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The talk on piety represented by Socrates and Euthyphro gives grounds to making a set of arguments on what should be related to this very concept. In this respect Socrates is too critical when taking a look at the claims by Euthyphro. One of the ideas getting through the overall debated by two is that pious is possibly defined as something pleasing to the gods, as long as Euthyphro highlights it (Plato 26). In fact, the third definition pinpoints the dilemma between Socrates and Euthyphro in finding out the exact definition of piety in terms of a definite situation (manslaughter charge).
Hence, the statement that “the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, and that it is not pious merely because it is loved by the gods” underlines the core idea of piety worked out by Socrates out of the Euthyphro’s reasoning. First of all, Socrates is too inventive in arguments to oppose Euthyphro in his idea of piety. When the latter amends the second definition, he just claims that “what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious” (Plato 14).
At this point, here comes the “Euthyphro dilemma,” so to speak. Moreover, it gives way for Socrates to make the Euthyphro’s claim incomplete or with no further justifications. The question is that the gods may comply with the concept of the “pluralism of opinions.” As in democratic society, they may seem different in the definition of pleasure and a state of being pleasant. This is why the Socrates may be justified in his reaction on the third definition by Euthyphro. He is likely to provide a syllogism in “whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods” (Plato 14).
Here comes a strong objection by Socrates who points out a form of discretion out of the Euthyphro’s understanding of piety per se. Besides, Socrates is right in that he does not stop in arguing the misconception of being genuinely pious as long as being loved by the gods does not makes a person pious automatically. There should be some prerequisite for this or some action or a set of activities to prove one’s piety for real. In keeping with the best tradition of the logic, there should be a causative-consecutive line of actions to gain the love of the gods.
It goes without saying that Socrates was closer to this viewpoint in his debate, since it is he who once claimed that the truth is sprout in discussion. Thereupon, Socrates highlights the need of being just in giving to (sacrifice) and asking of (prayer) the gods (Plato 24). This is the culmination of the Euthyphro versus Socrates debate. To conclude, being pious is not an attribute of all people who just want it to be as their characteristic feature. Piety follows after the sacrifice and prayer in terms of what the gods like and dislike according to a definite situation.
Thus, the dialogue between Euthyphro and Socrates is a logic line of reasoning coming, first, to a dilemma and followed by the final argument. Works Cited Plato. Euthyphro. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. New York, NY: Forgotten Books, 1928.
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