Police Tactics and Use of Force Policies in Urban Riots - Research Paper Example

 Police Tactics and Use of Force Policies in Urban Riots Introduction The recent riots in London, apparently begun by a killing of a youth by police in the city, spread from a single locality to neighborhoods across the country, showing how urban violence can be contagious. In the course of this uprising, over $350 million dollars worth of property damage was caused over approximately a week, five people lost their lives, and over 3,000 were arrested. (Wells and Jeffery, 2011) Initial reports suggested that protests erupted over the death of Mark Duggan, and that these “civil rights” protests were inflamed following an act of police brutality on a 16 year old girl. Some analysts suggest that in fearing a civil rights protest over an unwarranted civilian death caused by police officers, the force itself failed to definitively act to disperse and arrest the initial rioters after the protests became destructive. Rioters apparently used social media and mobile telephone communication to spread organized acts of property destruction, looting, and theft at locations across the city. TV news reports showed youth robbing sneakers, clothes, food, drinks, and electronics from stores, in apparent acts of opportunism seeming to have nothing to do with legitimate political protest. Arson was a tactic used to devastating effect by the looters, and the London riots of 2011 are defined symbolically in visual media by these images. In analyzing the police response and traditional tactics of law enforcement in urban uprisings, the practicalities inherent in law and order response can be balanced against the civil rights issues guaranteed in human rights and constitutional protections. Police Response to Urban Riots The encounter precipitating the London riots involved the death of Mark Duggan, who was killed by UK police officers using deadly force under questionable circumstances. Duggan was shown not to have fired his weapon, despite being illegally armed. (Wells and Jeffery, 2011) When a community protest organized in front of a police station to demonstrate against the Duggan killing spontaneously, police reportedly used a crowd protection shield to strike a 16 year old girl. (Wells and Jeffery, 2011) Therefore, the initial riots in London can be attributed directly to two acts of police violence that were likely unwarranted and one of which resulted in a civilian death. From these situations, the riots spread through ideological contagion that was given fuel by the discontentment, exclusion, and apparent hopelessness of thousands or millions of youth across England. When their anger exploded into rage, buildings and warehouses were torched in London while crowds rioted across the city to battle directly with police using rocks, bricks, burning tires, and Molotov cocktails. While in many areas the looting appeared to devolve into outright theft and violence on behalf of the protestors, the media also displayed a picture of London where law and order had seemingly broken down or evaporated into social chaos. The example of the UK riots in 2011 suggests that a major question still exists as to what correct police tactics should be in response to urban unrest, mass social protest, and violent rioting that destroys property. Fyfe (1988) noted that many of the initial attempts to restrain the use of deadly force by police officers by increasing training awareness of the issue related directly to the perception of police violence for civil unrest riots in the 1960s. (Fyfe, 1988) The London riots appear to affirm and reinforce the correctness of this analysis by displaying the causality between unjustified police violence and use of deadly force with the onset of urban rioting in the populace. However, there is also an assumption in making this connection that asserts there must be an additional widespread feeling of disaffection, helplessness, and repression on behalf of the populace who reacts publicly by rioting, for this is taken as the explanation for what would otherwise be viewed as irrational behavior or “the madness or crowds”. (Waddington & King, 2005) That these events occur on a regular basis around the world means that the policies of police response to civil disorders can be studied in order to build police training policies around a basis of best practices that are proven to work tactically in dispersing demonstrations peacefully. Use of Force Policies in Civil Disorders Just as unauthorized or unwarranted use of force by police can precipitate urban unrest, similarly unskilled police tactics in response to mass demonstrations can make the situation worse, socially contagious, or inflame into violence. Following the many examples of urban rioting and tactical response since the 1960’s, the New York Police Department has developed a response strategy based upon “broken windows” and “command & control”. (Vitale, 2005) The “broken windows” strategy seeks to break up large planes of mass demonstrators into smaller groups or fragments that can be more easily monitored, approached, detained, and dispersed. (Vitale, 2005) The “command and control” strategy aims to prevent the breakdown of authority into loss of public order, as this represents the worst aspects of historical rioting violence. (Vitale, 2005) In the 2011 Sheffield riots, UK police set up a “command center” to integrate streams from CCTV feeds across the city with police response and kept the public updated by Facebook and Twitter posts. (McSeveny and Waddington, 2011) Similarly, the UK police’s long experience of dealing with crowd violence in Football causals and sports riots has led to an identification of tactics that defuse rather than inflame crowd reactions. (Stott, Hoggett, & Pearson, 2011) What summarizes these responses are the shared goal for police to maintain authority in the community when crowd violence or demonstrations arise, and to move to swiftly disperse these organizations by breaking them down to smaller groups and apprehending the most violent offenders. In clearing areas on the urban environment in this manner, the leadership of the riots can be arrested while the smaller groups retreat as police presence and control is re-established by display of force through uniformed officers. UN Peacekeeping Forces – Tactics & Policies In searching for strategies designed to minimize and de-escalate urban violence and civil unrest, the U.N. Peacekeeping Forces, their training methods, and tactics should be considered as a leading example for local police departments, due to the experience that this group has in managing crowd control around the world. The UN master list of numbered rules of engagement (Provisional, May 2002) contains 10 clauses which define the circumstances where the use of force, up to and including deadly force, is approved and authorized. (Findlay, 2002) These instances are generally concerned with the defense of the life of police forces and local authorities when demonstrators, protestors, or rioters threaten them with violence. (Findlay, 2002) Nevertheless, these rules also preserve the defense of property, particularly critical governmental buildings, police offices, and military installations as justified in deploying lethal force. (Findlay, 2002) While the U.N. Peacekeeping forces operate under military rules, command, and structure, it can be argued that the majority of the world’s police forces operate under a similar structure and organization, making the cross-use of tactics between the U.N. Peacekeepers and local police forces a use of shared intelligence and strategy-making for success in operations. The U.N. response attempts to respect local sensitivities to avoid inflaming or making civil unrest worse, but it can also be argued that the local police forces have a greater responsibility and personal knowledge of the community under patrol, and therefore can act in response with a greater efficiency in crowd control than the U.N. Peacekeepers can. Nevertheless, the local police forces must learn restraint and sensitivity in crowd control from the U.N. example, as the prevention of escalation in crowd control can be a significant victory compared to examples where the police response incites, enflames, and spreads the civil unrest across the country in contagion. Ethical Considerations of “Less Than Lethal” Weapons New tactics in crowd control and civil unrest response are made possible by advances in what can be termed “less than lethal” weapons. The UK police refrained from using “tear gas” in the response to the 2011 riots, because of traditional reasons and in fear of inflaming local sensitivities. Tear gas, mace, stun guns, tasers, and other “less than lethal” weapons can be deployed by police in response situations to apprehend the worst offenders while avoiding the deadly consequences of firearm usage. (Downs, 2007) It should be noted that one of the oldest techniques of crowd control is to simply fire over the heads or in the direction of demonstrators. In more brutal and repressive forms of government, these warning shots may be fired directly into the crowd, so that the majority disperses in fear when the deaths of a few are discovered. Yet these tactics risk a huge escalation of civil conflict and demonstration into civil war and long term violence spreading through hatred in a society. Therefore, less than lethal weapons such as tear gas can be deployed effectively by police response to urban riots accomplishing the goals of dispersion and fragmentation of crowds, as well as providing a disincentive to the protesters in continuing organizational activity. Nevertheless, the deployment of non-lethal crowd control weapons can also be damaging to community sentiment and human health, and thus these weapons must also be deployed along similar guidelines as traditional weapons in police forces, with detailed rules, guidelines, and training required for professional use in crowd control response. (Downs, 2007) Conclusion The tactics of the U.N. Peacekeeping forces can be seen as being driven by collective training methods, respect for local sentiment, conscious de-escalation of crowd violence, and proven methods of holding public spaces through show of authority. (Findlay, 2002) The U.N. method represents advanced preparation for deployment in situations of public unrest, crowd control, rioting, and looting, whereas traditional police work is largely concentrated on other forms of crime control and investigation. The U.N. Peacekeeper methodology can be used by local police departments and academy in developing training programs for staff that equips recruits with the tactical knowledge required to minimize property damage and loss of life in civil unrest. Unfortunately, local police departments often do not dedicate enough time and resources to training new officers in crowd control, or in retraining old staff on new tactics and strategies, so that when urban rioting does erupt, the officers are often unprepared and overstrained in the community environment under threat. This lack of preparation and training creates a great risk that additional police violence can inspire the crowd to further acts of looting, rioting, and civil violence, as well as the possibility that the ill-formed police response can cause contagion of the social unrest to other locations through media sources. Therefore, tactical training to local police in crowd control responses are essential in urban areas where the threat of civil unrest is great, but also required in smaller locations in advance of situations so that officers are informed, aware, and equipped to perform their peacekeeping duties in the event of emergency situations. References Downs, Raymond L. (2007). Less lethal weapons: a technologist's perspective. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Vol. 30 Iss: 3, pp.358 – 384. Web. Retrieved from http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?articleid=1622101&show=abstract Findlay, Trevor (2002). THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS. Oxford University Press, 2002. PDF. Fyfe, James J. (1988). Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform. 5 Just. Q. 165 (1988). Web. Retrieved from http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/jquart5&div=21 McSeveny , Kerry and Waddington, David (2011). Up Close and Personal – The Interplay between Information Technology and Human Agency in the Policing of the 2011 Sheffield Anti-Lib Dem Protest. INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT, Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing, 2011, Part 3, 199-212, DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4471-2140-4_13. Web. Retrieved from http://www.springerlink.com/content/w231jv407l522477/ Stott, Clifford; Hoggett, James and Pearson, Geoff (2011). ‘Keeping the Peace’- Social Identity, Procedural Justice and the Policing of Football Crowds. Br J Criminol , doi: 10.1093/bjc/azr076, First published online: September 20, 2011. Web. Retrieved from http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/09/20/bjc.azr076.abstract Vitale, Alex (2005). From Negotiated Management to Command and Control: How the New York Police Department Polices Protests. Policing and Society, Volume 15, Number 3, September 2005 , pp. 283-304(22). Web. Retrieved from http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/gpas/2005/00000015/00000003/art00004 Waddington, David & King, Mike (2005). The Disorderly Crowd: From Classical Psychological Reductionism to Socio-Contextual Theory – The Impact on Public Order Policing Strategies. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 44, Issue 5, pages 490–503, December 2005. Web. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2311.2005.00393.x/abstract Wells, Matt and Jeffery, Simon (2011). UK riots aftermath – Friday 12 August 2011. Guardian.co.uk, Friday 12 August 2011. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/blog/2011/aug/12/uk-riots-day-six-aftermath Read More