The Meaning of the Battle of New Orleans - Perspective, Context, and Who Really Won - Research Paper Example

 Perspective: The last battle of a muddled war Most wars are somewhat chaotic in their causes and origins, but the War of 1812 was particularly so. Henry Clay, the great young leader of the War Hawk faction, seemed to be torn between issues about freedom of the seas (which were even then being negotiated peacefully ("Address")) and a more nebulous sort of respect: The pretensions of Great Britain, so unjustly set up, and pertinaciously maintained, by her orders in council, not to enumerate other wrongs, particularly the impressment of our seamen, arrogate to her the complete dominion of the sea, and the exclusion of every flag from it, which does not sail under her license, and on the conditions which she imposes. These pretensions involve no local interest, nor are they of a transient nature. In their operation they violate the rights, and wound deeply the best interests, of the whole American people. (Clay "Letter") Similarly, the pro-war Niles Weekly Register devoted only two paragraphs out of eighteen to the reasons for the war, spending all the rest of its space on the feasibility of the war and what they regarded as its certain success ("Article Regarding …" ) Indeed, the actual causes of the war were so muddy that they are not mentioned in the Declaration of War itself, which was introduced by John C. Calhoun, one of the leaders of the War Hawks ("Declaration"). The announced causes of the war were thus a hodge-podge of low-level complaints in international relations, anger at the high-handedness of various Royal Navy officers, and perhaps nostalgia for the experience of the then-rapidly-passing Revolutionary War generation. But underneath there were two perhaps more substantive issues: first, the British failure to accept that the former American colonies were actually now an independent, sovereign nation rather than a sort of obstreperous dependency; and second, the British denial of American hegemony on the continent, as demonstrated particularly by their maintaining friendly and supportive relations with the Indian nations. The Americans did not need (or seek) to sink the British navy, conquer the Empire for themselves, or burn London to the ground; their passive goal was to be treated by the British in the same way as a Frenchman or a Spaniard might be treated, and their active goal was to have a free hand in the conquest of Native Americans lands – to establish that the Native Americans could not demand or expect any alliance whatever with any European power. In the context of these two not-always-public goals, which I believe to be the real causes of the war, though the Battle of New Orleans was in fact fought after the formal end of the war and involved only tiny forces by European standards, it was nevertheless the battle that truly settled the issues of the War of 1812. Context: an expected defeat in a losing war This is primarily my summary of Chapter 6 of the Army's Official History ("Chief"); even a short, small war like 1812 has far too many battles and details to be covered in a few brief paragraphs, so this is intended only to supply context, and is not a thorough analysis. As a supplement I often referred to the chronology on pages 91-94 of Pickles, "New Orleans 1815." The War of 1812 see-sawed, but mostly the British had the better of it. At sea, the United States won several ship-to-ship engagements, and Perry's improvised built-on-the-lake fleet defeated the British flotilla on Lake Erie, but the Royal Navy, very expectably, was able to impose a very successful blockade and to strike at American port cities at will. The American Navy was occasionally a threat to isolated shipping, but it was in no way a challenge to British naval supremacy. On land the picture was less mixed, and bleaker for the Americans. Hull's abortive invasion of Western Canada simply accelerated the series of British/Canadian/Native American hammer blows that threatened the loss of the whole Northwest frontier. The many attacks on American forts in northern Ohio in the summer of 1813, though they did not result in lasting gains of territory, still provided depressing reading for the American newspaper reader. The inconclusive fighting around Niagara had its share of American victories, but there were also frequent defeats. Although the British did not occupy territory for any length of time around Chesapeake Bay, the Chesapeake campaign did result in the burning of Washington, a severe blow to national prestige; if we think of the two unexpressed goals, national self-respect and the isolation of the Native Americans, we would have to say that the attempt to build national self-respect was mixed at best, and the Native Americans were if anything less isolated – for example, in the British alliance with Tecumseh, and successful arming of Black Hawk and the Sauk Nation. Only Jackson's defeat of the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend could be cited as an example of pushing the British out of alliance with the Native American nations. At the end of 1814, with the European war apparently over and large forces therefore available, it looked as if the consequences of the war would be an unequivocal defeat on both the major American goals. Of the large British forces intended to punish the Americans, the northern operation into upstate New York was stopped at Plattsburgh; the invasion of the Chesapeake was in effect a sustained raid in force; and the third blow, it was realized, must be aimed at New Orleans. Andrew Jackson, the hero-commander of Horseshoe Bend, was known to be brave and capable, but he had the unenviable task of putting together, starting from a small regular army force of about 1000 and not more than 3000 trained militiamen, a fighting force to defend an unfortified city against an invasion that was expected, at the time, to total as many as 25,000. (Pickles 34) Louisiana had only entered the union in the spring of 1812, with somewhat less than perfect enthusiasm, and was essentially a city of Creoles, held by the United States but not yet truly a part of it. (Patterson 18) Jackson arrived in New Orleans on December 1, 1814 facing two separate citizen commissions for the defense of the city. He also badly needed a deal with the Choctaw Nation and with the notorious Lafitte pirate organization, and there were sharp and numerous fissures in his own troops, between regular army and militia, and between the Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi militias, whose elected officers felt more answerable to their own troops than to the central command. (Patterson 29) He received welcome help-with-high-competence from some Napoleonic officers who had settled in the city, and needed manpower from the local Free Men of Color. ("Chalmette" 3) With the British invasion bearing down on them, and the vast disarray of the American forces, it looked as if Jackson might merely ratify the verdict of the war so far: the United States was no power that might Great Britain need respect, and the Native Americans would continue to be able to secure an alliance with European powers for needed modern arms and training. (The Choctaw were actually in covert talks with British agents and seem to have been trying to find the winning side, or the one that offered the most) (Pickles 19). Everything pointed to one more brutal American defeat. The battle itself: reversal of fortune and stunning success For this account I am primarily relying on the NPS Handbook ("Chalmette"), Patterson, and Pickles because the basic facts of the military operation are not in dispute; troop positions and actions are well-established and, though not common knowledge, are available from a large number of sources. In preparation for the invasion, Admiral Cochrane's fleet dropped anchor near the mouth of Lake Borgne on December 12, 1814. This first wave of the invasion force was about 10,000 British sailors, marines, and soldiers. The Americans opposing this force, under Catesby, had just five gunboats. The British attack began on December 14; Captain Nicholas Lockyer's force of about 1200 sailors and marines, embarked in forty-two longboats. All five gunboats were captured before nightfall, opening the door for General John Keane's UNIT to seize Pea Island as a base of operations; they encountered no resistance on the island itself. Keane's first attempt to establish a forward base for a further attack on the city was foiled by his own decision to pursue slow, cautious development of his position, and a well-timed spoiling attack by the less-hesitant Jackson. Keane's camp at Lacoste's plantation was established before noon on December 23, and with his force of 1800 he could easily have struck at New Orleans itself, only nine miles away, before nightfall. (Pickles 41) Instead, the British prepared for substantial reinforcements, giving Jackson time to mount a surprise night attack. Though the British successfully held their forward base, they were disrupted by nearly three hundred casualties – almost a third of Keane's force killed, wounded, or missing -- including forty-six deaths. ("Chalmette" 7) Furthermore, Jackson was able to establish a line at the Rodriguez Canal, putting a prepared position between the British and their objective. It had all the classic features of a spoiling attack: though no ground was taken and the enemy was not defeated, Jackson had forced the British to expend far more time and resources, and destroyed any hope of an immediate, overwhelming surprise. While the Americans dug in, the effect of their spoiling attack was enhanced by confusion in command; Pakenham arrived while Keane's forces were still recovering and discovered that not only were his forces in disarray in a poor position, but Admiral Cochrane overruled his preferred route of approach. (Pickles 61) It was not till December 28 – five critical days for the Americans of digging in, bringing up reinforcements, and scouting the British forces – that British troops advanced again, and even then, it was only a series of probing attacks, trying to re-balance the American superiority in current battlefield intelligence. (Patterson 89) By January 1, when the British made their next significant attack, the American fortifications had 18 artillery pieces in place (four of them across the river from the main earthworks). (Pickles 57) The subsequent artillery duel knocked out about a third of the American guns and caused a panic on Jackson's left flank, but British hesitancy again saved the day for the American forces; low on artillery ammunition, and calculating that the balance of forces was gradually tilting in his favor, Pakenham decided to wait, again, during which time the Americans repaired the damage and constructed further earthworks. ("Chalmette" 11) On January 8th, 1815, the full British complement of 8000 men was assembled and ready to go. Pakenham planned that one brigade, under Colonel Thornton, would advance along a temporary canal in boats, seize the American cross-river batteries and secure a position from which they could bombard Jackson's right flank, along the river. With the stronger of the two American flanks enfiladed and pinned down, the main attack would proceed as a double wing, hoping to turn the American flanks thus surround and overrun their center; the left (river) flank was commanded by Keane and the right (bayou) flank by General Gibbs. (Patterson 224) The temporary canal, however, failed completely, leaving Thornton's brigade to drag the heavy supplies they would need upstream along the muddy bank. The flanking attack was twelve hours behind and in no condition to fight when they arrived. ("Chalmette" 14) Meanwhile, further delays so that the main attacks under Keane and Gibbs were barely underway at sunrise, and the unexpected lifting of the fog, exposed the main British columns to much more long range and artillery fire than had been expected. (Patterson 236) To this delay was added the disastrous mistake of Mullins, the lieutenant-colonel who failed to bring along scaling ladders and fascines, so that the British forces crossing the Rodriguez Canal were forced to wade, then climb a mud bank. (Pickles 70) General Gibbs himself was killed. The British were now in an infantryman's nightmare: attacking dug-in defenders on high ground across water, with little cover and no safe line of retreat. Because Thornton had still not taken the cross-river guns, the British forces along the river were particularly hard-pressed, and Pakenham reassigned the 93rd Highlanders from Keane's force to join the other flank. (Patterson 252) Keane, going with them, was wounded as they came under fire; his column was stalled and helpless on the left. Nor did the addition of the Highlanders improve matters for the British; although they briefly seized one redoubt, they were unable to advance from it and American reinforcements quickly routed them ("Chalmette" 14). All over the battlefield, British forces were pinned down, unable either to support each other or to move to any other position. When Pakenham himself was fatally wounded by grapeshot, the British chain of command was completely disrupted, and the British lost many soldiers in futile assaults and equally futile retreats. Eventually, General Lambert, who had commanded the reserve battalion, rode forward, establish that he was the senior officer on the battlefield, and succeeded in withdrawing the forces. (Patterson 278-281) In the middle of this, Thornton's forces finally arrived at the cross-river batteries, and did successfully secure them and begin to put the guns back into operation. Asked via messenger by Lambert what would be needed to hold against an American counterattack, Thornton estimated about two thousand men; having no way to get such a large force there quickly, Lambert told Thornton to withdraw, thus giving up the last British offensive position. (Pickles 79) At the end of the day the British losses were 291 dead, 1267 wounded, and 484 missing, to the American 13 dead, 39 wounded, and 19 missing. (Furthermore, many of the British missing were prisoners). ("Chalmette" 15) During the remaining weeks of the campaign, Lambert sought to mitigate the damage, but he was painfully aware that very little could be done now; for a few days, he continued the bombardment of Fort St. Philip (which guarded the sea approach to New Orleans), and tried moving his forces for a separate attack on Mobile Bay in early February. It was while there that they at last learned of the Treaty of Ghent, and departed, having taken the surrounding fortifications but not the city of Mobile itself. (Patterson 294-295) The meaning of the battle: perspective, context, and the unannounced goals The Battle of New Orleans was of course actually fought after the Treaty of Ghent was signed, and notoriously the Treaty of Ghent does not mention either the freedom of the seas issues like impressment and blockade, nor does it mention trade with the Native Americans. ("Treaty") Officially the war ended as a draw with both sides going home. But in reality the Battle of New Orleans was a stunning American victory for both of the real goals of the war. The boost to American prestige was enormous, and the devastating victory certainly helped to cement the position that the USA was a nation among nations, not an oddly constructed rebellious corner of the British Empire. (Chief 141; Pickles 89; "Chalmette" 17) Furthermore, the defeat resulted in swift and nearly complete cessation of British support for their former Native American allies, paving the way for the war of conquest soon to drive white settlement much farther west. (Calloway 18) As the final significant battle in a war fought for unacknowledged goals, it represents the complete achievement of those goals, and as such it settled the question, then and now, "Who really won the war of 1812?" Works Cited "An Address to the People of the Eastern States." New York Post April 21, 1812. text from Teaching American History Document Library. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland University. Web. December 6, 2010. "Article Regarding the Declaration of War." Niles Weekly Register May 30, 1812. text from Teaching American History Document Library. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland University. Web. December 6, 2010. "Chalmette National Historical Park." Historical Handbook 29. Washington: National Park Service, US Department of the Interior. 1958. Print. "Declaration of War 1812". (June 18, 1812) text from Teaching American History Document Library. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland University. Web. December 6, 2010. "Treaty of Ghent." (1815) A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 – 1875. Library of Congress. Web. December 6, 2010. Calloway, Colin G. "The End of an Era: British-Indian Relations in the Great Lakes Region after the War of 1812". Michigan Historical Review 12.2 (1986): 1–20. Print. Chief of Military History, Office of the. "Chapter 6: The War of 1812." in American Military History: Army Historical Series. Washington: US Army 1989. 123-147. Clay, Henry. "Letter in Support of the War of 1812." (April 14, 1812). text from Teaching American History Document Library. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs, Ashland University. Web. December 6, 2010. Patterson, Benton Rains. The Generals, Andrew Jackson, Sir Edward Pakenham, and the road to New Orleans. New York: NYUP 2008. Print. Pickles, Tim. "New Orleans 1815: Andrew Jackson crushes the British." Osprey Campaign Series 28. Osprey Publishing 1993. Print. Read More