country such as the former prime minister’s non-incarceration from numerous filed cases, creation of self-serving policies and laws, and questionable ownership of majority of national television networks resulting to near-total control over mass media (Guiliano, 2012; Viroli, 2011). Internal conflicts resulted to low ratings from EU leaders and other potential investors to Italy, subsequently seen as a possible threat to the strength of the Euro (Curran, 2011). Initially, appointing another prime minister had a positive effect and appeared as a favourable political move enticing investors to return, momentarily increasing the credit ratings for Italy and giving hope for investors of a better leadership (Manasse, et al., 2013). However, a year later and a few months after the inconclusive 2013 general election there has yet to be an effective solution for the Italian recession since the three leading forces, the lower house’s Pier Luigi Bersani from the Democratic Party (PD), the Senate’s former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi who formed the People of Freedom (PdL) party and Beppe Grillo’s 5-Star Movement (M5S) could not consolidate their ideas and actively oppose one another (Greenan, 2013). Their lack of a consensus despite Berlusconi’s offer of a coalition proves the lack of unity in leadership that could spell a continuing political instability in Italy, affecting its ability to attract more investors in the future. How a country appears stable politically and economically could affect its image for investors and other foreign countries due to the risks and gains, and for EU countries these would also contribute to a stable Euro. In assumption, a country that keeps in line with the visions and missions of the EU by establishing efficient economic and political policies could increase its credit ratings and improve other foreign countries’ perception on its stability and credit ratings. EU rules and regulations can be revised to have greater impact by making countries more resilient to the ever-increasing global economic crisis’ effects, but countries under recession must not solely rely on these measures. In Italy’s case, is the government prepared enough to promote long-term changes that would benefit the country? Or are there other influences that might prevent this from happening? This essay enquires on the events showing when and how the Italian government’s economic recession started, recognising other implications of the factors that prolonged the economic crisis in the country, identifying the effects of current Italian politics in either finding a solution or causing additional problems, and finally ending up with recognising what options are available to prevent Italy and its economy from further collapsing on the effects of the recession. The Compounded Effects of Political Conflicts in Italy’s Government Bond Spread Bond spreads are said to widen when there is a perceived economic or financial stress in a country (IMF, 2011). Current economic stability of the country and how it handles the financial issues is seen as a risk factor for investors in capitalising in the country, and whether or not the government could intervene on the economic impacts (Alter & Schuler, 2012). In Italy’s case, the economy kept stable for two years due to government assistance and an ample supply of private wealth (Sarcinelli, 2012). There were also additional revenue sources in the form of small and medium enterprises (SME’s). However, inefficient economic policies that mostly benefitted only large firms and major banks but did not address the SME’s needs did not completely stave off the impending economic predicament. Most major banks in Italy can avail government assistance during fiscal crises, which let them gain control over interest rates. However, this negatively affected borrowers and the outlook of foreign banks operating in Italy (Bofondi, et al., 2012). This prevented people from loaning or spending, ceasing the circulation of money and increasing the budget deficit. This also affected credit supply since the banks that rely on interbank funding had lesser to borrow and lesser to lend. Also, higher interest rates of local Italian banks forced foreign banks put focus more investing with less fragile borrowers, ending ties to other banks with higher interest rates they see as high-risk investments (Cline, 2012). The high interest rates and fixed costs for maintenance helped weather the economy through the economic crises by promoting effective communications and efficiency (Bank of Italy, 2011). Unfortunately, resilient banking systems are not enough to prevent the economic crisis, and other factors such as governance issues and ineffective policies could greatly contribute to a country’s continuous economic downfall. The Italian multi-party system was unable to consolidate plans benefitting majority of its people. Fascist attitudes of older forms of governance became evident and caused the lack of people’s initiative to protest, stemming from losing hope and trust in the government to elevate the citizens’ status (Anderson, 2011). Also, expected reforms such as improving employment rates and wealth-taxation to generate additional revenue in appeasing the people’s need for equality were not properly executed, keeping the underlying problems to remain. Other Factors Affected Economic and Political Stability in Italy Currently the effects of using outdated policies relying mostly on an export-dependent model economy and the inability of some policy-makers in creating sound decisions based on EU regulations are important factors preventing Italy from fully recovering its credit rating (Di Quirico, 2010). Declining ratings constantly escalated starting from the first quarter of 2011 at 126 points, up to 552 points before Berlusconi’s resignation in 12th of November of the same year, and down to 495 shortly before Prime Minister Monti’s appointment in the 18th (Country Economy, 2013). The 10-year bond spread fluctuations versus a relatively stable German bund are shown in Figure 1, showing the coinciding effects of political events to peaks (numbers not shown). The initial sharp bond spread increases mostly happened during Prime Minister Berlusconi’s administration while being impacted externally by the global economic crisis. Scandals tied to his name such as bribery, misuse of funds, accusations of conflicts of interest by owning 3 of the major broadcasting networks in Italy and turning these into sources of propaganda, and creating laws that prevented his incarceration but did not improve the country’s status (Curran, 2011; Guiliano, 2012). His ownership of major networks prevented freedom to express dissent of his administration and leaders, blocking out and censoring most news and masking the effects Figure 1. Italy’s bond spread has been stable until 2011, and the effects of the European fiscal crisis and Berlusconi’s scandals caused a sharp increase in the bond spread, which did not return to pre-crisis levels even during Prof. Monti’s appointment or the European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s speech (Manasse, et al., 2013). Figure 2. Compared with the steadily decreasing German bund, the Italian bond spread further increases sharply during the global crisis and Berlusconi’s issues in 2010-2011. It can be deduced that the German economy had better resilience and credit standings compared with Italy and its falling ratings within and outside the EU (Banque de France, 2012). of improper policy implementations while distancing the people from their problems’ sources. Berlusconi also deliberately misrepresented himself through various media sources, and once these defects were found out, the government already suffered from the impact of the global financial crisis (Di Quirico, 2010). These problems increased the Italian bond spread versus other stable countries, implying that Italy had the additional problem of having an incompetent and non-transparent leader apart from being affected by the global crisis affecting neighbouring nations, further decreasing its credentials in taking care of any kind of investments (Viroli, 2011). The effects of such issues are approximated in in Figure 2, in the seemingly-compounded increase of the Italian bond spread compared to Germany, a much more politically and economically stable country. It was imperative that Italy must make immediate changes to gain better economy after Berlusconi’s administration. Professor Monti was chosen by President Napolitano as new Prime Minister to serve until the 2013 elections, giving reassurance to most of the investors and other countries of a better Italian fiscal budget management (Manasse, et al., 2013). In due time the bond spread began to decrease substantially, though not as low as before the fiscal crisis hit the Italian economy around late 2010-2011 (Figure 2). It was possible for Italy to recover, but existing policies must be revamped to strengthen major companies, the public sectors, and SME’s, to increase revenue and increase highly-diversified jobs other than exportation. New jobs can considerably decrease unemployment and increase students entering higher educational institutions since other jobs are available after graduation. However, problems on implementing changes in hiring processes and strong oppositions to some of Prime Minister Monti’s reforms were indicated by rising bond spread basis points after an all-time low 278 points in March 2012 (Country Economy, 2013). The labour system’s lack of a broad scope caused burdens since the current system greatly emphasises semi-specialised labour such as luxury goods production, which prevents high employment rates for diverse people (Danske Bank, 2013). Thus, while Prime Minister Monti’s austerity measures improved public financials temporarily, the budget deficit did not decrease and public debt will rise to 128.1% of the GDP without effective interventions (Danske Bank, 2013). The Potential Impact of the Situations after the 2013 Italian Elections Italy’s 2013 elections had surreal results, and political parties are still unable to create compromising policies or solutions for older or obsolete implementations (Arnold & Lemmen, 2001; Manasse, et al., 2013). Government bonds are speculated to default, implying either low or no return on investments. For investors, this means that Italy’s relatively high public debt compared to the economy impacts both the country’s sustainability through fiscal and macroeconomic indicators, and poses greater risks in investment (Di Cesare, et al., 2012). Prime Minister Monti’s inability to consistently steer the country to a more favourable position at a rapid pace prevented possibilities for reform or implementing necessary measures, now more difficult since three major political forces, Berlusconi, Bersani and Grillo are unable to cooperate, with Berlusconi’s offer of ruling via coalition opposed by Bersani and Grillo’s 5-Star Movement (Munchau, 2013). In the EU’s beginnings, some countries took advantages of mispricing their actual economic and fiscal fragility, and effects were invisible until market expectation revisions around 2009 (Giordano, et al., 2012). This increased bond spreads among peripheral countries like Italy, resulting into a high debt-to-GDP ratio causing inflations and economic instability. Figure 3 shows that most investments in Italy come externally, thus economic growth or decline depends on the continuity of capital from foreign investors (Andritzky, 2012). Italy must remain competent despite setbacks to prevent investors from withdrawing. Figure 3. More than 50% of the total investments in Italy come externally, strengthening the need to take care of local and foreign investors’ interests (Andritzky, 2012). Under Prime Minister Monti, the government initially addressed this by implementing fiscal adjustments and a €20 B package to eliminate deficit though fiscal cuts, causing great improvement in credit ratings compared to Greece (Cline, 2012). Unfortunately there is no assurance on its long-term benefits since the recession’ effects can only be suppressed momentarily, as shown previously in Figures 1 and 2. IMF considered models projecting Italy’s reduced public debt ratio from 120% down to 114% of the GDP by 2016, but a low projection implied that the current government must take aggressive measures to fast track the Italian economy’s relatively low growth rates and improve other labour sectors such as employees and SME’s, whose potential contributions are forgotten. However unless Italian governance compromises and creates long-term solutions to these issues, the economy would remain under recession for a longer time. Revising European Union Policies could affect Italy’s Plans for Reformation The European Monetary Union (EMU) unifies most countries in Europe through changes such as using a single currency, removing autonomy in each nation’s monetary policies while deepening integrated markets within the EU (Mosley, 2004). Governments are rewarded for increased consolidation and liquidity of markets from a common currency and government bond standardisation, but could also affect each country’s bond spread negatively due to fluctuations (Schulz & Wolff, 2008). Currently some issues were unresolved 10 years after the EU’s formation, preventing total unification by not ensuring adherence of every country to rules, economic policies, and the lack of a political union crossing all borders of EU countries (Tilford, 2009). Loopholes on the EU architecture prevented poorly performing states to improve according to international standards for growth and productivity due to the union’s central governing body’s poor coordination, defeating the purpose of unifying Europe in currencies, policies and governance strategies (Piacentini, 2013). In addition, the national governments’ lack of responsibility to pursue improvements and the European Central Bank’s uninitiated assessments of macroeconomic performance increases political and economic strife in neighbouring countries. Solutions suggested to strengthen EU’s existing laws are by consolidating and standardizing all policies and plans since 1: some countries like Italy have defective policies clashing with other countries’ policies; and 2: other EU members create their own economic policies without assessing the economic impact on other EU countries (Tilford, 2009). Also, less-performing countries that cannot abide must have an option to default or leave the EU to prevent impacting the EU economy. Italy could benefit by creating similar options mentioned above or by following the rules and regulations set forth by the EU. To improve its economy, the government has these options: stay in the euro and solely create its economic adjustments; stay in the Eurozone and adjust to creditor and debtor nations; or simply leaving the euro, but issues from the lack of agreement among Italy’s politicians prevent choosing an effective way out of recession, instead ending up in an ineffective fourth option: staying in the euro, focusing on short-term solutions and waiting for results (Munchau, 2013). At present, problems arising from the lack of cooperation between the three current major political forces, Berlusconi, Bersani and Grillo prevent the creation of long-term solutions, and as to how their governance would dictate Italy’s path for the next few years is still an open-ended question without a clear outcome. Conclusions Like other EU nations, Italy was also affected by the global economic crisis starting from 2008, but this was not the sole factor that caused its large fiscal deficit and high bond spread. The political instability from the former Prime Minister’s issues such as misusing public funds and inefficient policies along with the nation’s multi-party system’s lack of unity lack of policies compounded on the recession’s effects. While Prime Minister Monti initially helped increase the country’s credit standing through some reforms, these were not enough to completely change Italy’s economic standing. In addition, the 2013 elections created more problems due to a political deadlock, and the three major forces that were expected to reform the Italian politics had no hopes for cooperation at present. The existing policies should be revised to solve fiscal problems as soon as possible, otherwise the recession would continue to affect the country and eventually block Italy’s further economic development. Since most problems rooted from the leaders’ inability to create effective policies, one possible solution for Italy and other European nations is unification similar to the United States, where the government, leaders, politics along with the currencies are centralised. However, this solution would take a long time due to restructuring, developing and proper implementation. Thus for the time being, aside from the EU consolidating its policies and strategies to benefit all member nations and focusing on the growth and development of each country, the Italian government must do its part as well by improving current economic policies and the labour systems since these could greatly affect not just the bond spread but the credibility of the nation, especially when major stakeholders and investors are from outside the country. But in answering the question of whether Italy is prepared to create policies with sustainable and long-term effects, it is still uncertain since at present there are problems on obtaining unified governance, preventing the creation of effective economic policies. There are only vague speculations on how and when this will happen since the political stalemate in the 2013 Italian general elections caused the three major ruling parties to oppose one another, without defining clear prospects on how to improve Italy’s economy onwards. Thus, until Italian governance has found a way to allow cooperation among its political constituents, it will be hard to change the political and economic situations which further prolong the country’s negative image among investors and in effect, the country’s slow economic growth. Bibliography Alter, A. & Schuler, Y. S., 2012. Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis. 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