Why Did the Korean War Start - Essay Example

Korea had been occupied by Japanese troops in 1905, then annexed by Japan in 1910. During World War II, it was considered enemy territory. At the Cairo Summit in November 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt endorsed a policy of a free and independent Korea in due course. That policy was reiterated in 1945 at the Yalta Summit. It was further agreed that until Korea became independent, it would be under the joint trusteeship of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union. 1 The world's first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan on 6 August 1945; Russia entered the war on 8 August; and the Japanese surrendered on 14 August. With the sudden and unexpected Japanese surrender, there was great haste to cobble together plans to accept the surrender of Japanese field forces and to disarm them. The opportunistic Soviet declaration of war on Japan, coming two days after the first atomic bomb was dropped, made it necessary to agree on a line of demarcation between the zones within which the United States and the Soviets would accept the Japanese surrender. The U.S. State Department wanted the American zone to be as far north on the mainland of China as possible, including key points in Manchuria. The Army did not want to go into an area where few other forces were close at hand. In the planning for the surrender, two young American colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel, from the War Department's Operations and Plans Division (OPD), were assigned the task of finding a line. Neither was particularly knowledgeable about Korea or the Far East, although Rusk had served briefly with Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell in China during the war. They retired to an office and pondered over a National Geographic map. The Army wanted to have two ports, Inchon in the north and Pusan in the south. North of Inchon, there did not seem to be any natural geographic division. They settled on the thirty-eighth parallel. The Soviets agreed. Later Rusk learned that in the early 1900s, the Russians and japanese had, initially, proposed the thirty-eighth parallel as the dividing line between their respective spheres of influence. There has since been suspicion that the Soviets took agreement on the thirty-eighth parallel to be an acknowledgment of their historic sphere of influence.2 The U.S. XXIV Corps came ashore at Inchon to carry out the U.S. occupation mission. The Soviet Army moved down from the north, closed on the thirty-eighth parallel, and sealed the border. All subsequent attempts to proceed with a coordinated policy toward Korea failed. The occupation was not a happy task. Lieutenant General John R. Hodges, the XXIV Corps commander, called it the worst job he ever had. The troops disliked it intensely. In Japan, one commander addressed his incoming troops, warning them to behave and saying that they had only three things to fear -- diarrhea, gonorrhea, and Korea. In the south, the Koreans were not willing to wait for "due course" to achieve freedom and independence. They wanted it right away. And there were competing groups of all political stripes ready to take on the job. 3 The wisdom of maintaining American troops in Korea was questioned almost from the very start. To the Joint Chiefs, the troops were needed elsewhere. In the years that followed, with the Cold War becoming more frosty, force levels dropping, and other needs increasing, the question became more urgent. It was not a decision easily made. An ongoing discussion of the subject continued from 1947 to 1949. It revolved around the strategic value of Korea, its political importance, and its importance in contributing to U.S. prestige. In April 1947, the joint Strategic Survey Committee noted, "This is one country within which we alone have for almost two years carried on ideological warfare in direct contact with our ideological opponents so that to lose this battle would be gravely detrimental to the United States prestige and therefore security." 4The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (prior to the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) concluded: ". . . the U.S. cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances which would inevitably lead to Communist domination of the entire country."5 That concern was echoed and reechoed in the next two years. The strategic considerations were equally convincing. In June 1947, the Joint War Plans Committee concluded that existing forces in southern Korea could not repel a Soviet attack. Reinforcements from Japan would only weaken the security of Japan without being able to match the size of forces the USSR could deploy. "A withdrawal from Korea immediately after the outbreak of hostilities is indicated." Withdrawal under those conditions would be difficult if not impossible. The newly formed Joint Chiefs concluded in September that, "in the light of the present severe shortage of military manpower, the corps of two divisions . . . now maintained in South Korea, could well be used elsewhere." 6 General George Marshall, then secretary of state, was not so sure. At a meeting in his office, the following conclusions were reached: "It was agreed that (a) ultimately the U.S. position in Korea is untenable even with expenditure of considerable U.S. money and effort; (b) the U.S., however, cannot 'scuttle' and run from Korea without considerable loss of prestige and political standing in the Far East and in the world at large; (c) that it should be the effort of the government through all proper means to effect a settlement of the Korean problem which would enable the U.S. to withdraw from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effects."7 The solution adopted was to ask the United Nations (UN) to take over U.S. responsibilities in Korea, followed by a gradual withdrawal of troops. This would give the new supranational body an opportunity to perform a task for which it was created. A UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was organized. UNTCOK attempted to arrange elections in both the north and the south. It too failed. As a result, two separate governments contending for control of the peninsula had been created in Korea by the fall of 1948.8 In the south, after a bitter and possibly fraudulent campaign, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formed, with Syngman Rhee as president. A month later, in September, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formed in the north, with twenty-eightyear-old Kim Il Sung as its head. The UN recognized the Republic of Korea as the only legal government on the peninsula. The Koreans are sometimes called "The Irish of the Orient" -- tough, stubborn, and combative; Kim and Rhee both vowed to unify Korea, by force if necessary. In the following years, guerrilla bands and raiding parties crossed the border from both sides. Then, with a North Korean government in existence, the Soviets offered to participate in a mutual withdrawal of troops, leaving Korea to the Koreans. So, if the Soviets were withdrawing troops from North Korea, it appeared safe to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea.9 The first U.S. troops left in March 1948. The headquarters of the XXIV Corps was transferred to Japan for deactivation in January 1949. The last troops left on 30 June 1949. But as the scheduled departure of the remaining troops approached, the subject was once again anxiously reviewed. In February 1949, the CIA had concluded that "U.S. troop withdrawal could probably result in a collapse of the supported ROK" and suggested a continued presence of a moderate number of American forces in the area to discourage invasion as well as to boost morale in the south. A month later, the National Security Council observed: "The overthrow by Soviet dominated forces of a regime established in South Korea under the aegis of the UN would . . . constitute a severe blow to the prestige and influence of the UN; in this respect the interests of the U.S. are parallel to if not identical with those of the UN."10 But the military continued to oppose keeping troops there, for two primary reasons: the pressure of other commitments and the conviction that Korea would not provide favorable fighting terrain should war come. An Army study, for the first time using the phrase police action, stated: ". . . police action with UN sanction" in Korea, including U.S. military units, would "involve a militarily disproportionate expenditure of U.S. manpower, resources and effort at a time when international relations in Europe are in precarious balance." Active military support of Korea"would require prodigious effort and vast expenditures far out of proportion to the benefits to be expected." 11The clinching argument seemed to be the possibility that the United States would become heavily and unnecessarily involved if the bellicose Syngman Rhee should attempt an attack northward to unify Korea on his own12. The last troops were withdrawn. To replace them, the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), under Brig. Gen. Lynn Roberts, was established to train the newly formed Army of the Republic of Korea. The strategic value of Korea was viewed rather narrowly. The problems of defending were certainly not overestimated. That became very clear in the next few years. But Korea certainly has strategic value comparable to or perhaps exceeding that of Taiwan. While subsequent debate on the value of Taiwan raged in public, Korea's strategic importance to the United States was overlooked both within the government and in public.13 Korea was a historic avenue of approach, a land bridge between Japan and the mainland of China. It was the route taken by the Japanese in 1895 when they defeated China at Pyongyang and the Battle of the Yalu and gained a toehold in Manchuria. It was the route the Japanese took in 1905 when they defeated the Russians, strengthened their position in Manchuria, and prepared for the full-scale invasion of China in 1937. Korea led straight into the heart of Manchuria, the most highly industrialized and productive area in China. If Germany was considered the cockpit of Europe, Manchuria was the cockpit of East Asia. It was the place where, historically, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese interests had collided.14 Conversely, in hostile hands Korea was a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. From bases in Korea, hostile aircraft could reach areas where they could do far more damage than those based on Taiwan. Korea was the closest and quickest route from the Asian mainland to the industrial heart of Japan. If, as MacArthur said, Taiwan was an unsinkable aircraft carrier, so too was the Korean peninsula, and it was much closer to a vital center of American interest.15 In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech to the National Press Club that, among other things, repeated MacArthur's explanation of U.S. Far Eastern strategy. Acheson went just a bit further. In response to a specific question, he stated that the United States had no strategic interest in Korea. But, he continued, "so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. . . . Should such an attack occur . . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression". 16 After the North Korean attack, Acheson's speech was blamed by some for encouraging the attack. Acheson amplified and corrected his remarks in a session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "The estimate that we have . . . is that South Korea could now take care of any trouble that was started solely by North Korea, but it could not take care of any invasion which was either started by the Chinese Communists or powerfully supported by them or by the Soviet Union" 17 The estimate to which he was referring was based on reports by General Roberts, the KMAG chief. The Korean Army had been increased to 100,000 men and was equipped with American weapons. Training was commenced, but it progressed slowly. There were serious deficiencies in weapons and equipment as well as deficiencies in training junior and senior officers. Despite this, and for reasons unknown, Roberts, who had been passed over for major general and was due to retire at the end of the year, embarked on an extensive public relations program touting the capabilities of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). In an article in Time, 5 June 1950 Roberts called it the "best doggone shooting army outside the United States" 18 MacArthur sent Gen. Leland S. Hobbs to inspect the ROKA. After the visit, Hobbs went away enthusiastic about the work of KMAG and the Korean Army. Author John Gunther in Tokyo was told by General Headquarters (GHQ) that if war came in Korea, "The South Korean forces, 'The best Army in Asia,' could wipe out the North Koreans with no difficulty." GHQ in Tokyo was convincedas were the Army General Staff in Washington and numerous influential politicians who visited Korea. John J. Muccio, the U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea, was convinced by Roberts's assertion and passed on Roberts's view to Acheson that the Korean Army had the capability of containing the North Korean forces.19 Not everyone was content with the condition of the ROKA. During a diplomatic dinner in Tokyo, the ROK defense minister confided to Ambassador William J. Sebald, MacArthur's political adviser, that much work needed to be done before the ROKA could match the North Koreans. On the same occasion, General Roberts was talkative, confident on the subject of South Korea's defenses. He emphasized: "I can hold the Commies if they attack."20 In reality, the ROKA lacked an air force, adequate artillery, and antiaircraft weapons. Roberts, an armored officer, decided that Korea was not good tank country. Therefore, adequate antitank weapons, including mines, were not needed, requested, or supplied. Training of the ROKA also fell behind. By 15 June 1950, only 25 percent of the Korean Army had completed battalionqevel training, 35 percent of the vehicles were out of commission for lack of spare parts, and 10 to 15 percent of the weapons were unusable.21 The resource-rich and industrialized north of the Korean peninsula was nicely balanced by the agricultural south. Korea was the one country in Asia that had the potential to be economically balanced and self-sufficient. President Syngman Rhee was determined to reunite the nation. To keep Rhee from launching an improvident adventure, the United States ensured that the ROKA received no weapons that could be used offensively. Kim Il Sung was equally determined to reunite Korea. But, like Rhee, he was dependent upon the support and approval of his patrons.22 Since the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in September 1948, Kim Il Sung had sought support from his Soviet sponsors for the reunification of Korea by force. In China, Mao Zedong concurrently sought Joseph Stalin's support for the invasion of Taiwan. Stalin was reluctant to assist either effort. Both ventures would improve his strategic position and further isolate China and Korea from the United States, but Stalin feared provoking an American declaration of war. In visits to Moscow in the fall of 1949 and the spring of 1950, however, Kim succeeded in convincing Stalin that, with the support of a huge South Korean block of sympathizers, he could attack and conquer South Korea before the United States could mobilize to help. Stalin gave his consent, contingent on approval by Mao. It has to be considered one of Stalin's most interesting missteps, approving an attack at the one place in the world where the United States had significant troop strength close at hand Just across the Tsushima Strait in Japan were four U.S. infantry divisions -- far from ready, but available nevertheless.23 Relations between the new PRC and the DPRK were ambivalent. There was a Chinese trade mission in Pyongyang but no Chinese embassy until August 1950. The Chinese resented Soviet influence in North Korea. Historically, Korea was within the Chinese sphere of influence. From medieval times until 1905, when it was occupied by the Japanese, Korea had been a buffer and a satellite state of China. The Chinese had a keen appreciation of Korea's value as an avenue of approach.24 North Korea had been of immense help to the Chinese Red Army during the civil war. In the Manchurian campaigns, Red Army units had withdrawn into the sanctuary of North Korea on a number of occasions. Sinuiju, just across the Yalu River from Manchuria, had been a supply base for Lin Biao's armies. A large number of North Koreans had volunteered to fight with the Chinese in the civil war. So when Kim Il Sung asked the Chinese to return those volunteers, they were sent back to form a part of the North Korean Army.25 In May 1950, Kim visited Beijing and obtained Mao's reluctant consent. Although Mao was not enthusiastic, he felt Kim was due fraternal support of a fellow revolutionary. In the discussions, Mao asked Kim if he wanted the Chinese to send troops to the SinoKorean border if the Americans became involved. Kim told him it would not be necessary. The war would be over within a month and the Americans could not deploy troops before that. There is some belief that Mao agreed to provide assistance if the Japanese became involved.26 As preparations for the North Korean attack progressed, Chinese resentment was sharpened by the Soviet and North Korean efforts to conceal from them preparations for the attack on South Korea. In the North Korean Communist Party, in the NKPA, and in the government apparatus were a large number of Koreans who had served in China. During the planning for the attack on South Korea, these "Chinese sympathizers" were isolated and excluded from the preparations. Such efforts went as far as shipping Soviet materiel to North Korea by sea to avoid alerting the Chinese by using railroads through China.27 In the years of the U.S. occupation, the Korean Liaison Office had been established. This was the cover name for covert operations into North Korea. When the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea was complete, Korea was deleted from the area of responsibility of the Far Eastern Command (FEC). But the Korean Liaison Office was maintained, and the FEC continued to monitor the intelligence situation in Korea.28 In December 1949, Maj. Gen. Charles A.Willoughby, Far Eastern Command G-2, reported that in his opinion the North Koreans might be ready to act by April or May 1950, because, "with the con clusion of the Chinese Communist campaign in China more troops and supplies could then be made available." But by 15 March he had changed his mind. He foresaw continued guerrilla and psychological war in Korea but stated: "There will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer." 29In the Pentagon, the Army G-2, Maj. Gen. Alexander Bolling, echoed this sentiment with an estimate: "Communist military measures in Korea will be held in abeyance pending the outcome of their programs in other areas, particularly Southeast Asia."30 As was to be the case later in the war, those speculative and reassuring opinions did not reflect the observations and concerns of the officers on the ground. Captain Joseph Darrigo was the KMAG adviser with the 12th ROK Regiment stationed at Kaesong. In his sector, there had been a continuous string of border incidents from January to early May of 1950. Then they dropped off sharply. North Korean civilians were being evacuated from the border zone. He noticed that information on the North Korean Army showed them to be disposed not on line in a defensive formation but in depth in three major avenues of approach. Then, in June, the North Koreans launched a peace offensive, an effort to convene a constituent assembly in Pyongyang to discuss unification of Korea. Darrigo thought this might be a cover for wartime deployment. His warning reports went unheeded. 31 Selective, after-the-fact analysis is easy. Not so easy is picking out the significant bits of information from a confusing background of conflicting reports. The command had been saturated with so many reports and alarms; living that close to the edge, all had become desensitized to the threat. Still, there were steps an alert command could have taken to clarify the situation. There is no indication this was done.32 So, at 3:30 A.M. on Sunday, 25 June 1950, when seven North Korean divisions, supported by 150 tanks, came thundering across the border in a full-scale invasion, ROK forces and their U.S. Army advisers were caught flat-footed. In his memoirs, Rusk says the "North Korean invasion came as a complete surprise. Only four days before I had told a congressional committee we saw no evidence of war brewing in Korea." Rusk went on to say that after the attack, some intelligence people thumbed through thousands of bits of information and put together six or seven items that seemed to point to invasion. They wanted to be able to say, "We warned you. . . . That was just damned nonsense." 33With the threats abroad and the suspicion verging on hysteria at home, the president and his government were hypersensitive to the advance of Communism and fearful of being considered appeasers. Another Munich was unthinkable. With the North Korean attack, it was time to take a stand. Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War. America in Korea, 1950-1953. New York: Random House, 1987 Borg, Dorothy, and Waldo Heinrichs, eds. Uncertain Years: ChineseAmerican Relations, 1947-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980 Bradbury, William C. Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity: The Communist Soldier in the Korean War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968 Goulden, Joseph C. Korea: The Untold Story of the War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982 Griffith, Samuel B. The Chinese Peaple's Liberation Army. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968 Hammel, Eric. Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War. New York: Vanguard Press, 1981 Panikkar, Kavalam M. In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat. London: Allen and Unwin, 1955 Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin's, 1964 Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge. New York: Doubleday, 1967 Read More