Bay of Pigs Invasion Intelligence Failure - Research Paper Example

One of the most criticized actions of the US military against another country was its Invasion of Bay of Pigs in 1961. This invasion was not only a total failure, it also caused great embarrassment for the Kennedy government. The main reason given for the outcome of the invasion was intelligence failure in the CIA. Less than two years later, the US was preparing for an offensive attack against Cuba, but this time round, the intelligence was accurate. The two events can be compared and contrasted due to the major differences in which CIA handled intelligence and planning. Speculation and the lack of accurate information led to the failure of one and the reliance of accurate intelligence and proper planning led to the success of the other. Bay of Pigs Invasion Intelligence Failure Compared To the Success of the Cuban Missile Crisis Intelligence In 1961, the US attacked Fidel Castrol’s Cuba in a bid to overthrow his government. This attack was that came to be known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion, which turned out to be a complete failure. The US had used an attacking force that had received thorough training and aid that was enough to launch a successful attack anywhere (Hughes-Wilson, 2004). Instead, the military operation at the end was a disaster that completely humiliated the US government at the time. The operation also did not achieve its initial objective which was to bring down Fidel Castro and his government. On the contrary the attack only increased the Cuban’s support for their leader (Walton, 2010). The events leading to this invasion started way back in 1960. The whole process had been well planned from the word go. On March 17 of that year, President Dwight Eisenhower started this elaborate program to get rid of the government of Cuba. The operation was a CIA project from the very beginning. The intelligence body not only provided necessary information on the invasion details, it also recruited and armed Cuban exiles who would carry out the attack. President John F. Kennedy is the one who authorized the failed attempt to oust Castro and his government. Taking a beachhead, establishing a government and gaining US recognition was all part of the plan (Jones, 2008). Some of the reasons associated with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion include: the inability of the US forces to defeat the Cuban air force, the overestimation made by the CIA about the willingness of Cubans to support an armed invasion on their government and the selection of an unfit landing site. Before this invasion the CIA, which the Eisenhower had entrusted with the responsibility of removing Castro from power, had tried many other options to get rid of the president. There were attempts made to poison him, there was support of anticommunist groups in Cuba, and radio broadcasts against the Castro regime were aired to Cuba from Florida. There were even some reports that the CIA made contact with the mafia so that they could work together to get rid of Castro. However, none of these tactics worked, but the CIA was not done yet. They planned and executed the invasion of the Bay of Pigs, but even this adverse action failed (Walton, 2010). The invasion was organized with only 1,297 troops that comprised mostly of Cuban rebels who were not in any position to lead an attack against a formidable military. Within two days, the invasion of the US had been quelled by Castro’s forces and several rebels rounded up. The failure of the CIA during the invasion of Bay of Pigs can be contrasted with the success in which the Cuban Missile crisis was handled. This was another crisis that ha the potential to go awry had the intelligence not been accurate. In fact, a few weeks before the crisis, the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), which was a branch of the CIA, predicted wrongly that the USSR would not place missiles on Cuban soil (Hughes-Wilson, 2004). However, the intelligence gathered after that was enough for the US to plan and identify the missiles before they could be launched. The CIA also gathered enough intelligence in a short time that enabled the US to gauge the technical capabilities of the missiles, thus they were able to device defense tactics to avert possible destruction to civilians and property. Blight and Welch (1998) state that “the Cuban Missile Crisis constitutes a qualified American intelligence success” (p. 132). It was through the efforts made by the CIA that timely information on the technical capabilities of the missiles was presented. The success of CIA operations and intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis is a great contrast to the failure of the agency to gather enough and accurate intelligence to enable it to anticipate the outcome of their invasion plans. The Bay of Pigs debacle only highlighted the lack of clear management of CIA Directorates which constituted a wide intelligence community. This lack of proper coordination in management could have led to the misinformation and poor planning of the Cuban invasion of 1961 (Nathan, 1992) . One of the major points that comes out in the failure of the CIA intelligence during the planning and execution of the 1961 invasion of the Bay of Pigs is misinformation. The CIA relied on the views of exiled Cubans, most of who were living in Miami, Florida to base their assumptions that everyone in Cuba did not like Castro or his government (Moore, 2010). The intelligence gathered was not enough to be used as a representation of what the majority of the people in Cuba actually wanted. It is not very clear how the CIA could have overestimated the willingness of Cubans to support an attack against their government. However, it is clear that the CIA’s intelligence was faulty and appeared to be more self serving than being centered on any particular reason (Blight and Welch, 1998). The CIA failed to collect conclusive information before they launched the attack just to show that they were in command, but the truth of the matter later emerged and it was clear that there was something wrong within the agency’s ranks. The CIA knew for a fact that an invasion on Cuba would be in direct violation of the laws as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. All these documents contained clauses that made it illegal for a country to attack another expect in cases of self defense (Walton, 2010). The CIA’s only reason to attack Cuba was to settle scores with a communist regime which had not attacked the US. Unlike the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile crisis was not treated like bureaucratic warfare within the CIA. Instead, the whole intelligence community worked as one to find a quick and timely action to counter any missile attack on US soil (Nathan, 1992). There were careful deliberations which were based on accurate intelligence gathered inside Cuba about the situation of the missiles. Politics of bureaucracy were kept aside and the CIA was able to concentrate on the events in Cuba and not politics of intelligence estimates (Blight and Welch, 1998) The CIA thought that the 1961 operation could be kept a secret its involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This was not to be as conflicting messages kept emerging in the media on what was happening. It also emerged in the media that the intelligence that the CIA was using as a basis for invading Cuba was quite ambiguous and did not warrant a military attack (Nathan, 1992). The CIA relied on misinformed reports about the loss of popularity of Castro’s government, a fact that they never bothered to find out if it was true or not. The aftermath of this lack of proper intelligence planning and information analysis led to what is considered one of the worst blunders of the US military in recent history (Moore, 2010). Conclusion The Invasion of the Bay of Pigs by the Americans in the disguise of Cuban rebel militants was a failure due to the intelligence mistakes made by the CIA. Bureaucratic politics and red tape contributed to the fiasco that was the invasion which ended up embarrassing the Kennedy government. The CIA also misread the loyalty of Cubans to their government. The support that the agency was expecting to get from Cubans was not forthcoming. Instead of defeating communism in Cuba, the invasion achieved the exact opposite. Cubans stood firmly behind their leader whom the US tried so hard but never managed to oust. The events of the 1961 invasion can be contrasted with those of the Cuban Missile crisis, an operation that was also under the CIA. The intelligence gathered in this case was accurate and not based on heresy. The two events, although closely related, differ like day and night due to the way in which the operations were executed. In one, there was lack of credible intelligence on which to base an attack, while in the other one, there was enough information gathered to make concrete pans to protect the US in any way possible. The intelligence gathered by the CIA about Castro in the Invasion of the Bay of Pigs was not enough, and that is the reason the agency went to great lengths to hide their involvement in the ensuing attacks. However, it was this secrecy that contributed mostly to the failure of the operation. The Missile crisis on the other hand was handled more professionally, with politics taking a back sit and common sense being given a chance. The CIA director at the time of the crisis was able to organize operations so that the US was ready to defend itself against any kind of attack that the Russians were planning. References Blight, J..G. and Welch, D.A. (1998). Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. London: Frank Cass Publishers Hughes-Wilson, J. (2004). Military intelligence blunders and cover-ups (Revised). New York: Avalon Publishing Group. Jones, H. (2008). The Bay of Pigs. London: Oxford University Press. Moore, D.T. (2010). Critical thinking and intelligence analysis. New York: DIANE Publishing. Nathan, J. (1992). The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. Turner, M.A. (2005). Why secret intelligence fails. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc. (Turner, 2005). Walton, T. (2010). Challenges in intelligence analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the present. New York: Cambridge University Press. Read More